troversy which arose about the measurement of the water and his refusal to comply with their demands, they declined to carry out the agree ment. Had the appellants been right in the position they assumed, they would have been justified in making this refusal. But we think that they were not right and, therefore, that they are bound to carry the agreement into effect, and that the appellee is entitled to receive the additional amount required, at the same rate, and on the same terms at which he was to have the original two hundred square inches. And as cleven cubic feet of water per second are due to the original aperture named, the additional twelve cubic feet per second would require, according to the report of the commissioner, a corresponding aperture of two hundred and seven teen square inches. For this additional amount of aperture the appellee should be charged, making the total amount four hundred and seventeen square inches. But to get the water to which it entitles him, as his fore-bay and apparatus are at present constructed, he is obliged to have, in reality, at the canal, an aperture of seven hundred square inches. The appellants were willing that he should have this aperture by increasing the height of the original aperture, but insisted that he should pay for seven hundred inches, according to the terms of the lease. Under the peculiar exigencies of the case, obstructed as the flow now is, we think that for the aperture 105*] named he should be charged *for only four hundred and seventeen square inches. This is precisely the view on which the decree below is based, and we think it is correct. But as the difficulty between the parties originated from the mistake made by the appellee himself in the construction of his fore-bay and works, he ought not to recover any costs from the ap pellants, either in this court or the court below. The result is that the decree must be affirmed, but without costs in either court. Mr. Justice Strong, dissenting: I dissent from the judgment given in this case. In my opinion, it practically makes a new contract for the parties; a contract to which they never agreed. It holds that what, at most, was an expectation of results amounts to a binding obligation that they shall follow. To this I cannot agree. Concurring in dissent, Mr. Justice Davis. ALBERT BOULDIN et al., Appts., v. JOSEPH ALEXANDER et al. 4. They cannot be removed from their trusteeship by a minority of the church society or meeting, without warning, and acting without charges, without citation or trial, and in direct contraven tion of the church rules. [No. 6.] Argued Dec. 5, 1872. Decided Dec. 16, 1872. APPEAL from the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. The case is stated by the court: Messrs. Moore & Riddle, for appellants: decree which can be properly made in the cause, It seems to us to be very clear, that the only would be to reverse the decree below, with directions that the bill be dismissed as to every matter except the settlement between the church and Bouldin, as to their financial differences. have no jurisdiction of any matter set up in In support of our position, that the courts this bill, except the settlement of the accounts of Bouldin with the church, we refer the court to the case of Tartar v. Gibbs, 24 Md. 323. The complainants have neither alleged nor proven any facts showing the usages of the church, nor the law of its organization, both of which are essential to the obtaining of the relief sought by them. See the case of Vasconcellos v. Farraria, 27 Ill. 237; Shannon v. Frost, 3 B. Mon. 253; Sutter v. Dutch Church, 42 Pa. 503. the church and formed a new congregation, The fact that the appellees withdrew from amounted to a relinquishment of all their rights in regard to the church from which they withdrew. 48 Pa. St. 20; see also, the case of M. E. Ch. v. Wood, 5 Ohio, 283; also, Harper v. Straws, 14 B. Mon. 48; Venable v. Coffman, 2 W. Va. 310; Atty. Gen v. Dublin, 38 N. H. 459; Hadden v. Chorn, 8 B. Mon. 70. Mr. Thomas Wilson, for appellees: The appellees will maintain the following propositions of fact and law: 1. That the description of the lot conveyed by Bouldin to them as trustees by deed of date April 1, 1864, was erroneous, and the deed did not convey to the church the lot which was intended to be conveyed, and on which the church building was erected and now stands. 2. That a decree of a court of equity is necessary to correct this erroneous description. 3. That Bouldin collected or received the money raised by, or on behalf of, the congregation, for the purpose of erecting the church, and that he has refused and now refuses to render an account. 4. That these accounts are in such a confusion that it will be necessary to refer the same to the auditor of court for a statement thereof. 5. That by reason of this complication of Title of trustees in lands-when trustees re- money accounts, the refusal of Bouldin to setmovable-excommunication-act of minor-tle, and for other causes the present unhappy (See S. C. 15 Wall. 131-140.) ity of society. 