ous instances of cessions of territory, or claims to territory, by states, to the Union. By New York in 1781; by Virginia in 1784 and in 1788; by Massachusetts in 1785; by Connecticut in 1786; by South Carolina in 1787; by North Carolina in 1790; and by Georgia in 1802. The last mentioned cession is the more remarkable, because it was made by a formal argeement between the United States and Georgia, in which the stipulations on each side are stated in the same manner and with the like solemnity, as in contracts with individuals. No doubt they were considered to be, and really are, of equal efficacy.

There is one instance, of a cession of territory by the United States to a state, that to Pennsylvania, in September 1788, in which also there are mutual stipulations.

Each of these instances, is a case of mutual compact, by which there was a surrender of a portion of power and sovereignty, on the part of the respective states; by which, too, there were terms mutually agreed upon. The most striking is that from Virginia, which I shall have occasion to refer hereafter, and that from Georgia, because they both contain conditions operating as a restraint upon the legislative authority of the United States, binding and adhering to the ceded territory, and fixing the terms and conditions of its future government. So, when the United States, soon after the state of Louisiana was admitted into the Union, enlarged the territory of the state by a cession, it was done upon conditions, which thenceforth became obligatory upon the state.

These instances are sufficient to show that the United States, and a state, are competent to make a binding compact. Indeed it is impossible that any man should doubt it. The states have capacity to contract with each other, so far as they are not restrained by the constitution. In 1785 a compact was made between Pennsylvania and Virginia. There was a compact between Pennsylvania and New-Jersey, and between South Carolina and Georgia.

The only restraint in the constitution (art. 1. sec. 10. clause 2.) is that which prohibits states from entering into any agreement or compact with each other, or with a foreign power, without the consent of congress; and this prohibition, from its very nature admits, that they may enter into such compacts or agreements with the United States.

The states have a capacity to contract even with individuals, and in so doing to part with a portion of their legislative power. This is the case wherever a charter of incorporation is granted, by which rights of property become vested. During the period of the charter, the subject is beyond the control of the legislative authority, which is so far suspended or extinguished by the grant. The United States have done the same thing, and with the like effect.

If it be competent to the United States to contract with an old State, it seems to follow of course, that it has a competency to contract with a new one. The admission of the state is itself a compact, as the constitution of the United States was a compact between the existing states, and it would be difficult to assign any good reason, why upon the admission of a new state to a participation in the privileges and benefits of the Union, such terms might not be proposed and insisted upon as the general welfare should seem to require. As the stipulation, whatever it may be, derives its binding efficacy from the assent of the state, which its sovereignty, or qualified sovereignty, enables it to give, a new state is as competent as an old one. Indeed, the possession and the exercise of this power are necessary to enable the United States to execute the contracts they may enter into, with any state of the Union, upon receiving from it a cession of territory, wherever such cession is accompanied, as it usually has been, with terms upon the part of the ceding state, applying to and intended to bind the territory ceded.

Accordingly, no new state (unless formed out of an old one) has ever been admitted into the Union, but upon terms agreed upon by compact, and irrevocable without the consent of all the parties. The states formed out of the North-West Territory, (Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois,) have been made subject, as a fundamental law of their government, to the terms of the ordinance of 1787, including the very condition now proposed for Missouri. The states of Mississippi and Alabama, formed out of the territory ceded by Georgia, have been subjected to all the provisions of the ordinance, except the one which regards slavery, and that was expressly excluded by the terms of the cession. The state of Louisiana, the only one yet formed out of the territory acquired from France, has been in like manner admitted upon terms; different it is true, from those which have been required from the other states, but still such terms as congress thought applicable to her situation, and such as are sufficient to demonstrate the extent of the authority possessed by the United States. Even in the bill now under consideration, certain propositions, as they are styled, are offered to the free acceptance of Missouri, but if accepted, they are to be forever binding upon her.

Thus, it appears, that a new state may contract; and it is essential that it should be so, for her own sake as well as for the sake of the union. It remains, then, to inquire, whether the stipulation proposed in the amendment, is, on account of the nature of the subject, such an one as it is beyond the power of a state to enter into? It has already been remarked, that a state, at the moment of its formation, is as entirely sovereign, and as capable of making a binding contract, as at any future period. The real question, therefore, is, whether it is beyond the power of any state in this union, for any consideration whatever, to bind itself by a compact with a state, or with the United States, to prohibit slavery within its borders? To suppose so, seems to impute a want of sovereign power, which could

only arise from its being parted with by the constitution, and this I think can scarcely be affirmed. But I do not mean to anticipate, as my object at present is to follow the practice of the government.

In this view, the ordinance of 1787, respecting the NorthWest Territory, and the history of the states formed under it, are eminently deserving of consideration and respect. This ordinance was framed upon great deliberation. It was intended to regulate the government of the territory; to provide for its division into states, and for their admission into the union; and to establish certain great principles, which should become the fundamental law of the states to be formed. In its territorial condition, it was subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of congress, to be exercised by the ordinary process of legislation. But it was one of the terms of the cession by Virginia to the United States, that this territory, as it became peopled, should be divided into states, and that these states should be admitted into the union, " upon an equal footing, in all respects, with the original states." We shall now see how the fulfilment of this engagement was effected. After providing for the territorial government, the ordinance proceeds as follows: "And for extending the fundamental principles of civil and religious liberty, which form the basis whereon these republics, their laws and constitutions are erected; to fix and establish those principles as the basis of all laws, constitutions and governments, which forever hereafter shall be formed in the said territory; to provide, also, for the establishment of states, and permanent government therein, and for their admission to a share in the federal councils on an equal footing with the original states, at as early periods as may be consistent with the general interest. It is hereby ordained and declared, that the following articles shall be considered as articles of compact, between the original states and the people and States in the said territory, and forever remain unalterable unless by common

consent." Then follow the several articles, of which the sixth declares, "that there shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, &c." The fifth article provides expressly, that "the constitution and government (of the states) so to be formed, should be republican, and in conformity to the principles contained in these articles." When the states of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, respectively, applied for admission, they were admitted upon the express condition that their constitutions should be republican, and in conformity to the ordinance of 1787. They assented to the condition, and were admitted" upon an equal footing with the original states."

I am aware that all this has been pronounced, rashly I think, to be an usurpation. The term does not well apply, at this time of day, after the repeated sanction of every kind which the ordinance has received. In truth, if there be any thing in our legislative history, which is entitled to our affection for the motives in which it originated; to our veneration for the authority by which it is supported; to our respect for the principles embodied in it, it is the ordinance of 1787. But the charge of usurpation is in every sense inapplicable, for the efficacy of the contract arises from the assent of the state to the conditions proposed as the terms of her admission.

But this ordinance is entitled to still higher consideration. It was a solemn compact between the existing states, and it cannot be doubted, that its adoption had a great influence in bringing about the good understanding that finally prevailed in the convention, upon several points which had been attended with the greatest difficulty. It passed on the 13th July, 1787, while the convention that framed the constitution was in session. From the minutes of that body, lately published, it will be seen, that the two most important and difficult points to adjust, were those of the admission of states, and the slave representation. This ordinance finally adjusted both these matters, as far as con