"Thus shalt thou say the first word only contains the name: unto the children of Israel, hath sent me unto you." If therefore we separate from the other two words, as it is already separated by the Hebrew accents, though I would not lay too much stress on this, we bring out the natural meaning with much greater clearness. (or) "And God said unto Moses, 18 (Ehyeh); because I am, That is, My name is Ehyeh, because I am He who alone can say of himself. I have purposely transliterated the first word, because it is clearly a proper name and connected with 7. Whether we render by 'because' (as in Gen. xxxi. 49 and many other passages), or by the simple relative 'who,' is a matter of comparatively minor importance. Personally I prefer the former. Nor do I very much care whether in the clause which contains the interpretation of the name we render the verb 'I am' or 'I will be.' Perhaps the slightest change from the A.V. would be to print the words thus: "I AM; because I am." What I chiefly contend for is the separation of the words, so that the first shall represent the name, and the others the explanation or reason of the name. In support of this I will only quote a remarkable passage of Jehudah ha-Levi (Kusari, IV. 3). "And when he asked Him, and said, And they say unto me, What is his name? He answered him, saying, What have they to do to seek that which they are unable to comprehend?-just as the angel said, Wherefore dost thou ask after my name, seeing it is wonderful?—. The .אשר אהיה and its interpretation ,אהיה Tell them only meaning is, the Being who will be (lit. be found) for them at the time when they shall seek me. Let them not seek a greater proof than my being with them, and so let them receive me; and say hath sent me unto you." It is clear from this that Jehudah ha-Levi separated the first word from the other two. The renderings eyó eiμi i av of the LXX., ego sum qui sum of the Vulgate, and 'I am that I am' of the English Authorized Version are objectionable, because they represent the first word of the clause simply by the copula and first personal pronoun, which in Hebrew would rather require NN. Ex. xxii. 4 (5). This verse is rendered as follows in the Authorized Version, and the rendering is that which is generally adopted: “If a man shall cause a field or vineyard to be eaten, and shall put in his beast, and shall feed in another man's field; of the best of his own field, and of the best of his own vineyard, shall he make restitution." I must confess this appears to me to yield at best an obscure sense. Whose is the field first mentioned? Is it the man's own, or his neighbour's? If the latter, as seems generally to be understood, how is the construction to be accounted for? We should rather expect in if it is merely an explanation of the preceding clause. But a much better sense may be obtained by a very slight alteration in the text, which is simply to read any, lit. 'the kindling,' for his beast.' This change will bring the verse into close connexion with that which follows, and both may be read with Judg. xv. 5 for an illustrative comment. The one law provides redress in case of incendiarism, the other in case of accidental fire. The first of the two verses would then read: 'If a man shall set on fire a field or a vineyard, and shall put the burning fuel so that he burn up the field of another; of the best of his own field, and of the best of his own vineyard, shall he make restitution.' Here the first field and vineyard mentioned are the man's own, and the fire he lights in them is probably for burning up the stubble and rubbish. For in connexion with fire, see Judg. xv. 5, Am. i. 4, &c., and for the construction of the thing set on fire preceded by the preposition see Ez. xxxix. 9, 10. The next verse deals with the compensation to be made for damage done by accidental fire. with 'If fire break out and catch hold of thorns so that shocks of corn or the standing crop or the field be consumed, he that set fire to the burning fuel shall make full restitution.' That is, the compensation shall be in proportion to the damage done. In the former case, where the fire is wilfully caused, the compensation is something in excess of the damage; it is to be of the best of the man's own field or vineyard. The 'thorns' in the latter verse are the thorn hedge separating the fields of two neighbours (Is. v. 5; Ecclus. xxviii. 