colored in the translation.* That which follows what is said of the Great Bank is nonsense, or if it conveys any meaning I think it not such as a man of common sense would speak. I do not find that the Count de Vergennes gives any account of your propositions to the minister here, though his letters are a day later than those I have from you. I should conclude from that circumstance that they had not been communicated, if I was not persuaded that, acting under the instructions you do, you would not withhold them except for the most weighty reasons, and that if such reasons existed you would have assigned them in your letters. Presuming therefore that you had com. municated them, I have made no secret of them to the minister, who appeared much pleased with them, though a little surprised at the latitude of the last article, which may not perhaps be agreeable to them in all its extent, as it will occasion a revolution in their system of commerce if they would share ours. I am extremely pleased that in freeing ourselves we have a prospect of unfettering the consciences, and the commerce of the world. I am far from regretting that the Marquis D'Arunda has no powers to treat. We think with you that it is time to adopt the Spanish system, and to retort upon them all the delays we can interpose, without descending to the contemptible shifts they have put in practice. Any time will be better than the present. But the instructions you have already received are full on this head. Mr. Jefferson will be the bearer of this. The information he can give you will shorten this letter. This and general politics will be contained in my letter to Dr Franklin, to whom I also enclose a letter on the subject of your commercial propositions. I enclose to you a new cipher, which I pray you to make use of upon every important occasion. You will find it very easy after a little prac tice. I must again entreat you to write more fully to us. I have received from the Count de Vergennes' letters-almost all I know relative to the progress of the negotiations. It would give me more pleasure to receive information of this kind through another channel. I am, dear sir, with great respect and esteem, yours, &c., R. R. LIVINGSTON.t Edward Everett (N. Am. Rev. of October 1831, 33 N. Am. Rev., 475) adopts this view as having "great good sense," and says of Livingston's suggestion that the letter, if authentic, may have "undergone some alterations." "We have not the least doubt that this is exactly the truth." The text of this important instruction, which is referred to by Edward Everett in an article in the North American Review of Oct., 1831 (33 N. Am. Rev., 474), as striking the true line in the momentous controversy to which it relates, is taken from the record book in the Department of State, in which instructions are copied after signature and immediately before transmission. From this, however, the instruction as printed by Sparks, under date of Jan. 4, 1783 (vol. 4, p. 525), differs throughout so materially in mode of expression, that I now give the latter for the purpose of comparison. Whether the instruction after being engrossed, but before Substance of a Verbal Communication from Livingston to the President of Congress.* OFFICE OF FOREIGN AFFairs, December 30, 1782. The substance of a verbal communication made to the Secretary for Foreign Affairs by the minister of France on the 30th and 31st of December, 1782, offered to the consideration of Congress on the 1st of January, 1783, by the said Secretary. The minister of France came this day, agreeably to appointment, to the office of Foreign Affairs, and read to Mr. Livingston a letter from the Count de Vergennes to him, dated the 12th of August last, which transmission, was as rewritten by Livingston, or whether, after having been engrossed and transmitted, it was rewritten by Sparks, there is nothing now in the Department to enable us to decide. PHILADELPHIA, January 4, 1783. DEAR SIR: I have before me your despatches of the 4th and 18th of September last, and the 13th of October. It gives me much uneasiness to find by them that your health is not yet confirmed, particularly as the extreme shortness of your letters, compared with the importance of the matter, gives me reason to fear that it has suffered more than you would have us believe. I am under some anxiety relative to the fate of your letter of the 18th of September, as only the duplicate copy has arrived, and I find by that you have risked it without a cipher. Should it get into improper hands it might be attended with disagreeable consequences. It is of so much importance that both you and we should judge rightly of the designs of the court to whom we have entrusted such extensive powers, that I most earnestly wish you had enlarged on the reasons which have induced you to form the opinion you intimate; an opinion which, if well founded, must render your negociations extremely painful, and the issue of them very uncertain. If, on the other haud, it should have been taken up too hastily, it is to be feared that, in defiance of all that prudence and self-possession for which you are happily distinguished, it will discover itself in a reserve and want of confidence which may afford hopes to our artful antagonists of exciting jealousies between us and our friends. I so sincerely wish that your conjectures on this head may not be well founded, that I am led to hope you carry your suspicions too far, and the more so as Dr. Franklin, to whom I dare say you have communicated them freely, does not (as you say) agree in sentiment with you. But I pretend not to judge, since I have not the advantage of seeing from the same ground. Perhaps some light may be thrown upon the subject by such facts as I have been able to collect here, and with which it is impossible you should be acquainted. The policy you suppose to influence the measures of France can only be founded in a distrust which I persuade myself she can hardly entertain of those who have put their dearest interest into her hands. She is too well informed of the state of this country to