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person in possession cannot dispute title of lessor; no proof of title is necessary, because the tenant has accepted possession under his lease and is estopped, and that where the prayer of the complaint is for stipulated rent, the court cannot adjudge twice that sum. The statute is directory only and the prayer must govern the recovery. Decided 1892, July. Action from King county. Opinion by Stiles, J.

Collins v. Hall, 5 W. 367, decided that in action to recover rent where the tenant by answer denied the landlord's possession, that a prima facie case is made by introduction of the lease, in the absence of proof, the presumption being that when executed the lease was valid and binding on all parties; that the burden of showing facts which avoided its effect was upon the defendants, and no proof having been offered by defendants, judgment for plaintiff was sustained. The court here decided that this case substantially depended on the doctrine of Hall v. Wilbur, supra, and this is an approval of that case. December, 1892. Opinion by Hoyt, J., a

King county action.

Roderick v. Swanson, 6 W. 222, decides that where the tenant was in possession under a written lease, a purchaser of the land with full knowledge thereof cannot maintain ejectment or unlawful detainer on the ground that only a portion of the agreement had been reduced to writing, and that the tenant refused to accept from the purchaser a new lease containing the alleged omission. Proper remedy is a proceeding to correct the alleged mistake. 1893, April, Mason county, Stiles, J., and seems to be the only case in the books where farming land was the subject matter of the controversy.

Seattle v. Cavanaugh was a tide flats case where the supreme court held that a verdict of jury for defendant in action for unlawful detainer, will not be disturbed where the relation of landlord and tenant is not clearly established by the evidence. 1893, May. Opinion by Stiles, J. King county case.

Porter v. Tull, 6 Wash. 408, establishes the doctrine that where a building occupied by a tenant for which rent is payable monthly in advance, is destroyed by fire, tenant may recover money for the portion of the month remaining after the destruction of the demised premises. This was a Spokane case and was part of much similar litigation which resulted from our fire of August 4, 1889.

The writer did not preside in this trial below, but it occurred to him always in considering this opinion, that the supreme court thought the landlord had got what some of our people never tire of talking about, viz., "the unearned increment," whatever that is, and the supreme court evidently thought he ought not to have it, and so gave it to the other fellow.

The writer justified the conclusion of his learned associate who decided the case in the lower court on the ground—(1) That the contract was executed between the parties, and that all the advantages which went to either party under the contract, must be held to have been intended by the parties to the contract; the landlord had one such advantage; (2) that the contract for the payment of rent on the first day of each month in advance is an agreement for the payment of an entire sum; it is an entire contract, and, under the doctrine of the entirety of contracts must be sustained, and there is no law till Porter v. Tull, and no agreement for apportioning the rent earned and unearned.

In the very next case of Carraher v. Bell, 7 W. 81, the supreme court says of such a contract that the rent fell due in installments and the respondents are entitled to each as it became due: "Each was a separate, several and distinct claim, upon which a forfeiture could be founded for failure to pay." And it may be added, for the nonpayment of each, or any installment, an action might have been maintained.

But some one has said that a dissenting opinion is but a howl from out the darkness of adjudged cases, and so that performance will not be attempted here.

J. Spokane county action.

May, 1893. Opinion by Dunbar, C.

Carraher v. Bell, supra, decided that a landlord does not waive claim to forfeit a lease by collecting rents from sub-tenants after notice to his tenant to vacate, and applying collections to the payment of the installments of rent which fell due prior to that on which forfeiture is claimed. That is, he may collect the rents and apply them to installments which first became due and unpaid and claim forfeiture for subsequently maturing installments. In this case the landlord collected the rents under a stipulation. 1893. Opinion by Scott, J. King county action.

Tryon v. Davis, 8 Wash. 106, holds to the doctrine already es

tablished by our supreme court, that before a tenant of community property can abandon his defective lease he must demand a good lease from the landlord, and give him an opportunity to furnish it. And that in an action to recover rent under a lease, proof of lessor's ownership is unnecessary. 1894, January. Opinion by Dunbar, C. J. Spokane county action.

McLennan v. Grant, 8 W. 603, holds-(1) That where one voluntarily dispossesses himself of the premises and another assumes possession from him for any determinate period, there is a tenancy whether the words appear to be a license, a covenant or an express agreement.

(2) That where possession was taken under a lease, neither the tenant nor his assigns can repudiate the lease because of uncertainty of description of the demised premises.