2. They were not removable at the will of the cestui que use and without cause. 3. Trustees are not necessarily communing members of the church. Excommunication from communing membership does not disqualify them, even If the excision be regular. differences arose. 6. That in these differences there arose two parties, one of which is represented by the complainants, numbering 242, and the other represented by the respondents, numbering 23. 7. That the complainants were, at the commencement of the suit and are now, the regular and legally elected trustees of said church. Baptist Church Manual( p. 28, sec. 3; Bap. tist Church Directory. D. 58. note 4; Church Manual, pp. 102, 103, 111, 112; Watson v. -Jones, 13 Wall. 724, 20 L. ed. 675; Shannon v. Frost, 3 B. Mon. 253; Smith v. Nelson, 18 Vt. 511; Goescle v. Bimeler, 14 How. 608; Field v. Field, 9 Wend. 394; People v. Peck, 11 Wend. 604, 610. 8. That, as such trustees, they were legally entitled to the possession, custody and control of the church property, and therefore of the church building. Church Manual, pp. 37, 8; Baptist Church Directory, p. 27. 9. That at the time of, and for a long time before, the present eruption in said congregation, they, as such trustees, had peaceable and quiet possession of said church building. 10. That shortly after the outbreak the respondents commenced their suit before Charles Walter, Esq., J. P., to obtain possession of the church building by action of forcible entry and detainer. conveyed in fee simple to Joseph Alexander, Charles Alexander, John Middleton, and William Minor, four of the present complainants as trustees of the church, a lot of ground with the buildings thereon, "to be used as the Third Baptist Church." Having thus secured a lot, the society proceeded to make arrangements for erecting a church building thereon. Some money was collected, most if not all of which went into the hands of Albert Bouldin, who was then acting as pastor of the church, and under his superintendence a building was erected. Very soon, however, after its completion, dissensions arose, and the church was divided into two parties, each claiming to be the true "Third Colored Baptist Church." On the 7th of June, 1867, one of these parties, being a very small minority of the church, and being probably about fifteen in number, including Mr. Bouldin, resolved to "turn out" four trustees without naming them, and proceeded to elect four others in their stead. The persons thus elected were Anson Robinson, Julius Bouldin, William Pearson, and Charles Pearson. The attempted ejection of the old trustees was without citation, without trial, and without charges preferred. It was also at a time when, according to the rules of the church, an election was not in order. The church was congregational 13. That by reason of his conduct in this be- in its government, as all Baptist churches are, half, and for other causes, charges were pre- but it had the general rules that exist in Bapferred against the respondent Bouldin by the tist churches generally, which provide that members of the congregation; that he was trustees shall be elected in January of every duly notified of their pendency; that he refused year, or in case of failure to hold the election, to attend and make defense; that there was a at the next regular meeting for business. A few hearing and trial, and he was, in assordance days afterward, on the 10th or 17th of June, with the disciple and usages of the church, 1869, the same minority proceeded to "turn legally expelled from further communion with out" forty-one members of the church, also this congregation. (The complainants admit without citation or trial. Having thus, as they that this expulsion does not affect his right to thought, secured the control of the church propreceive and recover the money due him on ac-erty in their own hands, some of the persons counts stated between them. They also admit the right of the minority to employ and continue Bouldin as their pastor, if they see fit). Baptist Church Directory note 2; p. 74, notes 3-5. 11. That pending this action, and before the return day of the process, the respondents and those acting in their behalf, broke open said church building and took forcible possession thereof, and then dismissed their action before Squire Walter. 12. That they have held that possession up to the present time. 14. That the body of the church is represented by the complainants, and it, and those who adhere with them, are entitled to all the rights and franchises belonging to the congregation or the trustees representing it. 15. The independent congregational character of Baptist churches. Baptist Church Directory, p. 56, 57, note 2; p. 58, notes 3, 7; p. 73, note 2; p. 129, 131, 181, 239; Church Manual, pp. 102, 111, 112; Buck's Theological Dictionary; McClintock & Strong's Cyclodedit of Biblical and Theological Literature, tit. Baptist. Mr. Justice Strong delivered the opinion of the court: This controversy originated in an unincorporated religious society organized in the year 1857, and calling itself "The Third Baptist