or engagement was not provable under the act of 1841. 1 Smith, Lead. Cas. 1137, 6th Amer. ed. notes to Mills v. Auriol, by Hare. Judgment having been given for the plaintiff, the defendant sued out this writ of error. The case is further stated by the court. Messrs. Thos. J. Semmes and Wm. A. Meloy, for plaintiff in error: These indorsements are not entitled to any weight, for they have, in law, no date; they are what are termed acts sous seigne prive, acts under private signature (Revised C. C. 2240, 2241), and our courts have decided that "An act sous seigne prive has no date against third persons," "unless the real date be proved by evidence dehors the instrument." Corcoran v. Sheriff, 19 La. Ann. 140; 2 La. Ann. 311; 11 La. Ann. 275; 2 Mart. (N. S.) 171; 6 Mart. (N. S.) 332. In 1843 Martin Thomas was still living, and there was no certainty that his wife would ever 552*] survive *him. It was uncertain whether there would ever be any claim or demand. On what principle, then, could the covenant have been liquidated or reduced to present or probable value? If an action at law had been brought on the covenant at that time, nominal damages at most, if any damages at all could have been recovered. It did not come within the category of annuities and debts payable in future, which are absolute existing claims. If it had come within that category, the value of the wife's probability of survivorship after the death of her husband might have been calculated on the principles of life annuities. Had a proposition for a compromise of her right been made between her and the owner of the land, such a mode of estimation would have been "It seems, the indorsement of the last credit very proper. But, without authority from the is in the handwriting of the plaintiff, who testistatute, the assignee would not have been justified that it was made with the knowledge and fied in receiving such an estimate and making a dividend on it. It is unnecessary to review the authorities pro and con on the subject. They are quite numerous, and are mostly cited in the note of Mr. Hare, above referred to. The case is so clear that we have hardly entertained a doubt about it. The judgment is affirmed. Third parties are those who do not sign or produce the acts. The supreme court, of La. has decided what effect is to be given to indorsements on written obligations as affecting the question of prescription, and has said: consent of Valery J. Mayeux, one of the defendants, who promised to pay and offered to pay the balance of the note; but the witness, thinking the debt well secured, left it in the hands of the defendant. The prescription had accrued prior to the date of the credit last appearing on the note, and the act of 1858, requiring a written promise of the debtor to pay the debt in order to revive the obligation. We think the judgment correct. Judgment for defendant." Aveaux v. Mayeux, 23 La. Ann. 171; Mun WILLIAM E. ADGER, Admr. of John Adger, son v. Robertson, 19 La. Ann. 170. Deceased, Plff. in Err., v. The indorsement of partial payment is insufficient to interrupt prescription. Splane v. WILLIAM S. ALSTON, Exr. of William J. Daniel, 11 Rob. (La.) 449. (See S. C. 15 Wall. 555-562.) Civil War, effect of on statute of limitations— in Louisiana-what sufficient acknowledgment. 1. The precise period of time to be deducted for the interruption in the running of the statute of limitations to be made in consequence of the Civil War, is different for different states. 2. In La. it is the time which elapsed between Apr. 19, 1861, and Apr. 2, 1866. 3. Under a statute of La., that no verbal declara tlon of a deceased man shall be given in evidence to prove against him an acknowledgement of a debt, which would otherwise be barred by the stat ute of limitations; and that no written evidence shall be offered unless signed by him or his agent, oral statements of a deceased person, and indorsements of credits on a bond, not signed by such person, are not admissible against the administrator of such deceased. [No. 182.] Argued Mar. 21, 1873. Decided Apr. 28, 1873. This suit was brought Feb. 20, 1868, in the court below by the defendant in error, upon a bond payable Jan. 1, 1858. There were several indorsements upon the bond by the plaintiff, the last one dated Feb. 2, 1863. NOTE.-Suspension of statute of limitations during war-see note to Hanger v. Abbott, 6 Wall. 18 L. ed. U. S. 939. "We are of the opinion that the district judge did not err in refusing to consider the note as relieved from prescription by the indorsement which appeared on it. It matured in 1841, and on the back was written: 'Received on the within from J. E. Morhouse, $81 in gold, Dec. 11th, 1843.' This suit was brought in Mar., 1848. There was no evidence to show the indorsement, nor when it was put there." kell v. Pooley, 12 La. Ann. 661. "It appears by a comparison of dates above given, that both claims are prescribed." "The plaintiff was bound, therefore, as to that note, to establish a renunciation of prescription, and of this there is no legal evidence. Such renunciation can only be established by written evidence." Laws of 1858, No. 208, § 4. It will not be seriously contended, that the plaintiff can make such evidence for himself by simply writing upon the instrument the receipt