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Review.-Davies's Estimate of the Human Mind.

physical and philosophical arguments can only be considered as auxiliaries, or as developing an essential truth, the know- : ledge of which we had previously derived from another source. On what authority these conclusions are founded, we do not presume to say. That the Bible disowns this assumption, we may gather from the following passage: "For the invisible things of Him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and godhead, so that they are without excuse.” Rom. i. 20. In this light the momentous subject has been surveyed by Dr. Clarke, and on this ground he has laid down many of his fundamental propo

sitions.

In the commencement of his first discourse, Dr. Clarke states - that creation, or the causing of that to exist which did not exist before, is the work of an almighty, self-existent, and eternal Being— that the works of creation, give demonstration of such a Being-that creation implies conservation or providence-and that, as all we have comes from this Being, it is our indispensable duty to render him worship and adoration.

In favour of his primary propositionthat there is a God-he has confined himself to five distinct topics of argument, furnished by Thomas Aquinas, leaving the vast field of evidence for others to explore. His first argument is from rest and motion; his second, from the necessity of an efficient cause, or from cause and effect; his third, from possibility and necessity; his fourth, from gradation, or the different degrees of perfection and excellence in natural things; his fifth, from the government of affairs, or the wise tendency in all things to produce the most beneficial results. These topics of argument he has pursued through their various meanderings, and from them reasoned out his ultimate .conclusion, that there is a God.

Having established this fundamental principle, he proceeds to bring forward, throughout these discourses, which are sixteen in number, a train of momentous truths, which are either immediately dependent on the preceding, or obviously deducible from it, as legitimate inferences, or inevitable consequences. The whole, therefore, that this volume contains, may be considered as so many parts of one common web, partaking the same texture, and being distinguished by the same tints of colouring. The subjects investigated, and the doctrines deduced from them, furnish great variety; and although from

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hence we might conclude, that these discourses bear little or no similitude to each other, yet, there is a family likeness that runs through the whole, from which, even if the name of the author had been withheld, an acute observer would have inferred, that they all spoke the same dialect, and were the offspring of the same parent.

Of the discourses contained in this volume, one only has ever before appeared in print. This was in the Methodist Magazine about four years since, and it has lost nothing by being transplanted into its present soil. All besides may be said to be original; and from various circumstances we are led to conclude, that this is the commencement of a series, which will continue to be published, as the author's health and various engagements will allow him leisure. The general character and features of these sermons tell us, that they belong to a particular class, and that others will be necessary to cover ground that will otherwise be left unoccupied. The author has also inserted in his title page, Vol. I, from whence we are led to infer, that others are intended to succeed, to fill up the outline, and complete the series.

In those that are now before us, there is a depth of penetration, an acuteness of research, and a vigorous range of thought, which, in modern discourses, we but rarely find. These are accompanied with such a warmth of devotional feeling, such a rich vein of piety, and such a strong regard to the fundamental doctrines of the gospel, as greatly to enhance their value. All this, however, was expected from the author's well-known talents, and literary character; and few, we believe, will complain of disappointment. Similar expectations will be entertained respecting his future volumes; and should they equal the specimen now before us, Dr. Clarke's sermons will be ranked among the first discourses of the age.

REVIEW.-An Estimate of the Human Mind, being a Philosophical Inquiry into the legitimate Application and Extent of its leading Faculties, as connected with the Principles and Obligations of the Christian Religion. By the Rev. J. Davies. In two vols. 8vo. pp. 380-360. Hatchard, London,

1828.

Ir has sometimes been mentioned as a subject of deep regret, that, while almost every other branch of science has, of late, been cultivated with care, the intellectual field has excited but little attention, and that

scarcely any improvement has been made in our knowledge of its phenomena and varied operations. The days of Aristotle furnish the earliest important dawn of intellectual light; and from him, to the time of Locke, scarcely any thing was done to explore and estimate the invaluable region of mental science. The success which crowned

the efforts of this prince of modern philosophers, soon drew the attention of others to this deeply interesting subject, and in succession, Reid, Brown, Stewart, and others, have appeared above the horizon, and shone as stars of the first magnitude. By these master spirits, the flame has been transmitted to others, by whom it has been kept alive. We have seen its coruscations playing around us in various quarters; but in no case have the lambency and emanations been more steady and brilliant than in the volumes now before us.