believe there is the least reason to suppose that we could have the most distant idea of a separate peace. If such distrust really exists, it would, in my opinion, dictate to them to let Great Britain acknowledge our independence at once, rather than make it the subject of subsequent negociation. When satisfied on that point, we can with more advantage contend for those our allies have at heart. Whereas, by withholding it, and making it the price of concessions on the part of France which she may not choose to make, an opportunity would be afforded to * Secret journal of Congress; MSS. Dep. of State; 6 Sparks' Dip. Rev. Corr., 105. WH-VOL VI—12 contained in substance that the negociations begun by Mr. Grenville and Mr. Oswald were interrupted by the resignation of Mr. Fox. That previous to that the King of England appeared disposed to acknowl edge the independency of America in express terms, without making embroil and incline us to listen to separate proposals. Upon this principle France seems to have acted in all the answers which she has hitherto given, as well to the direct proposals of Great Britain as to those made by the Imperial courts. When Mr. Grenville proposed to treat of the independence of the United States with his most Christian majesty, an opportunity was afforded to take the lead in the negociation and to suspend that part of it; yet we find the reply of the court of Versailles led to a direct negociation between Great Britain and us, and ended in the offer of unconditional independence. The reply of the court of France to that of London, communicated to Mr. Grenville on the 21st of June, speaks the same language. From these and the following facts you will, when you have compared them with those within your own knowledge, draw your inferences with more judgment than I can pretend to do without those you possess. Before your letters were received the Chevalier de la Luzerne showed me a letter from the Count de Vergennes of the 14th of August, in which he speaks of Mr. Grenville's commission, and the ground it gave him to hope that negociations would open with an express and unconditional acknowledgment of independence. He mentions the change in the British ad ministration; their assurance that it should occasion no alteration in the plan of their negociation, and concludes by expressing his surprise at the alteration which afterwards took place in this essential article in the propositions offered by Mr. Fitzherbert, and infers from thence that Lord Shelburne had no other design than to divide and deceive. In a letter of the 7th of September he mentions Mr. Oswald's com mission, your objections to it, and his doubts of the manner in which these objections will be received. "If," says he, "Mr. Oswald is right in his conjecture that they will be favorably received and removed, then everything is said. If they reject them because they will not begin where they propose to end, I conceive the negociations should still go on. We may judge of the intentions of the court of London by their first propositions. If they have independence for their basis, we may proceed; if not, we must break off." In his letter of the 14th of October he mentions with great apparent satisfaction the alterations in Mr. Oswald's commission. From the general tenor of these letters I can discover nothing but an anxious desire for peace, which might very naturally lead him to wish that objections, which he did not conceive essential in the first instance, after having declared to Great Britain that no peace could be made till our independence was acknowledged, should not break off a negociation which must end in the attainment of an object which they have as much at heart as we. Whatever the sentiments of the Count de Vergennes may be as to the claim of Spain, in a letter which I have seen he treats them, as well as ours, as chimerical and extravagant, and declares that he does not mean to interfere in them. You can best judge of the sincerity of this declaration. If insincere, I can not conceive for what purpose it was made or the subject treated so lightly, or why this should be confided to me. For my own part, I believe their situation with respect to Spain is very delicate, and that they are embarrassed by her demands. I mention these things that you may, by comparing them with facts within your reach, draw useful inferences from them; and I wish to give you everything that may possibly be of use to you. As to the letter of Marbois, I am by no means surprised at it, since he always endeavored to persuade us that our claim to the fisheries was not well founded. Yet one thing is very remarkable, and I hope evinces the determination of France to serve us on this point: The advice given to discourage the hope is certainly judicious, and yet we find no steps taken in consequence of it. On the contrary, we have DECEMBER 30, 1782. it a condition of the peace; that Mr. Grenville encouraged them to hope that this object would be rendered complete by an act of Parliament; that they looked in vain for this act till they were apprised of the resignation of Mr. Fox; that the difference which arose between him and been repeatedly told in formal communications since that period "that the King would do everything for us that circumstances will admit, and that nothing but dire necessity shall induce him to relinquish any of the objects we have at heart, and that he does not imagine that such necessity will exist." This communication was made on the 21st of last November from letters of the 7th of September, previous to our success at Yorktown, and has been renewed at different periods since. You will undoubtedly avail yourself of this engagement if necessary. Congress, relying upon it, have made no alteration in their instructions since the change in their affairs by the blow the enemy received at Yorktown. This letter of Marbois, and the conduct of the court of France, evince the difference between a great politician and a little one. France can, by prohibiting the importation of fish, supply herself; she can not do more. Our exclusion