Church," in the city of Washington. To understand its inerits, a very brief statement of facts, as they appear in evidence, is all that is necessary. At first the congregation out of which the church was formed was small in numbers and feeble in resources. For some years it had no convenient church buildings; but on the first of April, 1864, Albert Bouldin and wife elected to be trustees in place of former trustees, caused the locks to be taken from the church doors and new locks to be put on in their places, and they, with Mr. Bouldin, have since claimed and retained possession of the property. Such was the condition of things in the summer of 1867. On the 28th of September of that year, this bill was filed. The complainants are the four trustees named in the deed of the church lot from Bouldin and wife, and also seven other persons, who claim to have been elected trustees of the church on the 15th day of February, 1867, at the annual election provided for by the general rules of Baptist churches. The bill is brought against Albert Bouldin, who had received the money of the church, and who claimed to be a trustee, without, however, any election, and against three of the persons claiming to have been elected trustees at the meeting of the minority on the 7th of June, who took possession of the church, together with some other trustees in deeds of trust for Albert Bouldin. It seeks discovery and an account of the money received and expended by Bouldin, a release of deeds of trust of the church property, given to secure notes held by Bouldin, a surrender and cancellation of the notes, alleging them to have been satisfied, and the restoration of possession of the church property to the plaintiffs as the lawful trustees. It seeks also an injunction against future interference by the defendants with the church property, against the sale of the nctes, and against sale or foreclosure under the deed of trust. The bill also charges that there was a plain mistake in the deed from Bouldin and wife to the trustees of the church, which it prays to have corrected. In the court below a decree was rendered in favor of the complainants, sustaining all their claims, except that reference was made to a master to ascertain and report the state of accounts. It is now contended that the court erroneous ly decided the complainants were, at the time of the commencement of the suit, the legally constituted trustees of the church. But it is very evident that Joseph Alexander, Charles Alexander, John Middleton, and William Minor were then trustees for the church of the church property, unless they had been removed by the action of the minority on the 7th of June, 1867. They were nominated as trustees in the deed from Bouldin and wife, and they had never surrendered or renounced their trust. And we think the evidence is satisfactory, that Joseph Alexander, Henry Watson, Henry Scott, John Wiggins, John Middleton, William Laws, and Willis J. Minor were then general trustees of the church, unless they, or some of them, had been removed by the action of the same minority, on the day last mentioned. It is not to be overlooked that we are not now called upon to decide who were church officers. The case involves no such question. What we have to decide is: where was the legal ownership of the property? The question respects temporalities, and temporalities alone. That the attempt made on the 7th of June, 1867, to remove the trustees then holding was inoperative, is not to be doubted in view of the facts which we have just stated. Those who held under the deed were not removable at the will of the cestui que use, and without cause. And had there been cause, none was shown. No ecclesiastical authority has decided that the defendants, or any of them, were legitimate trustees of the church, or of its property. Even if it be assumed that 138] it was in the power of the church *to substitute other trustees for those named in the deed, it may not be admitted that a small minority of the church, convened without no tice of their intention, in the absence of the trustees, and without any complaint against them or notice of complaint, could devest them of their legal interest and substitute other persons to the enjoyment of their rights. troversy arose, show that on the 15th of February, 1867, at a regular church meeting, the seven persons who with the church iot trustees are complainants in this bill were elected trustees of the church for the ensuing year. This was before any division took place in the society. It is true, Mr. Bouldin testified that the minute of an election is a forgery, and that no such election ever took place. But we are satisfied that he is mistaken. An examination of the minute book leaves no doubt in our minds that the election was made as claimed by the complainants, and that they were elected by a number of votes averaging more than two hundred. The entry in the minute book is attested by the church clerk. It is in regular order, and there are subsequent minutes in the same book made by Bouldin himself. The court below was, therefore, as