which appears indorsed on it. Nor can the parol testimony of the plaintiff in the record be permitted to establish a renunciation. The statute of 1858 is positive in requiring the written proof." Offutt v. Chapman, 21 La. Ann. 293. "A verbal promise to pay after the lapse of the period of prescription did not operate a re nunciation thereof." Megibben v. Wilson, 21 La. Ann. 748. "In all such cases the acknowledgment or promise to pay shall be proven by written evi dence, signed by the parties deceased, or his specially authorized agent, or attorney in fact." Rec. Stat. of La. 1869, § 2819, p. 550. This law, originally enacted in 1858, has been in force ever since, and as part of the remedy, is applicable to this case. Story. Conf. L. 482, § 576; Hanger v. Abbott, 6 Wall. 538, 18 L. ed. 942. Mr. Wm. W. Boyce, for defendant in error: The acknowledgment or promise, required by section 2 of the act of 1858 to be proved by written evidence, applies only to express acknowledgments or promises, and not to implied acknowledgments or promises. Express acknowledgments or promises are spoken words. They can always be put in writing. Implied acknowledgments or promises are not spoken words, but are conclusions of law from antecedent facts. They cannot be in writing. This distinction is supported by analogies in the law. We conclude, then, that the judge below was right in holding that the payments indorsed on the bonds in this case were properly proved. Indorsements of partial payments, in the creditor's handwriting, on an obligation, interrupt prescription, when proved that they were made before prescription acquired, and against creditor's interest, and had been recognized by the obligor's debtor in solido. Beatty v. Clement, 12 La. Ann. 82; Bk. v. Bradford, 14 La. Ann. 154; see, further, 2 Greenl. Ev. § 444, 359; Chippendale v. Thurston, 4 Car. & P. 98 (19 E. C. L. 293); Pease v. Hirst, 10 B. & C. 122 (21 E. C. L. 38). Mr Justice Miller delivered the opinion of the court: The action in this case was brought in the circuit court of the United States for the disFor example, the liability of a guarantor un-trict of Louisiana, by Alston, a citizen of South der the statute of frauds being required to be in writing: "The question, whether each particular case comes within this clause of the statute (requiring the undertaking to be in writing) depends upon the fact of the original party remaining liable, coupled with the absence of any liability on the part of the defendant (the guarantor) or his property, except such as arises from his express promise." 1 Saund. 211, n. j; Smith, Cont. § 46, p. 35. Where the guarantor is liable on other grounds than his guaranty, the promise need not be in writing. Smith, Cont. § 48, n. a, p. 36. The principle deducible from these authorities is, that where the grantor's, liability arises only from his express promise, it must be in writing; but where the promise is implied, no writing is required. So the statute of frauds, which requires certain declarations of trust to be proved by writing, exempts trusts arising by implication of law; that is, express trusts must be evidenced by writing; implied trusts, not. Hill, Trust. 56. "The chief object of the statute of frauds was to prevent the facility to frauds and perjuries, held out by the enforcement of obligations depending for their evidence upon the unassisted memory of witnesses.' Smith, Cont. § 32, p. 29. This objection does not apply to proving a fact like payment. "The payment of principal or interest stands on a different footing from the making of promises, which are often rash or ill interpreted, while money is not usually paid without deliberation; and payment is an unequivocal act, so little liable to misconstruction as not to be open to the objection of an ordinary acknowledgment." Per Tyndal, Ch. J., in Wyatt v. Hodson, 8 Bing. 302 (21 E. C. L. 302). Carolina, against W. E. Adger, administrator of John Adger, the latter in his lifetime, and the former at the commencement of the action, citizens of Louisiana. The foundation of the action was a penal bond, conditioned for the payment of $4,500, with interest on the first day of January, 1858. The writ was served on the 29th of February, 1868, more than ten years after the note was due, and the law of prescription of the state of Louisiana was relied on as a defense, and this defense presents the only matter assigned for error in this court. The defendant pleaded, and relied on, the five years' prescription, in his answer, and also filed what is called in the practice of that state, the exception of the five years' prescription. This exception, according to that practice, was tried by the court without a jury, and on this trial the court ruled, as is shown by a bill of exceptions, "That the whole of the time of the late Rebellion or Civil War, viz.: from the 26th of January, 1861, when the ordinance of secession was passed by the Convention in Louisiana, to the 26th of August, 1866, when the Proclamation of the President was made, declaring the restoration of peace between the states, should be deducted from, and not counted as the time during which prescription ran; and therefore there was not a period of five years between the claim, as made in the plaintiff's petition, and the service