33D CONG....2D SESS.

The convictions of my own mind are clear as to the correctness of those views, and my regret is, that I have not the power to enforce them with an ability commensurate with the importance of the measure under discussion.

THE ANNEXATION OF CUBA.

SPEECH OF HON. W. W. BOYCE,
OF SOUTH CAROLINA,

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
January 15, 1855.

The House being in Committee of the Whole

on the state of the Union

Mr. BOYCE said: Mr. Chairman, I propose to make some observations on the annexation of Cuba. I consider it the great question in our foreign relations.

A feverish impatience seems to be seizing upon our people for territorial extension. In some quarters the cry is for the Canadas. Upon this point, we have been informed by a leading member from Ohio [Mr. CAMPBELL] that the people upon the northern frontier look with deep feeling to the annexation of the British Provinces of North America. In other quarters the cry is for the Sandwich Islands; some are wishing for another partition of Mexico; others are looking to the regions watered by the mighty Amazon; more are bent upon the acquisition of Cuba, and some have such inordinate stomachs that they are willing to swallow up the entire continent. These are all but various phases of the manifest destiny idea. I must confess, I do not sympathize with this idea. I think our true mission is conservatism, not indefinite extension.

Why do we desire further extension? Do we need any more territory? On the north we lose ourselves upon the verge of eternal snows; on the south we penetrate to the fierce heats of the equator; upon the east and the west we pause only on the beach of the two great oceans of the world. If we apply the instruments we find that the United States are ten times as large as Great Britain, Ireland, and France combined; three times as large as the whole of France, Great Britain, Ireland, Austria, Prussia, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, Holland, and Denmark, nearly equal to the whole of Europe; as large as the Roman Empire when its eagles dominated from the Euphrates to the pillars of Hercules. If it be possible for a nation to have territory enough, we certainly have it, and whatever else we may need,, we do not need any more space. If any one were to propose placing the whole of Europe, one of the great divisions of the globe, under a single Government, he would be deemed a madman, yet we realize territorially this idea, and still crave more. What a madness!

Do we need any more population? Why, our population is already near thirty millions, and increasing at a velocity so fearful that the boldest must tremble at the future. Our annual increase is a million. If we had the same density of population over our entire surface as in Massachusetts, our population would be four hundred and twenty millions; and if we increase for the next century in the same ratio we have for the last sixty years, our population will be within a fraction of five hundred millions. What a prospect, and how short a time; for what is a hundred years to a nation; the Roman Empire existed twelve centuries-there are noble families in England who date back the luster of their houses four hundred years. A century to a nation is not more than a year to an individual. When we look beyond the present, and pierce the future, the increase of our population presents a great problem. When the vast surface of our territory shall be in a blaze with the fires of civilization; when the living tides of human beings flowing from the shores of the Atlantic shall be met by the returning tides from the Pacific; when the very gorges of the Alleghanies and the Rocky Mountains shall be full of people; when population shall be pressing upon the means of subsistence, what will become of the Republic, what will be the fate of liberty itself? Instead of desiring more population, we would be most fortunate if we could remain at what we are.

The Annexation of Cuba-Mr. Boyce.

A nation has sufficient population when it is able to protect itself from external force. We have already fully reached this point.