Mr. Davies has divided the great subjects of his work into books and parts, and subdivided these parts into numerous sections, to each of which he has given an appropriate title. His first book is entitled "The Limits of Reason in the Investigation of Revealed Truth, stated and explained." This has two parts: the first, telling us in four sections how far reason is allowed to proceed; and the second, stating "how far reason is not allowed to proceed."

The second book, is an inquiry into the nature and extent of the faculty of volition, as connected with moral agency and religious obligation. This also has two parts: the first states how far man is to be considered as free in his volitions; and the second points out various groundless and erroneous notions of human liberty which some have entertained. These two parts contain nineteen sections. Such are the contents of the first volume. The second has also its books and parts, and contains an inquiry into the legitimate uses of the imagination, as connected with subjects of revealed truth, and also into the legitimate use of the affections, as a component part of the Christian character. This volume comprises about twenty sections, in which the ramifications of the various topics are distinctly pursued. Such is the general outline of the work before us.

From the various subjects that pass under investigation, it is obvious that the two prolific sources of controversy, liberty and necessity, must come under the author's examination, and many will perhaps be ready to inquire which side of the question does he take? On this important and interesting subject he shall speak for himself.

Now, then, we have arrived at the grand point of inquiry: Is man free? and, if he is, what is the distinguishing circumstance which constitutes his freedom, and qualifies him for moral agency, and for a responsibility so awful as is involved in that agency?

"Now, with whatever real or imaginary diffi. culties this question may be embarrassed, in whatever obscurity nature may have involved it, in some of its ulterior ramifications, or in whatever web of metaphysical subtilty, nice controversialists, and prejudiced disputants, may have en

tangled' it, no man, who forms a just and enlightened estimate of his own character, faculties, and destinies, can seriously doubt whether he be free. However scriptural and lamentably true may be the doctrine of the bondage of the Will,

and of the enslaving power of lusts and rectly it may be said, as an illustration of the passions, as a theological tenet-however cordepravity of our moral nature, that, since the gross and utter apostasy, man is only free to sin, but not free to holiness and virtue,-still it cannot for a moment be questioned by any one who dispassionately consults either the dictates of nature, the records of couscience, the arrangements of providence, or the declarations of scripture, that he is possessed of such a liberty of action, and such a power of discretionary selfcontrol, as are sufficient to justify that course of divine government which evidently regards him as a fit subject of rewards and punishments; and when we consider the awful magnitude of the evil to which he renders himself obnoxious, on the alleged perversion and abuse of his native freedom of action, it cannot surely be an equivocal free to act otherwise. It is with no less truth or problematical question, whether he had been than simplicity and admirable conciseness, that

Bishop Butler remarked, that we are treated as if we were free, and, therefore, we are free. Whatever logical artillery the polemic may direct against this fact, whatever quibbles of reasoning, or whatever array of weighty argument may be advanced against it, and whatever difficulty, upon principles of theory and system, there may be to repel the assault, and to maintain it in all the soundness of technical symmetry and consistency, yet, like an impregnable bulwark of nature, it stands upon its own basis, firm as the fortress of morality itself, coeval with humanity, and destructible only when man shall cease to be accountable, or God shall cease to be just

"It is not enough to grant, as philosophical necessitarians have done, that man is free to act

as he pleases, while it is at the same time maintained that it as necessarily pleases him to act in one way, as a stone falls down to the earth-that, in his most spontaneous and unfettered actions, he is subject to an influence, over which he has no more command or control than the criminal has over the chains by which he is bound, or the wheels of the vehicle in which he is conveyed to execution. It is in vain to attempt to escape out of the palpable absurdity, or to hide the glaring incongruity, of this preposterous representation, or, at least, of notions which amount to the full import of this representation, by saying that it is allowed to man, in all his volitions and determinations, to follow the bent of his own mind, and that in which it is assumed that he does choose, as it is as necessary he should choose, in the manner that any one event in nature should follow another. If all that is meant by the necessity which is attached to the exercises of volition, imports no more than this, it surely did not require much philosophy to make out such a mere truism.

