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lowing. We may very juftly rank this, among the most wonderful phænomena of nature, which yields nothing analogous to the growth of fuch hard folid bodies, of fo great a bulk, in fo fhort a time. Many idle opinions have been maintained, concerning the cause of their falling off. The truth feems to be this: they are a fort of vegetables, growing on animals, as the nails and hair on man, and feathers on birds. And there is fome analogy between the growth of them, and that of branches and leaves in trees. Trees commonly drop their leaves in Autumn, because the nourishing juice flows into them no longer. And at certain periods, these parts of the animal drop off, because the blood and juices ceafe to flow into them. At this time, the hollow part at the root of the horn grows hard, and the pores through which the juices paffed, grow up. And as no more nourishment can then be carried to the horn, it decays and falls off. It is probable this ftoppage of the pores happens, as foon as the horns are at their full growth. But they are fo fixt to the head, that it takes a long time for them to loofen and fall. Whereas in leaves, their stalks are so tender, that when the juice ceases to flow, they prefently wither and fall.

The analogy between the falling off of Deer's horns and the falling of leaves and ripe fruit from the tree, will receive light from obferving the procefs of Nature in the latter cafe. If the stalk from which a ripe Orange has fallen, be compared with that part of a Deer's forehead, from which a horn is just fallen, it will plainly appear, that Nature has operated by the fame laws in both. The young horns while yet soft, are full of blood-veffels; and if cut off, especially near the head, bleed violently. By these veffels they are fupplied with nourishment for their growth. But thefe dry up, when there is no farther occafion for them. And hence it is, that no ill fymptoms attend the falling off of these parts, when full grown.

So far we may give a probable account; But who can account for this, that if a Stag be caftrated while he is fo

young

young as not to have horns, he will never have any; and if caftrated afterward, while his horns are on, he will never cast them?

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EXTRACTS from LOCKE on HUMAN UNDERSTANDING: with fhort REMARKS.

[Continued from page 195.]

CHAP. XI. On the difference of Wit and Judgment.

"Sect. 2.

How

TOW much the imperfection of accurately difcriminating Ideas one from another lies, either in the dulness,or faults of the organs of fenfe; or want of acuteness, exercife, or attention in the Understanding; or haftiness and precipitancy, natural to fome Tempers, I will not here examine : it fuffices to take notice, that this is one of the operations. that the Mind may reflect on, and obferve in itself. It is of that confequence to its other knowledge, that fo far as this faculty is in itself dull, or not rightly made ufe of, for the diftinguishing one thing from another; fo far our Notions are confused, and our Reafon and Judgment difturbed or misled. If in having our Ideas in the Memory ready at hand, confifts quickness of parts; in this of having them unconfused, and being able nicely to diftinguish one thing from another, where there is but the leaft difference, confifts, in a great measure of the exactness of Judgment, and clearness of Reafon, which is to be observed in one man above another. And hence, perhaps, may be given some reafon of that common obfervation, that men who have a great deal of Wit and prompt Memories, have not always the cleareft Judgment, or deepest Reafon. For Wit lying moft in the affemblage of

Ideas, and putting those together with quickness and variety, wherein can be found any resemblance or congruity, thereby to make pleasant pictures, and agreeable vifions in the Fancy: Judgment, on the contrary, lies quite on the other fide, in feparating carefully, one from another, Ideas, wherein can be found the leaft difference, thereby to avoid being misled by fimilitude, and by affinity to take one thing for another. This is a way of proceeding quite contrary to metaphor and allufion, wherein, for the most part, lies that entertainment and pleasantry of Wit, which ftrikes fo lively on the Fancy, and therefore fo acceptable to all people; because its beauty appears at firft.fight, and there is required no labour.of thought, to examine what truth or reason there is in it. The Mind without looking any farther, rests satisfied with the agreeablenefs of the picture, and the gaiety of the fancy and it is a kind of an affront to go about to examine it, by the fevere Rules of Truth and good Reafon; whereby it appears, that it confifts in fomething, that is not perfectly conformable to them.

