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sists in a certain mediocrity of the affections, or in seeking an agreeable life, or in living conformably to the law of nature, as either deficient, or erroneous, or obscure; but he, nevertheless, pays a high and deserved compliment to the superior elevation and sublimity of the morals of the Porch. He next discusses the opinions of some of the modern writers on the nature of virtue; Clarke, Wollaston, Payne, Hutcheson, Edwards, Hume, and Brown: who have, respectively, placed the essence of virtue in acting conformably to the fitness of things, or to truth, or to the relation in which we are placed, in universal benevolence, in what is the same thing benevolence to being in general, in a utility which excites approbation, and in the relation of certain actions to certain emotions. To each of these theories Mr. Spalding more or less objects, though his own views on the nature of virtue come nearest to those of Hutcheson and Edwards, who make it to consist in universal benevolence. He excepts against Dr. Payne's definition, which is nearly identical with that of Clarke and others, that it would render mere pathological affections virtuous: thus the desire of knowledge, for example, though in harmony with our relative situation, is not necessarily virtuous. Virtue,' says our author, must lie, not in the conformity merely, but in the state of mind which produces it.' Now if we understand Dr. Payne aright, this is exactly what he would say: maintaining that virtue is such a conformity of man's affections and actions to the relations in which he stands, as is produced by a voluntary aim to do right. We observe, also, that, in connection with the above remark of the author, he states that Dr. Payne is not of the intellectual school' of morals: this, however, is incorrect according to Mr. Spalding's own description of that school as holding that right and wrong are perceived directly by the understanding. For, as we have seen above, Dr. Payne clearly maintains that moral judgments must always precede moral emotions. It is probable that this writer's views of conscience as strictly an emotion, though consequent on moral judgment, may have led Mr. Spalding into this oversight. Whatever view we may take of the theory that conscience is an emotion, and that our notions of right and wrong originate purely in judgment, it is evident that the two statements are by no means incompatible. The disadvantages under which the lamented author of the interesting volume before us composed it, (for he was away from home, and in a foreign country,) and the fact of its posthumous publication, demand that a candid interpretation should be put on these and some other blemishes which would, probably, have disappeared under the final revision and editorship of the author himself: we allude to errors in the orthography of proper

names, and occasional confusion of sense, possibly arising from the state of the manuscript. After having discussed the different theories above alluded to, our author proceeds to state his own views of the nature of virtue, which, as we have before remarked, he regards as consisting in the single affection of benevolence.

'When we say that all virtue consists in the supremacy of this one affection, it must be carefully remembered that we do not wish to deny the term to many others which are currently esteemed virtuous. The proposition we wish to maintain is that love, chosen by the mind as its governing principle, and hence giving it the determination to act in accordance with the various relations in which we are placed, is the first great cause of these moral emotions; that this is the original source to which all other virtuous states of mind must be ultimately referred; and that these latter become the object of moral approbation only in consequence of the relation in which they stand to the great principle of benevolence; apart from which they would possess no moral virtue whatever. In a word, just as we have shown that actions are not virtuous, but merely the evidence of a virtuous state of mind, so certain states of mind, deemed virtuous, are only so many evidences that we possess the great principle of love to God

or his creatures.'

Since, according to our author, we say that an agent has done virtuously when, on contemplating his conduct, we find it producing in us a certain emotion, (or as others would say a certain perception of relations, or a certain moral judgment;) it may be contended that, if virtue and benevolence are identical, then whenever we thus say that an agent has acted rightly, we ought to have in our minds the distinct impression that his impelling motive was benevolence. Now is this actually the case? When the truth is spoken, for instance, or an act of justice is done, no doubt we see exemplified a general principle which benefits society, but do we demand that the idea of this benefit as a motive, shall be in the mind of the agent, before we pronounce his conduct, as far as it goes, virtuous? Suppose a person in a court of justice giving evidence decidedly against his own personal interest and advantage, and that we could know that no motive is present to his mind but that of doing what is right in itself: undoubtedly, we should approve his conduct, though the notion of benevolence does not present itself in connexion with it. Objections of this kind are made by Butler, Price, and Brown, to the theory that virtue is always identical with benevolence; and we think they are not fully rebutted by our author. We would not, however, be supposed for a moment to question that benevolence to man is an essential element in by far the greater number of those modes of conduct, having a direct bearing on society, which are denominated virtuous, as being objects

of universal moral approbation. Much less would we hesitate to admit that love to God is the principle which alone can stamp human agency with the highest character of virtue. There is no doubt that it ought to be the pervading and impelling motive of all human conduct, as it most perfectly harmonizes the human soul with the eternal source of all order and moral beauty, and renders virtue no longer an abstraction, but a 'union and a communion, as it were, of the finite with the infinite. Still there are degrees of conformity with the relations in which man is placed, that is degrees of virtue. The preponderance of conscience when it just turns the vibrating balance in favour of right, because it will not be silenced, is different from a ready, cheerful, enlightened, obedience, emanating from devout love to God as the source of all moral excellence, the fountain of all moral law. In both cases the human agent would be doing right; though it is in the latter case only, that he would be doing so in the highest sense. In this case, benevolence towards man, also, would be diffused through all social relations to the utmost possible extent. On these principles, we cordially sympathise with the author in the prominence he has given to benevolence, under which he includes love to God and man. Of these two forms of the general disposition, he has given various glowing and beautiful illustrations.

