as ruins in a foreign neighbourhood, yield to the general tide of human affairs, and their destruction is commonly preceded by the most complete anarchy.

.

This description expresses, though perhaps too forcibly, the difference between the Doric and Ionic races. The former had, of all the Grecians, the greatest veneration for antiquity; and not to degenerate from their fathers, was the strongest exhortation which a Spartan could hear: the latter, on the other hand, were in every thing fond of novelty, and delighted to excess in foreign communication; whence their cities were always built on the sea, whereas the Dorians generally preferred an inland situation. The anxiety of the Dorians, and the Spartans in particular, to keep up the pure Doric character, and the customs of their ancestors, is strongly shewn by the prohibition to travel, and the exclusion of foreigners; an institution common both to the Spartans and Cretans, and which has been much misrepresented by ancient authors. It is very possible, as Plutarch thinks, that the severity of these measures was increased by the decline of all morals and discipline, which had arisen among the Ionians from the contrary practice; that race having, in the earliest times, fallen into a state of the greatest effeminacy and indolence, from their connection with their Asiatic neighbours; for how early was the period when the ancient constitution of the Grecian family degenerated among the Ionians into the slavery of the wife! how weak, effeminate, and luxurious do their ancient poets, Callinus and Asius, represent them! and if the legend describes even the daughters of Neleus, the founder of the colony, so completely destitute of morality, what must have been the condition of this people, when the wives of the Ionians had mixed with Lydian women! The warning voice of such examples might well stimulate the ancient lawgivers to draw in, with greater closeness, the iron bond of custom.'-vol. ii. pp. 1—5.

We have then a most erudite, and, as far as we can judge, from some acquaintance with the works of the ancients, a very accurate account of the developement of the constitutions of the different Greek states, beginning with the heroic age, so charmingly described in different passages of the Iliad and Odyssey. Muller shews that, beyond all doubt, all these constitutions originated in a kind of Wittenagemote, like that from which we have derived our parliament, and which was principally composed of the aristocracy, the people being present to hear the debates, to express their feelings, perhaps, on important occasions, but having no deliberative voice in the assembly. In some of the states, the aristocratic principle was, in the course of time, merged in tyranny, or subverted by the power of the democracy. The Doric form of government, that is to say the political institutions founded upon the ancient laws, usages, and traditions of the Dorians, was, as we have already intimated, most decidedly established in Sparta and Crete, where the power of that people was predominant. The legislation of Lycurgus was altogether based on Doric principles, his object being to keep the old as well as the young in complete subjection; to produce harmony and order by means of self control and manly virtue,

which were to be systematically infused into the minds of the citizens. Hence their education was considered as the first and most essential duty of the government, and a Doric state may be truly described as consisting of a body of men, who acknowledged one strict principle of order, and one unalterable rule of manners; and so subjecting themselves to this system, that scarcely any thing was unfettered by it, every action was influenced and regulated by the recognised principles.'

The Dorians, in fact, contrived by their institutions to retain in their own hands, for many centuries, the government of the mass of the inhabitants, and it was to this end, as we have stated, that all their laws were forcibly directed. Hence, as we learn from Thucydides, when Brasidas harangued the Peloponnesians, he said to them,-"You are not come from states in which the many rule over the few, but the few over the many, having obtained their sovereignty in no other manner than by victory in the field." It is not very surprising that a nation of this description should have altracted the enthusiastic admiration of a German scholar, considering the notions upon the subject of government, which prevail too generally amongst the learned men of that part of the continent.

In speaking of the subject classes in the Doric states, Muller corrects some popular errors with respect to the Helots, who are generally supposed to have been originally inhabitants of the maritime town of Helos, and to have been reduced by their conquerors to a condition of unqualified slavery. He suggests that they were called Helots, not from the town, but from the word Es, signifying prisoners, probably, who were taken in war. He shews that they were possessed of several political rights; that they belonged to the state, and not to individuals, that the state allowed them to be possessed by individuals, but reserved to itself the power of enfranchising them. The state could not sell them beyond the frontiers, nor could individuals, the author thinks, sell them at all, or even liberate them. Like the boors of Russia, before they were emancipated, the Helots were annexed to the landed property, which was inalienable in Sparta. On these lands they had certain fixed dwellings of their own, and particular services and payments were prescribed to them. They paid as rent a fixed measure of corn to their masters.' Thus they resembled in a great measure the villeins regardant, that is to say those who were annexed to the manor or land, under the Norman system in former ages in our own country.

