“ λόγον καὶ ἐλέγχειν :” and again Socrates objects to the ἐριστικὸς λόγος that οὐκ ἔστι ζητεῖν ἀνθρώπῳ οὔτε ὃ οἶδεν οὔτε ὃ μὴ οἶδεν.

This latter position is examined at length in the Theætetus, which I consider to belong to a group of dialogues later than any yet mentioned. This group is defined in my view by two characteristics. (1) The concentration on ethical and political interests, due to the influence of Socrates, has ceased: Plato's attention is fixed on questions from a social point of view more narrow and professional, from a philosophical point of view more central and fundamental-on knowledge: its nature, object and method. He has passed definitely from the market-place into the school; and as an indication of this, (2) he is now engaged in controversies with other philosophers: an element absent from the earlier dialogues-even from the Republic. When he takes up ethical questions again, as in the Philebus, the more scholastic and technical treatment is striking.

Now in the Theætetus perverse dialectic is noticed, though not by the name of Eristic, but by that of Sophistic, which here bears its later meaning. "If," says Socrates, If," says Socrates, "you and I were engaged in Sophistic logomachy (ξυνελθόντες σοφιστικῶς εἰς μaxν тоlavтiv) we should go on verbally confuting each other: "a sort of confutation that produces no real conviction."

This then is the first identification of Sophistic and Eristic: that is, if I am right in connecting closely the Euthydemus and the Sophistes, previously discussed. I know that the Euthydemus has generally been placed earlier: but I think this is due to a mistaken inference from the style. The extreme difference of form has blinded readers to the substantial affinity of its polemic with that of the Sophistes.

I am

aware that any argument which depends on an assumption as to the order of Plato's dialogues is insecure, on account of the difference of opinion that exists on the subject. In particular, many would dispute the place I assign to the Theætetus. But most, I think, would allow at any rate that there was a time at which Plato attacked as Sophists rhetorical moralists and politicians, a later time at which he defined a Sophist as a perverse disputer, and a time between the two at

which he contended against the same sort of perverse disputations without identifying it with Sophistry. And this seems strongly confirmatory of my view that this kind of disputatious Sophistry is post-Socratic and a degenerate offshoot of Socratic method.

H. SIDGWICK.

NOTE ON HERODOTUS v. 28.

μετὰ δὲ οὐ πολλὸν χρόνον ἄνεσις κακῶν ἦν καὶ ἤρχετο τὸ δεύτερον ἐκ Νάξου τε καὶ Μιλήτου Ἴωσι γίνεσθαι κακά.

THE MSS. have åvews or äveos. Editors have adopted Reiske's conjecture of aveois, and the common translation would be 'Afterwards, but for no long time, there was a respite from suffering. Then from Naxos and Miletus troubles gathered anew about Ionia' (Rawlinson). Grote would join μetà dè ov Toλλov Xрóvov, understanding apparently, 'So after a little time of trouble there was a respite from suffering, and then, &c.' Probably no one ever felt content with either of these explanations. It may be worth considering whether the true reading be not ȧvavéwois, a word which gives unexceptionable sense and which might well be corrupted into ävews. It is used by Herodotus elsewhere.

HERBERT RICHARDS.

ON SOME PASSAGES OF THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS.

ACCORDING to the received interpretation of Bk. v. ch. 5 of the so-called Nicomachean Ethics, the author attempts in this difficult passage an explanation of the laws of value. It is obvious that, if that is his intention, he fails egregiously. That he should have failed in such an inquiry is neither impossible nor even improbable: but is it quite certain that we have formed a right conception of the end which he has in view?

The following extract from Sir A. Grant's commentary will serve to recal not only the usual interpretation, but also the doubts and difficulties which have suggested themselves to most readers of the Ethics:

"Now the joining of the diagonal of a square gives us proportionate return.' The joining of the diagonal gives each producer some of the other's work, and thus an exchange is made, but the respective value of the commodities must be first adjusted, else there can be no fair exchange. What, then, is the law of value? It is enunciated a little later (§ 10). Seî Toívvv -Tрopýv. 'As an architect (or a farmer it may be) is to a shoemaker, so many shoes must there be to a house or to corn.' That is, the value of the product is determined by the quality of the labour spent upon it. The sort of comparison here made between the quality of farmer and shoemaker seems connected with a Greek notion of personal dignity and a dislike of Bavavoía. Such feelings are opposed to the impartial views of political economy, and are quite superseded by the law of supply and demand. If it be asked what is to determine the quality of labour, it will soon be seen that quality resolves itself into quantity, that the excellence of labour must be measured also by supply and demand. We cannot be sure that we have

above the full statement of Aristotle's ideas upon value, but if we have, they are imperfect."

