the opposers of the bill, that as the Company's legal right to the appointment of all its own fervants, and to the entire management and regulation of its internal affairs, had been fo clearly proved as not to admit of a question, and that the rapacity, mifconduct, and difobedience of the fervants in the prefidencies abroad, was fo notorious as to be allowed on all hands, no reasonable objection could now lie to the exercise of that right, when its expediency, and even neceffity, were fo evident; and that as every delay in the prefent circumftances, must be ruinous in the highest degree to the Company, and proportionally prejudicial to the nation; it was to be hoped, that no farther oppofition would be made to the carrying of the commiflion of supervision into immediate execution, and that the prefent bill would be rejected, as founded upon falle principles, and of an unconstitutional and dangerous tendency.

To this it was answered, that the evidence given at the bar, and the arguments oppofed by the counfel against the bill, contained the strongest reasons that could poffibly have been brought to fhew the urgent neceffity of its being paffed. That they fully demonftrated the evils in India to be of fuch a magnitude, that nothing lefs than the legislature could reform them; that no powers could be granted to the fupervifion, competent to the remedy of fuch enormities; that the commiffion was befides faulty in its principles, as the governors and councils in the refpective prefidencies in India, were joined in power by it, with the fupervisors who were intended to be fent from England;

that as the number of the former was permanent, they muft foon, by death or fickness, become a majority; that by this means, the capital offenders, who were the authors of all the evils complained of, would become the judges of their own crimes, and the redressers of their own oppreffions; was it then by men, who had long rioted with the moft unrelenting cruelty in the diftreffes of their miferable fellow creatures, that juftice was to be restored to her proper courfe, and the mischiefs which their iniquities caufed were to be removed?

That the legislature had a fupreme controuling power, to which all things muft, and ought to fubmit; that this power could never be applied with greater propriety, or benefit, than in the prefent inftance, when the welfare and fecurity of many millions, and the prefervation of great countries and revenues depended upon its exertion. That laws, as well as charters, muft fubmit to a change of times and feafons, and must be altered, modelled, or repealed, as circumftances, and the nature of things require; that it could never have been intended, at the time of granting the Company's charters, to give them a power of legiflation over great countries, in which it was not poffibly to be supposed they ever could have any other footing, than a permiflion to trade as inmates and strangers. That India af fairs were now under the confideration of parliament, and while matters were in this fufpence, it would be abfurd to allow the Company to proceed on their own bottom, and to fnatch the business out of their hands: either there was, of

there

there was not, occafion for the interpofition of parliament; if there was, how could the Company pretend to act independent of them, after it had applied for relief to the minifter? if there was not, why did they apply?

On the other fide it was obferved, that parliamentary interpofition had hitherto been attended with very little advantage to the Company. That the laft parliament had undertaken, in the year 1767, the regulation of their affairs, and after spending the greater part of the feffion upon that bufinefs, the refult was, the extortion of a vaft fum of money from the Company without an equivalent, and the leaving their affairs to thift for themselves, without the fmalleft regulation; that their affairs had fince continued open to parliament, without any thing being done, but the making or renewing of bargains for the benefit of governmeat, without the fmallest attention to that of the Company; that a felect committee had been appointed in the preceding feffion, which had continued its fittings throughout the fummer, and it was not pretended that the Company had reaped any advantages from them; and that a fecret com mittee had newly started up, the benefits of which were yet to be difcovered, as nothing but complaints had hitherto attended its proceedings. That if the Company was not armed with fufficient powers, for the punishment of its fervants and the regulation of its governments in India, the fault lay wholly in adminiftration, as a bill had been brought in for that purpose in the preceding feffion, which was laid by, under pretence of waiting for the difcoveries that

were to be made by the select committee.

That the evils apprehended, from the extraordinary powers of the fupervision falling into the hands of the offenders in India, were merely imaginary; the Company had well foreseen, and effectually provided against thofe evils, in the body of the commiffion; no act of the fupervifion can be valid, without the prefence of three of the commiffioners; the first of these is to have the cafting voice, and they are to be affifted by the governor, commander in chief, and fecond in council, only as inferior affeffors; and the fupervifors have power, if they fee caufe, to difmifs the governor and the whole council, and have a power of controul in all cases.

