dence is equally good as to the practicability of that route for a pretty large division. From Bokhara to Balkh there would be very little desert marching, and although the Hindu Kush must be crossed between Balkh and Cabul, the passage of the Hindu Kush cannot be considered transcendently difficult. Two passes at least, except for two months of the year, are practicable for wagons, and Affghan armies with artillery have repeatedly passed that way, which was certainly followed last century by the Persian conqueror, Nadir Shah, and is supposed, not without reason, to have been taken by 'Alexander. As to the practicability of the intercommunicating roads, Herat is little more than 400 miles by road from Bokhara, while the fertile valley of the Mourghab lies midway between the two points; and although the most direct road lies over belts of desert, there are yet paths only a little less direct, such as the one M. Vambéry took two or three years ago, which almost altogether keep to inhabited tracts. There is equally little doubt of the practicability of the road between Cabul and Candahar, which has been traversed by a British army, and is the scene of continual fighting among the Affghans themselves.

There remains the question what a Russian army could do, if it reached the Indus unopposed. If we got long warning, it would be easy enough to occupy Cabul and Candahar, or at least to oppose the Russians in the Bolan pass. But what has to be considered, is the chance of Russia acting suddenly when we are off our guard, when India is perhaps temporarily denuded of troops, or at a time of great disturbance, like the Indian mutiny. In such a case, we could spare no force to bar a Russian march to the Indus, and Russia might act so quickly as to give us no time to collect

one.

The first intimation of danger would probably be the simultaneous seizure of Herat and Cabul. Two or three months afterward a great Russian army might appear on the Indus. If our hands should happen to be fully occupied elsewhere, it would be very awk ward, to say the least of it, to have such an army upon us. By superhuman efforts it might be resisted and thrust back as far as Candahar, our careless

ness having no worse effect than temporary danger and disaster; but the fact of the movement described being practicable appears already to demand a very considerable addition to our Indian force. In all probability the Indian Empire by itself is as strong as Russia, but its nature is such that unguarded moments are dangerous, and a lost battle on the Indus might lead to the most calamitous results.

We have spoken only of the danger to India in the existing position of affairs. Danger, of course, is aggravated by every step in advance which Russia takes. When she has advanced to the Oxus, the occupation of Herat and Cabul would become even more easy than at present, and proportionably more tempting. But we need say nothing on this head, since the optimists whose opinions we controvert view with apparent cheerfulness the prospect of a Russian lodgement in Affghanistan. Such a lodgement may be effected very soon. Only two or three scattered millions of population interpose, and there is nowhere a force which Russia need even consider. She has only to prepare a short time beforehand, and, in less than two months after the order leaves St. Petersburg, Herat, Cabul, and Candahar might all be occupied. The achievement would only be slightly less easy than it would be to ourselves. We fear the cheerfulness of our optimists would be put to rather a severe test were this event accomplished. In possession of Affghanistan, Russia's power to injure India would be literally overwhelming. By improving the roads and communications, digging wells, and settling the country as she has done all through her progress in Central Asia, forty thousand men would not long be the limit of the force she could prepare for an attack on India. Always on our frontier, she would be ready to take advantage of every untoward incident. Probably nothing short of an additional hundred thousand of European troops would be requisite to defend India against surprise. Where are we to get this additional force? Putting such a question, we can scarcely wonder at military men viewing with so much alarm the prospect of Russia securely seated at the gates of India.

It is not easy to say what our policy

should now be. The time is past when we could have negotiated with Russia, and demanded her adherence to the limits she prescribed for herself when the first bit of Kokan was annexed. The mischief is done, and we cannot expect but that Russia would prefer war to giving up Djuzac, Oratepe, Khojent, and Taschkent. It may be said again, with some show of reason, that by advancing ourselves into Central Asia we would only add to the chances of a conflict, and at once bring the frontiers together the very contingency we dread. We are inclined to think that, inconvenient as the last alternative may be, it is the only one left us. It is preferable to keeping within the present limits of India. If we must have Russia for neighbor, it becomes us, instead of leaving things to chance, to choose our ground. In this view the expediency of occupying Herat at once is apparent. It would be a step in the right direction to go half-way, and occupy Quetta, as recommended ineffectually by the Bombay government; but to have all the security desirable, we must go to Herat. Only by so doing could we effectually prevent the Russians from combining the lines of advance we have described. But the proceeding would be effectual. If Russia then thought to attack us, she would only have the one path straight from Asterabad, without any cover on the left to screen her movements, and without any good sub-base, such as the plain of Herat would afford, if we allow her to be there before us. The defence of Herat and Candahar-in short, of all Affghanistan-would also give us time to rally in the event of a sudden movement; and the confusion of the fight would be kept remote from India-a very great advantage. At Herat, too, we might have all the benefits of railway communication, just as we have now, for it would not be difficult to extend so far the Indian railway system, which must at any rate be extended to the Indus valley. In the interests of both England and India, the occupation of this advance post should not be delayed. The more secure we can make our Indian position the less likely is it to be attempted; while the preoccupation of Herat would take away from Russia a temptation, by yielding to which she might easily provoke a