(3) That the assignee or purchaser of a tenant of his entire interest takes as under an assignment, no matter what the form of the instrument, and becomes tenant of the lessor, notwithstanding he may have had no notice that his grantor only held a leasehold interest.

(4) A lease having been established, that it was error to allow evidence that before the expiration of the term the lessor made no claim to the premises. He had no right to the premises till the term expired. 1894, April. Anders, J. Clallam county. (Property in Port Angeles.)

Noyes v. Loughead, 9 W. 325, is really not a case deciding anything on the law of landlord and tenant, it was an action on a bond for the payment of rent. It is rather a practice case, and construes the contract between parties as to the time when the lease began. June, 1894. King county case. Opinion by Hoyt, J.

Rucker v. Studebaker, 10 W. 386, is put down as a case of landlord and tenant, but is not. The action was to enforce payment of rent alleged to be due plaintiff from defendant. The only thing decided is that there never was any lease or any relation of landlord and tenant between the parties, and hence the trial court should have non-suited the plaintiff; and the judgment was reversed and the court below directed to dismiss plaintiff's action. 1894, December. Snohomish county action. Opinion by Stiles J.

Tibballs v. Iffland, 10 W. 451, decides:

(1) Practice question.

(2) Question as to admissibility of evidence.

(3) When secondary evidence may be introduced as to the contents of a writing and evidence of diligence to get the writing is addressed to the court and not to the jury.

(4) Our statute does not require a lease to be recorded.

(5) Assignee of lease may re-assign to be rid of liability, and this without notice to the lessor.

There is nothing there illustrating the relation between landlord and tenant. January, 1895. Jefferson county. Anders, J.

Byers v. Rothchild, 11 Wash. 296, decided (1) That where the rent became due on Sunday, the tenant has Monday in which to pay. (2) That under sec. 519, Code W., the purchaser at a judicial sale is entitled to rents until redemption of property, yet he cannot recover these in advance, even though under the lease between the parties the lessor might, because of the uncertainty whether or when there may be a redemption, and if the tenant had paid rent in advance to the purchaser, he might have to answer to his landlord for the same debt after redemption. March, 1895. King county. Dunbar, J.

Gaffney v. Megrath, ib., p. 456, approves Hall v. Wilbur, 4 W. 644. That in an action for unlawful detainer, plaintiff cannot recover more than he prays for, and is not entitled to double damages under section 564 of the Code of Washington unless the same are specially claimed. March, 1895. King county. Gordon, J.

Shannon v. Grindstaff, 11 Wash. 536. This case established the doctrine that-(1) One having knowledge of a tenancy, and afterwards deals about the demised premises, the law charges him with notice of the terms thereof.

(2) That original lessor cannot collect rent of sub-tenant who has taken for shorter term or less than the whole estate; but the land is not discharged from the claims of the original lessor who may evict, if there has been a forfeiture.

(3) That notice to surrender possession is sufficient though unsigned, though it insufficiently describes the premises, and was not served on the wife, where it appears that the sub-tenant and wife refused to surrender unless paid $75. Their lessor had surrendered

under the terms of the original lease. This is a Skagit county case, decided April, 1895. Opinion by Gordon, J.

Kohne v. White, 12 Wash. 199, was an action against the landlord by the tenant for alleged breach in the covenant in the lease for repairs to have been made by landlord. It fixes the measure of damages in such cases, and is rather a damage case than a case of landlord and tenant. June, 1895. King county. Opinion by Dunbar, J.

Gilmore v. The Baker Co., ib., 468. If a case on our subject at all, dicides that notice to quit, signed by one joint executor, is sufficient notice and must be admitted in evidence in an action for unlawful detainer. The act of one of such executors being the action of all in the contemplation of the law. 1895, July. King county. Opinion by Gordon, J.

Frye v. Hill, 43 Pac., page 1907, decided February, 1896, opinion by Scott, J., is rather a case of application of payments and priority of liens than a case of landlord and tenant.

The writer has not found any other cases of landlord and tenant from our supreme court.

From the foregoing it appears that

(1) Of the whole number of cases decided, only one pertains to farming lands, the others being of tenements in the cities, and shows how extensive must be the proprietorship of those cultivating our agricultural lands.

(2) That of the cases,

Eight were from King county.
Three were from Pierce county.
Three were from Spokane county.

One from Thurston county.
One from Clallam county.

Two from Jefferson county.
One from Skagit county.

One from Snohomish county.

One from Mason county.

That there was not one case of landlord and tenant from the other twenty-five counties of the state, and that the work of preparing opinions in the decided cases was pretty evenly divided among the judges of the supreme court.

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