from the fishery would only be beneficial to England. The enmity it would excite, the disputes it would give rise to, would, in the course of a few years, obliterate the memory of the favors we have received. England, by sacrificing a part of her fisheries and protecting us in the enjoyment of them, would render herself necessary to us, our friendship would be transferred to her, and France would in the end be considered as a natural enemy. I am persuaded she has wisdom enough to see this in its true light. I know not how far the Marquis may deserve your confidence; you are the best judge of his conduct. I ought, however, in justice to him to mention that he has steadily, in all his letters, recommended an adherence to our claims, and assured us that both might be obtained if insisted upon. You see, sir, I have purposely leaned to the opposite side from that which you appear in some measure to have taken; not because I think you are wrong in the opinion you have adopted, but because you may possibly be so. Such essential iujuries may flow from the slightest jealousies, that I wish you to examine yours with all of the coolness you are master of. I am persuaded the last hope of Britain is founded on the distrusts they may show among their enemies. I wish you had in a private letter in cipher informed me how you got at the letter of Marbois, and why it was copied in English. I more particularly wish to know whether it passed through the hands of either of the British commissioners. If it has, it will be of some consequence to see the original, not that I doubt its authenticity, but it may possibly have undergone some alterations. That which follows what is said of the Great Bank is nonsense, or if it conveys any meaning, I think it is not such as a man of common sense would speak. Count de Vergennes, in his letters dated a day later than yours, gives no account of your propositions. I should conclude from this circumstance that they had not been communicated. If I were not convinced that, acting under the instructions you do, you would not withhold them except for the most weighty reasons, and that if such reasons existed you would have assigned them in your letters, and presuming there fore that you had communicated them, I have made no secret of them to the Count de la Luzerne, who appeared much pleased with them, though a little surprised at the article which relates to commerce, which I can not suppose perfectly agreeable to them in all its extent, since it will render a revolution necessary in the commercial system of France if they wish to have an extensive trade with us. I am extremely pleased that, in freeing ourselves, we have a prospect of unfettering the consciences and the commerce of the world. We are far from regretting that the Marquis d'Aranda has no powers to treat. We think with you that it is time to adopt the Spanish system. We may treat at any Lord Shelburne led them to suppose that the design of the first was to recognise the independency of America and treat for a general peace upon fair and honorable terms; that Lord Shelburne's was, on the contrary, to endeavor to excite distrusts, and particularly to endeavor to mislead the Americans; that in pursuance of this system in the month of June last, at the very time that they opened their treaty in Europe, he proposed to offer the most advantageous terms to America upon condition that the Americans laid down their arms and left France to settle the dispute alone. This insidious conduct was pursued during Mr. Grenville's negociation. That Mr. Fox's resignation suspended the negociation, though the new administration declared that this event should occasion no change of measures; that the court of France expected the effect of this dec. laration when a commission was expedited to Mr. Oswald to treat with the American plenipotentiaries, and another to authorise Mr. Fitzherbert to resume the negociation begun by Mr. Grenville; that he had presented his credentials the 4th instant; that Mr. Oswald had yet received only a copy of his, owing to the chancellor's absence; that Mr. Fitzherbert had returned the answer of Great Britain to the counter proposition given by France; that this contains full evidence of the unsteadiness of Lord Shelburne's conduct, since, instead of making the independence of America a separate object, it proposes it as a condition and as the price of peace, and adds, that every other circumstance should be placed upon the basis of 1763. He observes that the Chevalier de la Luzerne will judge from this that they affected much surprise at the counter propositions, and that they did not assent to them; neither, on the other hand, have they yet refused them, but confine themselves to demanding explanations. That this was then the state of their negociations; that Mr. Oswald had presented bis commission, to which Mr. Franklin and Mr. Jay had yet given no reply, suspending it till they knew his (the Count de Vergennes') sentiments; that as yet he had formed no opinion, waiting the result of a conference which he was to have the next day with those ministers; that the commission was in the usual form, but speaks of the Americans as colonies, without naming them rebels or asserting any claims upon them. time with more advantage than at present. You had received your instructions on this subject before you wrote your last letters. By your saying nothing of them, I supposed you had not deciphered them. Mr. Jefferson being the bearer of this, it is unnecessary to enlarge. News and general politics will be contained in my letter to Dr. Franklin, to whom I also send an instruction on the subject of your commercial proposition. I enclose you a new cipher, which I pray you to make use of. You will find it very easy on a little practice. I must again entreat you to write more fully to us. I have received from the Count de Vergennes' letters the whole progress of the negociation. Information of this kind it would give me more pleasure to receive through another channel. I have the honor to be, dear sir, with great respect and esteem, &c., |