A Republic, a Federal Republic in particular, cannot exist without external pressure. It is the fundamental idea upon which the whole theory rests. Take away the pressure from without, and a Confederacy necessarily goes to pieces. As long as Carthage stood a rival to be dreaded by the Roman people, the Republic flourished in its greatest vigor; but when Carthage was overthrown, the Republic, relieved from external pressure, became the prey of factions; the Gracchi, Sylla, and Marius, Pompey and Cæsar, passed over the stage, making it bleed at every pore, and trampling unconvulsing the State with their struggles for power, der foot the glory and the liberty of Rome. The history of our own country is instructive on this point. Before the war of 1812, while the State was in dread of English power, sectionalism was unknown. We were one people. Patriotism was an American plant, indigenous to the soil. It grew as well on the bleak hills of New England as in the swamps of the South. Great men and great ideas made our history. But after that war had demon strated our entire security from external force, sectional ideas and sectional parties arose. Fac tions usurped the stage. Narrow ideas loomed up into gigantic proportions. The North and the South became two hostile camps; and the gulf of separation has gradually been widening as we advanced in our career of greatness and power. It is very clear that, do what else we may, we have nothing to gain by annexing more territory, to increase our population by a foreign supply. If we do not need any more territory, or any extraordinary addition of population by acquisition of territory, then the annexation of Cuba cannot be urged on either of these grounds. Then upon what grounds can it be urged? Perhaps it may be urged on the ground that it is necessary to us as a military position to protect our commerce. But I cannot admit this; and, in considering this point, I must assume that it is the settled policy of our Government not to permit Cuba to pass from Spain into the hands of any of the great European Powers. Taking this for granted, I say we have nothing to fear from Cuba. We have strong positions at Key West and Tortugas, which we are now fortifying, and which can be rendered impregnable. Our naval power is infinitely superior to that of Spain; we can effectually command the outlets to the Gulf of Mexico; and the idea of our commerce being in any danger from Cuba, is, I think, without the slightest foundation. Experience is the most conclusive argument on this point. Our commerce never has been disturbed from Cuba; and if we have not been disturbed in the infancy of our power, what have we to fear now in its maturity?

HO. OF REPS.

the uncertain tenure of European tolerance. For my own part, I am unwilling to increase the Navy a single gun beyond what is necessary for the service of the country in its present condition. The people are already sufficiently taxed, and the Navy is already, in my opinion, a moth of adequate appetite. The conviction that we cannot acquire Cuba securely without a vast increase of the Navy, is an additional obstacle to my taking any steps in that direction.

But it may be said it will extend our commerce. I admit this. The annexation of Cuba would furnish an increased market for certain agricultural productions of the middle and northwesterne States, and the manufactures of the eastern States, and to the extent of this increased trade; and even beyond it, under the preference given to our own vessels in the coasting trade, the shipping interest of the North would be benefited. Under the influence of these several causes, and others which could be presented, I have no doubt the free States would make a great deal of money out of Cuba, if annexed. Though I see the North would reap a golden harvest from Cuba, yet I cannot, however great may be the interest I take in the increase of northern wealth, forego the objections I have to the annexation of Cuba on other grounds. Besides, while I consider the advantage certain great forms of industry at the North would derive from the admission of Cuba, I cannot forget that the admission of Cuba might paralyze the vast slave interest at the South engaged in raising sugar. When I am told that the annexation of Cuba will extend our commerce, I reply

First. This mere moneyed motive is outweighed, in my mind, by other more important and more elevated considerations.

Second. That this advantage may be attained, to a considerable extent, by a course of policy short of annexation, by the modification of our own commercial regulations and those of Spain and Cuba. To understand my meaning on this point, I must briefly refer to the nature of our commercial relations with Cuba. The duties on foreign vessels in Cuba is $1 50 per ton; on Spanish vessels, sixty-two and a half cents per ton. The duties on foreign merchandise imported under the Spanish flag, are from seven to nine per cent. less than in foreign vessels, except a few articles paying specific duties, one of which is flour, the duty on which, in favor of the Spanish flag, is from $1 to $150 per barrel.

The United States, in order to coerce a repeal of these regulations, in 1832 passed an act by which Spanish vessels coming from Cuba were required to pay the same rate of duty on tonnage that was levied on American vessels in Cuba. In the same mistaken spirit of retaliation the United States, in 1834, enacted that Spanish vessels coming from Cuba should pay, in the ports of the United States, such further tonnage duty, in addition to the tonnage duty already payable, as should be equivalent to the amount of discriminating duty that would have been imposed on the cargoes imported in the said vessels, if the same had been exported from the port of Havana, in American bottoms; and further, that before such Spanish vessel should be permitted to depart from a port of the United States with a cargo for Cuba, such vessel should pay such further tonnage duty as should be equivalent to the amount of discriminating duty that would be payable for the time being upon the cargo, if imported into the port of Havana in an American vessel. The discriminating duties above alluded to amount to about eight per cent. The result is, that Spanish vessels leav