As our author insists largely on the claim of 'love' to God and man to be the highest principle of human conduct, and so extensively deduces from it the duties of social life, he of course maintains the usefulness of virtue, both to the individual and to mankind in general. While, however, he recognizes the uniform tendency of virtue to promote happiness, he rejects the theory that a moral action is right merely on account of its utility; for if so, says Mr. Spalding, we should find that whenever we contemplate our own actions, or those of others with approbation, we do so in consequence of their tendency to usefulness being present to our minds, which is not the case. We approve of gratitude to a benefactor, when we witness it; we think of the martyr to truth and principle with approbation; and the emotion arises in us, instantaneously, without any immediate view of the real tendency of the actions to benefit society.

We should be glad, if our limits permitted, to follow the author in other illustrations of the principle of benevolence, which he traces through a variety of duties. This development of the general principle occupies, either directly or indirectly, the larger portion of the volume, and is exhibited in numerous passages of genuine eloquence. We are bound in justice to say that the extracts we have given are by no means to be regarded as specimens of the greatest power and beauty. The delineation

in the eleventh chapter, corresponding to the heading, 'Love personified in the Saviour,' and the closing pages of the volume, which treat of the future triumphs of Christianity,' are peculiarly worthy of attention: but throughout the whole work there is an elevation of thought and of sentiment which are well calculated to recommend it to the intelligent and reflective. We can assure the reader that, although embracing the most difficult points of a difficult subject, it is anything but a dry book. The author writes with the glowing warmth of one whose whole heart is in his subject; sometimes with an intense ardour of feeling. The book is, on this account, of a more popular cast than is usual with treatises on the principles of ethics; though it often discusses principles ably and profoundly. It also exhibits more successfully, we think, than is sometimes done, the relation which subsists between Christianity and the moral nature of man: illustrating the real harmony of the Christian precepts with the genuine dictates of the moral faculty, notwithstanding all apparent and supposed discordancies. Though some of the theories advocated may be regarded as disputable, involving as they do points on which the most celebrated inquirers have differed, and though some allowances must be made for the work, as a posthumous publication, there is shown, in its investigations, a talent for philosophical discussion, an independence of mind, a freedom from prejudice, a love of truth, a freshness and simplicity of heart, a devout and benevolent temper of mind, which altogether throw a charm over the volume, and render it a valuable contribution to ethical literature. We would particularly recommend it to the attention of theological students, perfectly free as it is from all sectarian and party feeling, and avoiding as it does both the extremes which, as we have already shown, it appears to us that different writers have fallen into, on the subject of ethics. The enlarged and catholic spirit of the writer, we may add, is repeatedly manifested; and the division and strife' which are too often witnessed on the subject of religion, evidently occasioned much grief and pain to a mind so exquisitely attuned to the harmonies of moral truth and benevolence.

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Art. V.-1. A Bill to Amend two Acts passed in Ireland for the better Education of Persons professing the Roman Catholic Religion, and for the better Government of the College established at Maynooth for the Education of such Persons; and also an Act passed in the Parliament of the United Kingdom for Amending the said Two Acts. Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed, April 3rd, 1845.

2. Resolutions of the British Anti-State-Church Association respecting the Maynooth Grant, March 26th.

3. Resolutions of the Committee of the Congregational Union of England and Wales respecting the Maynooth Grant, March 12th.

4. Resolutions of the Committee of the Baptist Union of Great Britain and Ireland respecting the Maynooth Grant, March 26.

5. Resolutions of the Deputies of Protestant Dissenters of the three Denominations in and within twelve miles of London respecting the Maynooth Grant, April 9th.

6. Resolutions of the General Body of Protestant Dissenting Ministers of the Three Denominations residing in and about the cities of London and Westminster respecting the Maynooth Grant, April 1st.

THE government of Sir Robert Peel is in some respects the most extraordinary which has ever ruled this country. Its distinction, however, is not of a proud and ennobling order; it does not consist in the possession of pre-eminent ability, in the breadth and capaciousness of the views entertained, or in the consistency of its measures with the principles avowed and the professions with which it took office. The least scrupulous of its advocates will scarcely venture to found its claims on these grounds. They are manifestly foreign from the merits of the existing administration, which, nevertheless, possesses an unenviable notoriety, a character sui generis, which will separate it from all others in the judgment of an impartial and discriminating posterity. We can readily imagine the perplexity of some future student of political history who shall employ himself in the investigation of these times, with a view of doing justice to the men by whom their course has been shaped. Commencing with the advent of Earl Grey to power, and passing onward to the period when Lord Melbourne finally resigned the seals of office, he will meet with an active and organized party, stealthily adapting its phraseology to the altered aspect of the times, renouncing the title by which it had been known, discarding, in words at least, some of the dogmas long deemed essential to its creed, and seeking, under the guise of popu lar sympathies, to regain its forfeited power and resuscitate the spell by which the popular mind had for generations

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