19. Contracts to Influence Legislation.-Persons who are personally interested in pending legislation, are not guilty of a breach, either of morals or of the law in calling the attention of the members of the legislative body to the measure whose passage they desire, nor can personal solicitation, within the bounds of moderation, unaccompanied by any promise of reward, be justly criticised.'

While a contract for the employment of a person to present a measure pending before the Legislature, or to be presented before it, is legitimate, where it involves the presentation before a committee, of facts and arguments favorable to such legislation, and may be fairly sustained, yet an attempt to secure legislative action or to influence the action of the executive or judicial officers by personal influence or solicitation, is against public policy; and all contracts and promises of reward for such services are void.'

A contract for the performance of lobby service for another for a consideration is against public policy and void.'

A contract founded on an agreement to obtain signatures for a protest, or to procure the passage of an Act of the Legislature by using personal influence, is void.*

A contract by which one party stipulates to employ a number of secret agents, in order to obtain the passage of a particular law, in consideration of a large sum of money, is void.

1Gulick v. Ward, 10 N. J. L. 102; Harris v. Simonson, 28 Hun, 318; Pingry V. Washburn, 1 Aik. 264; Fuller v. Dame, 18 Pick. 472; Clippinger v. Hepbaugh, 5 Watts & S. 315.

Lyon v. Mitchell, 36 N. Y. 241; Mills v. Mills, 40 N. Y. 546, 36 Barb. 474; Gray v. Hook, 4 N. Y. 449; Providence Tool Co. v. Norris, 6 U. S. 2 Wall. 45, 17 L. ed. 868; Marshall v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. 57 U. S. 16 How. 314, 14 L. ed. 953; McKee v. Cheney, 52 How. Pr. 144; Edwards v. Grand Junction R. Co. 1 Myl. & C. 650; Harris v. Roof, 10 Barb. 489; Rose v. Truax, 21 Barb. 361; Powers v. Skinner, 34 Vt. 274; Smith v. Applegate, 25 N. J. L. 352; Frost v. Belmont, 6 Allen, 152; Hatzfield v. Gulden, 7 Watts, 152; Martin v. Second & Third St. Pass. R. Co. 3 Phila. 316; Cunningham v. Cunningham, 18 B. Mon. 19; Wood v. McCann, 6 Dana, 366; Hunt v. Test, 8 Ala. 713; McBratney v. Chandler, 22 Kan. 692; Filson v. Himes, 5 Pa. 452; Cummings v. Saux, 30 La. Ann. 207; Frankfort v. Winterport, 54 Me. 250; Usher v. McBratney, 3 Dill, 385; Coquillard v. Bearss, 21 Ind. 479 As to presumption of illegality, see Millbank v. Jones, 38 N. Y. S.

R. 910. 'Burke v. Child (Trist v. Child), 88 U. S. 21 Wall. 441, 22 L. ed. 623; Sweeny v. McLeod, 18 Or. 330.

Hatzfield v. Gulden, 7 Watts, 152; Clippinger v. Hepbaugh, 3 Watts & S.

315.

Marshall v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. 57 U. S. 16 How. 314, 14 L. ed. 953.

Contingent compensation for securing the passage of legislation is likely to induce an attempt to use improper means to accomplish success, and such contracts are looked upon with disfavor by the courts.'

§ 20. Contracts Influencing Elections or Appointments.-All agreements which interfere with the integrity, discretion, or freedom of the electing or appointing power are illegal.'

Promises by candidates for offices, made with intention to swerve a voter from his duty to consider qualification for office only, and to trammel the free exercise of his right of suffrage, are subversive of the plainest dictates of public policy."

The agreement of a candidate for public office that he will reimburse an association promoting his canvass, for its expenses for advertising, clerk hire, room rent, etc., is unlawful and void. So a contract to obtain, by private means, appointment to a public office is void."

A promise to aid in the election of another cannot be made the foundation of an action."

The sale of a person's influence to obtain office for another is void at common law."