Before we determine on the policy of acquiring maritime colonies, there is a prior question we should consider. It is this: Are we willing to pour out indefinite millions to build up such a Navy as will enable us to contend with the great Powers for the supremacy of the seas? If not, then, indeed, would it be a short-sighted policy to acquire such colonies, which we would hold by

eight per cent. more than if they imported the same cargoes from any other foreign port. In our anxiety to monopolize the freights we have lost, to a very great extent, the sale of the merchandise. Under the influence of our acts of 1832 and 1834, the imports into Cuba, in Spanish vessels, from the United States, amounted, in 1849, to only $11,000, whereas the imports from England for the same period, in Spanish vessels, amounted to $4,345,300. That this striking difference is mainly attributable to our own regulations is obvious, from the fact that England stands on no more favored footing in reference to the commercial regulations of Cuba than the United States, except her freedom from our own enactments. For ten

33D CONG....2D SESS.

guage and the marks of the tattoo.

An intelli

gent Cuban has lately informed me that nearly all the slaves in Cuba are Africans imported since 1820, and their descendants; that, until recently, it was estimated the entire slave population died out every ten years. Now, I wish to ask, what would be the condition of this class, if Cuba were annexed, and they brought, without any modification of their condition by any supreme authority intermediate between the Spanish Power and our own, under the influence of the law of our Federal Government? This very question has already been decided by our courts. The Supreme Court

of the United States, in the celebrated case of the Amistad, 15 Peters, 593, sustaining the decision of the circuit court, hold that "these negroes were unlawfully transported to Cuba, in violation of the laws and treaties of Spain, and the most solemn edicts and declarations of that Government. By those laws, and treaties, and edicts, the African slave trade is utterly abolished; the dealing in that trade is deemed a heinous crime, and the negroes thereby introduced into the dominion of Spain are declared to be free." If Cuba were directly annexed from Spain, without an intermediate state of separate independence in which a new fundamental law could be passed, great difficulties might arise on this point from the efforts of the Abolitionists.

The next item in the population is the white race. This is estimated at six hundred thousand, of which a small proportion are European Span iards, the residue are Creoles-about equal, as a class, to the people of Mexico. Now, can these people be relied upon to preserve slavery? The country being an old settled country, there would be, as I have already said, no great tide of emigration from the South; the comparatively few southern men who would go there, would be counterbalanced by an equal and adverse emigration from the North. The continuance of slavery would, therefore, depend on the Creoles of Cuba. I would consider this bad security. Slavery is never secure, where the masters are an inferior white race. There is, too, a marked tendency in the Spanish Creole race to emancipation. This is owing to several causes.

1st. The equality of the two races. They assimilate without difficulty; there is no gulf between them. The philosophy of African slavery consists in the superiority of the white race; where this superiority is wanting, there is no basis for the institution to rest upon, and it crumbles like a house without a foundation.

2d. The tendency of the Spanish democratic idea is to ultraism; they carry liberty to the extreme of anarchy. Every Spanish revolution is a socialistic revolution.

3d. Their inability to govern themselves produces bloody struggles, the leaders in which seek the aid of the slaves. Hence it has resulted, that the Spanish American colonies, who have set up for themselves, though under Spain they were slave communities, have all gone into emancipation. Have we any right to expect anything more from the Creoles of Cuba, than the Creoles of Central America? I think not.

From the rapid summary thus taken of the population and institutions of Cuba, I doubt whether Cuba would be reliable upon the slavery issue. Looking at the question of annexation in all its bearings, I doubt exceedingly whether it would be to the interest of the South to annex Cuba now, if it could be done without money or blood. But no one has any idea that Cuba can be thus easily acquired at the present time.

There are only three modes by which Cuba could be acquired, víz: 1. By purchase. 2. By war. 3. By treaty with Cuba as an indepenent Power.