we think, not in error in holding that the complainants were the legally constituted trustees at the time when this suit was commenced. And if they were the rightful *trustees, the decree for an account, for [*139 the surrender of the church property, and indeed the entire decree made by the court, was a matter of course upon the evidence. But the appellants insist that the complainants and those who acted with them, withdrew from the church and formed a new congregation. This, they argue, was a relinquishment of all their rights in the Third Colored Baptist Church. It may be conceded that withdrawal from a church and uniting with another church or denomination is a relinquishment of all rights in the church abandoned. But there is no sufficient evidence in this case that any new congregation was formed, or that there was any withdrawal from the church, or union with any other. The complainants, and those who acted with them, after the church building had been wrested from the custody and control of the rightful trustees, and after very many of them had been excommunicated in mass by the small minority, held their religious services at another place. But they formed no new organization. They still had the same trustees, the same deacons, and they claimed to be the Third Colored Baptist Church, and as such they were recognized by councils of Baptist churches duly called, and by the Philadelphia Baptist Association, an ecclesiastical body with which the church was associated. That body, it is true, was not a judicatory. Its action was not conclusive of any rights. But the fact that the complainants and those acting with them applied for recognition as the Third Colored Baptist Church, and that the association thus recognized them, is persuasive evidence that they were not seceders, and that their rights have not been forfeited. It is equally true that the seven persons who sue as church trustees were not removed by the action of the minority meeting held on the 7th of June, 1867. Indeed, that action does not seem to have been an attempt to remove them. It was voted to turn out four trustees, but who the trustees intended were, nowhere appears. This is not a question of membership of the None were named. In view of the fact that church, nor of the rights of members as such. the number was four, it is presumable the It may be conceded that we have no power to meeting had in view the four trustees of the revise or question ordinary acts of church dischurch lot, named in Bouldin's deed, and not cipline, or of excision from membership. We the ordinary trustees of the church, those com- have only to do with rights of property. As was templated by the Baptist Church Manual. said in Shannon v. Frost, 3 B. Mon. 253, we canThat Manual provides, that in every church not decide who ought to be members *of [*140 seven trustees shall be elected annually, in the church, nor whether the excommunicated January, or at the next regular church meeting have been regularly or irregularly cut off. We thereafter. And the church books, which ap- must take the fact of excommunication as conpear to have been kept with considerable regu-clusive proof that the persons exscinded are not larity from September 2, 1857, until this con- members. But we may inquire whether the res olution of expulsion was the act of the church. or of persons who were not the church, and who consequently had no right to excommunicate others. And, thus inquiring, we hold that the action of the small minority, on the 7th and 10th of June, 1867, by which the old trustees were attempted to be removed, and by which a large number of the church members were at tempted to be exscinded, was not the action of the church, and that it was wholly inoperative. In a congregational church, the majority, if they adhere to the organization and to the doctrines, represent the church. An expulsion of the majority by a minority is a void act. We need not, however, dwell upon this. Certain it is, that trustees are not necessarily communing members of the church. Excommunication from communing membership does not disqualify them, even if the excision be regular. Still more certain is it that they cannot be removed from their trusteeship by a minority of the church society or meeting, without warning and acting without charges, without citation or trial, and in direct contravention of the church rules. The decree of the Supreme Court is affirmed. CHAS. G. SCOTT, John S. Bestick and Saml. S. Griffith, Exrs. of Phillip Pennywit, Deceased, Plffs. in Err., v. ice by appointment of the military governor of the state of Louisiana, and under no other authority, the judgment was void. This raised, though somewhat obscurely, the question whether the court so held had any jurisdiction under the Constitution of the United States, and the question was decided against the privilege claimed under the Constitution by the defendants. We cannot, therefore, dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction, although we may have a very clear conviction that the decision of the state court