whole know the motive of every particle. Put Cogitation now in the place of Motion and the same argumentation holds good." To which Locke rejoins:

'Twould be impossible if it were supposed to be in matter as matter. But if god gives it to a certain systeme of matter soe disposed it is then in that systeme.

Burnet prosecutes his argument in the same strain: "I may further add that not only the different perceptions that come to the soul from different parts and motions of the body, but also the different operations of the mind and understanding, simple Apprehension, Judgement, Ratiocination, must all lie under the Prospect, Intuition and Connection of some one common Principle, and that must be a principle of such a perfect unity and simplicity as the Body, any part of the body, or any particle of matter is not capable of." To which Locke replies:

If an inability to explain how any system of matter can thinke be an argumt agt a material soule, the inability to explain how body by motion can affect an immaterial being will be an argumt agt an immaterial soule. But such arguers raise great trophies from the ignorance of others, but think themselves safe in their own. When both sides are equaly ignorant I think noe advantage can be made of it on either side.

Burnet next urges from the nature of Free-Will: ""Twer an odd thing to fancy that a piece of matter should have Freewill and an absolute power like an emperor on his throne, to command as his slaves about him all other parts of matter." Locke replies:

All the same difficulties are agt the conceiving how an immaterial created substance can begin, change or stop its own motion or thoughts, or give any motion or determination to body. But where is it I have said body has those powers? When y" have demonstrated humane soules to be immaterial & explained how these powers are in them, yu have s something agt me & shall finde me y' glad convert. If argumts from our shortsightednesse be good and y' any principles or systeme is false because it removes not all difficulties, lay down yrs & see whether it will not be liable to as strong objections of defect, & as invidious inforency, if it be the way of lovers of truth to make them.

Burnet goes on to say: "You must fix this self-moving Faculty to some one part of that system (for every part hath not the power and free-will upon any supposition) and when you have assigned that divine self-moving part or particle of the body, we shall examine the power and capacities of it" Locke rejoins in a similar strain :

Yu too must fix y'self moveing substance to some part of the body, & when y have assigned the part or particle of the body it is fixed to we shall examine its operations.

Burnet urges an argument from the nature of Free-Will as follows: "If matter be capable of it, if it can deliberate, consult, choose or refuse, then matter is capable of virtue and vice, duty and religion, Merit and demerit, and also of punishment and Reward, which hypothesis about the powers of matter as to the Will, would furnish all our Rules in Moral Philosophy, as the former the Understanding, all in Natural." Upon this Locke comments:

That knowledg & will placed in a solid substance will more pervert y rules of moral philosophy than if placed in a substance void of solidity remains to be proved.

Burnet procedes: "Neither do I see a capacity in any part of the body for memory or Remembrance especially as to some Ideas. Take what part you please to be cogitant or reminiscent. (I suppose it will be some part of the brain), all our new acquired ideas must work some change in that part and leave some marks there for a foundation of memory." Upon which Locke offers a series of comments:

Yu doe suppose indeed. But can y say yu see a capacity of remembrance in an immaterial substance? Yu say, 1st Remarks, p. 9, yu doe not understand how ye soule if she be at any time without thoughts what is it that produces the first thought agn. Y" may if you please apply this & y rest y" have said to Remembrance & see whether y understand memory better.

Burnet then takes up a more general strain: "To these reflections upon the nature of our faculties and the powers of matter it would not be fair nor satisfactory to give us a short answer and tell us every thing is possible with God. 'Tis true every thing that is possible is possible to God, but we must also consider the capacities or incapacities of the subject. Quiquid recipitur recipitur ad modum recipientis. And what you suppose possible may be supposed actual. Possibili posito in actu, nihil sequitur absurdi. Pardon the old axioms by which you are obliged to vindicate the actual existence of such powers and properties as we are treating of from absurd. ity and to make them intelligible if you would have them received." To which Locke rejoins with some spirit:

I would not have them received when another hypothesis is produced wherein there are not the like difficulties & things as remote from humane conception. Produce such an one & ya have me y gratefull scholler. But objections from ignorance & ye weaknesse of humane capacity does not this; And such objections invidiously heard (as I think it is clear yr are are not great marks that y" ever seriously thought of any such thing. Finding fault is an easy businesse & not always of the most elevated understandings. You Presse me to a contest, ede tua stake too, & then it will be seen whether y or my principles are clearest & leave fewest difficulties to humane understanding How do yu know that they have not corporal marks in the brains? But if memory be in an immaterial substance, pray make me understand how comes it that a disease blots out all y' is in ye past memory, as I may call it, & yet leave a future memory, i. e., a power to retain future perceptions.

