Opinion of the court. as a whole; with the new operation in consequence of the change; with the increased utility and beneficial results, thus incontestably proved, bring this patent within the principle of all the cases as a patentable invention. There are many cases in which the materiality of an invention, whether it be a machine or a process, can be judged of only by its effect on the result, and this effect is tested by the actual improvement in the process of producing an article, or in the article itself introduced by the alleged invention.* No opposing counsel. Mr. Justice BRADLEY, having stated the case, delivered the opinion of the court. The question is whether the mere change of material— making the curve of iron instead of wood and iron-was a sufficient change to constitute invention; the purpose being the same, the means of accomplishing it being the same, and the form of the reach and mode of operation being the same. It is certainly difficult to bring the case within any recognized rule of novelty by which the patent can be sustained. The use of one material instead of another in constructing a known machine is, in most cases, so obviously a matter of mere mechanical judgment, and not of invention, that it cannot be called an invention, unless some new and useful result, an increase of efficiency, or a decided saving in the operation, is clearly attained. Some evidence was given to show that the wagon-reach of the plaintiff is a better reach, requiring less repair, and having greater solidity than the wooden reach. But it is not sufficient to bring the case out of the category of more or less excellence of construction. The machine is the same. Axe-helves made of hickory may be more durable and more cheap in the end than those made of beech or pine, but the first application of hickory to the purpose would not be, therefore, patentable. * Roberts v. Dickey, 4 Fisher, 532, per Strong, J.; and see McCormick v. Seymour, 2 Blatchford, 243—definition of a patentable subject, by NelBon, J. Opinion of the court. Cases have frequently arisen in which substantially the question now presented has been discussed. Perhaps, however, none can be cited more directly in point than that of Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, in which it was held that the substitution of porcelain for metal in making door-knobs of a particular construction was not patentable, though the new material was better adapted to the purpose and made a better and cheaper knob-having been used for door-knobs, however, before. So, in a case at the circuit, referred to by Justice Nelson in the last-named case,† the substitution of wood for bone as the basis of a button covered with tin was held not patentable. In Crane v. Price, it is true, the use of anthracite instead of bituminous coal with the hot-blast in smelting iron ore was held to be a good invention, inasmuch as it produced a better article of iron at a less expense. But that was a process of manufacture, and in such processes a different article replacing another article in the combination often produces different results. The latter case is more analogous to the cases of compositions of matter than it is to those of machinery; and in compositions of matter a different ingredient changes the identity of the compound, whereas an iron bar in place of a wooden one, and subserving the same purpose, does not change the identity of a machine.§ But the plaintiff's counsel alleges that his invention does not consist of the mere substitution of a particular material for another material which had been previously used for the same purpose in the same way, but consists in the production of a certain described article by a certain described mechanical process, which process, viewed as a whole, is new and useful; and then he describes what he supposes to be such new mechanical process. This is his argument; but the facts do not bear out such a view of the case. In our judgment, the patent in this case is void for want of novelty in the alleged invention. DECREE AFFIRMED. Webster's Patent Cases, 409. * 11 Howard, 248. + Ib. 266. 70-73. INDEX. ACCEPTANCE. Where a party authorized another to draw different drafts on him upon ACTION. See District of Columbia, 2, 3; Ex turpi causâ non oritur actio; ACTUAL SETTLER. See Oregon Donation Act. Unless forbidden by positive law, contracts made by actual settlers on the ADMIRALTY. See Collision; Demurrage. 1. Rule of, that damages in collision cases are to be divided, is applicable 2. Costs in, are wholly under the control of the court giving them. Ib. 4. An entry on the record of an admiralty case, that on the return of a 5. A District Court of the United States, when acting as a court of admi- ADMIRALTY (continued). habitant of the United States not residing within the district (within AGENCY. See Ratification. ALABAMA. 1. Prior to the act of March 3d, 1873, the District Court of the United 2. An order of a State court within those limits ordering the removal of APPEARANCE. An entry on the record of an admiralty case, that on the return of a pro- ARKANSAS. See Statute of Limitations, 1. ASSIGNMENT. Of a debt carries with it in equity an assignment of a judgment or mort ATTORNEY. See California, 7; Notice. AUTREFOIS ACQUIT. See Judgment. AUTREFOIS CONVICT. See Judgment. BANK CHECK. 1. Where money is paid on a "raised" check by mistake, neither party 2. Where a party to whom such a check is offered sends it to the bank 3. Unless there is something in the terms in which information is asked BANK STOCK. Bullard Is not, in National banks organized under the National Banking Act of BANKRUPT ACT. See Wife's Separate Property. 1. Nothing short of a clear, distinct, and unequivocal promise will revive 2. A payment by one insolvent, which would otherwise be void as a pref- 4. Where a bankrupt owes a debt to two persons jointly, and holds a joint BUILDER'S LIEN. See Montana. Held not to have attached where a builder took a real security for payment BURDEN OF PROOF. See Legal Presumptions. It is error to instruct a jury, in an action for penalties for alleged frauds CALIFORNIA. See San Francisco, City of. 1. The subject of the rights of the city of San Francisco and her grantees |