"But surely there must be something more than this in the theory of necessity, as relating to the exercises of volition; otherwise to what purpose would be all the parade of learning and philosophy, if the object was no more than to prove a proposition, so purely and palpably trifling, as

that a man must prefer and will and act, as he does prefer and will and act-a proposition which is but another and a modified formula of the axiom, that the same thing cannot be and not h

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Review.-Davies's Estimate of the Human Mind.

at the time. If there is any meaning worthy of notice in the assertion of necessity, as governing the acts of the human will, it must be that there is some external influence, or some combination of circumstances, independent of itself, the impulse of which it cannot control or resist, or by the presence of which it is so completely paralyzed, as never to attempt a resistance. Then, if this be a just theory of volition, if this be the real economy of the human mind, upon what imaginable basis can desert, or blameworthiness, rest? Where is the ground of punishment? What is the distinguishing principle upon which man, in the full possession of his faculties, and transgressing in the midst of warnings and exhortations, the grounds and reasons of which he was fully qualified to appreciate, is more justly exposed to punishment than the maniac, who, driven by an equally powerful impulse of Will, had committed the same act?

"Upon the principles of the scheme which we are now resisting, the only difference of the Necessity which produced these acts, is, that, in the one instance, it was a necessity which entailed no evil consequence upon its subject; in the other, it was the necessity of the stoic philosopher and his slave, combining the necessity of punishment with the necessity of crime. It is futile and trifling, to say that reasons were sug gested to the mind of the sane man, which could not be suggested to that of the insane. To what purpose are reasons, if they do not prove themselves sufficiently strong to form a chain of neces sity, which will prevail over the antagonist chain already leading onward the mind to its determinations? What avails it to bind green withes upon the arms of Samson? To say, as has sometimes been inadvertently and superficially done, that the blameworthiness and punishableness of a crime lie in its own nature, and are estimated by what the act is in itself, and by the real state of the mind, without any reference to the manner in which it was brought into existence, is surely to lose sight of the fact, that in thus estimating an action, as odious in itself, and as entitling its author to punishment, there is always a latent supposition, that the perpetrator of such action might have forborne it, if he had chosen. The measure of its moral odiousness and guilt is always proportioned to the supposed unbiassed freedom of his mind, and so far as it is deemed the result of circumstances and influences, which have interfered with that freedom, he is considered worthy of pity rather than of punishment. If, therefore, a clear distinction be made by God and man in estimating the voluntary conduct of a rational intellectual being, and that of those sensitive creatures which are destitute of these endowments, as it stands related to punishment, it follows that there must be some material and most important difference in the exercise of the faculty of Will, as the immediate instigator and regulator of that conduct in these two ranks of beings."-Vol. i. p. 220-226.

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In a subsequent part of this volume, the author calls our attention to the nature, character, and influence, of motives. On this point, also, we shall give his sentiments in his own words.

"Motives may be either external or internal. They may either be circumstances from without, having simply a general, and perhaps feeble, tendency to move and excite the will; or they may be feelings of the mind inciting to action, and in a manner constituting themselves prevailing acts of will. In the former sense, as mere circum. stances that have some tendency, and are in a certain degree calculated to call forth and to direct the exercises of the will, there is certainly no necessary connexion whatever between them and the final decisions and preferences of that will. If motives in this respect were resistless and uncontrollable, man would be continually exposed to the action of different and even con

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tradictory kinds of necessity, inasmuch as a thousand impulsive strokes of this nature fall upon him from different, and often diametrically op posite quarters, every day of his life. A great part of liberty, doubtless, consists in conscious and actual discretionary power to decide amidst this violent collision of jarring motives. There may be many motives, in other terms many eir cumstances, to induce an individual to pursue one line of conduct, to enter upon one order of pursuits, but there may be more numerous or stronger motives to incline and to determine him to the contrary. He may see many reasons, which would powerfully urge him to the adoption of such a measure, if they were left to their own free and undisturbed operations; but there are counteracting circumstances, which more than balance their weight. It is not true, therefore, universally and without limitation, that external motives, that objects and events from without, invariably control the preferences of the human will. They may be neutralized in their effects by other mo tives of the same kind, but of an opposite tendency, or there may be a sufficient energy of resistance in the mind itself, in its established principles and habits, to annul and to frustrate that measure of influence which they are able to exert. And this is the only sense in which it seems to be pos sible that man should will and act independently of motives, and in a manner contrary to their sug gestions. In any other view, to choose to act against motives is as impossible and absurd as te choose against choice, and to prefer a particular action in opposition to that preference itself.