The first method is impracticable, because Spain will not sell. The recent debate in the Spanish Cortez sets that point at rest. I go further, not only Spain will not sell, but no Spanish administration would dare to sell. The announcement of such a treaty would revolutionize Spain, and the Ministry who would have the temerity to sign a treaty so humiliating to the pride of the nation, would be torn to pieces by the infuriated mob. And hence I have always looked upon the mission of Mr. Soulé for this purpose, as a sterile idea, fruitless in itself, and unfortunate, from his European birth, in the agent selected. But, supposing

The Annexation of Cuba-Mr. Boyce.

this difficulty overcome, the price would be so enormous $150,000,000 or $200,000,000-that I would not be willing to give it. I look upon the advantages to the South as too precarious to give so much money, especially when I see that the necessary effect of such an expenditure, would be to fasten a high tariff upon us indefinitely. There is no practical measure within the scope of Government power, from which the South would derive so vast a benefit, as from the reduction of the tariff to the lowest revenue standard. I should be very unwilling to abandon this great practical measure of deliverance to the South, for the uncertain hazards of annexation.

Ho. OF REPS.

of Cuba is only a question of time. The final decision of this great question of annexation belongs appropriately to the future. I say, take no step now in that direction; wait and watch the course of events, and profit by them. I do not wish to shackle the ultimate action of the country. When the future rolls round, and Cuba emerges independent from its bosom, when the fruit is ripe, then let this great question be decided under the light of all the surrounding circumstances. I might stop here, but several hypothetical cases must be disposed of to manifest myself truly.

It may be said, suppose England or France seize Cuba, what then? There are some things so im

probable they need hardly be considered, and this

is one. After England and France are done with Russia, they will not be in a mood to disturb anybody, much less will they want to jar on the United States. But neither England nor France want Cuba; in their hands it would be necessarily a free negro colony, and, therefore, worthless; but if either of them should want it, their mutual jealousy would prevent either from taking it. But if, in violation of all possibility, they should make the attempt, I say at once I would draw the sword and drive them into the sea.

certas to the second mode, war, I say nothing of the shocking injustice of wresting from a feeble Power, without provocation, her most valuable possession. I have no doubt we could succeed in this way, but at great cost of money, and men. The Spanish troops would make some resistance, the climate more. I cannot forget, too, that a large portion of the treasure expended would be wrung from the hard earnings of the southern people, and much of the blood shed would be the best blood of the South; for our system of taxation is unequal; and this being looked upon as a southern measure, the gallant young men of the South Again, it may be said, suppose Spain refuses would volunteer with alacrity. But of all modes to satisfy our claims against her, what then? My which could be devised for the acquisition of Cuba, answer is direct. I would not mingle up these for the benefit of the South, war is the most fatal. claims with the question of Cuba. I would act For no one who has any knowledge of the Spanish towards Spain with extreme forbearance, for she character, its pride, obstinacy, and revenge, can is weak and we are strong. The truest greatness for a moment image that Spain would stop at any consists in great ideas. I would exhibit the counsteps to blast the acquisition in our hands. The try in this light towards Spain. I would act topolicy of Spain is obvious: she would cling towards her with generosity and magnanimity. I Cuba with the tenacity of a dying convulsion, and when she could hold on no longer, she would decree universal emancipation. But, it may be said, we would reverse this state of things in our territory of Cuba. But, just at this juncture, the people of the North, who have the control of the Federal Government, would, by a unanimous voice, bid us stay our hands; that non-intervention was their doctrine; that, by the Spanish law, there were no slaves in Cuba. The result would be, that the South, after all her sacrifices, would have acquired a free negro colony, the greatest curse imaginable. This result would be very amusing to the Abolitionists, but not to me. I have, therefore, no idea of blindly traveling a road which leads nowhere but over a precipice.

Another motive which makes me still more determined not to go to war with Spain for Cuba, is, that we of the South are upon the eve of a great struggle with a hostile majority of the North, and we will need all our resources, not to make foreign conquests, but to defend the very ground upon which we stand. I am, therefore, unwilling to weaken our resources, or complicate our position by an attack on Cuba; others, who hear only the songs of peace in the future, may take a different

course.

As to the third mode, treaty with Cuba, this implies that Cuba has thown off the Spanish yoke, and established independence. If it were desirable to acquire Cuba, this seems to me to be the only mode it could be done beneficially to the South. By this mode we would escape the agitation of the slavery question in the territorial condition of Cuba. The question would be in a nut-shell, annexation or no annexation? The Wilmot proviso might precede and prevent annexation, it could not succeed annexation and mar it. Cuba would have organized her institutions. We would be enabled to judge, with some degree of confidence, as to her capability for self-government, and her reliability upon the slavery issue. We would know what we were getting, and run less risk of getting what we did not want. We would have gotten rid of the embarrassing questions arising out of the treaties, ordinances, and decrees of Spain. And then, nationally speaking, she would cost us nothing, neither men nor money.