of the citation in the suit at bar." This court has held, previous to the decision in the present case in the circuit, that as to the time of bringing suits in the court of claims under the captured and abandoned property act, which must be within two years after the close of the war, the Proclamation of[*557 the President of August 20, 1866, announcing that peace prevailed all over the United States, which had also been adopted by Congress as the close of the war in regard to certain mili to be the period of its termination. No period was fixed for its commencement, because none was necessary. "We think payment of money by one of sev-tary services, must, as to those matters, be held eral joint contractors, an acknowledgment not within the mischief or the remedy provided by the legislature against the effect of an oral promise." Wyatt v. Hodson, supra. The distinction between part payment and a verbal acknowledgment or promise is specially Assuming that the commencement of the war was the ordinance of secession of Louisiana. and its close the President's Proclamation of August 20th, 1866, and applying the principle of deducting the period of the war from the time in which prescription would have otherwise been counted, as held by this court in Hanger v. Abbott, 6 Wall. 532, 18 L. ed. 939, the ruling of the court below as shown by the bill of exceptions, on the exception of the five years' prescription, would have been sound. to be charged, or by his specially authorized agent or attorney in fact. The principle of this act is not new in the legislation of England and this country, and its purpose and construction are equally obvious and well understood. It is that no verbal declaration of a deceased man shall be given in evidence to prove against him an acknowledgment of the debt, which would otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations; and that no written evidence shall be offered unless signed by him or his agent. The case before us comes precisely within both the letter and spirit of the statute. The evidence offered was parol evidence, and if the indorsements of credits on the bond are not strictly parol they are not written evidence signed by the party to be charged; and the object is to prove an acknowledgment of the debt, against his succession, of a deceased man, by such evidence. There seems no room for doubt that whatever may be the rule as to parties who are alive, no such evidence is admissible against the administrator of a deceased party. But in the case of The Protector, 12 Wall. 700, 20 L. cd. 463, the question of the precise period of time to be deducted for the interruption in the running of the statute of limitations to be made in consequence of the civil war, was much considered; and the necessity of fixing the precise period was felt by the court to be very pressing. An examination of the several Proclamations of the President, and other acts of the political department of the government was had; and as a result it was found that different periods of time must be fixed for different states. It was held that the commence561*]ment of the war must be governed by the President's Proclamations of blockade, of which there were two. The first, dated April 19, 1861, embraced the states of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, On both points ruled by the court concerning Louisiana, and Texas; and the second, dated prescription we think the court erred, and the April 27, 1861, embraced the states of Virginia | judgment is, therefore, reversed, with directions and North Carolina. So there were two Proc- to grant a new trial. lamations declaring that the war had closed; the first, issued April 2, 1866, embraces the states of Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Mississippi, Tennessee, Alabama, Louisiana, and Arkansas; and the second, issued on the 20th of August, 1866, embracing the state of Texas. And it was held that these dates must be taken as the commencement and the close of the war as to those states respectively, in the question of the time to be deducted for the existence of that war, in counting time under the statutes of limitation. Under this rule the time which elapsed between the 19th of April, 1861, and the 2d April, 1866, being deducted from the time of the maturity of the bond and the service of the writ in this case, there still remained more than five years, and the plea of prescription in that view would be a bar. MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF v. MARY TERRY. (See S. C. 15 Wall. 580-591.) Suicide, when avoids policy-impaired reason -insane impulse. 