and why was it so hastily repealed by such an immense majority? it may be that it was misunderstood, as it is even now. It may be that its mischievous tendencies were greatly exaggerated, as they have been in this debate. It may be, that the fancied right of the creditor, to pursue the future effects of an insolvent debtor, worthless as it is in any practical estimate, was swelled into the same theoretical magnitude, as it has been in this House; and that some were persuaded to believe that to interfere with this right, to take this shadow from the creditor, even upon the most urgent motives, transcended the just power of legislation. It may be that it was unpopular then, as it is perhaps now, because it concerns chiefly but a small portion of our fellow citizens. A thousand circumstances, having no connexion with its real merits, may have influenced its fate, and it was not suffered to continue long enough in existence to establish its real character in the public estimation.

To establish that a measure is unpopular, without proving that it deserves to be so, is altogether inconclusive. To establish even that it deserved to be unpopular twenty years ago, would by no means prove that it ought to be unpopular now. It might have been unfit then, and be very fit and proper at the present time. The change in human affairs which is continually going on, is precisely what gives occasion for continual legislation, and we are all of us obliged repeatedly to admit that we have been in error. Time conquers even the pride of opinion. Look at the history of your navy. Many a gallent battle was fought for it in this house by the venerable gentleman who sits before me, (Mr. Bassett) many a prejudice had he and others to contend against, for its support, before it had fought its own way to renown and favour. Now it is the favorite of the nation, universally popular, and it deserves to be so-every man is its friend and forward to be its champion. But for the opportunity offered by the war with the Barbary powers, but for its heroic achievements

in the war with England, the same cloud might still have rested upon the navy; it might still have been unpopular, and we should have been without the great inheritance of fame secured by our naval heroes, which those wars have left us.

The unpopularity of the bankrupt law, was owing chiefly if not wholly, to the circumstances in which it came into being. I never said, it was a party measure. I do not know whether it was or not, for I have not examined the journal, and if I had, I should not be able to decide. I know it ought not to be, and cannot now be justly so considered. But it came into being in violent party times, was characterized as a measure of the party who then wielded the power of the government, and from whom the power soon after departed; and it has been, and even at this moment, continues to be (as we are obliged to know and feel) associated in the feelings and opinions of many with the character of the stormy day when it first appeared. There were other circumstances attending the passage of the law in the house, calculated to make it odious, and the spirit of warm party contest which then prevailed, suffered nothing of this sort to fail of due effect, for want of being sufficiently pressed upon the public attentionHence its unpopularity.

But now let us see what it is that a bankrupt law promises to effect. Exaggeration would be as dangerous on one side as on the other-it would be as foolish to overstate itsadvantages, as it is to overstate its defects. A bankrupt law does not promise to cure all the evils of society; nor to relieve all the distress in the world; nor to correct all the vices and follies of men. Nay, sir, its friends cannot soberly undertake that it will be altogether free from some peculiar evils of its own-for that is the case with every human institution. Let us not deceive ourselves. Good and evil are found mixed in some proportion in whatever comes from the hand of man, as virtues and vices, wisdom and

folly, strength and weakness are found mixed in his character. The true question is this-is it better or is it worse than the present state of things? Is it our duty under the constitution? Let us take a fair and liberal and rational view. It is very possible, and even very easy, by presenting only the objectionable parts of any human establishment, to give it a bad appearance. Perhaps to hasty and superficial observers, the evil is more apparent than the good. The law's delay, the expense of judicial establishments, occasional hardship and inconvenience from the rigorous demands of justice-these are often insisted upon. If we forget that judicial tribunals, are the great conservators of private rights and public tranquillity—that their mere existence is a perpetual safeguard, of which we feel the benefit when they are at rest, as when they are in exercise that the number of cases they may have to decide, is of little importance compared with the knowledge that they are always open to give redress, and thus are exercising a constant preventive and conservative influ ence-if we forget that the authority of the judge is the authority of the law, that the independence of the judge is indispensable to enable him to perform his stern duty, and that the unvarying rigour of judgment, is the dispensation of justice according to law-I say, forgetting all these things, we may prove that courts of justice are almost

an evil.

The good which is done, is silent, unostentatious, gently but efficaciously pervading the community, and scarcely attracting observation, while each instance of what any man or set of men choose to think a grievance, is instantly the topic of complaint, and often of loud and importunate complaint.

The same thing has happened to us, I mean, to congress. We have been freely censured, and we have censured ourselves; perhaps the censure may in part be just; but those who see in this body, nothing but a collec

tion of men, who waste their time in fruitless discussion, do not do justice to representative government or to the body itself. They do not know that even here, there are many who are silently and laboriously occupied in doing public work, which makes no noise, and engages no attention, however faithfully done. Let us endeavour to avoid deserving such censure.

The press, too, the great intellectual light of the world -what should we say of that, if we looked only at one side of the case? But I must not enter further into such inquiries. What is it, I repeat, that the friends of this bill promise? That it will do some good. What do its enemies say? That it will not cure all evil. Granted. Will it be better or worse than the present state of things? I firmly believe things cannot be worse than they now are.

The laws, as they stand at present, are sufficient for creditors in general, but not for the creditors of a failing debtor. They are limited in territorial operation, they are strongly tinctured with local feeling and views, are repugnant and contradictory, and occasion conflicts, where one uniform system would produce harmony throughout the nation. They are inadequate, because they have no efficient power to compel, and can offer no adequate motive to induce an honest surrender.

The laws are insufficient for failing or for fallen debtors. They are limited in territory, and they are limited in the relief they can give. They are wholly inefficacious against foreign creditors, while the foreign debtor finds a sure refuge from his creditors in the institutions of his own country, the benefit of which is extended to him here. The merchant of the United States, whether creditor or debtor, is in a worse condition than the merchant of any European

nation.

Where is the remedy? Here, in a bankrupt law-and here only; the states can do nothing, they have surrendered all their power to you-Such a law will establish

peace between the citizens of different states, by extending a common rule to all who are likely to have relations with each other, in a case where a common rule is of the greatest importance. It will give relief to the unfortunate; restore them to society, and to usefulness, and teach them to look with affection and gratitude to the government of their country-It will place your merchants upon a footing of equality with foreigners, while even to foreigners it will do equal justice—It will give greater security to the revenue; and it will have a tendency to perpetuate the blessings of this union, by extending the hand of constitutional authority with parental power, but with parental tenderness too, throughout every part of the nation.

Gentle

And at whose expense will all this good be done? I answer, unhesitatingly, at the expense of no one. men have indeed told us, that creditors may be in distress as well as debtors, and the Speaker has indulged himself in sketching for us a picture of the misery that may be brought into the family of a creditor by the failure of a debtor. It may happen, that is certainly true. What then? You cannot relieve the creditor, nothing would be relief to him but the payment of his debt, and that you cannot pay if you could, you would effectually relieve both debtor and creditor. The debtor you can relievebut, as you cannot give relief to both, according to this argument, you will give relief to neither. Because the misfortune of one (more or less as it may happen to be) is inevitable and incurable, therefore you will not administer the aid you can give to the extreme misery of the other. Because you are not certain that you can do all possible or conceivable good, you will do none at all. Is this wise, or humane, or just? It is of the same class with another objection that has been made, and amounts to this, that if we cannot relieve all debtors, of every description, we ought not to relieve any.

Is the bill perfect, or is it even such that any one would