Burnet turns again to a point previously discussed: "In motion you properly so called besides the change of situation there is a vis movens, which is not the power of matter nor any modification of it, but the power of a superior agent acting on matter. In like manner if there was a vis cogitans in the body or in any other matter, it would not be a power of matter nor any modification of it any more than the vis movens is.” Upon which Locke remarks:

When yu have explained & helped us to conceive a Vis movens in any created substans yrs will be a good objection agt it in a solid substance.

Burnet proceeds: "We can distinctly conceive the mechanical properties of matter and what results from them, but as cogitation cannot be any of those nor an effect of them, so neither can I any more conceive the power of Intellection or Ratiocination communicated to certain systems of matter, than I can conceive penetration of dimensions communicated to certain parts or systems of matter, etc., etc." Upon this Locke observes:

Pray tell us how ya conceive cogitation in an unsolid created substance. It is as hard, I confess, to me to be conceived in an unsolid as in a solid substance.

Burnet also urges: "If we grant such arbitrary powers whereof we have no idea or conception to be communicable to matter, there will be no end of imputing powers to matter according to every one's fancy or credibility." Locke very

briefly replies:

The objection is as good agt finite immaterial substances.

Burnet expands his own views as follows: "As to the state of that question, How far cogitation is communicable to matter? we allow that a spirit may act and cogitate in matter and be so united to some systems of it that there may be a reciprocation of actions and passions betwixt them according to the laws of their union. But still all these cogitations are the powers of the spirit, not of matter. Suppose involuntary motion which proceeds from the Will. If that Will may be power of matter, then it may have the power of motion or of the determination of motion, and it seems easier to me, an easier supposition to make vis movens communicable to matter (which I think cannot be allowed), than a vis cogitans. If they both be the powers of matter, Innate and Superadded, God and matter are the whole of the Universe, without particular spirits or spiritual substances, permanent and distinct in their individuation." To all this Locke replies at some length:

Y allow here of suppositions as unconceivable and as unexplicable as any thing in the thinking of matter. For, to use y' way of argueing, 1st I desire y" will help me to conceive an unextended, unsolid, created substance, for yt I suppose y" mean here by spirit. 2° to conceive how such a substance acts & cogitates in a solid substance. 3° to conceive how it is united to some systems of matter. 4° to conceive how it can act on or suffer from matter, &c. For to use your own words, "It would not be fair nor satisfactory to give us a short answer and tell us every thing is possible to god," and "If we grant such arbitrary powers of wch we have noe Idea nor conception—there will be no end of imputing powers according to every one's Fancy or Credulity." According to wch rule of y's all that is allowed beyond what we can conceive must goe for Fancy or Credulity. And therefore pray let us see that phylosiphie of y bounded by such rules as may keep us from unconceivable suppositions.

The last utterance of Burnet which Locke deems worthy of any comment is the general statement: "I have noted those doctrines you see which chiefly relate to the soul of man and found agreeable to or consequential upon the principles of the Deists." Locke dismisses this as follows:

When y" have demonstrated the soule of man to be immaterial y' own hypothesis will be clear of these objections agt mine, & I shall come over to y" & be clear too, if yu know more than I can goe beyond probability yt it is soe. All my accusations of Philosophical Deisme let the fault of yt be what y" please fall upon y'self & own hypothesis.

VOL. XI.

4

NOAH PORTER.

ARTICLE V.-CHRISTIANITY AND MODERN

ECONOMICS.

IT is the object of this paper to show that there is a new economic system, theoretical and practical, and that it stands in a special relation to Christian ethics. Economic science is changing because practical methods of industry are doing so; theory waits upon practice. The change involves a scientific recognition of moral forces in business life because the industrial revolution is calling those forces into active exercise; it is enabling and requiring the individual man to place his business life on a higher moral level; it is subjecting the general process of distributing wealth to the control of the moral forces of society; it is calling on ethical agencies, the church, the benevolent society, the school, and within scientific limits carefully applied, the state, to take a part in guiding economic development.

At a time when such interference was working mischief the doctrine of laissez faire originated; and economic science spent its energy in warning philanthropic agencies, public and private, to keep wholly out of the industrial field. Now that moral agencies are clearly needed and are actively at work in this domain, the science is obliged to change its attitude and to formulate, if it can, the principles that should govern their action. A divorcement of ethics and economics characterized the theories of the past; and it was based on apparent separation between them in practical life. The present movement is restoring the union in theory and in practice. It is (1) enabling the individual to call his moral nature into fuller action; it is (2) subjecting the division of wealth to moral arbitration; and it is (3) breaking down the barriers that barred the church, the benevolent society, the school and the state from participation in economic affairs.

The science of Political Economy has been traditionally based on the assumption of unrestricted competition. This is essentially a self-seeking process, and the science was, there