24), and the spreading of the fire is accidental. This is shown by the word , which would hardly have been used, if the object of the fire had been to consume the thorns in the owner's field. Nor is it likely that the Hiphil of would be employed in two such different senses, 'cause to be eaten,' and 'kindle,' in two consecutive verses, as in the Authorized Version. The only other instances given by Gesenius in support of the meaning depavit, which he attaches to the Piel of this verb, are Is. iii. 14, v. 5, and there is nothing in these to show that cremavit or combussit is not equally appropriate. WILLIAM ALDIS WRIGHT. ON THE EISANGELIA. AMONGST the discoveries which have been made of the works of ancient writers there is scarcely one more deserving of our notice than that of the papyri of Hyperides. These mss. written at a very early period are to us a rich source of information on the pronunciation of the Greek language as spoken at that time; Sauppe, whom J. B. Lightfoot agrees with, thinks that the papyri of the three judicial orations were not written later than the middle of the second century B.C. and Babington concludes from the characters and marks used in the ms. of the funeral oration that it is at least as old as the second century after Christ. The spelling of πρodedáνισται, μιρακίων, μεικράς, βέλτιον etc. proves that er was sounded as ; as in many other mss. and Egyptian inscriptions (Letronne, Recueil des inscriptions vol. II p. 31) is added to the terminations in a no where it ought not to be and has been omitted where it is required, from which we may conclude that it was silent, see Strabo XIV p. 648; e seems to have been confounded with a, e. g. Or. Fun. c. 5, 17 ẻπed[eú0nσav and J. B. Lightfoot conjectures that kai has been left out between aкоVEL KEλEVEL (pro Lycophr. c. 9, 20) through the conformity of the sound of Kai with the first syllable of κελεύειν; see αιτιαι οικειοι for αἱ αἰτίαι οἱ οἰκεῖοι in the same oration. But when E. M. Geldart the recent defender of the similarity of the pronunciation of ancient and modern Greek maintains that at has always had the sound of e he seems to have overlooked Dionys. Halic. de compos. verb. c. 22: Ti πρὸς τούτοις ἡ τῶν φωνηέντων παράθεσις ἡ κατὰ τὴν τελευταίαν τοῦ κώλου τοῦδε γενομένη ἐν τῷ ‘Καὶ ̓Αθηναίων διακέκρουκε τὸ συνεχὲς τῆς ἁρμονίας καὶ διέστακε, πάνυ αἰσθητὸν τὸν μεταξὺ λαβοῦσα χρόνον· ἀκέραστοί τε γὰρ αἱ φωναὶ τοῦ τε ι καὶ τοῦ α καὶ ἀποκόπτουσαι τὸν ἦχον; so also spellings like μετε for μήτε, οικητας for οἰκέτας prove that η had still at that time its genuine sound etc. Since we are in possession of these papyri we are enabled in some degree to form a judgement upon the eloquence of Hyperides which I shall attempt to give at some future time. In a passage from his oration contra Demosthenem (c. 19) we find fresh data for ascertaining the time of the birth of Demosthenes; the funeral oration throws some light on the first proceedings of the Lamian War and on the allies of the Athenians and the Macedonians, about which we gain only imperfect information elsewhere etc. So also we find that the orations of Hyperides pro Lycophrone and pro Euxenippo contain valuable information with regard to the εἰσαγγελία which has not yet been sufficiently applied to its elucidation. To point out what in those orations I consider of the greatest interest on this subject and to adduce some other passages not yet applied by others will be the object of the present essay. εἰσαγγελία signifes in its literal and general sense an information of any kind; in the language of the Attic courts, however, it has been peculiarly applied to three classes of causes, as we learn from Harpocration s. v. εἰσαγγελία· δημο σίας τινὸς δίκης ὄνομά ἐστι, τρία δ ̓ ἐστὶν εἴδη εἰσαγγελιών. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ δημοσίοις ἀδικήμασι μεγίστοις καὶ ἀναβολὴν μὴ ἐπιδεχομένοις, καὶ ἐφ ̓ οἷς μήτε ἀρχὴ καθέστηκε μήτε νόμοι κεῖνται τοῖς ἄρχουσι καθ ̓ οὓς εἰσάξουσιν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὴν βουλὴν ἢ τὸν δῆμον ἡ πρώτη κατάστασις γίγνεται (see Schol. on Hermog. εἰς στάσεις Par. in marg. Rhet. Gr. IV p. 72 Walz), καὶ ἐφ ̓ οἷς τῷ μὲν φεύγοντι, ἐὰν ἁλῷ, μέγισται ζημίαι ἐπικεῖνται, ὁ δὲ διώκων, ἐὰν μὴ ὅλῃ, οὐδὲν ζημιοῦται, πλὴν ἐὰν τὸ έ μέρος τῶν ψήφων μὴ μεταλάβῃ· τότε γὰρ χιλίας ἐκτίνει. τὸ δὲ παλαιὸν καὶ οὗτοι μειζόνως ἐκολάζοντο. ἑτέρα δὲ εἰσαγγελία λέγεται ἐπὶ ταῖς κακώσεσιν· αὗται δ ̓ εἰσὶ πρὸς τὸν ἄρχοντα, καὶ τῷ διώκοντι ἀζήμιοι, κἂν μὴ μεταλάβῃ τὸ ἐ μέρος τῶν ψήφων. ἄλλη δὲ εἰσαγγελία ἐστὶ κατὰ τῶν διαιτητῶν· εἰ γάρ τις ὑπὸ διαιτητοῦ |