"It must be borne in mind, however, that motives, as internal sensations, are generally founded upon the view of some external circumstance of direct and positive good, or of negative advantage in the alleviation of evil, which is con. sidered of sufficient weight and importance to operate with a prevailing influence upon the faculty of volition. It is implied in the very nature of exercising a preference, that there be some ground for it. And if the sensation excited by any order of facts or any particular object was of the same relative strength, and was attended with the same commanding power over other sentiments and emotions in every instance, there is no doubt that such circumstances would act with a perfect and complete uniformity of effect upon every mind. It is, however, continually seen in the course of human life, and in the development of the principles of character, that this is by no means the case. What operates as a prevailing motive, and outweighs with a paramount and unrivalled superiority of influence, in one instance, in another is found utterly powerless and ineffective, just as different physical constitutions and habits of body, superinduced by different modes of living, require a different kind of treatment, and the application of a different combination of medical ingredients, in order to receive a salutary impression. In the case of one person, for example, any object which promises the immediate gratification of a strong sensual appetite, acts with a decided predominance over every other consideration which can be presented to him, and thus forms the outward ground of the internal prevailing motive, and consequently his volition becomes imbodied in that motive, so as in reality to form one feeling or state of mind. Let the same object offer itself to the view of another, and instead of yielding himself at once with a passive succum→ bency to its force, he pauses, directs towards it the eye of calm, unimpassioned reason, views it in its present meanness and fugitiveness of enjoyment and in its future consequences, and connects it with the law, by which it is perhaps prohibited, and with the misery, which it will in all probability entail. Having exercised these reflections upon it, he finds it loses all its motive energy, becomes stripped of all its attractiveness, and sinks into powerlessness and insipidity. And his will, consequently, refuses to comply with its suggestions, or fix its preference upon it. In this instance, the material of the outward motive, or of the ground of the mental feeling, was precisely the

same. But in its actual bearing and influence upon the mind in these respective cases, it has proved very different. In one, it operated as a prevailing motive, and enlisted the Will in its favour; in the other, it only made an impotent attempt, and was repelled from its encroachment upon the character, through the exercise of that prerogative of the intellectual and reasoning faculty, in which we have represented the prin ciple of liberty to rest as a part of the mental constitution of man. And it is in this view of the matter only, that the will can be said not to be invariably influenced by motives. It must be recollected, however, that considering motive simply as an affection of mind, both these persons willed in strict accordance with its dictates. The difference was this, that the sensual man wilfully neglected to exercise his reason and understanding in such a manner, as would have effectually counteracted the influence of the first motive, by bringing other more cogent motives into operation; whereas the thoughtful and considerate man, by availing himself of this principle of his nature, was enabled to call into existence a motive, or combination of motives, derived from other views and sources, which more than neutralized the force of that which first appealed to the will. The man of serious and reflecting mind thus bring all the interests of eternity to act as a restraining or stimulating force, in giving a salutary direction to his volitions. But it is impossible, in the nature of things, that he should be possessed of any such liberty, as that he can choose and determine the operations of his will in direct opposition to those views and feelings which actually exist as prevailing motives in his own mind. To suppose him possessed of any such power, is, in reality, to suppose him capable of preferring and rejecting the same thing at one instant of time."-Vol. i. p. 341 to 347.

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From the specimens thus given of the author's principles, and manner of supporting them, it will be perceived, that he is well acquainted with the subject he has taken in hand, and that he always has his eye fixed upon those important points, on which the controversy hinges. out all doubt, there are many difficulties that have been urged by the subtle advocates of necessity, to which this work furnishes no replies. The author's design appears to have been to investigate the intellectual powers of man, and to establish his moral agency and responsibility, without having recourse either to philosophical or decretive necessity, though, in the estimation of many, nothing without these can be supposed to exist. The contrary of this, Mr. Davies has clearly proved; and though some of his reasonings may be liable to objections, we think the aggregate mass of his arguments to be unanswerable.

With his observations on the province of reason in the examination of revelation, we have been much pleased. The character and evidence of a professed revelation fall immediately under its inspection, and nothing, he contends, can be received as such, which is palpably opposed to the principles of common sense. On the con trary, he argues that a doctrine of revela

tion is not to be rejected either because supernatural aid was necessary to its discovery, or because reason cannot comprehend its mode, and although it may be attended with difficulties which reason cannot solve. These are fair marks of discrimination inserted just where we could wish to see them placed.

In the concluding sections of the second volume, we have found several expressions which we cannot altogether approve. We fear that they look with an aspect too frigid and philosophical on experimental religion. We are well aware that the author's design was to guard against the undue influence of imagination. This, however, is delicate ground on which to tread. The tares are not always easily separable from the wheat. But, passing by these anomalies, we have found much to admire, much to esteem, and strongly recommend these volumes to the thinking part of our readers.