was correct. H. R. HALL et al., Plffs. in Err., V. WILLIAM JORDAN. (See S. C. 15 Wall. 393-395.) Jurisdiction over state decision-stamp act. Under the act of Congress which provides that no deed not properly stamped shall be received in evidence, where the decision of the state court was against the right claimed by the defendant under the act of Congress, and necessarily involved its construction, the objection, however frivolous, raised a question under the 25th section of the judiciary act, the decision of which may be revised in this court upon a writ of error. [No. 365.] JOHN EATON and Wm. H. Betterton, late Submitted Dec. 6, 1872. Decided Dec. 16, 1872. Partners, as Eaton & Betterton. (See S. C. 15 Wall. 380, 381.) Jurisdiction over state judgment. Where the question raised in the state court was whether a court held by a judge appointed by a military governor had any jurisdiction under the Constitution of the United States, and the question was decided against the privilege claimed under the Constitution, this court will not dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction, although it may think the decision of the state court was correct. [No. 68.] Submitted Dec. 6, 1872. Decided Dec. 16, 1872. N ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State I of Tennessee. On motion to dismiss. The bill in this case was filed by the defendant in error, in the court of chancery for Lauderdale county, Tennessee, to enforce a vendor's lien upon certain lands and for an account. A decree having been entered in favor of the complainant and affirmed, upon appeal, by the supreme court of the state, the respondents sued out this writ of error. The facts of the case are sufficiently stated by the court, so far as regards this motion. Mr. F. P. Stanton for defendant in error. Messrs. R. Johnson and J. H. Embry for IN ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State plaintiff in error. of Arkansas. On motion to dismiss. The action was brought in Arkansas, upon the record of a judgment rendered by the fourth district court of New Orleans, which was held by a judge appointed by a military governor of Louisiana; and the court was asked to hold that, if it appeared from the evidence that the judge who presided in said court and rendered the judgment, held the of Mr. Chief Justice Chase delivered the opinion of the court: This is a motion to dismiss a writ of error, addressed to the supreme court of Tennessee. The defendant claimed that a deed offered in evidence was void, because the stamps upon it amounted only to $13 when they should have been $13.50. The court admitted the deed, aldeed not properly stamped should be received though the act of Congress provided that no in evidence. The decision was against the right claimed by the defendant under the act of Congress, and necessarily involved its construction. However frivolous the objection, it undoubtedly raised a question under the 25th section of the judiciary act, the decision of which may be revised in this court upon a writ of error. The motion to dismiss, therefore, must be denied. of state court-see note to Hamblin v. Land Co. 37 NOTE.- Federal jurisdiction to review judgment L. ed. U. S. 267. HENRY S. DEXTER, Plff. in Err., v. MARY K. HALL et al. (See S. C. 15 Wall. 9-28.) Power of attorney, when ceases-medical expert, how examined-opinion upon hypothetical facts-ejectment, evidence in. 1. The power of attorney of a lunatic or of a non compos mentis is void. 2. When evidence has been given, tending to show the insanity of a grantor, and other evidence tending to show his sanity, a medical expert cannot be asked his opinion respecting that person's sanity or insanity, forming his opinion from the facts and symptoms detailed in the evidence. 3. Such a witness may be asked his opinion upon a case hypothetically stated, or upon a case where the facts are certain and found; but he will not be allowed to determine from the evidence what the facts are, and to give his opinion upon them. 4. Under the California statutes of limitation, a plaintiff in ejectment who has established a legal titie in himself is presumed to have an actual possession of the land within five years next prior to a commencement of his suit, unless an actual, adverse possession by another is affirmatively proved. [No. 1.] IN Argued Dec. 4, 1872. Decided Jan. 6, 1873. IN ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of California. This was an action of ejectment commenced in the court below by the defendants in error, to recover a certain lot of land in the city of San Francisco. The plaintiffs below claimed as heirs of one John Hall. The defendants set up a power of attorney executed by the said Hall to one James W. Harris, substitution by Harris of David B. Rising, and mesne conveyances from Rising. To avoid this title, the plaintiffs gave evidence to show the insanity of John Hall at the time he executed the power of attorney to Harris. The defendants also relied on the statute of limitations. The widow of John Hall, who was one of the original plaintiffs, died during the pendency of the suit, and it is now prosecuted by the children alone. Judgment was rendered in the court below for the plaintiffs. All the defendants, except Dexter, paid the heirs for their respective titles, and the suit was dismissed as to them. Dexter sued out this writ of error, relying upon exceptions to the charge of the judge, and also to the admission and refusal of certain evidence. The nature of these exceptions appears in the opinion. NOTE.