war. Indifferent as we seem at present, the threat of Russia to occupy Heratmuch more its actual seizure-would provoke an explosion of feeling in India which no government could disregard. The common arguments against annexation do not apply to the case of Affghanistan, at present no man's land, and the source of endless disquiet by its lawlessness and anarchy to our possessions in the north-west of India. By taking part of it, we should interfere with no rights of self-government, and our rule wonld confer on the districts we occupied a material prosperity, such as has been unknown since our former occupa tion, which was held in grateful remembrance by the mass of the people long after we withdrew.

North British Review.

A DUTCH POLITICAL NOVEL. Officer. My Lord, this is the man who killed little Barbara.

Judge. To the gallows with him! How did he do it?

Officer. He cut her to pieces and pickled the body.

Judge. Infamous! To the gallows with him! Lothario. My Lord, I did not murder little Barbara. I fed, and clothed, and provided for her. I can bring witnesses to prove me a good man, and no murderer.

Judge. You are to be hanged. You aggravate your crime by your arrogance. It is not becoming in a man, accused of any crime, to consider himself a virtuous being.

Lothario. But, my Lord, there are witnesses to confirm it, and as I am now accused of murderJudge. You will be hanged. You cut little Barbara to pieces, and pickled the body, and bold no small opinion of yourself; three capital crimes. Who are you, woman?

Woman. I am little Barbara.

Lothario. Heaven be praised! You see, my

Lord, I am not her murderer.

Judge. Hem! yes, hem! But as to the pickling?

Barbara. No, my Lord, he did not pickle me; on the contrary, he has done me a great deal of good; he is the kindest of human beings.

Lothario. My Lord, you hear how she declares me to be a good man.

Judge Hem; but the third crime allows of no

exculpation. Officer, away with that fellow and hang him! He is guilty of self-conceit. And, clerk, be sure to quote in his sentence the jurisprudence of Lessing's Patriarch.-From an Unpublished Tragedy.

THE above was the rather startling motto prefixed to a novel published ex

actly seven years ago at Amsterdam by an author styling himself "Multatuli," and who gave his book the singular title of Max Havelaar; or, the Coffee Sales of the Dutch East India Company.

There was certainly nothing very attractive in this title, but it had the charm of novelty, and suggested, too, the possibility of its containing some allusion to the great question of the day in the Netherlands-the government of the Dutch colonies-which has for so many years agitated the country, and been the lever used by all parties in political warfare,-either as a means of rais ing themselves, or of upsetting their adversaries.

In order fairly to judge the question as it now stands, it is decidedly necessary to have some insight into the general state of the Dutch colonies, and it will soon become evident that a more intricate problem is scarcely to be conceived than the one still puzzling the brains of our Dutch neighbors. A bird's-eye view of their chief colonies in India will enable us to appreciate in some measure the difficulties to be overcome in legislating for these islands from the other side of the globe, and, with all due respect for the Dutch Chambers, by a set of legislators, but few of whom are well versed, either by study or personal experience, in colonial affairs.

Java, the principal island of the great Soenda group,* * is itself four times as large as the kingdom of the Netherlands; and whilst the mother country counts about three and a half million inhabitants, above thirteen millions are spread over the surface of Java.

Of these, in round numbers, some twelve millions are Javanese, cultivators of the soil, an agrarian population, quiet, inoffensive, much attached to their home, and to native customs and traditions; Mohammedans, intellectual to a certain degree, the higher classes refined even, to some extent, but addicted to all the vices of the Asiatic temperament; fond of gaming, uxorious, vain, and dissipated, greatly inclined to imitate the European in superficial acquirements, but without the tenacity of purpose or the energy only found in northern climes.

