contract or otherwise, will be protected and enforced by a court of equity, pp. 227, 228.

Cited and principle applied in Jones v. Slauson, 33 Fed. 634, holding transfer of lease in fraud of creditors by insolvent, before going into bankruptcy, may be reached by assignee in hands of any subsequent transferees with knowledge, though they be holding under a new lease, executed after expiration of bankrupt's term. Cited in 28 Am. Dec. 436, note on syllabus, collecting authorities.

Deeds.- Equity can give no relief, where condition precedent is not performed, pp. 229, 230.

Cited and principle applied in Giddings v. Insurance Co., 102 U. S. 112, 26 L. 93, see 37 Am. Rep. 320, holding suit not maintainable, the payment of the premium in the lifetime of the insured being a condition precedent to company's liability; Francis v. Deming, 59 Conn. 112, 21 Atl. 1007, holding that payment of judgment was a condition precedent, and no equitable relief could be given. See note, 70 Am. St. Rep. 829.

Distinguished in Gates v. Parmly, 93 Wis. 306, 66 N. W. 257, holding that equity will relieve against a penalty, even though it is in the form of a condition precedent.

Deeds.- Conditions subsequent will not be enforced in an action at law unless there has been a re-entry, or something equivalent thereto, p. 230.

Cited and principle applied in Ruch v. Rock Island, 97 U. S. 696, 24 L. 1102, holding that breach of conditions subsequent vests in grantor or his heirs a right of action, not transferable, but which they can enforce by a sult for the land; State v. Boyce, 43 Ohio St. 50, 52, 1 N. E. 220, 221, where conditions of ordinance do not clearly appear to be conditions precedent, they will be regarded as conditions subsequent; Branch v. Directors, etc., 11 Ohio C. C. 190, until re-entry after condition subsequent is broken, only a right of action subsists, and that cannot be conveyed to a stranger.

Railroads Contracts.- Where Texas, by plunging into war, rendered it impossible for railroad to perform all the conditions subsequent attached to a land grant, within the specified time, the court refused to recognize a forfeiture of the grant upon lapse of the prescribed time, but allowed a reasonable time for their per formance, p. 231.

Cited and principle applied in Carey v. Brown, 92 U. S. 173, 23 L 470, holding that a person cannot avail himself of a lien, the discharge of which has been fraudulently prevented by his own acts; Green v. Dyersburg, 2 Flipp. 499, F. C. 5,756, if no time be specified for the performance of the condition to construct the road, the law implies a reasonable time; Chicago v. Chicago, etc., R, R., 105 Ill. 78, holding right of railroad not lost, where city prevented the

completion of the road within specified time; Portland v. Terwilli ger, 16 Or. 477, 19 Pac. 97, where condition subsequent becomes unlawful, the estate is freed from the condition; Burnham v. Burnham, 79 Wis. 567, 48 N. W. 664, holding that devisee's right to the estate was not divested by his death prior to the expiration of the time in which he was required to reform. See note, 70 Am. St. Rep. 831.

Distinguished, per Harlan, J., dissenting, in Angle v. Chicago, etc., Ry., 151 U. S. 40, 41, maintaining that, in a legal sense, nonperformance of condition, as to completion of road, did not result from passage of act; Farmers' L. & T. Co. v. Chicago, etc., Ry.. 39 Fed. 152, holding revocation of grant by an unconstitutional act did not, in a legal sense, make performance of condition impossible. State, becoming party to contract, is governed by same rules of law as an individual under like circumstances, p. 232.

Cited and principle applied in Newton v. Commrs., 100 U. S. 557, 25 L. 710, declaring that there are cases in which a State may contract as an individual; Hall v. Wisconsin, 103 U. S. 11, 26 L. 305, holding that contract between a State and a party to perform certain duties for a specified time at a stipulated compensation is protected by the Constitution; Corbin v. Board of Co. Commrs., 1 McCrary, 527, 3 Fed. 362, holding that statute providing for return, with interest, of all money paid by purchaser at invalid tax sale, constitutes, when acted upon, a contract; Southern Ry. Co. v. North Carolina Ry. Co., 81 Fed. 600, holding that State becoming stockholder places itself on an equality with other stockholders; Roberts v. Columbet, 63 Cal. 24, holding that location was valid as between State and locator, and when land was listed to State, title passed to locator; Winona, etc., R. R. v. County of Deuel, 3 Dak. 13, 22, 12 N. W. 563, 568, holding that exemption from taxation in charter of railroad constitutes a contract; Hull v. State, 29 Fla. 89, 30 Am. St. Rep. 99, 11 So. 99, 16 L. R. A. 310, holding statute providing that purchaser at tax sale shall receive a conveyance, unless land be redeemed within one year, constitutes. when acted upon, a contract; Carr v. State, 127 Ind. 207, 22 Am. St. Rep. 627, 26 N. E. 779, 11 L. R. A. 371, and n., holding that State cannot invalidate contract by repealing statute authorizing it; The State v. Walker, 88 Mo. 283, holding that repeal of act ap pointing State claim agent revokes his authority. Cited in Cooke v. United States, 12 Blatchf. 59, note, F. C. 3,178, discussing whether the government is liable on its commercial paper like an indi vidual; dissenting opinion in Antoni v. Greenhow, 107 U. S. 795, 27 L. 478, 2 S. Ct. 113, majority holding obligation of contract with State not impaired by compelling holder of coupons, refused as taxes by collector, to pay taxes before he can get a mandamus. See dissenting opinion of Harlan, J., p. 809, 27 L. 483, 2 S. Ct. 125.

