tion of the eighteen representatives from Brussels in Parliament. * * * The people of Brussels took a lively interest in the experiment. Meetings were held in various parts of the city, and the method of voting was explained. About 12,000 electors cast their ballots. The voting booths were open from 9 a. m. to 4 p. m. The counting of ballots. was begun at once and completed in all the precincts in three-quarters of an hour to four hours' time, for from 300 to 1,940 ballots each. This work was found to be not at all complicated, and was done as easily and rapidly as in the ordinary elections. The work of the Central Bureau began at 5:30 p. m., and the returns from the several precincts were added up as rapidly as they came in. The party votes were the following:

* *

*

Applying the proposed American plan to the distribution of seats, the result would be as follows: The total number of votes, 207,429, divided by 18, gives 11,523 as the unit of representation. Dividing the party votes by this unit provides for fifteen representatives; the remaining three are assigned to the parties having the largest remainders.

While such a system would, without doubt, be a marked improvement over the present systems, or the system proposed by Mr. Johnson, of Ohio, still it would not wholly eliminate the evils that might arise from the cumulative feature in the "party ticket." The retention of this feature would furnish an inducement for the party managers to nominate only such a number as they might hope to elect. Therefore there would be little of choice remaining within the party or without, and a nomination secured by manipulating the primaries would still amount to an election. The system under consideration might secure proportional representation in the deliberative branches of government, but it would not be adapted to securing men of ability and integrity to the public trust-men who were not primarily the tools of a ring or machine.

The first step in a popular election is the nomination of candidates. Here our work of reform and here the application of any successful device for securing good men must begin. To this end the following plans of nomination are suggested:

First, where a party convention is not necessary and a "primary" alone will suffice to make the necessary preparations for a final election, that the "limited ballot" be used in the nominating or primary election. Experience has shown that in a final election the "limited ballot" does not secure good results; while it gives minority representation it also gives the election, in each party, to the machine men.12 That is if, as in Boston, in 1894, twelve aldermen were to be elected "at large," each voter being allowed to vote for seven candidates only, the machines of each of the leading parties would nominate only seven candidates, and then concentrate all their energies to elect these. The result would be

12 See page 301.

that there would remain little chance for anti-machine candidates being elected. But for the same reason that the "limited ballot" has been a failure in the final election, it would appear to be an excellent device for the purposes of a primary. When used in the final elections the strength of each party would be so directed and controlled that those places not filled by the machine men of one party would be filled by the machine men of the other party. When used by a single party for the purposes of nominating candidates, however those places not filled by the machine men would be filled by antimachine or independent candidates, and if the voter were allowed to vote for only half as many candidates as there were places on the ticket to be filled then the machine men could not get more than one-half the places on the ticket. This would give the electors of the party an opportunity for choice between "good" and "bad" candidates in the final election. If, then, we require each party to pursue this method of nominations not more. than half of the candidates on any ticket would be of the ring. Taking the ordinary case in which the strength of each of the two leading parties is about equal, if we give to each party its proportional strength, each would elect about one-half of the officers to be elected at the final election, and if by use of a "free ticket" under the Australian system, the anti-machine candidates of the parties received stronger support from the electorate than the machine men received, all of the offices would be filled by anti-machine or independent candidates. At the same time the party lines and issues would be retained as a means of expressing popular sentiment and instructing representatives on the questions of the day.

We will suppose, for example, that there are ten congressmen to be chosen "at large" from the State of Illinois, that in the primary election held by each party, each partisan elector was restricted to one vote from

each of five "candidates for nomination" by his party,13 and that the ten having the highest number of votes at the primary be considered as the regular nominees. Then the machine, if the. be one, could not nominate more than five of the ten c. .didates, while the other five would be filled by other opposition or anti-machine candidates. In case the primary election law required that only those candidates nominated according to its provisions might have their names placed on the official ballot, we would have in each party represented ten nominees for as many offices to be filled. Holding the final election under the Australian allot system and giving to each elector the opportunity of voting for whomsoever he would, i. e., a "free ticket," those candidates of each party which had the largest popular support would stand at the head of the ticket in his party. If, then, we used the plan proposed by Mr. Johnson, or Mr. Commons, in making the count1 we would secure the two ends so desirable in elections: (1) We would secure a representation in the deliberative bodies proportional to the strength of the party divisions; (2) we would have as representatives of those parties the men who had the greatest strength in their party, i. e., those who were in highest popular favor.

It is thought that proportional representation under such a system of popular nominations and direct election would accomplish the following results:

I. It would give to each constituency which is of sufficient strength for recognition a representation in the legislative or deliberative bodies of the government pro

13 That is, supposing that each voter were allowed to vote for five candidates only.

14 Proportional representation, as presented, means nothing more than so counting the votes that each party will have its proportional strength and that the leading candidates of each party shall represent the parties in that proportion.

portional to the strength of such constituency,15 as a result of which the sentiment of the people would be represented in and impressed on the governing bodies.

It would prevent the exaggerated influence of successful parties in government as it exists at present under majority and machine rule.

3. It would destroy machine rule in nominations and elections, by preventing "gerrymandering," by making futile efforts to concentrate forces in critical districts, by minimizing the inducement to use money, fraud, deceit, misrepresentation and other subversive tactics as a means of obtaining votes.

4. It would give the greatest possible independence and equality to the voters.

5. It would give the greatest possible force to independent citizen movements.

6. It would place the most prominent men in the party in office-would bring the greatest statesmen to the front instead of the "party boss."

7. It would make the political party a true instrument of political expression, and party success a means of promoting the general welfare instead of a device for distributing spoils.

But nominations by primary election alone are not always practical. In nominations for State and national elections the constituencies are large. It is often desirable to frame issues and get a representative expression on leading men from different parts of the State or nation as candidates. For this purpose conventions are often found necessary. The convention system, however, in its present form is subject to many abuses. The plan of nominations here suggested where conventions are thought necessary is set forth in the appendix.

15 Each constituency which had the required number to be entitled to representation under the law.