It may be supposed, from these considerations, that I favor fillibustering. Not so. An impassable gulf intervenes between me and this policyduty. I cannot interfere with the domestic institutions of other people, for I wish other people not to interfere with the domestic institutions of our people. On the other hand, I cannot shut my eyes to the inevitable future. I see the world is in a transition state, and I feel that the independence

would urge our claims in the most respectful manner. If, after a reasonable time, they were still disregarded, I would propose arbitration. If this failed, then, after assuring myself that our claims were well founded, and after sufficient and final notice, I would send out a fleet of steamers, seize some Spanish ships, pay the claims, and give a receipt in full.

But, it may be said, suppose Spain should attempt to Africanize Cuba, what then? For my part, I am clear that our Government should use every possible means to prevent this. I would stop at nothing, not even war. There is, however, an old saying, and a true one, that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. I would act upon this maxim. I would remove the causes leading Spain to this course. They are two-the fear of our designs upon Cuba, and the pressure of England. Let us take such a line of conduct as will remove the first cause; the Russians are removing the second cause, in which operation our Government could coöperate efficiently, by encouraging Spain. That, in my opinion, is the true line of our diplomacy. It is the interest of Spain to preserve slavery in Cuba-her interest and our policy concur We would be bunglers, indeed, if, under such circumstances, we could not produce the desired result. The policy of the South is not so much to have more slaves, as to have more people interested in slavery. Spain is so interested; we should let her continue thus.

I am glad to be able to fortify my opinions upon this subject by the authority of Mr. Calhoun. As late as May, 1848, he said, in his speech upon the proposed occupation of Yucatan:"

66

"So long as Cuba remains in the hands of Spain, a friendly Power-a Power of which we have no dread-it should continue to be, as it has been, the policy of all Administrations ever since I have been connected with the Government, to let Cuba remain there."

I assume what he says as an axiom. I deduce from it a corollary, that we are not to buy Cuba, or go to war for it; because, if our policy is for Cuba to remain with Spain, it is against our policy to change that possession, with or without the consent of Spain.

This disposes of every mode of acquisition, except by treaty with Cuba as an independent Power. This is, from its very nature, a question for the future. When the contingency arises, then, and not till then, we should render a definite judgment.

Mr. Chairman, the acquisition of Cuba will open a new volume in our history. Former acquisitions were the necessities of location, or of circumstance. This is not. By the step we are fairly launched in the career o aquest, from

33D CONG....2D SESS.

which there is no outlet but to storm the future, sword in hand. From this career we have nothing to hope, and everything to fear; for our greatest success would be our greatest disaster.

The history of nations has been the history of their imaginations. The pomp of power, the thirst for dominion, the glare of glory, have been the empty baubles for which they have exhausted their energies, and slaughtered each other. These have been the dim lights by which poor humanity has hitherto advanced. Who can estimate the infinite miseries, the multitudinous slaughters, these barren vanities have entailed upon the human race. The book of time is bloody on every page with the horrid recital. Shall we learn nothing from it? Shall the past turn its sorrowing features upon us in vain? Shall we be insensible to the tears and agonies of history? or shall we furnish another instance of stupendous folly by embarking in the same insane career? I trust not. I trust we shall turn with aversion from the deceitful seductions of false glory, and be instructed by the disasters of universal humanity.

We may extend our dominion over the whole continent, our navies may ride triumphant on every sea, our name may be the terror of Kings, our decrees the destinies of nations, but be assured it will be at the price of our free institutions. I know not how it may be with others, but for my own part, I would not pay this price for all the power and all the glory that ever clustered around all the banners and all the eagles emblazoned in the pantheon of history.

