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ject; they are effectually conceived for this. If those laws be fully executed, there will be no Cherokee boundary, no Cherokee nation, no Cherokee lands, no Cherokee treaties, no laws of the United States in the case. They will all be swept.out of existence together, leaving nothing but the monuments in our history of the enormous injustice that has been practised towards a friendly nation.
These laws of Georgia operate upon the individual Cherokees as well as upon the nation. They are virtually made outlaws, neither citizens nor aliens, nor competent to be witnesses in courts of justice. They operate also upon their property, and upon the rights and privileges declared for them by the laws of the United States.
Is not this, then, a case or controversy of judicial cognizance? The bill sets forth a number of individual instances of the exercise of the unjust authority. Would they not, upon the complaint of individuals, be the subject of judicial cognizance? Would not the questions to be presented, discussed, and decided, be precisely as they now are? As questions of property, as personal privileges, or as corporate privileges, they are matters of judgment purely and strictly, without any admixture whatever of political or diplomatic considerations, and they have become a case, or subject of a suit, by the actual perpetration of injury and the menace of its repetition. They are questions upon the laws of the United States, in suits against citizens of the United States; and if it be necessary still further to examine the ground of complaint, it will be found that it is one of every day judicial cognizance, namely, that the laws of Georgia are unconstitutional and void.
Is not the character of the aggregate the same as that of the particulars of which it is composed ? Is there any thing in the process of aggregation to alter it? The constitution of the United States gives no colour to
such a distinction. It applies the same description of case or controversy to bodies and to individuals. Judicial decisions gives it no countenance, but the contrary. Jurisdiction is entertained of suits between states, as in the instance now pending. In the case between states, there must always be individual interests involved with those of the state. Jurisdiction is entertained of suits by corporate bodies. Osbourn vs. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheaton, 739.
To what forum (of those belonging to the United States) the resort is to be had, depends upon the parties. The federal jurisdiction depends upon the nature of the case or question. If that be such, that it might be here by an individual, under the twenty-fifth' section of the judiciary act, by appeal; it may be brought here originally by a state.
It might be that, in fact, the present was the only mode in which the protection of the United States judiciary could be obtained, or in which it could be called upon to vindicate the majesty of the laws and treaties. The nature of the Cherokee institutions and polity, as to the tenure of land, presented a difficulty on the one side. The determination of the authorities and tribu. nals of the state of Georgia not to permit a suit to reach a stage where a writ of error could be made available, was at present an insuperable difficulty on the other. If redress could not be afforded in the mode now proposed, they might all, like Tassels, suffer final and irreparable infliction while waiting for the time of hearing before this court.
The complainants, then, come here upon the ground of the violation of a legal right, and that, he submitted, was a case or controversy. They do not present an abstract question. They do not present a political question. They do not come to demand in general terms the fulfilment of a treaty, nor to ask this court
to enforce the execution of an active article. They do not come to claim any thing adversely to the United Statės, nor to ask this court to settle questions between the high contracting parties. They ask for redress and protection against wrong-doers in the accustomed legal way, and they vouch the treaties as the evidence of their rights.
4. Is such a case presented by the bill as entitles the complainants to the specific remedy of injunction. For the purpose of this inquiry, in its present stage, all the averments of the bill are to be taken to be true.
An injunction is the process of equity to restrain, where restraint is necessary, to prevent irreparable mischief; for which there is no adequate redress at law. Eden on Injunctions, 1, 209. It is granted to hold a fund, until a decision can be had of a claim upon it. State of Geor. gia vs. Brailsford, 2 Dallas, 402.
In this court there is a decision directly applicable. An injunction may be issued to restrain a person who is an officer of a state from performing an act .enjoined by an unconstitutional law of the state. Osburne vs. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheaton, 733. Mr. Sergeant referred particularly to the argument of counsel, 748, and the opinion of the court by the Chief Justice, 838, 9. This case, in the argument and decision, was full to the present purpose, and was an adequate and sufficient authority for the injunction in the present case. The subject of complaint was the same -an unconstitutional law. The object was the same to restrain its execution. The state of things, calling for relief, was the same, except that here the threatened danger was far greater and more urgent. Here, as there, the property, the franchises, rights and privileges of the complainants were menaced.
Perhaps it might be suggested that the complaint related to matters out of the United States, but within the
Indian nation, and therefore beyond the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. It was not necessary to examine very particularly the foundation in fact. of such a suggestion. Among the acts stated, however, it would be remarked, was that of drawing the complainants to tribunals within the United States, to which they were not amcnable. But, independently of this, there was a very satisfactory answer. A court of equity does not regard the situation of the subject matter in dispute, but considers only the equities arising from the parties. It has enjoined a party from proceeding in a foreign court. Eden, 101, 2, 3. Wharton vs. May, 5 Ves. 27. Upon the same point there is a clear authority in this court. In Massie vs. Watts, 6 Cranch, 148, it was decided, that a court of equity has jurisdiction, in personam, in cases involving trust, contract, or fraud, wherever the person of the defendant is even casually to be found within its jurisdiction; although it may be unable to enforce its decree in rem, the property in controversy being out of its jurisdiction. This was a case involving contract.
He deemed it unnecessary to trouble the court further upon this point.
ON THE BANKRUPT BILL, DELIVERED IN THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES, TUES-
MR. SERGEANT remarked, that, from the course which had been taken by the opponents of the bill, its provisions seemed to be understood as having no object but the relief of debtors, and those of a particular class. One gentleman, 'indeed, appeared to have a glimpse of a more extended operation, for his objection was that the bill imposed extraordinary liabilities, and conferred peculiar privileges, úpon the mercantile part of the community; but it did not seem to have occurred to him, that the imposition of extraordinary liabilities might of itself be an adequate inducement for granting some peculiar privileges. The truth is, that the bill now under consideration, and every well conceived bankrupt law, proposes, chiefly, the security and advantage of the creditor. The ultimate relief afforded to the debtor
only an incident, though an incident, undoubtedly, of great importance, whether it is regarded in its connexion with the public interests, with the demands of justice, or the duties of humanity. The question which presents itself to the consideration of an enlightened legislature, is simply this—if from motives of public policy, you deem it necessary to exercise over a certain description of citizens the summary power of arresting them in their career, upon indications of weakness and approaching failure; of taking their property out of their hands, and distributing it among their creditors, for the satisfaction of their debts, what terms ought you to grant to those over whom you have