The inferior classes are simple-minded peasants, easily contented, if only well fed, and in the darkest ignorance of everything beyond their immediate neighborhood, living as serfs to their lords and masters, whose word is a law, and possessing so little individuality that distinctive family names are almost unknown among them.

Next to the natives in importance are the Chinese settlers, some 150,000 in number, all busily occupied in commercial affairs, victimizing the natives, cheating the Europeans, and thriving by their intelligence and want of principle. Their influence on the Javanese is so much dreaded by the Dutch government that they are not allowed to settle in the interior of the island, but are strictly confined to the townships along the coasts. There the "Chinese Camp," as it is styled, stands in its own quarter of the place, under its own jurisdiction, the Chinese "Captain" or "Major" being the responsible personage to the Dutch authorities for the acts of all his fellowcountrymen in those parts.

A mixed race of Arabs and Malays crowd the numerous ports; Madurese, Alfoers, or Harafoers, from the Moluccas, serve as sailors, or, when occasion offers, turn pirates, enlist as soldiers in the Dutch regiments, perform the work of coolies, and, mingling with numerous other tribes from the surrounding islands, are looked down on as rude barbarians

by the Javanese themselves, but highly esteemed by the Europeans for the execution of the rougher work, for which the more effeminate native is less fitted, and never inclined.

Politically viewed, the island offers a varied aspect. Western Java, the Soenda districts, is scarcely more like the eastern extremity of the island in aspect or in institutions than France is to Switzerland. By far the greater part of the Europeans residing on the island are crowded together in Batavia, Buitenzorg, Soerabaya, and the other larger towns along the northern coast. Few and far between are scattered the dwellings of some settlers in the interior, or along the southern bays. Two small states retain here, nominally, a semi-independence; the Sultans of Djocjokarta and Soerakarta govern in their own names, and adjudicate by their own laws,

though under supervision of the Dutch Resident, who in all other districts reigns supreme, and dictates despotically to the native prince. The latter bears the title of Regent, is a man of high caste and ancient descent, and the instrument by whose means the native is directly ruled and held under the strictest subservience to his foreign conquer ors, of whom, in many parts, he has very little or no personal knowledge.

The Regent himself, but indifferently salaried by the Dutch Government, sets the inhabitants of whole districts to work, according to the orders given him by the Resident; and the peasant, besides what he has to pay, either in cash, in work, or in substance, to the Regent for the foreign Government, has likewise to provide for all that is requisite to keep up the magnificence of his own prince's court, whose beggarly pittance would otherwise barely suffice to keep him from starvation. "Forced labor" is one of the most efficient means of supplying the sums required by both parties. For instance, the Dutch desire the cultivation of coffee in the one or other district, either for the Govern ment or for European landholders, with or without Government contracts; the Resident mentions his wish to the Regent, who gives his orders in consequence, and coffee-gardens, as they are termed, soon cover the whole surface of the country.

Of course but little prosperity can fall to the share of the peasant where such a system prevails, and but a minimum of wages is paid to the laborer. Whatever riches the soil or his own work produces pass into others' hands, and a bare subsistence is all he reaps from the rich harvest, sown and garnered by himself for the benefit of others.

A general feeling of discontent, of passive resignation, reigns in all these districts. It may well be supposed that the Regent throws the blame on the strangers; that the native serf, whilst obeying, and even often loving, his own lord, hates the foreign conqueror; that sooner or later an end must come to this preposterous and monstrous state of affairs; and that meanwhile the liberals in colonial politics call out loudly for radical reform.

Their cry is Give the peasant his

own plot of ground, recognize his individuality and his rights; let there be free labor and no tyrannical oppressions; and though our returns may be less for some years, eventually all the profit will be ours.

It is but fair to state the arguments of their opponents. If we give the Javanese, they say, his own farm and plot of ground, what will be the case? He has no family name by which he can be designated in the registers; he has no idea of property, or its sacred rights, beyond the privilege of dwelling on the homestead of his fathers-the open grounds belonging to his race in general. He will neither understand nor attach any value to the legal possession of what he already regards as sufficiently his own. Within a few months he will thus be ruined,-the victim of the first speculator, Chinese or European, who settles in the neighborhood, and chooses to become proprietor of a whole district for a very trifling sum.