Let us turn from the line of vulgar conquerors to the fathers of the Republic; let us learn from them, that the truest patriotism is the preservation of our institutions, the truest wisdom is moderation. In short, let our history be not the history of our imagination, but the history of our common sense. By this course we may not vaunt so many statues, so many triumphal arches, so many trophies of victory, and boundless dominion, but we shall have what is more glorious than these, we shall have our institutions preserved; we shall have the conquests of peace; the mighty march of civilization; christianity working out, unimpeded, her Divine mission; these will be our statues; these our triumphal arches; these the trophies of our victories; and they will be such as no nation before us have ever had.

THE NATURALIZATION LAWS-POLICY OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH.

voracious appetite, going about seeking whom it may devour. For my part, I have not been able to discover any of these dangers; I feel none of these apprehensions; and it is my purpose, on this occasion, to inquire into the existence of these dangers and apprehensions.

Sir, who compose this new party? So far as the public know, and so far as we all know, and so far as it is admitted, the party consists of native Americans, not aboriginals, not exactly cannibals, but free-born American citizens. And how can an American behold in an organization of his own countrymen such extravagant terrors? Who will say that an association of native Americans is less worthy of confidence than an association of mixed Americans and foreigners?

I assume that the admitted elements of this organization, being native American, absolutely exclude the idea that, as a party, they can have anything at heart but the glory, honor, and welfare of the country. And what do they propose to do? With all their dangerous appearance, their mysterious organization; with all their test oaths of secresy, as alleged, what do they propose to do? They have but one simple proposition to submit to the country, and that is, the purification of the ballot-box. That idea embodies the whole doctrine of the organization of this party. In order to bring about that result, what do they propose to do? They propose to exclude unnaturalized foreigners from the ballot-box, and to check immigration, by wholesome laws for that purpose. That is the utmost extent to which they propose to go.

Intimately connected, however, with this question, is one of a very delicate character-the question of Catholicism in this country. It is said that it is the policy of this new party to exclude Catholics from office. I have no doubt that such a policy is a part of their faith, not only because of their Catholic faith, but because the Roman Catholic Church in this country is so intimately connected with foreign influence in all its branches, that it is impossible to separate the two-and they have to take the whole or exclude the whole.

I do not pretend that I have, upon this occasion, any well arranged plan in reference to the repeal or modification of the naturalization laws. I have, however, some distinct propositions to make, which are radical in their character. I propose to strike at the root of the evil. I do not bring forward my .proposition in the form of a bill, because nobody can suppose that this Congress will favor this reformation. It cannot be expected that an Administration which is so distinctly committed in favor take the back track. I do not suppose that during the present session of Congress any bill of the kind will receive any serious attention. I will lay before the committee, however, the propositions

OF ALABAMA,

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

January 15, 1855.

on the state of the Unior.

Mr. SMITH, of Alabama, said:

Mr. CHAIRMAN: Propositions have been already made in this Hall, and at the other end of the Capitol, to repeal or modify the naturalization laws. That question is assuming proportions of considerable magnitude. In fact, sir, it is becoming the great question of the age. The time has come when American legislators will be forced, by the voice of the people, to take a stand upon this subject; and before this question, which in itself embodies the grand idea of American nationality, all mere party organizations will have to give way and retire.

Intimately connected with the advent of this question is the rise and progress of a new order of men, whose name and designation, up to this period, is as yet unknown, but whose existence, however shadowy and mysterious, is a fixed fact; and whose power in this country, for good or evil, has made itself felt from one end of the Union to the other.

Against this party the vituperations of the press have been leveled. Many of our honorable friends here have entered into the discussion of the subjects arising upon it with intense excitement. They behold in this new order nothing that is good, but some shadowy giant-some fabulous Hercules-se raw head and bloody bones-some mysterious yer-some lion, endowed with

the Native American party; but I do not wish to commit any person but myself for these propositions.

In the first place, it is well known that we now have no law by which a foreigner can be excluded. If there is any law requiring a foreigner to bring a passport, it is so loosely administered as to amount to nothing. Foreigners can come by millions, and there is nobody to exclude them, or to say nay. Is there any other country upon the face of the earth, properly organized, that admits an influx of foreigners without any restriction whatever? None.

RADICAL PROPOSITIONS.