1. The proviso in a life insurance policy, that if the insured shall die by his own hand, the policy shall be void, attaches, and there can be no recov ery if the assured, being in the possession of his ordinary reasoning faculties, from anger, pride, jealousy, or a desire to escape from the ills of life, intentionally takes his own life. 2. If the death is caused by the voluntary act of the assured, he knowing and intending that his death shall be the result of his act, but when his reasoning faculties are so far impaired that he is not able to understand the moral character, the general nature, consequences and effect of the act he is about to commit, or when he is impelled thereto by an insane impulse, which he has not the power to resist, such death is not within the contemplation of the parties to the contract, and the insurer is liable. [No. 166.] But the question of prescription was submitted to the jury on the facts, under the defense set up in the defendant's answer, and on the trial the court admitted as evidence, against the objection of the defendant, oral statements of conversations and admissions of decedent, tending to prove an acknowledgment of the Submitted Mar. 14, 1873. Decided Apr. 28, debt, as due, within the period of prescription, and also admitted for the same purpose indorsements on the bond of payments made of States for the District of Kansas. interest up to the year 1863. In this we think the court erred also. A statute of the legislature of Louisiana, of the year 1858, by its 2d section enacts that: hereafter, parol evidence shall not be received to prove any acknowledgment or promise of a party deceased to pay any debt or liability against his succession, in order to take such debt or liability out of prescription, or to revive the same after prescription has run or been completed; but in all such cases the acknowl562*]edgment or promise to pay shall be proved by written evidence, signed by the party 1873. 'N ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United NOTE. Effect of provision avoiding policy of life insurance in case of suicide. Under a proviso in the policy that it should be void if the assured "shall die by suicide." the asgured committed suicide while insane, but the policy was held void in the absence of evidence proving delirium or madness, or that the act was invol untary. Cooper v. Mass. Mut. L. Ins. Co. 102 Mass. 227. 3 Am. Rep. 451; Borradaile v. Hunter, 5 M. & G. 639; Clift v. Schwabe, 3 C. B. 437. Where the policy contains a provision that it shall be void, if the assured "shall die by suicide" or shall die by his own hand," it has been held that the condition refers to a voluntary act when he was capable of distinguishing right from wrong, and that death by suicide while so insane as not The facts of this case which was brought in 121 Pa. 466; Billmeyer v. Guar. Life Ins. Co. of the district court of Douglas Co., Kan. by the V. Y. U. S. Cir. Ct. Western Dist. of Pa. June defendant in error, and was removed upon pe- 1872 (not reported). tition of the defendant to the court below, are sufficiently stated by the court. The United States circuit court for Connecticut has, in a recent case, adopted the rule Messrs. Henry E. Davies and Julian T. Da-here contended for. vies, for plaintiff in error: Gay v. Life Ins. Co. 9 Blatchf. 142; 2 Bigelow Life & Acc. Ins. Cas. 4. The law, as understood by the learned judge, and the correct rule, as we contend, was there stated by him to the jury as follows: In cases of self-killing by one perfectly sane, all the three elements necessary to make the act that of the "own hand" of the self-destroyer are present. The act of self-destruction by one having sufficient reason to understand the na- "We do instruct you, in view of the claims ture and physical consequences of his act is no and the concessions, expressed or implied, in less the work of "his own hand." With this the positions taken by counsel, that, if Sheridegree of reasoning power, the suicide is cap dan Gay, at the time he fired the pistol, was able first, of forming the intention to do the conscious of the act he was committing, intendfatal act; second of conceiving the intention to ed to take his own life, and was capable of unproduce death by the act, or of appre-derstanding the nature and consequences of the hending the fact that death is the im- act, the defendants are not liable. And, if mediate result of the act; third, of per- the act was thus committed, it is immaterial forming the act with the appropriate phys- whether he was capable of understanding its ical organ or limb. His mind, although dis- moral aspects, or of distinguishing between eased controls him. He is himself, and gov- right and wrong. erned from within and by a mind that masters him, although debased and weakened by disease. The rule here contended for is as well settled by authority, both in this country and England, as it is in accord with a logical interpretation and construction of the words of the contract. This rule was early settled in England in the leading case of Borradaile v. Hunter, 5 Mann. & Gr. 639, 44 Eng. C. L. 335); see, further, Clift v. Schwabe, 3 Mann. Gr. & S. 437 (54 Eng. C. L. 437); Dufaur v. Professional Life Ins. Co. 25 Beav. 602. Massachusetts has adopted the same rule. Dean v. Ins. Co. 4 Allen, 96; see, also, Cooper v. Life Ins. Co. 102 Mass. 227. The United States circuit court for the western district of Pa. has adopted the same rule. Nimick v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. 10 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) 101; see also Hartman v. Ins. Co. to be capable of making that distinction, will not avoid the policy. Phadenhauer v. Germania L. Ins. Co. 7 Heisk. 