ritable, or think a piece of liberality can comprehend the total of charity; divinity hath wisely divided the act thereof into many branches, and hath taught us in this narrow way, many paths unto goodness; as many ways as we may do good, so many ways we may be charitable; there are infirmities not only of body, but of soul and fortunes, which do require the merciful hand of our abilities. I cannot contemn a man for ignorance, but behold him with as much pity as I do Lazarus. It is no greater charity to clothe his body, than apparel the nakedness of his soul. It is an honourable object to see the reasons of other men wear our liveries, and their borrowed understandings do homage to the bounty of ours; it is the cheapest way of beneficence, and like the natural charity of the sun, illuminates another without obscuring itself. To be reserved and caitiff in this part of goodness, is the sordidest piece of covetousness, and more contemptible than the pecuniary avarice. To this (as calling myself a scholar) I am obliged by the duty of my condition, I make not therefore my head a grave, but a treasure of knowledge; I intend no mono the minds of men, that artificials differ not from natural in form and essence; but in the efficient only; for man hath no power over nature save only in her motion; that is, to mingle or put together natural bodies, and to separate or put them asunder; wherefore where there is apposition and separation of bodies natural conjoining (as they term it) active with passive, man may do all things: this not done, he can do nothing.---BACON. poly, but a community in learning; I study not for my own sake only but for theirs that study not for themselves. RASH JUDGMENT. No man can justly censure or condemn another, because indeed no man truly knows another. This I perceive in myself, for I am in the dark to all the world, and my nearest friends behold me but in a cloud; those that know me but superficially think less of me than I do of myself; those of my near acquaintance think more: God, who truly knows me, knows that I am nothing, for he only beholds me, and all the world, who looks not on us through a derived ray, or a trajection of a sensible species, but beholds the substance without the helps of accidents, and the forms of things, as we their operations. Further, no man can judge another, because no man knows himself, for we censure others but as they disagree from that humour which we fancy lau dable in ourselves, and commend others but for that wherein they seem to quadrate and consent with us. So that in conclusion, all is but that we all condemn, self-love.* See Ante 153, in note, where there is an extract from Wordsworth, upon "rash judgments and the sneers of selfish men." What we oft do best, By sick interpreters, or weak ones, is T PRIDE. I THANK God, amongst those millions of vices I do inherit and hold from Adam, I have escaped one, and that a mortal enemy to charity, the first and father sin, not only of man, but of the devil, pride; a vice whose name is comprehended in a monosyllable, but in its nature not circumscribed Not ours, or not allowed: what worst, as oft For our best act.-Henry VIII. Act 1, Scene 4. See Barrow's Sermon against detraction; Sermon xix. See also his Sermon xx. against "Rash Judgment," which An honest and charitable mind disposeth us, when we see any man endued with good qualities, and pursuing a tenor of good practice, to esteem such a person, to commend him, to interpret what he doth to the best, not to suspect any ill of him or to seek any exception against him; it inclineth us, when we see any action materially good, to yield it simply due approbation and praise, without searching for or surmising any defect in the cause or principle whence it cometh, in the design or end to which it tendeth, in the way or manner of performing it. A good man would be sorry to have any good thing spoiled; as to find a crack in a fair building, a flaw in a fine jewel, a canker in a goodly flower, is grievous to any indifferent man: so would it be displeasing to him to observe defects in a worthy person, or commendable action. The sensorious humour, as it argueth ill nature to be predominant (a vulturous nature which easily smelleth out, and hastily flieth toward, and greedily feedeth on carrion) so it with a world; I have escaped it in a condition. that can hardly avoid it; those petty acquisitions and reputed perfections that advance and elevate the conceits of other men, add no feathers into mine I have seen a grammarian tour and plume himself over a single line in Horace, and shew more pride in the construction of one ode, than the author in the composure of the whole book. For my own part, besides the jargon and patois signifieth bad conscience! for he that knoweth evil of himself is most prone to suspect, and most quick to pronounce ill concerning others, so it breedeth and fostereth such ill dispositions it debaucheth the minds of men, rendering them dim and doltish in apprehending their own faults, negligent and heedless in regard to their own hearts and ways, apt to please and comfort themselves in the evils, real or imaginary, of their neighbours; which to do is a very barbarous and brutish practice.-BArrow. A truly great man is considerate before he condemns, and hesitates when compelled to censure. He knows that in all censure of others there is something of self-approbation. He knows that, exalted into the situation of a judge, it is difficult to walk humbly. He remembers that it is the nature of human weakness to inflate its trifling acts into matters of vast importance. "The school-boy who caught a tame rabbit, thought himself a mighty sportsman." He is also fearful that he may mislead others: that he may awaken intemperate zeal; that he may administer to envy and malice, and at last that a subject deeply considered, and by him cautiously stated, may prove a step for restless vanity, which would lift itself into notice, or a text for the cant which confounds goodness with the talk of goodness. A. M. Does not the tendency to Rash Judgment, which would crucify merit, really originate in the respect for merit, from the pain attendant upon the consciousness of being excelled? of several provinces, I understand no less than six languages: yet I protest I have no higher conceit of myself, than had our fathers before the confusion of Babel, when there was but one language in the world, and none to boast himself either linguist or critic. I have not only seen several countries, beheld the nature of their climes, the chorography of their provinces; topography of their cities, but understood their several laws, customs and policies; yet cannot all this persuade the dulness of my spirit unto such an opinion of myself, as I behold in nimbler and conceited heads, that never looked a degree beyond their nests. I know the names, and somewhat more, of all the constellations in my horizon; yet I have seen a prating mariner that could only name the pointers and the North star, out-talk me, and conceit himself a whole sphere above me. I know most of the plants of my country, and of those about me; yet methinks I do not know so many as when I did but know a hundred, and had scarcely ever simpled further than Cheapside; for indeed heads of capacity, and such as are not full with a handful, or easy measure of knowledge, think they know nothing, till they know all; which being impossible, they fall upon the opinion of Socrates, and only know they know not anything.* * SOLILOQUIES OF THE OLD PHILOSOPHER AND THE YOUNG LADY. "Alas!" exclaimed a silver-headed sage, "how narrow is the utmost extent of human knowledge! how circum |