contract or otherwise, will be protected and enforced by a court of equity, pp. 227, 228.

Cited and principle applied in Jones v. Slauson, 33 Fed. 634, holding transfer of lease in fraud of creditors by insolvent, before going into bankruptcy, may be reached by assignee in hands of any subsequent transferees with knowledge, though they be holding under a new lease, executed after expiration of bankrupt's term. Cited in 28 Am. Dec. 436, note on syllabus, collecting authorities.

Deeds.- Equity can give no relief, where condition precedent is not performed, pp. 229, 230.

Cited and principle applied in Giddings v. Insurance Co., 102 U. S. 112, 26 L. 93, see 37 Am. Rep. 320, holding suit not maintainable, the payment of the premium in the lifetime of the insured being a condition precedent to company's liability; Francis v. Deming, 59 Conn. 112, 21 Atl. 1007, holding that payment of judgment was a condition precedent, and no equitable relief could be given. See note, 70 Am. St. Rep. 829.

Distinguished in Gates v. Parmly, 93 Wis. 306, 66 N. W. 257, holding that equity will relieve against a penalty, even though it is in the form of a condition precedent.

Deeds.- Conditions subsequent will not be enforced in an action at law unless there has been a re-entry, or something equivalent thereto, p. 230.

Cited and principle applied in Ruch v. Rock Island, 97 U. S. 696, 24 L. 1102, holding that breach of conditions subsequent vests in grantor or his heirs a right of action, not transferable, but which they can enforce by a sult for the land; State v. Boyce, 43 Ohio St. 50, 52, 1 N. E. 220, 221, where conditions of ordinance do not clearly appear to be conditions precedent, they will be regarded as conditions subsequent; Branch v. Directors, etc., 11 Ohio C. C. 190, until re-entry after condition subsequent is broken, only a right of action subsists, and that cannot be conveyed to a stranger.

Railroads Contracts.- Where Texas, by plunging into war, rendered it impossible for railroad to perform all the conditions subsequent attached to a land grant, within the specified time, the court refused to recognize a forfeiture of the grant upon lapse of the prescribed time, but allowed a reasonable time for their per formance, p. 231.

Cited and principle applied in Carey v. Brown, 92 U. S. 173, 23 L 470, holding that a person cannot avail himself of a lien, the discharge of which has been fraudulently prevented by his own acts; Green v. Dyersburg, 2 Flipp. 499, F. C. 5,756, if no time be specified for the performance of the condition to construct the road, the law implies a reasonable time; Chicago v. Chicago, etc., R. R., 105 Ill. 78, holding right of railroad not lost, where city prevented the

completion of the road within specified time; Portland v. Terwilliger, 16 Or. 477, 19 Pac. 97, where condition subsequent becomes unlawful, the estate is freed from the condition; Burnham v. Burnham, 79 Wis. 567, 48 N. W. 664, holding that devisee's right to the estate was not divested by his death prior to the expiration of the time in which he was required to reform. See note, 70 Am. St. Rep. 831.

Distinguished, per Harlan, J., dissenting, in Angle v. Chicago, etc., Ry., 151 U. S. 40, 41, maintaining that, in a legal sense, nonperformance of condition, as to completion of road, did not result from passage of act; Farmers' L. & T. Co. v. Chicago, etc., Ry.. 39 Fed. 152, holding revocation of grant by an unconstitutional act did not, in a legal sense, make performance of condition impossible. State, becoming party to contract, is governed by same rules of law as an individual under like circumstances, p. 232.