"Sect. 13. The defect in Naturals feems to proceed from want of quickness, activity, and motion, in the intellectual faculties, whereby they are deprived of Reafon: whereas mad men, on the other fide, seem to suffer by the other extreme. For they do not appear to have loft the faculty of Reasoning: but having joined together fome Ideas very wrongly, they miftake them for truths; and they err as men do that argue right from wrong principles. For by the violence of their imaginations, having taken their fancies for realities, they make right deductions from them. Thus you fhall find a distracted man fancying himself a king, with a right inference, require fuitable attendance, respect, and obedience; others who have thought themfelves made of glafs, have used the caution neceffary to preferve fuch brittle bodies. Hence it comes to pafs, that a man, who is very fober, and of a right understanding in all other things, may in one particular be as frantic

frantic as any in Bedlam; if either by any fudden very strong impreffion, or long fixing his fancy upon one fort of thoughts, incoherent Ideas have been cemented together fo powerfully, as to remain united. But there are degrees of Madness, as of Folly; the diforderly jumbling ideas together, is in fom more and in fome lefs. In fhort, herein feems to lie the difference between idiots and mad-men, That mad-men put wrong Ideas together, and fo make wrong propofitions, but argue and reason right from them: but idiots make very few or no propofitions, and reafon fcarce at all."

9. The reft of this volume treats of Complex Ideas, most aukwardly divided, (I fear, chiefly through affectation of Novelty,) into Modes, Subftances, and Relations! How much clearer is the vulgar divifion of Beings into the ten claffes, called Predicaments? Or into the two, Subftances, and Accidents? If the word Mode has any determinate meaning, it is only another term for Accidents. And are not Relations one fpecies of Accidents? So that Mr. L's difcovery. comes to this, "Complex Ideas are without Modes, Subftances, or a particular fort of Modes!"

When Accidents are termed Modi Eatis, or Eatium in Latin, the phrafe feems proper enough. But why any man. fhould fqueeze it into the English tongue, I know not; fince the old word, Accidents is full as good. And we may retain it without any danger of "running into the notion, that Accidents are a fort of real Beings."

[To be continued.]

An Account of the PASSIONS, or NATURAL AFFECTIONS: extracted from Dr. Watts.

Of ADMIRATION or WONDER.

8. Proceed to give fome account of each general or original Paffion, with the particulars contained under it.

VOL. V.

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The primitive and original Paffions, are Admiration, Love, and Hatred.

Firft, Admiration. When we perceive any object that is new and flrange, either for its kind or qualities; or when we meet with fuch an occurrence as is unufual or unexpected; at least unusual at fuch a particular time and place, we are ftruck with Admiration: and that without any confideration whether the object be valuable or worthlefs, whether it be good or evil. Admiration has no regard to the agreeablenefs or disagreeableness of the object, but only the rarity of it. And for this reason Wonder feems to be the first of the Paffions.

If our wonder arife to a high degree, it is called Amazement or Astonishment. When it rifes very high, it will flop the voice, and and reduce the perfon to the pofture and filence of a ftatue. And if Fear be joined with it, it will produce more unhappy effects.

Let it be obferved, that this Paffion has properly no op pofite, becaufe if the object be not rare or new, or if the appearance be not fudden or unexpected, but a common thing, we receive it with Neglect inftead of Wonder: now Neglect is no Paffion. The rest of the Paffions, at least the most of them, go in pairs.

Let us take notice also that Admiration is most frequently excited in young perfons, and fuch as have had but little opportunity of furnishing themselves with the knowledge of various things; whereas men, who have feen or known a large variety of objects and events, feldom find things rare, or ftrange enough to wonder at.

The great end of this Paffion is to fix our attention upon the admired object, to impress it more effectually upon our memory, as well as to give a fenfible delight to the mind of man, which loves newnefs and variety.

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