As for free labor,-it is only by foreing him to work that the Javanese can be brought to renounce his sloth. Leave him free, and he will just cultivate rice enough for himself and family, and pass the rest of his time in gambling or in idleness.

The only "free laborers," too, to be had in most parts of Java, are, for the greater part, vagabonds; men without a home, and criminals, who, having been obliged to leave their own villages, lead a nomad life,- -earn a bare subsistence by their manual labor, sleep at nights where they best can find a resting-place, and gamble away every farthing they lay hand on as soon as possible,-if they do not spend it on opium. The great dearth of laborers has led many owners of sugar-mills and coffee-plantations to pander to the lusts of these wretches, rather than miss their coöperation.

The reformers, or liberal party, would remedy these evils, by raising the salaries of the Regents, and enabling them to live according to their high rank on the income granted them by government; by augmenting the rate of wages paid to the laborer, and thus encouraging his efforts; and by severely punishing every

* Vide Hasselman, Mijne evaring, enz., p. 27, seq.

attempt of the Regent to extort anything to which he has no positive claim from the peasant. This latter measure is subject to the greatest difficulty in its execution: a buffalo, even a wife, is often required by the prince, and the submissive peasant bows his head and gives up his dearest possessions with a sigh, but without resistance, to his lord and master. The great argument against the proposed reforms is, that whatsoever price be offered, free labor is not obtainable; that, by raising the pay of the Regents and the wages of the laborer, the Indian Archipelago, instead of remunerating the home government as it now does, say to an extent of some twenty millions of florins per annum, will cost the mother country annually large sums; and that, in the end, no advantage will be obtained, as all the profits will still flow into the hands of the native princes and foreign traders, Chinese, Malays, and Arabs, who live on the spoils of the natives.

For many years thus all complaints on the above subjects were carefully suppressed by the Indian and the home Governments. The Residents reported favorably (in their official and published documents) on the state of their provinces; the Governor-General sent home flaming accounts, and, better still, bags full of gold; and any man who had the courage, or the imprudence, to complain of the existing system, was carefully "put down;" or, if a Government officer, quietly shelved.

But, as always will be the case, magna est veritas, and by degrees the truth oozed out. A sort of uneasiness began to spread about the state of the colonies, or rather about the state of affairs in Java; the other islands are too remote, too thinly colonized to be of such preponderating importance; whispers and reports circulated to an alarming extent; "understood relations revealed the secretest" extortions; some men, such as the Baron von Hoevell, were not to be put down; and loud and long murmars were heard in all quarters, though but few efficacious steps were taken to examine into or reform the grievances complained of.

This was the general aspect of the question when Multatuli's book appear ed. The sensation it made was unequalled

by anything of the sort ever printed in the Netherlands; and though some years have passed since the publication of the work, the state of the question remains, in its principal features, unaltered and undecided, owing to the frequent changes of ministry, and the other difficulties to which we have slightly alluded, and which will be further elucidated in the course of this paper.

Before analysing the book itself, we have a few words to say about its author. It was soon discovered that the pseudonym "Multatuli" had been selected by M. Douwes Dekker, exAssistant Resident of Lebak, in Java, a highly-gifted but eccentric personage, the friend of the native par excellence, -but rather a sentimental, fantastic, and irritable character than a practical statesman. M. Douwes Dekker had quarrelled with the Indian authorities; he had, in short, advocated the interests of the natives much too powerfully to please his superiors. He had objected very strongly to the system of cooked reports, always representing everything to be in the most flourishing state, dans ce meilleur des mondes; he had become violent and disrespectful in tone and language; and the result was, that he was obliged to throw up his situation in disgust, and return home in disgrace. On the part of the Indian government, there had been the desire to get rid of a troublesome official, who would neither hold his tongue nor yield an inch of the ground on which he had chosen to establish himself; there was no doubt, too, of his capacity for exciting awkward discussions and much trouble to the government; and unless he could be reduced to silence before his influence made itself felt in the colonies, there would be no possibility of prolonging the old and vicious system, which time and custom had hallowed. Instead, then, of looking into the complaints, serious as they were, so loudly uttered by Multatuli, he was, as we have hinted, sent home in disgrace.

In so far the Indian government was decidedly to be blamed. It is not improbable, that some partial reforms, some very necessary improvements, in the spirit required by M. Dekker, would have satisfied both him and his friends, and