Contracts for the sale of public office are void; or to secure support in a candidature. So of a contract to give a subordinate

'Marshall v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. 57 U. S. 16 How. 324, 14 L. ed. 957; Wood v. McCann, 6 Dana, 366; Gil v. Williams, 12 La. Ann. 219; Bryan v. Reynolds, 5 Wis. 200; Fuller v. Dame, 18 Pick. 472; Weed v. Black, 2 McArth. 268.

Hartwell v. Hartwell, 4 Ves. Jr. 811; Wallis v. Portland, 3 Ves. Jr. 494: Stevens v. Bagwell, 15 Ves. Jr. 139; Morris v. MacCullock, 2 Eden, 190; Hanington v. Du Chatel, 1 Bro. Ch. 124; Boynton v. Hubbard, 7 Mass. 112, 119; Ferris v. Adams, 23 Vt. 136; Hunter v. Nolf, 71 Pa. 282; Me guire v. Corwine, 101 U. S. 108, 25 L. ed. 899; Reed v. Peper Tobacco Warehouse Co. 2 Mo. App. 82; Guernsey v. Cook, 120 Mass. 501. See Phelan v. New York 38 N. Y. S. R. 805.

Alcord v. Collin, 20 Pick. 428.

Foley v. Speir, 1 Cent. Rep. 716, 100 N. Y. 552.

Meguire v. Corwine, 101 U. S. 108, 25 L. ed. 899; Filson v. Himes, 5 Pa. 452; Lewis, Crim. L. 123.

'Martin v. Wade, 37 Cal. 168; Nichols v. Mudgett, 32 Vt. 546; O'Rear v. Kiger, 10 Leigh, 622.

"Meguire v. Corwine, 101 U. S. 108, 25 L. ed. 899; Martin v. Wade, 37 Cal. 168; Carlton v. Whitcher, 5 N. H. 196; Cardigan v. Page, 6 N. H. 183; Boynton v. Hubbard,7 Mass. 119; Stroud v. Smith, 4 Houst. (Del.) 448; Gaston v. Drake, 14 Nev. 175.

"Outon v. Rodes, 3 A. K. Marsh. 433.

'Swayze v. Hull, 8 N. J. L. 66.

office in consideration of receiving personal services from the appointee.'

A agreed to pay B 2 per cent commission to procure a purchaser for the office of surveyor of baggage of the city of Q. Such an agreement is void.

A purchased the office of constable from the town of W. and afterwards brought suit to recover the price paid. He was non

suited."

An agreement between candidates that each will pay to the other one half of the net proceeds of his office is against public policy and cannot be enforced.*

An agreement to abandon an election contest in consideration of a sum of money is void.

So, an agreement between candi

dates that one shall withdraw in favor of the other is void.

A corrupt agreement between two officers in whom were vested certain county nominations for the allotment of certain votes, is a conspiracy at common law."

Any agreement to divide the emoluments of an office is void." A contract by which the salary of an office is assigned to other parties is void as against public policy.'

Where an outgoing city treasurer, a defaulter, and the candidate who, if elected, would be his successor in office (the malversations of the incumbent being known to such candidate at the time, and who, to screen his friend, the outgoing incumbent, from liability, consented to run for the office), entered into a contract wherein it was agreed that the defaulter incumbent should continue during the term of his successor to retain custody of the 'Waldron v. Evans, 1 Dak. 11.

2Stackpole v. Earle, 2 Wils. 133; Greenhood, Pub. Pol. 593.

Groton v. Waldoborough, 11 Me. 306. Contra, Whittingham v. Burgoyne, 8 Anstr. 900; Morris v. McCullock, Ambl. 432.

4Glover v. Taylor, 38 La. Ann. 634.

Coppock v. Bower, 4 Mees. & W. 361.

Ham v. Smith, 87 Pa. 63; Hunter v. Nolf, 71 Pa. 282; Martin v. Wade, 37 Cal. 168; Gray v. Hook, 4 N. Y. 449; Benedict v. Ehler, Lewis, Crim. L. 126.

"Com. v. Callaghan, 2 Va. Cas. 460.

Gaston. v. Drake, 14 Nev. 175.