I make this, then, my first proposition, that no emigrant should be allowed to leave the ship in which he comes until, upon his solemn oath, he renounces his allegiance to all foreign Powers, and until he swears that it is his bona fide intention to become an inhabitant of the United States. The necessity of this requisition shall be made known to him by the captain of the ship before he takes passage, and his passport shall contain in its face this requisition.

A word, sir, upon this proposition. I stated that we had no law, and no clause of a law, by which to exclude foreigners in any numbers. England, France, and Russia, and all Governments in the East require every man who puts his foot upon their shores, to exhibit a passport. Thereby they can regulate immigration, and say who is to come,

Ho. OF REPs.

and who is to remain. Suppose, sir, that England, France, or Russia, or any other Government have a desire and an intention to make war upon the United States. In the absence of the law to which I refer, before any act of hostility should be committed, they could land upon our shores in merchant ships, in the form of emigrants any number of soldiers, from one hundred to a million. How easy would it be for the Czar to send one hundred thousand Russians to this country as emigrants. One hundred thousand immigrants arriving in New York in a month would create no excitement. Their promenading Broadway would not so swell the tide of that immense population as to be perceivable. They could go and equip· themselves with American rifles, furnish themselves with American powder, and American bullets, and go in American cars to any portion of the country, and be ready at any time, to exhibit themselves as an armed force, in the heart of the country. This may never occur, but we know that the landing of an army in an enemy's country, in case of war, is a most important matter, and our laws enable an enemy to flood the country with his soldiers in the form of emigrants. I ask now, of American statesmen, if this thing ought to exist? Will any man say that it is his duty to live alone for this present day. Will any statesman say his duty stops with this hour? Will any statesman say he lives alone for his own age and his own generation? There may be no danger now, but we should look ahead, far into the future, and for that future supply, at this day, the lamentable deficiencies of our laws.

My second proposition, connected with the first, is, that no immigrant shall be allowed to land until he produces a passport from the proper authority of the United States, resident in the country from which the immigrant comes; which passport shall contain upon its face the requirements which I have read.

Now, sir, if there is any law requiring immigrants to bring passports to this country, it is so loosely executed as to amount to nothing.

My third proposition is: our consuls, and such other officers as may be appointed for such purpose, shall be instructed to give passports to no persons except those who are of sound health both in mind and body, of good character for sobriety and honesty; and upon satisfactory proof of the applicant that he has never been convicted for any crime; and the consul shall refuse passports to all notoriously rebellious and seditious persons, and to all persons, who, in their opinion, shall be liable to become a charge upon any of the United States as paupers. I will not pause to enforce this proposition with argument. The necessity of it must be palpable to every American statesman.* My fourth proposition is as radical as all the

rest.

I would provide that the naturalization laws shall be so repealed and modified as to prevent all foreigners from voting who shall not have become naturalized, or who shall not have taken steps to

The following letter from the Mayor of New York to the President, will illustrate what I have said about felons and paupers: MAYOR'S OFFICE, NEW YORK, January 2, 1855. His Excellency, Franklin Pierce,

President of the United States: DEAR SIR: There can be no doubt that, for many years, this port has been made a sort of penal colony for felons and paupers, by the local authorities of several of the continental European nations. The desperate character of a portion of the people arriving here from those countries, together with the increase of crime and misery among that class of our population, with other facts before us, prove, conclusively, that such is the case.

It is unnecessary to refer to the gross wrong thus perpetrated upon this city. It requires from me no allusion to the jeopardy of our lives and property from this cause. Men who, by a long career of crime and destitution, have learned to recognize no laws, either civil or natural, cannot fail to produce feelings of terror at their approach.

The inherent right of every community to protect itself from dangers arising from such emigration, cannot be questioned. New York has submitted to it long enough. The disease and pauperism arriving here, almost daily, from abroad, is, of itself, a sufficient evil; but when to it is added crime, we must be permitted to remonstrate. We ask the interference of the General Government, as it is its duty to protect us from foreign aggression with ball and cannon, so is it its duty to protect us against an enemy more insidious and destructive, though coming in another form.

I call your attention to this subject, hoping it will receive from you that action which its very great importance to the whole country demands.

I am very truly yours, &c.,

FERNANDO WOOD, Mayor.