That if the particular interests of the Company were confidered as matters of indifference, the great revenues and immenfe benefits it afforded to the public were not to be wantonly fported with; that as the restraint in the bill was laid for fix months, and the feafon of the year would of neceffity continue it for fix more, twelve whole months, in the prefent critical state of their affairs, would be totally loft to the Company, before any intended regulation, whether by parliament, or otherwife, could poffibly take place; that this delay might be productive of the most mifchievous effect to the Company, as the grievances and evils, which they wanted to remedy or prevent, would have the accumulation of all that time added to their prefent amount; and as the defign of regulation would be fo long known before hand to the offenders, they would ufe fuch induftry in their feveral departments, that there would

not

not be much left for redrefs, by the time that it could take place.

But the great force of the arguments on this fide, was principally directed to the prefent unufual and extraordinary stretch of parliamen tary authority; it was acknowledged that a fupreme undefined power was ultimately lodged in the legiflature; but it was infifted, that fuch an exertion of it could only be juftified by the most urgent neceffity; and that as no fuch neceffity now exifted, it was a wanton violation of public faith, law, and the constitution, without an equitable motive. That it was the invafion of a right, which parliament had not granted, but fold; a right for which the faith of the nation was pledged, and which could not be taken away without an act of forfeiture in the Company; even in that cafe without due compenfation. That this violent and dangerous exertion of power, muft not only destroy the credit of the India Company; but allo affect the Bank, the South-Sea, and all other public companies, none of which could have any other fecurities than thofe which were now violated; that whenever a war took place, the effects of this unjust and pernicious measure, upon the national credit in general, would be too late and too fatally experienced; and that it was not lefs dangerous in its principle, nor mischievous in its precedent, to the city of London, and all the other corporate bodies in the British empire.

nor

A particular charge was alfo made upon adminiftration, with regard to their motives for this fufpenfion. It was faid that they had arbitrarily and capricioufly fufpended the legal courfe of bufinefs in the court of proprietors, and

forced this matter into parliament only to gratify a private refentment; that the Company had been officially informed by their chairman, and deputy-chairman, (the only medium through which they could have any communication with government) that the meafures relative to the fupervifion were approved of by adminiftration; but that as foon as it was found that the Company did not chufe to intrust their affairs in the hands of those who were nominated for that purpose by the minifters, they immediately fet their face against the whole measure, and now had the fortune to find the House fo compliant as to adopt their refentments.

It was obfervable, that many of thofe, who either in themselves or their families, were under great obligations to the Company, and particularly fuch as had obtained valt fortunes in her fervice, now joined administration in this bill. The effects of the party difputes with refpect to the appointment of fupervisors, were also very visible upon this occafion. Though the queftion was debated warmly and ably by the oppofition, fuch was the force of the general odium in which the Company flood, and fuch the weakness arifing from its internal diffenfions, that the numbers against the bill were very trifling. Befides, many of the oppofition had not then come to town. Upon a divifion late at night, and not a very thin Houfe, the bill was carried by a majority of more than five to one, the numbers being 153, to 28, only.

The refraining bill was prefented the next day to the House of Lords, and it being fo near the holidays, was carried through with

the

the greatest difpatch. It did not, however, pafs without oppofition; though, as in the other Houfe, the Opponents were few. A noble duke, who had long been diftinguished in oppofition, and who of late had applied himself with uncommon industry to obtain a perfect knowledge of India affairs, traverfed this bill with great vigour and almoft alone, for the fhort time in which it was paffing through its feveral ftages. As the bill was brought in on a Saturday, and a report was fpread in the evening, and inferted in the news-papers, that it had been carried that day through its last reading, (a matter, however uncommon, which was readily believed) the India Company had not time to go through the neceffary forms, for affembling in its corporate capacity, and framing and prefenting a petition, before the following Wednesday, on which it was finally paffed. A petition figned by 14 proprietors was, however, received, and witneffes were examined, and counfel heard at the bar against the bill.