567, 19 Am. Rep. 623; Breasted v. Farm. Loan & Trust Co. 4 Hill, 73, 8 N. Y. 299; Eastabrook v. Union Mut. L. Ins. Co. 54 Me. 224. "Die by his own hands" standing alone defined to mean any kind of suicide (Hartman v. Keystone Ins. Co. 21 Pa. St. 466; Breasted v. Farm. Loan & Trust Co. 4 Hill, 74; Moore v. Conn. Mut. 1. Ins. Co. 1 Am. L. T. Rep. N. S. 319); defined to mean "the destruction of life by the voluntary and intended act of the party assured." Dean v. Am. Mut. L. Ins. Co. 4 Allen, 96. Under such condition suicide while insane would not avoid the policy. Phillips v. La. Eq. L. Ins. Co. 26 La. Aun. 404, 21 Am. Rep. 549. To take the case out of above proviso the assured must be so insane as to render him unconscious that the act will cause his death, or he must commit it under some insane impulse which he cannot resist. Van Zandt v. Mut. Ben. L. Ins. Co. 55 N. Y. 169. 14 Am. Rep. 215. The policy is void although the act was done in consequence of mental disease, if assured comprehended the physical nature of the act. Nimick v. Mut. Ben. L. Ins. Co. 3 Pittsb. (Pa.) 293. Death from an overdose of laudanum taken by mistake, while drunk, is not dying "by his own hand;' but taken with intent to destroy life although while in a drunken condition would be. Eq. L. Ass. Soc. v. Paterson. 41 Ga. 338. Life insurance policy, conditioned to be void if insured shall die by suicide, is not avoided by self-destruction of assured while insane, although he meant to kill himself and knew that death would result from his acts (Conn. Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Groom, 86 Pa. St. 92, 27 Am. Rep. 689), contra, if he was conscious of the act, he was committing: whether he was capable of understanding its moral aspects or distinguishing between right And to give you the alternative, gentlemen, if, on the other hand, he was not thus conscious, or had no such capacity, but acted under an insane delusion impairing his understanding and will, or was impelled by an uncontrollable impulse, which neither his understanding nor will could resist, then the defendants are liable." It will be observed that the word used in the policy in this case, is "suicide" in place of the expression "die by his own hand." The case of Eastabrook v. Life Ins. Co. 54 Me. 224, seems to be an authority in favor of the view, that suicide by an insane person, although not so far afflicted as to be incapable of understanding the nature and physical consequences of his own act, would not avoid the policy. There is no discussion of the question in the case, whether the jury found a verdict that and wrong, or not. Gay v. Union, etc., Ins. Co. 9 Blatchf. 142. If assured innocently takes a fatal overdose of medicine, while sane, that is not death "by his own hand or act, voluntary, or otherwise." Penfold v. Universal L. Ins. Co. 85 N. Y. 317, 39 Am. Rep. 660; Bayless v. Trav. Ins. Co., etc., 14 Blatchf. 143. Provision that in case insured die "by his own act or intention whether sane or insane," includes intentional self-destruction by an insane man conscious of the physical nature and consequences of the act and intending to destroy his life though he was not conscious of its moral quality. kins v. Col. L. Ins. Co. 70 Mo. 27, 35 Am. Rep. 410 Bigelow v. Berkshire L. Ins. Co. 93 U. S. (3 Otto) 284. Ad No degree of insanity will avoid such a condition. Chapman v. Repub. L. Ins. Co. 6 Biss. 238. Death by drowning presumed to be accidental, not suicidal. Mallory v. Trav. Ins. Co. 47 N. Y. 52. Condition that policy shall be void if insured die by his own hand or act voluntarily "or otherwise;" the latter words are too vague for practical application. Jacobs v. Natl. L. Ins. Co. 1 McArthur, 6. Self-killing by an insane person, understanding the physical nature and consequences of his act, but not its moral aspect, is not a death by suicide, within the meaning of a condition of his policy that it should be void in case he died by suicide. Manhattan L. Ins. Co. v. Broughton, 109 U. S. 121. So if he was impelled to the act by an insane impulse which the reason left him did not enable him to resist, or if his reasoning powers were so far overthrown that he could not reagon on the act he was about to do-the company is tiable and his insanity is a question for the jury. Ins. Co. v. Rodel, 95 U. S. 232. Insanity as affecting the proviso-see note, 35 L. R. A. 258. could not be supported by the facts proved, and the closing sentence of the opinion-"But whether these views are correct or not, the defendants had the benefit of instructions in entire conformity with the law as stated by the supreme court of Massachusetts, in Dean v. Ins. Co. 4 Allen, 96, and the jury have, on the evidence, found the facts such as, in accordance with the law of that cause, would justify that verdict" -destroys the entire force of the case as an authority adverse to our position, and enables us to say, that the case was decided in accordance with Massachusetts law, and that there was enough question about the degree of insanity of the deceased to render it impossible to disturb the verdict. struction of the contract here considered, the principles governing the liability to punishment of persons alleged to be insane, for acts that would be criminal when committed by persons of sound mind. The reasons for exempting from punishment a person capable of distinguishing between right and wrong have no place in determining whether a party, who has made a distinct contract with reference to a particular event, shall be held bound by his agreement on the happening of that event. The rule most in accordance with public policy should be adopted in construing this contract. 