OF THE

Supreme Court of the United States,

AT DECEMBER TERM, 1872.

(After five cases of preceding term.)

[Names of Counsel who actually appeared and argued the case, as shown by the "Minutę, Book," are given in heavy faced type.]

159*] *FREDERICK P. JAMES et al., Piffs. | "to the South Wisconsin Railroad Company, or

I States for the bastern District of WisUnisi cil passed an ordinance authorizing the issue of

cy of John N. Bonesteel, Appt.,

v.

constitutes the law. If it had been intended to | JAMES C. VOORI¡EES, Assignee in Bankruptlimit the scope of the act to pre-existing corporations, we cannot doubt that the term "heretofore," or some equivalent phrase, would have been employed in the proper place. This would have made the effect of the act what is con

JOHN N. BONESTEEL et al.

(See S. C. 16 Wall, 16-32.)

Equity relief, for fraud-married woman— property of, not liable for husband's debts.

1. Affirmative relief will not be granted in equity upon the ground of fraud unless it be made a distinct allegation in the bill, so that it may be put in issue by the pleadings.

2. Courts of equity cannot decree against distinct denials in the answer on the testimony of a single witness.

3. Under the laws of New York, a married woman may manage her separate property, through the agency of her husband, without subjecting it to the claims of his creditors. business, the application of a portion of the income to the support of the husband will not impair the title of the wife to the property. wife, as against her husband, it cannot be seized 5. Where the legal title to property is in the to satisfy his debts without proof that in the given case her title is merely colorable and fraudulent as against his creditors.

4. Where the husband has no interest in the

[No. 41.]

Submitted Nov. 14, 1872. Decided Jan. 6, 1873.

PPEAL from the Circuit Court of the Unit

tended for by the defendant in error. If the
word "hereafter" had been used, that would
have produced the opposite result. In either
case the effect of the term employed would have
been exclusive. In the former, the act would
have applied only to companies already exist-
ing, and in the latter, only to those of later
creation. The language is, "any other railroad
company duly incorporated and organized." No
tense is expressed and no particular time is in-
dicated. There is nothing which limits and
points its meaning any more to companies then,
than to those thereafter, organized. It is applica-
ble, and in all respects alike applicable, to both,
and we think both were intended to be included.
This view of the subject derives support from
the plain reason and object not only of this act,
but of the entire series of acts upon the subject.
They are all in pari materia, constitute a com-
mon context, and are to be regarded as if em-
braced in the same statute. Smith, Com. 758.
The presence of railroads, and especially of their
termini, are beneficial to cities by increasing
their business and promoting their growth.
Such works animate all the sources of local
prosperity. In the case before us, doubtless
quite as much was anticipated as could, under
any circumstances, have been realized. The leg-
islature intended to give the city the full ben-peal to this court.
efit of this policy. Companies organized and
those to be organized were alike important.
The restrictions and safeguards provided
162*] *are applicable to both. They are found
in the required sanction of the common council,
the approval of the voters, the limitation of the
maximum of credit to be given to each company
selected, and the limitation of the maximum of
the aggregate of such credits. No reason can
be imagined why one class should be embraced
and the other excluded. There is no considera.
tion, affirmative or negative, which does not ap.
ply alike to both. No discrimination is made
in any of the acts, and both classes are within
the language employed.

The construction practically given by the parties interested, as evinced by their conduct, is in harmony with the views we have expressed, and is not without weight. Meyer v. Muscatine, 1 Wall. 384, 17 L. ed. 564.

The common council deliberately passed the ordinances, the electors approved them, the mayor subscribed and issued the bonds, and the companies received them as valid. We do not learn that there was any doubt or dissent as to the question of legal authority until after both companies had become hopelessly bankrupt.

Aed States for the Eastern District of New
York.

The bill in this case was filed in the court below by the appellant, for the transfer of certain stock. A decree having been entered dismissing the said bill, the complainant took an ap

The case is further stated by the court. Mr. J. P. C. Cottrill, for appellant: The answer in fact admits that the transfer was partly in consideration of the bankrupt's services. It says that "at and previous to the time the bankrupt entered into Taylor's service, etc.," and that he agreed to give her husband employment, which would bring her a larger income and better support to the family; if his services, then, contributed to the consideration, the whole is liable to his creditors.

In Sherman v. Elder, 24 N. Y. 381, the rule is laid down that, if the wife allows her separate estate to be commingled with her hus band's, the whole is liable to his creditors.

See, also, In re Bonesteel (as to this very property), 2 Bank. Reg. 106.

The bankrupt lives in a house furnished by the wife's father at the rate of $5,000 a year and pays no rent. He receives a salary of $4,000. He has been bankrupt since 1859; has received $10,000 from Smith & Co., $2,000 from Page, Kidder & Co., and one fourth of the profits, which last year exceeded $30,000, and is now the President of this company.

The farthest the courts have gone under the married woman's act is to hold that the wife may appoint the husband her agent in respect to her separate estate and its management. They do not give her the time or services, the skill, brains or muscle of the husband.

Our attention has been called to numerous parallelisms of language in other statutes of Wisconsin, where there is, as in this case, clearly a prospective meaning. Doubtless such analogies might be found in abundance elsewhere. But we deem it unnecessary to pursue the sub-to ject further.

The act of New York of 1848 only allows her take property from "any person other than her husband."

The judgment of the Circuit Court is re- The act of New York of 1860 and 1862, alversed, and the cause will be remanded with di- lows her to engage in trade and protects her rections to proceed in conformity to this opin-earnings. Otherwise they do not change the sources from which she may acquire property,

ion.