In my opinion ch. 5 should be read in close connection with ch. 2-4, the passage as a whole being an attempt at once to connect and to distinguish three kinds of particular justice. In order to connect these three kinds of particular justice, the author regards them each as áváλoyóv т: in order to distinguish them, he represents each by a special and appropriate kind of ἀναλογία, the word αναλογία being employed in the larger of the two senses recognized by the Greek mathematicians, and therefore including arithmetical proportion, which is strictly speaking a peoórns. Cf. Nesselmann, Die Algebra der Griechen, pp. 210-212, where it is shown from Nicomachus Gerasenus and Iamblichus, that, though properly avaλoyía meant geometrical proportion (all other proportions being peoóτητες), αναλογία and μεσότης are frequently used synonymously for any kind of proportion. I shall henceforth use the word proportion as an equivalent for åvaλoyía in its extended meaning.

Premising that in the earlier part of ch. 3 particular justice has been made to consist in rò loov, and that it has been afterwards explained that the ἰσότης spoken of is ἰσότης λόγων, or ávaλoyía, § 8, 'between the persons and the things, according to some standard' (πρós тi), §§ 5, 6, I proceed to state, as briefly as possible, the substance of the investigation of distributive, corrective, and commercial justice. In the course of my summary, it will, I hope, appear, that the purpose of the author is merely to translate into the language of proportion the following proposition: 'Particular justice is attained in distribution, correction, and barter, when the parties are, after the transaction, in the same position relatively to one another, as they were before it.' What constitutes identity of relative positions, the author does not ask. The investigation is in fact introduced in order to justify the statement made in 3 § 8, čσTw ἄρα τὸ δίκαιον ἀνάλογόν τι, just as the list of virtues is introduced in II. 7 to justify the definition of virtue. But though the author's principal aim is to show that the just in distribution, in correction, and in commerce is áváλoyóv Tɩ, he thinks it worth while to enter into detail and to distinguish them,

because Plato had taken one kind of proportion, ý loótns ǹ Yewμeтρin, as the rule of justice (Gorg. 508 A, Laws 757 A, B), whilst the Pythagoreans had endeavoured to reduce all justice to retaliation, Tò àvtiteπovlós, a phrase which may be interpreted by reference to proportion.

1. The first of the three kinds of particular justice, distributive justice, in the distribution of property or honour secures to the individual a share proportioned to his desert. Desert is differently estimated in different cases: for example, in a democracy freedom constitutes desert, in an oligarchy wealth or birth, in an aristocracy ἀρετή.

Thus distributive justice assigns to the persons concerned shares such that the position of the persons relatively to one another is not altered by the distribution, but does not determine what constitutes alteration of relative position.

Let A, B, C, D be proportionals, so that A: B :: C : D. Hence alternando A: C: B: D; and componendo A taken together with C: B taken together with D :: A : B; which last proportion exactly represents distributive justice as above described. Or, as the author expresses it, distributive justice consists in the conjunction or composition of A and C, B and D, A, B, C, D being proportionals (ἡ ἄρα τοῦ Α' ὅρου τῷ Γ καὶ ἡ τοῦ Β τῷ Δ σύζευξις τὸ ἐν διανομῇ δίκαιίν ἐστιν, 3 § 12), since by such conjunction the position of the two parties, relatively to one another, is not altered: whether, as in a democracy, A and B are equal, and therefore C and D; or, as in oligarchy and aristocracy, a difference is assumed between the persons, which therefore necessitates a difference in the shares assigned to them. Cf. Politics, III. 9. 4. Distributive justice then may be represented by the formula

A+ C: B+ D :: A : B.

But mathematically when A taken together with C is to B taken together with D as A is to B, A, B, C, D are said to be in geometrical proportion. Hence distributive justice is a geometrical proportion.

δ

1 The Editors print a, ß, y, d here, A, B, T, ▲ in ch. 5. As the proportionals are in both cases lines, not

numbers (else we should have the proportion 1: 2 :: 3 : 4), I have restored capitals in the present passage.