Upon the subject of the divisions of the free citizens and public assemblies in the Doric states, the author's researches appear to have been extremely elaborate. It would seem, that to the popular assembly all citizens were admitted, who were above the age of thirty, and who had not been deprived of their rights by law. They so far exercised supreme power, that nothing could become a law without their consent, though they could not originate laws or

decrees. They met at an appointed place in the open air, and the extent of their authority appears to have rather militated against the aristocratic tendencies of Mr. Muller.

In the first place, with regard to the external relations of the state, we know that the whole people alone could proclaim war, conclude a peace, enter into an armistice for any length of time, &c.; and that all negociations with foreign states, although conducted by kings and ephors, could alone be ratified by the same authority. With regard to internal affairs, the highest offices, particularly the councillors', were filled by the votes of the people; a disputed succession to the throne was decided by the same tribunal; changes in the constitution were proposed and explained, and all new laws (as often as this rare event took place,) after previous examination in the council, were confirmed in the assembly. Legally, also, it required the authority of the assembled people to liberate any considerable number of Helots, as being the collective possessor of them. In short, the popular assembly possessed the supreme political and legislative authority; but it was so hampered and restrained by the spirit of the constitution, that it could only exert its authority within certain prescribed limits.

This circumstance was shewn, in an especial manner, in the method of its proceedings; none but public magistrates, chiefly the ephors and kings, together with the sons of the latter, addressed the people without being called upon, and put the question to the vote; foreign ambassadors also being permitted to enter and speak concerning war and peace; but that citizens ever came forward upon their own impulse to speak on public affairs, is neither probable, nor do any examples of such a practice occur. A privilege of this kind could, according to the Spartan principles, only be obtained by holding a public office; as, therefore, the magistrates only were the leaders and speakers of the assembly, so we often find that stated as a decree of the authorities (especially in foreign affairs) which had been discussed before the whole community, and approved by it. The occasional speeches were short, and spoken extempore. Lysander first delivered before the people a prepared speech, which he procured from Cleon, of Halicarnassus. The method of voting by acclamation, has indeed, something rude and barbarous; but it has the advantage of expressing, not only the number of approving and negative voices, but also the eagerness of the voters, accurately enough, according to the ancient simplicity of manners.'-vol. ii. pp. 91-93.

The remark contained in the last sentence looks like an apology, for introducing to the notice of the Germans, the privileges of a popular assembly-such an assembly, by the way, as they, of all other nations, are entitled to possess, if antiquity of usage give any rights to a community. In Sparta, the popular branch of the legislature was controlled by a council of elders, in whom the aristocratical interests were centered. They were chosen for life by the people. None but men of sixty or more years were eligible to this council, and they were generally aristocrats in the true sense of the word; that is to say, they were of distinguished families, eminent station, and blameless lives. They were subject to no responsibility, since it was thought that the near prospect of death would give