Cited and principle applied in Newton v. Commrs., 100 U. S. 557, 25 L. 710, declaring that there are cases in which a State may contract as an individual; Hall v. Wisconsin, 103 U. S. 11, 26 L. 305, holding that contract between a State and a party to perform certain duties for a specified time at a stipulated compensation is protected by the Constitution; Corbin v. Board of Co. Commrs.. 1 McCrary, 527, 3 Fed. 362, holding that statute providing for return, with interest, of all money paid by purchaser at invalid tax sale, constitutes, when acted upon, a contract; Southern Ry. Co. v. North Carolina Ry. Co., 81 Fed. 600, holding that State becoming stockholder places itself on an equality with other stockhold ers; Roberts v. Columbet, 63 Cal. 24, holding that location was valid as between State and locator, and when land was listed to State, title passed to locator; Winona, etc., R. R. v. County of Deuel. 3 Dak. 13, 22, 12 N. W. 563, 568, holding that exemption from taxation in charter of railroad constitutes a contract; Hull v. State, 29 Fla. 89, 30 Am. St. Rep. 99, 11 So. 99, 16 L. R. A. 310, holding statute providing that purchaser at tax sale shall receive a conveyance, unless land be redeemed within one year, constitutes, when acted upon, a contract; Carr v. State, 127 Ind. 207, 22 Am. St. Rep. 627, 26 N. E. 779, 11 L. R. A. 371, and n., holding that State cannot invalidate contract by repealing statute authorizing it; The State v. Walker, 88 Mo. 283, holding that repeal of act ap pointing State claim agent revokes his authority. Cited in Cooke v. United States, 12 Blatchf. 59, note, F. C. 3,178, discussing whether the government is liable on its commercial paper like an individual; dissenting opinion in Antoni v. Greenhow, 107 U. S. 795, 27 L. 478, 2 S. Ct. 113, majority holding obligation of contract with State not impaired by compelling holder of coupons, refused as taxes by collector, to pay taxes before he can get a mandamus. See dissenting opinion of Harlan, J., p. 809, 27 L. 483, 2 S. Ct. 125.

Distinguished in State v. Succession of Taylor, 33 La. Ann. 1272, holding that defendant in suit brought by State cannot require her to furnish security for costs.

Constitutional law. Act of incorporation and land grant of a railroad are contracts, within protection of Constitution, p. 232.

Cited and principle applied in Lerma v. Stevenson, 40 Fed. 359, holding that any act nullifying a Mexican grant would impair a contract; Houston, etc., Ry. Co. v. Texas, etc., Ry. Co., 70 Tex. 657, 8 S. W. 500, holding that charter by which land was granted to a railroad was a contract; Pearsall v. Great Nor. Ry., 161 U. S. 662, 40 L. 843, 16 S. Ct. 708, discussing doctrine of vested rights. Cited in 5 Am. St. Rep. 804, note.

16 Wall. 234-240, 21 L. 276, PIERCE v. CARSKADON.

Constitutional law. West Virginia act prohibiting, in effect, all suitors who could not take the "test oath" from petitioning for a rehearing, allowed under the prior law, is ex post facto because inflicting additional punishment for past acts, p. 239.

Cited in Burgess v. Salmon, 97 U. S. 385, 24 L. 1106, holding that increase of tax did not apply to tobacco stamped, sold and removed; 37 Am. St. Rep. 591, note.

Distinguished in Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 126, 32 L. 627, 9 S. Ct. 235, holding statute requiring a diploma is not unconstitutional, when enforced against a physician who had been practicing; Washington v. The State, 75 Ala. 586, 51 Am. Rep. 483, holding valid, constitutional provision disqualifying convicts from voting; Wooley v. Watkins, 2 Idaho, 566, 22 Pac. 106, holding valid, statute requiring the qualifications it prescribes, to be ascertained by oath of the electors.

16 Wall. 240-244, 21 L. 311, PEABODY v. STARK.

Statutes. In absence of a clear conviction on part of court, the unvarying interpretation of statute by internal revenue commissioner was adopted, p. 243.

Cited and relied upon in Hahn v. United States, 107 U. S. 406, 27 L. 529, 2 S. Ct. 497, Brown v. United States, 113 U. S. 571, 28 L. 1080, 5 S. Ct. 650, Schell v. Fauché, 138 U. S. 572, 34 L. 1043, 11 S. Ct. 380, United States v. Union, etc., Ry. Co., 37 Fed. 555, Rand v. United States, 38 Fed. 667, and Grossett v. Townsend, 86 Fed. 912, 56 U. S. App. 721, in construing various kinds of statutes. Cited, without particular application, in United States v. Myers, 3 Hughes, 245, F. C. 15,846. Cited in dissenting opinion in Northern, etc., R. Co. v. Barden, 46 Fed. 623, majority holding "mineral lands," in provision excluding same from grant to railroad, applied only to "known mineral lands.