-Insanity in avoidance of deeds-see note to Harding v. Handy, 6 L. ed. 429. Power of attorney revoked by death or insanity of principal-see note to Hunt v. Rousmanier, 5 L. ed. 589. Evidence, opinions as to sanity. Mr. Roscoe Conkling, for plaintiff in er ror: The plaintiff in error entered and held pos. session under claim and color of a title, to wit: a deed from Page, who held by deed from John Hall and wife, under their power of attorney. This was good to found an adverse possession at least. McDonald v. Bear River, etc., Co. 13 Cal. 220; Nieto v. Carpenter, 21 Cal. 455; Williams v. Council, 4 Jones' Law (N. C.) 206; Harden v. Barrett, 6 Jones' Law (N. C.) 159; Hester v. Coats, 22 Ga. 56; Grant v. Fowler, 39 N. H. 101; Farrar v. Fessenden, 39 N. H. 268; St. Louis v. Gorman, 29 Mo. 593; Vancleave v. Milliken, 13 Ind. 105; Edgerton v. Bird, 6 Wis. 527; Dickinson v. Breeden, 30 Ill. 279; Munro v. Merchant, 28 N. Y. 9, 41; Root v. McFerrin, 37 Miss. 17. Even if the deed to Page was void, it gave color of title to a party in actual possession, claiming under it, as the cases cited abundantly show. Mr. Dexter held by a title not merely adverse to the plaintiffs, but one derived from the plaintiff's intestate. If, then, a conveyance from one having no title, or a defective title, might ripen into a fee, much more would a title coming directly from the party through or under whom the plaintiffs claim become a fee. Assuming, for the purposes of the argument, that Hall was insane when he executed the power of attorney, we insist that neither the power nor the deed executed under it was void. It may have been voidable, but it was not void. Suppose, instead of a power of attorney, the instrument had been a contract for the sale of the land, acknowledged by Hall and wife, and that the contract had been assigned through Page to Dexter for value; the same objection would lie against it as against the power of attorney. The consideration being adequate, and the transaction being free from fraud and without notice, a court of equity would enforce it against both. Jackson v. Gumaer, 2 Cow. 552; Ingraham v. Baldwin, 12 Barb. 9; S. C. 9 N. Y. 45; Story, Eq. Jur. secs. 751, 771, 772, 774, 788, and notes; Willard, Eq. Jur. (N. Y.) 196, 201-203, 297, and notes; Williston v. Williston, 41 Barb. 635; Kerr v. Purdy, 50 Barb. 25; Cuff v. Dorland, 50 Barb. 438; Freeman v. Freeman, 51 Barb. 306; Bruce v. Tilson, 25 N. Y. 194; Pittsford, 7 Vt. 158; Morse v. Crawford, 17 Vt. 499, 44 Am. Dec. 349; Clifford v. Richardson, 18 Vt. 620; Cram v. Cram, 33 Vt. 15; Cavendish v. Troy, 41 Vt. 99; Potts v. House, 6 Ga. 324; Berry v. State, 10 Ga. 511; Walker v. Walker, 14 Ga. 242; Grant v. Thompson, 4 Conn. 203, 10 Am. Dec. 119; Kinne v. Kinne, 9 Conn. 102, 21 Am. Dec. 732; Dunham's Appeal, 27 Conn. 192; Temple v. Temple, 1 Hen. & Munf., 476; Burton v. Scott, 3 Rand. 399; Den v. Gibbons, 2 Zab., 117; Whitenack v. Stryker, 1 Green, Ch. 8; Sloan v. Maxwell, 2 Green, Ch. 563; In re Vanauken, 2 Stock. 192; Turner v. Cheese A non-professional witness after stating facts upon which his opinion is founded may state his opinion as to sanity. Pidcock v. Potter, 68 Pa. 342, 8 Am. Rep. 181; 1 Redfield on Wills, 141; Rambler v. Tryon, 7 S. & R. 90, 10 Am. Dec. 444; Wogan v. Small. 11 S. & R. 141; Grabill v. Barr, 5 Pa. 441; Wilkinson v. Pearson, 23 Pa. 117; Brickerman, 15 N. J. Ch. 243; Garrison v. Garrison, 15 v. Lightner, 40 Fa. 199; Titlow v. Titlow, 54 Pa. 216; Dickinson v. Dickinson, 61 Pa. 401; Stewart v. Redditt, 3 Md. 67; Stewart v. Spedden, 5 Md. 433; Dorsey v. Warfield, 7 Md. 65; Weems v. Weems, 19 Md. 334; Kelly v. McGuire, 15 Ark. 555 Abraham v. Wilkins, 17 Ark. 292; Stewart v. Lispenard, 26 Wend. 291; Culver v. Haslem, 7 Barb. 314; De Witt v. Barley, 13 Barb. 550, 9 N. Y. 371. 17 N. Y. 340; Delafield v. Parish, 25 N. Y. 37; Clapp v. Fullerton, 34 N. Y. 190; Clarke v. Sawyer, 3 Sand. Ch. 357; Hoge v. Fisher, Pet. C. C. 163; Harrison v. Rowan, 3 Wash 580; Lester v. N. J. Ch. 266; Mercer v. Kelso, 4 Gratt. 106; Clary v. Clary, 2 Ired. 78: Heyward v. Hazard, 1 Bay. 335; Clark v. State, 12 Ohio, 483; White v. Bailey, 10 Mich. 155; Beaubien v. Cicotte, 12 Mich. 459; Roberts v. Trawick, 13 Ala. 68; Norris v. State, 16 Ala. 776; Florey v. Florey, 24 Ala. 241; Powell v. State, 25 Ala. 21; Stubbs v. Houston, 23 Ala. 355; In re Carmichael, 36 Ala. 514 Doe v. Reagan, 5 Blackf. 217, 33 Am. Dec. 466; Pelamourges v. Clark, 9 Iowa, 1; State v. Felter, 25 Iowa, 67: Roe v. Taylor, 45 Ill. 485; Hardy v. Merrill, 56 N. H. 227, 22 Am. Rep. 44, Overrulinf Boardman v. Woodman, 47 N. H. 120; State v. Pike, 49 N. H. |