them more moderation, than the fear of incurring at the cessation of their office the displeasure of the community.' This institution obtains from the author unbounded praise. It appears to him the most splendid monument of early Grecian customs. Its functions were at once executive, deliberative, and judicial, (in criminal matters). It advised with the kings, prepared and passed through their first stages, the laws which were submitted for the sanction of the public assembly, and had the power of supreme decision in all criminal cases. The kingly office, exercised by two princes for a considerable period, was strictly limited, indeed much more so than it is in this country. It was hemmed around not only by the popular assembly and the council of elders, but also by the Ephoralty, an institution peculiar, we believe, to the ancient Greek states. The office of the Ephori (who were five in number) is supposed to have been originally limited to a superintendence over sales, and over the public market. They were chosen by the popular assembly, without reference to property or distinctions, but merely on account of personal qualifications. They obtained, in the course of time, jurisdiction in all civil matters, and became a most formidable tribunal. They exercised the privilege of instituting scrutinies into the official conduct of all magistrates, the members of the council alone excepted. The kings were amenable to the decisions of the Ephori. They could not only punish magistrates, who, after the termination of their office, had been found guilty of misconduct, but they could divest them of office before the period of its cessation, if they thought proper. They could moreover impeach the kings as well as the other magistrates in extreme cases, without consulting the assembly of the people, and could bring them to trial for life and death. Such impeachments were carried before an extraordinary court, however, composed of one of the kings, the councillors, the Ephori, and a number of other public officers, and from its sentence there was no appeal. In short, they ultimately became a directory, like that of France, which engrossed all the power, executive, legislative, judicial, and financial, of the state. They affected to learn the will of the gods by dreams, and by the inspection of the heavens, and they did not cease to extend their prerogatives until they eradicated every vestige of the Spartan constitution. The Ephoralty was an institution altogether abhorred by Mr. Muller. Strictly speaking it must have been an excrescence upon the true Doric principle of government, for it was, in every sense, a tribuneship of the people, not unlike that which was subsequently established in Rome. Nevertheless, the author attempts to reconcile the Ephoralty with the aristocratic spirit of the Spartan constitution, and this he does in a way that would almost induce us to suspect that there was a spice of democracy in his Toryism.

Now,' he says, 'I call the Spartan constitution an aristocracy, without the least hesitation, on account of its continued and predominant tendency towards governing the community by a few, who were presumed

to be the best, and as it inculcated in the citizens far less independent confidence than obedience, and fear of those persons whose worth was guaranteed by their family, their education, and the public voice which had called them to the offices of state. The ancients, however, remark that it might be called a democracy, since the supreme power was always considered as residing in the people, and an entire equality of manners prevailed; that it might be called a monarchy on account of the kings; and that in the power of the Ephors there was even an appearance of tyranny: so that in this one constitution all forms of government were united. But,' adds the author, anxious for the consistency of his argument, the animating soul of all these forms was the Doric spirit of fear and respect for ancient and established laws, and the judgment of older men, the spirit of implicit obedience towards the state and the constituted authorities; and lastly, the conviction, that strict discipline, and a wise restriction of actions, are surer guides to safety than a superabundance of strength and activity directed to no certain end.'-vol. ii. pp. 194-195.

In the public economy of the Spartans, there were some very extraordinary arrangements according to our notions. Nature does not abhor a vacuum more than they abhorred the extinction of a family; considering, that by the destruction of a house, 'the dead lost their religious honour, the household gods their sacrifices, the hearth its flame, and the ancestors their name among the living.' This evil, so formidable in their estimation, was prevented, as far as possible, by various regulations, some of which were most unnatural. For instance, if a husband considered his wife to be barren, he had the power of putting her away, and dissolving the bond of marriage. If he had reason to suppose himself to be the cause of unfruitfulness, he, as it were, put himself away, appointing a substitute, whose child, if one were born, was considered as legally belonging to the family of the husband, although the relation between the child and its real father was openly proclaimed. But there was another institution still more extraordinary than this. If, before he had children, a husband were slain in the field of battle, a successor to him, probably a slave, was appointed as to his marital rights, for the purpose of producing heirs and successors, not to themselves, but to the deceased husband!' Nothing can possibly demonstrate the artificial economy of the Dorians more palpably than these strange regulations.

For the laws which prescribed the appropriation of the lands, the value of money, and the punishment of criminals, we must refer the reader to Mr. Muller's volumes. From these subjects, which he treats with his wonted learning and skill, he passes to the history of architecture, that art in which the Dorians were so pre-eminent, and upon an order of which they bestowed the name of their nation, which to this hour remains attached to it. The remarks which the author makes upon the connexion between the architecture and character of the Dorians, may seem perhaps a little enthusiastic; but they will not, therefore, be considered as less interesting.

'The Doric character, in short, created the Doric architecture. In the