Ryall v. Rowles, 2 Lead. Cas. Eq. *734, 1 Ves. Sr. 348; Davis v. Marlborough, 1 Swanst. 74; Cooper v. Reilly, 2 Sim. 560; Palmer v. Bate, 2 Brod. & B. 673; Pollock, Cont. 289; Leake, Cont. 727.

funds and generally perform all the duties of the office, his successor merely to sign the official reports and be treasurer merely in name, such contract is void as against public policy.'

It has been held that there is no difference in principle between the sale of an office for a valuable consideration and the disposing of it to the person who will perform its duties for the lowest compensation.'

To permit a candidate, in order to influence the voters, to hold out a promise that he will serve, in case of election, for less than the fees or salary fixed by law, is to thwart the will of the Legislature, and to defeat the object of the law. It is unjust to honest aspirants who rely upon their merits for political preferment, and tends to degrade the public service by making the offices not the reward of official capacity and honorable conduct, but the prey of those who by reason of incapacity to earn a livelihood in the common pursuits of life are willing to undertake the duties of public service for a less sum than the Legislature has deemed an adequate compensation for the work. It puts up the offices of the State to the lowest bidder and conduces to influence the voters to lose sight of the personal fitness of the respective candidates and to be governed by considerations of a false economy.'

It may be that an offer by a candidate for county clerk to remit, in case of his election, his fees for ex officio services, should be deemed an offer to contribute to each taxpayer his proportion of the taxes necessary to raise the sum so remitted.

In Carrothers v. Russell, 53 Iowa, 346, 36 Am. Rep. 222, the Supreme Court of Iowa held such a promise virtually an offer to bribe the voters. But it does not follow that, in the absence of some constitutional or statutory provision, a candidate who has made such promise and has received the highest number of votes and has taken the required oath can be removed from office by the mere proof of the fact in the proceeding in which he is sought to be ousted.

The case of Com. v. Jones, 10 Bush, 725, is an authority bear1Cobbs v. Hixson, 4 L. R. A. 682, 75 Mich. 260.

Bacon, Abr. Offices, F; Stockwith v. North, F. Moore, 781; Blachford v. Preston, 8 T. R. 89; 1 Hawk. P. C. chap. 67, § 3; State v. Dustin, 5 Or. 375.

State v. Humphrey, 5 L. R. A. 217, 74 Tex. 466.

ing upon the question. The Constitution of Kentucky requires every person before accepting office to take an oath that he has not fought a duel or sent or accepted a challenge to fight a duel. That Constitution also contained the further provision which declared that anyone who had fought a duel or sent or accepted a challenge should be disqualified from holding office. In the case cited it was held that a party who had been elected to an office and had qualified by taking the prescribed oath could not be deprived of his office until he had been legally convicted of the offense of having sent a challenge, in a proper criminal proceeding, upon an indictment charging him with that offense.

In Greenhood on Public Policy (p. 341) it is said: "So far has the doctrine, which prohibits anything which might influence the selection of public officers from other considerations than that of personal merit, been carried, that an election secured by a promise on the part of a candidate to perform the duties of the office to which he aspires, if elected, for less than the legal fees or salary, is void." The same doctrine is recognized in McCrary on Elections (3d ed.) § 181. If the authors mean to assert that an election so procured is void, without reference to the question whether or not a sufficient number of voters were induced by the promise, to vote for the successful candidate, to have changed the result, they are not supported by the authorities which they cite.

In Carrothers v. Russell, 53 Iowa, 346, the Iowa court held that a promise by a candidate to pay into the treasury, if elected, all the fees of his office in excess of $1,000, rendered him ineligi ble; but the decision is expressly based upon the provisions of a statute of that State.

In State v. Purdy, 36 Wis. 213, 17 Am. Rep. 485, it was decided, merely, that the votes which were procured by a similar promise should be rejected. To the same effect was State v. Olin, 23 Wis. 327.

In State v. Collier, 72 Mo. 13, 37 Am. Rep. 417, the information charged that a like promise had been made and that a sufficient number of votes had been influenced thereby to change the result. The court held that a demurrer to the information was improperly sustained; but it did not hold either that the election was void or that the candidate was disqualified.