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IN favour of Christian charity, men of all creeds are ever ready to lift their voices; but when we inquire into the extent of its application, we sometimes find that it is restricted within a very narrow compass. With many, the peculiar dogmas of a creed furnish the infallible rule by which it is measured, and all who unfortunately lie beyond this pale, they piously consign to endless perdition. It would be much to the advantage of Satan, if such men were permitted finally to judge the world. Another class, still more benevolent, make what they call the fundamental doctrines of the gospel the great criterion by which they judge; but, unfortunately for mankind, by making every thing to be fundamental which is included in their creed, and leaving nothing for others, they condemn, without remorse, all who refuse to submit to the standard which their bigotry had erected, and this they call true Christian charity!

We must not, however, forget, that between truth and falsehood there is an essential difference; nor must we suppose, from the sects and parties into which the Christian world is divided, that no fundamental principles characterize the doctrines of the gospel. These general truths all are ready to allow, but when we proceed

755 Review.-Discourses on the Sacrifice and Priesthood of Christ. 756

to particularize, Christian charity too frequently gives place to discord, and we mutually anathematize each other. Were it possible, that all the fundamental principles of the gospel could be pointed out with as much clearness and precision as the existence of God, the certainty of a future state, and the assurance of rewards and punishments hereafter, Christian charity Iwould be defined in the extent of its operation, and we should not be so liberal in dealing our curses on those who happen to differ from us in minor points of faith. For such a desideratum, however, in the present state of things, it is in vain to hope, and, therefore, while traversing the regions of disputation, we need all the importance of truth to be set fully in view, to preserve us from indifference, and a consciousness of our own fallibility to protect us from uncharitableness towards others.

This happy medium, the author of the volume before us seems to have found, and we cannot but admire the amiable

spirit which breathes throughout the twenty chapters, into which this work is divided. In the third chapter, indeed, he seems to to take his seat for a few moments in the chair of infallibility, while arguing against that spurious candour which false philosophy has sent out to deceive the nations.

"It does appear to me, that the most perfect benevolence to men, is that, which, instead of looking with complacency on their errors, warns them of their danger, and admonishes them to escape. It is no matter that they think they are in the right-this only makes their case the more alarming; and, to act towards them as if we thought their mistaken views of no consequence, is only to confirm their delusion, and to aid their destruction."-p. 38.

It does not require any great strength in the olfactory nerves to discover that the preceding passage emits an Italian scent, and if its principles are carried into the non-essentials of religion, "discord with her thousand mouths," and hideous aspect, will assail both our ears and eyes. We are well aware that in all such cases as those to which our author alludes, a consciousness of truth must necessarily be assumed; but great care should be taken that its dictates are clear and indisputable, and that the subject be enforced with a degree of energy duly proportionate to its importance, as being connected with the essentials of religion. Without this, success will hardly justify the experiment.

We readily admit, that throughout this volume, the author has done his utmost to guard each vulnerable part, and in every other portion he has been eminently successful. In the case before us, he had

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REVIEW.-Four Discourses on the Sacrifice and Priesthood of Jesus Christ, and on Atonement and Redemption. By John Pye Smith, D.D. 8vo. pp. 332. Holdsworth, London. 1828.

THIS is a work of such an extraordinary character, that it rises as much above the general mass of sermons, as the Alpine mountains do above the Malvern hills; and with these views we cannot but regret that the author should not have found some title more expressive of its character, than that of Discourses. To publications with this name there are certain ideas attached, which, in the minds of many, are better calculated to raise a prejudice against them, than to ensure a patient and candid perusal. All who read and think will allow, that between sermons there is an essential dif. ference, but in public estimation they are presumed to belong to the same common genus, and on this preconceived opinion, the fate of many a well-written discourse has been decided, without any examination.

We are well aware, that the severity of this remark applies rather to the reader than to the author, but to the latter it is poor consolation to know, that the former is under the influence of an inveterate prejudice. This he should endeavour to meet in its accustomed haunts, and, so far as truth would allow, accommodate his title to the wishes of all by whom he is solicitous his book should be read. Were this method more generally adopted, an extensive circulation would be given to many a publication, that now lies mouldering on the bookseller's shelves.

We do not, however, pretend to augur that such a destiny awaits the volume before

us.

The author is too well known in the learned and theological world to allow such a suspicion. His name prefixed to any publication is sure to command attention, and, in connexion with it, an expectation is excited, which every reader assures him

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