cubation. Then they make their nefts, every one after his kind, that their eggs and young may be foft and warm and those fo elegant and artificial, as no art of man can imitate.

After they have laid their eggs, how diligently do they fit upon them, fcarce giving themselves time to go off, to get them meat? When the young are hatched, how diligently do they brood over them, left the cold fhould hurt them? All the while labouring hard to get them food, and almost starving themselves, left they fhould want. Moreover, with what courage are they infpired, fo as to venture their own lives in defence of them? The moft timorous, as hens and geefe, daring then to fly in the face of a man. And all these pains are bestowed upon thofe that will render them no thanks for it! And they are bestowed just so long as is neceffary. For when the young is able to fhift for itfelf, the old retains no fuch affection for it, but will beat it indifferently with others.

8. It is another proof of a fuperintending Providence, that all animals are produced at the moft convenient time of the year, juft when there is food and entertainment ready for them. So lambs, kids, and many other living creatures, are brought into the world in the spring, when tender grafs, and nutritive plants are provided for their food. The like may be obferved concerning filk-worms, whofe eggs are hatched juft when the leaves of the mulberry-tree appear; the aliment being foft and tender, while the worms themselves are fo, and growing more ftrong and fubftantial, as the infects increase in bulk and vigour.

9. A ftill farther proof hereof we have in the various Inftincts of animals, directed to ends which they know not, as, 1. All creatures know how to defend themselves and offend their enemies. All know what their natural weapons are, and how to make use of them. A boar knows the ufe of his tusks, a horse of his hoofs, a cock of his fpurs, a bee of her fting. Yea a calf will make a push with his head, even before horns any 2. Those creatures which have not appear. ftrength,

trength to fight, are ufually fwift of foot or wing, and are naturally inclined to make ufe of that fwiftness, and fave themselves by flight. 3. Every creature knows and fhuns its natural enemy, as a lamb does the wolf, and partridge or poultry, birds of prey. And they make ufe of a peculiar note, to warn their young of their approach, who thereupon immediately run to fhelter. 4. As foon as ever it is brought forth, every animal knows its food. Such as are nourished with milk, immediately find the way to their paps and fuck; whereas those which are defigned for other nourishment, never make any fuch attempt. 5. Birds that are fin-toed, or whole-footed, are naturally directed to go into the water. So ducklings, though hatched and led by a hen, if he brings them to the brink of a river or pond, presently leave her and go in, though they never faw any fuch thing before; and though the hen clucks and calls, and does all fhe can to keep them out. 6. Birds of the fame kinds make their nefts of the fame materials; laid in the fame order, and exactly of the fame figure, fo that by the nest one may certainly know what bird it belongs to. And this, though living in diftant countries, and though they never faw any neft made; that is, although they were taken out of the neft, and brought up by hand. Nor were any of the faine kind ever known to make a dif ferent neft, either for matter or fashion; unless where the ufual matter was not to be had: in that cafe, fome birds use what they can get.

F

EXTRACTS from LOCKE on HUMAN UNDERSTANDING;

"Sect. 14.

IF

with fhort REMARKS.

Of POWER.

[Continued from page 417.]

F this be fo, (as I imagine it is,) I leave it to be confidered, whether it may not help to put an end to that long agitated, and, I think, unreasonable, becaufe unintelligible, Quellion, viz. Whether Man's Will be free, or no? For if I mittake not, it follows, from what I have faid, that the Queflion itself is altogether improper; and it is as infignificant to ask, whether Man's Will be free, as to afk, whether his Sleep be fwift, or his Virtue fquare: liberty being as little applicable to the Will, as swiftness of motion is to Sleep, or fquareness to Virtue. Every one would laugh at the abfurdity of such a Question, as either of these; because it is obvious, that the modifications of motion belong not to Sleep, nor the difference of figure to Virtue: and when any one well confiders it, I think he will as plainly perceive, that Liberty, which is but a power, belongs only to Agents, and cannot be an attribute or modification of the Will, which is but a power.

66

Sect. 15. Such is the difficulty of explaining, and giving clear notions of internal actions by founds, that I must here warn my Reader that Ordering, Directing, Chufing, Preferring, &c. which I have made ufe of, will not diftinctly enough exprefs Volition, unlefs he will reflect on what he himself does, when he wills. For example, Preferring which feems perhaps beft to expreis the act of Volition, does it not precifely. For though a man would prefer flying to walking,

yet

yet who can say he ever wills it? Volition, it is plain, is an act of the Mind, knowingly exerting that dominion it takes itself to have over any part of man, by employing it in, or with-holding it from any particular action. And what is the Will, but the faculty to do this? And is that Faculty any thing more in effect, than a power, the power of the Mind to determine its Thought, to the producing, continuing, or ftopping any Action, as far as it depends on us? For can it be denied, that whatever Agent has a power to think on its own actions, and to prefer their doing or omiffion either to the other, has that Faculty called Will? Will then is nothing but fuch a power. Liberty, on the other fide, is the power a man has to do or forbear doing any particular action, according as its doing or forbearance has the actual preference in the Mind, which is the fame thing as to fay, according as he himself wills it.

"Sect. 16. It is plain then, That the Will is nothing but one power or ability, and Freedom another power and ability: fo that to afk, whether the Will has Freedom, is to afk, whether one Power has another Power, one Ability another Ability; a queftion at first fight too grofsly abfurd to make a difpute, or need an answer. For who is it that fees not, that Powers belong only to Agents, and are Attributes only of Subfances, and not of Powers themfelves? So that this way of putting the question, viz. Whether the Will be free? is in effect to afk, Whether the Will be a Substance, an Agent? or at leaf to fuppofe it, fince Freedom can properly be attributed to nothing elfe. If Freedom can with any propriety of fpeech be applied to Power, it may be attributed to the power that is in a man, to produce, or forbear producing motions in parts of his body, by choice or preference; which is that which denominates him free, and is Freedom itself. But if any one should ask, whether Freedom were free, he would be fufpected not to underftand well what he faid; and

he

he would be thought to deferve Midas's ears, who knowing Rich was a denomination from the poffeffion of Riches, fhould demand whether Riches themselves were Rich.

[To be continued.]

An Account of the PASSIONS, or NATURAL AFFECTIONS: extracted from Dr. Watts.

16

TH

Of HOPE and FEAR.

HE fecond fet of Paffions which arife from Love and Hatred, are Hope and Fear. As an abfent good merely poffible raises our Defire, fo if there is a prospect of its being obtained, it awakens our Hope: but fo far as the attainment of it is difficult or unlikely, it excites our Fear. Fear and Hope mutually gain the afcendency over each other, as the attainment of the good appears more or less probable.

As the acquifition of good, so the avoiding of evil awakens our Fear and Hope: if we may poffibly efcape it, there is Hope; if we may poffibly fuffer it, there is Fear. These also reciprocally rife and fink according to the probability of the evil coming upon us.

Fear and Hope are not utterly excluded, when the good or evil is present with us; for even when we poffefs good, we may hope to preserve it, and fear to lofe it: and when evil is come upon us, we may fear its continuance, or hope for its removal.

When our Hope rifes to the highest degree, it is Confidence or Security. As on the other hand, when our Fear rifes higheft, and there is little Hope left, it turns into Defpondency; and when all Hope is banifhed, it becomes Defpair.

When