1. The rule, that policies are only avoided in cases where the insured is so insane as to be incapable of appreciating the nature and physical consequences of his act, furnishes a safe, sound basis for adjudication in this class of cases. It gives to judges and juries a standard of measurement of unvarying character, and experts, the uncertainties and difficulties that must attend any investigation into degrees of insanity, other than the search directed to such an objective point as is here established. No different rule has been established by the courts of the state of New York, in the case of Breasted v. Loan & T. Co. 4 Hill, 73, although that case is often cited in opposition to the position here taken. This case first came before the court of appeals, on demurrer to the plain-relieves them from the conflict in theories of tiff's replication "That the deceased was insane, and wholly unconscious of what he did, at the time of self-destruction." The case again came to the court of appeals on a report by referees in favor of plaintiff. 8 N. Y. 299. 2. The contract between the parties, in its It must be presumed that the facts stated in literal meaning, covering even accidental selfthe plaintiff's replication "That the deceased destruction, or self killing by the delirious, was wholly unconscious of what he did" was must be upheld in its language as far as posclearly shown, and the case can only be con- sible; and it is a matter of right on the part of sidered as authority for one presenting a simi-those who have similar contracts, to demand a lar state of facts, notwithstanding the learned strict construction of its words, that the assets judge who delivered the opinion went into oth- of a company, especially a mutual one, should er questions than those that were before the not be diminished, except in accordance with court, and made use of dicta which might be the contract. Insanity, of whatever degree, construed as being opposed to the views here does not avoid the contracts of those who make supported. The referees not having found that the ordinary agreements of daily life. the act of suicide was voluntary, the learned 3. The temptation to an impoverished head judge assumes the unconsciousness of the de-of a family to remove himself from the world, ceased at the time of his death, of the nature and by enabling his representatives to recover and physical consequences of his act. Speak-on his policy to provide means of subsistence ing of the English cases above cited, he said: "If Borradaile v. Hunter, 5 Mann. & Gr. 639, be an authority which we ought to follow, it differs so much from the case before us, that we are at liberty to decide it upon principle. The case of Clift v. Schwabe, 3 M. G. & S. 437, is open to the same remark as Borradaile v. Hunter, supra. It turned upon the assumed fact that the act of suicide was voluntary, a fact not found by the referees in this case." to those who are depending upon him, would be a very great one, could he rely upon the position that slight evidence of insanity, easily manufactured by himself before the deadly deed, would counteract the express provision in the policy. This inducement would be stronger to one who was morally insane, i. e., incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong, than to a virtuous man in full possession of his moral faculties. Such a temptation In the case of Fowler v. Life Ins. Co. of N. often presented, might well excite an insane deY. 4 Lans. 202, an action brought upon a pol-lusion that it was the duty of the insured to icy of insurance containing a provision in the thus sacrifice himself to the well-being of othsame words as that in the policy in question, ers. Instances might be multiplied a thousand payment was resisted by the company upon the fold, in which a man, partially insane, yet in ground that the death of the insured was self-full possession of sufficient mental power to uninflicted, and the insanity of the deceased at derstand that doing a certain act would result the time of the death was sought to be estab-in his death, would be impelled to self-destruclished as a ground of recovery. The plaintiff was nonsuited at the circuit, and on motion for a new trial before a general court, the nonsuit was sustained. In the opinion of the court, Justice Miller says: "None of the cases hold that insanity alone excuses the taking of life by the insured. Something more is required; and the courts hold that if the party is insane, it must be to such an extent as to render him wholly unconscious of the act, to entitle his representatives to recover upon the policy." It is illogical to attempt to reply to the con tion by the knowledge that his family could recover on the policy; and such is the cunning of madness, the self-knowledge of his aberration would be relied upon by him to insure the recovery. See Nimick v. Ins. Co. 10 Am. L. Reg. (N. S.) 101. Mr. W. W. Nevison, for defendant in er ror: Was the charge, which was given by the court, correct? We think there was no error in the charge as given. The instruction having been given by so able a court, being composed of |