The Federalist: A Collection of Essays by Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison, Interpreting the Constitution of the United States as Agreed Upon by the Federal Convention, September 17, 1787Colonial Press, 1901 - 488 Seiten |
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Seite v
... . Hence were derived the single head of the State , with his veto on legislation , his treaty power , and his command of the army ; the bicameral legislature with a conservative Upper House ; the exclusive origination SPECIAL INTRODUCTION.
... . Hence were derived the single head of the State , with his veto on legislation , his treaty power , and his command of the army ; the bicameral legislature with a conservative Upper House ; the exclusive origination SPECIAL INTRODUCTION.
Seite 12
... single Indian war has yet been occasioned by aggressions of the present federal gov- ernment , feeble as it is ; but there are several instances of Indian hostilities having been provoked by the improper conduct of individual States ...
... single Indian war has yet been occasioned by aggressions of the present federal gov- ernment , feeble as it is ; but there are several instances of Indian hostilities having been provoked by the improper conduct of individual States ...
Seite 16
... single Government of Great Britain would ? We have heard much of the fleets of Britain , and the time may come , if we are wise , when the fleets of America may engage attention . But if one national government had not so regulated the ...
... single Government of Great Britain would ? We have heard much of the fleets of Britain , and the time may come , if we are wise , when the fleets of America may engage attention . But if one national government had not so regulated the ...
Seite 37
... single man . ' Tis possible , though not easy , that the people of that island may be enslaved from other causes ; but it cannot be by the prowess of an army so inconsiderable as that which has been usually kept up within that kingdom ...
... single man . ' Tis possible , though not easy , that the people of that island may be enslaved from other causes ; but it cannot be by the prowess of an army so inconsiderable as that which has been usually kept up within that kingdom ...
Seite 39
... single State or to the con- solidation of several smaller States into one great confederacy . The latter is that which immediately concerns the object under consideration . It will , however , be of use HAMILTON , MADISON , JAY 39.
... single State or to the con- solidation of several smaller States into one great confederacy . The latter is that which immediately concerns the object under consideration . It will , however , be of use HAMILTON , MADISON , JAY 39.
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Häufige Begriffe und Wortgruppen
admit advantage America Amphictyonic appear appointment army Articles of Confederation authority bill of rights branch Britain causes circumstances citizens commerce common confederacy confederation Congress consideration considered Convention councils courts danger declare defence degree duties effect elections equal eral ernment established executive exercise existence experience extent favor federacies federal government force foreign former greater happen impeachments important influence instance interests jealousy judges judicial judiciary departments jurisdiction lative latter lature laws legislature less liberty Macedon magistrate means ment militia mode Montesquieu national government nature necessary necessity objects observations officers particular parties passions peace Pennsylvania persons political possess President principle proper proportion propriety provision PUBLIUS question reason regulation render republic republican requisite respect revenue Senate situation society South Carolina Sparta spirit stitution supposed Supreme taxation taxes tion treaties trial by jury Union United usurpation
Beliebte Passagen
Seite 46 - A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, with many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into different classes, actuated by different sentiments and views.
Seite 135 - That the raising or keeping a standing army within the kingdom in time of peace, unless it be with consent of parliament, is against law.
Seite 268 - In the government of this commonwealth, the legislative department shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them : the executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them: the judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them : to the end it may be a government of laws and not of men.
Seite 247 - No state shall, without the consent of congress, lay any duty on tonnage, keep troops or ships of war in time of peace, enter into any agreement or compact with another state or with a foreign power, or engage in war, unless actually invaded or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay.
Seite 435 - NEXT to permanency in office, nothing can contribute more to the independence of the judges than a fixed provision for their support.
Seite 47 - When a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular government, on the other hand, enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both the public good and the rights of other citizens. To secure the public good and private rights against the danger of such a faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government, is then the great object to which our inquiries are directed.
Seite 48 - The two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic are: first, the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of country, over which the latter may be extended.
Seite 286 - In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people. The different governments will control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself.
Seite 246 - Bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and laws impairing the obligation of contracts, are contrary to the first principles of the social compact, and to every principle of sound legislation.
Seite 372 - to nominate, and " by and with the advice and consent of the senate, to appoint " ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of the " supreme court, and all other officers of the United States, whose " appointments are not in the constitution otherwise provided for, " and which shall be established by law.