fince his exercifing them in the ftrictest conformity to all the rules of law, general equity, and moral conduct, is not fufficient to prevent parliament from interefting its fovereign powers to divest him of thofe rights; by means of which infecurity, the honourable diftinction between the British, and other forms of government, is in a great meature lott; that this misfortune is greatly growing upon us, through temporary, occafional, and partial acts of parliament, which, without confideration of their conformity to the general principles of our law and conftitution, are adopted rafhly and hastily upon every petty occafion; that though it may be difficult to fix any legal limit to the extent of legislative power; it is to be fuppofed, that parliament is as much bound as any individual to the obfervance of its own compacts; or otherwife it is impoffible to understand what public faith means, or how public credit can fubfift.

We shall take notice of fome of the arguments that were ufed upon this occafion, fo far as they were peculiar to the place, or may feem to throw new light upon the fubject. As the Houfe of Lords is clofe fhut, we are obliged for the arguments of the minority in that house to their protefts; thofe of the miniftry we must fuppofe nearly the fame with thofe ufed in the House of Commons. It was urged against the bill, that the arbitrary taking away of legal franchifes and capacities, without any legal caufe of forfeiture, establishes a precedent, which leaves no fort of fecurity to the fubject for his liberties; VOL. XVI.

That the India Company might have been legally called in quef tion, and even its charter endangered, for a neglect of exercising thofe neceffary powers with which it is entrusted, and the ufe of which it is now proposed to suspend; and that it must be a government compofed of deceit and violence, where men are liable to be punished if they decline, or to be reftrained if they endeavour, to exercife their lawful powers. That it appears by evidence, upon oath at the bar, that the Company had been authoritatively informed, that the commiflion for regulating their affairs would have been approved of by adminiftration; and that their fituation was peculiarly unforty

nate,

nate, when driven from all confidence in public faith, and the laws of their country, they should find no fecurity for their charter privileges even in thofe very minifters, under whofe fanction they had every poffible reafon to believe they were acting.

It was much objected to, that the bill was brought in at a fealon, when the House is always ill at tended, and hurried through with a violent, and, it was faid, indecent precipitation. That a reafon of fact was alledged in the preamble, ftating the expence of the commiffion to be very confiderable: and they had not before them any account or estimate of the expences actual or probable, nor were fupplied with any accounts tending to thew the prefent ability or inability of the Company to bear it; fo that the Lords were to affert facts, and on thofe facts to ground a law, altering the condition, and fufpending the charter-rights of the company, without a poffibility of knowing whether the facts were true or falfe; and that with a determination to continue uninformed, it had been refused to call for the evidence of the directors concerning the expence; or in a matter of fuch importance, both in itfelf, and its example, to follow the ancient fettled parliamentary course of defiring a conference with the Commons, in order to be acquainted with the evidence which they received as the grounds of their proceedings.

It was faid, that it must be a matter of aftonishment to the pub. lic, who had for a long time, earneftly and anxioufly looked to the Company, or to parliament, for redrefs of the grievances in India,

to find at length, that the latter is only employed in preventing the former from doing its duty; that instead of correcting the abufe, they oppofe themselves to the reformation; that when it was expected, that thofe who had wronged the Company should have been brought to exemplary punishment, the fuffering Company itself is deprived of its rights; and, inftead of calling delinquents to account, the perfons. legally empowered to correct or reftrain them, are by parliament fufpended from their office.

On the other fide, befides many of thofe arguments which we have before feen stated in fupport of the bill, it is faid, that the charge upon adminiftration, of having at one time given a fanction to the commiffion for fuperintending the Company's affairs, was pofitively denied with respect to fuch of its members as belonged to that House; and reafons were brought to fhew, why it could not be well founded with refpect to others. As to the dangers that were apprehended from this measure with refpect to the national credit, they were reprefented as merely imaginary; and, it was faid, that it would have a totally contrary effect, as the Dutch, who had much more money in our public funds, than any other foreigners, would think. themselves much fafer, when they found that the India Company was under the care and protection of parliament, than if they had been abandoned to their own wild fchemes of regulation and manage, ment.

That they had no evidence that this bill was contrary to the Company's inclinations, any more than to their juterells; that the petition

they