Claims under Treaty of 1819 with Spain. Answer. To the first branch I return an affirmative answer; to the second, a negative one. I forbear to answer more at length, but see authorities cited supra. Tenth question. If, under the treaty and laws passed to carry it into effect, the Secretary had authority to inquire into the justice of the amount awarded by the judges, was he to be guided in such inquiry by the same rules and principles as were operative upon the judges; or, in other words, do the treaty and laws passed to carry it into effect provide for two standards of measuring the "satisfaction" stipulated to be made: one operative on the judges, and another, and different standard, operative on the Secretary? Answer. The Secretary of the Treasury upon appeal from the judges was to be guided by those rules and principles of law which, in his judgment, were rightly applicable to the cases. There were not two standards of measuring the satisfaction provided by the treaty. Neither the treaty nor the statutes fixed a standard of measurement, but the acts of Congress made the Secretary the final arbiter, and his decision. is an end of the cases. In conclusion I desire to say, that all the positions taken by the memorialists and their counsel, except perhaps that relating to the power of the President, have been most elaborately and thoroughly considered by my predecessors, Messrs. Legare, Nelson, Crittenden, and Cushing, in opinions which I have cited. They have uniformly reached conclusions similar to those stated above. They have exhausted the subject. The Florida claims cases are, in my opinion, and have been for more than a quarter of a century, settled and determined, so far as they can be by the Executive Department of the Government. There is not (to use the language of Mr. Cushing), in the history of the Government, a stronger and clearer case than this of res adjudicata both in opinion and action. If former Secretaries of the Treasury have erred in their rulings, their errors are reparable only by an appeal to Congress. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, The PRESIDENT. Deed of Indian. DEED OF INDIAN. Proposed deed of Pe-wo-mo, a Pottawatomie Indian, granting certain land near Chicago, Ill., considered with reference to objections suggested by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs. Advised that the President, when satisfied that the consideration is a fair one, should approve the deed and transmit it to the Indian Bureau with directions that the Commissioner deliver the same upon satisfactory evidence that the consideration has been either paid or secured to the Indian. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, May 10, 1879. SIR: I have carefully read the communication of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs concerning a proposed deed of Pe-wo-mo, a Pottawatomie Indian, of certain land in the vicinity of Chicago. 1. The first objection suggested by the Commissioner is that the files of his office show that one Pe-y-mo (apparently the same person) executed a deed to the same tract on March 28, 1873. As this deed does not appear to have been approved by the President, it could not operate to convey the lands in question; and it is fairly to be presumed, as that deed in its present shape is inoperative, that the proposed conveyance is one in lieu of it. 2. The acknowledgment of the grantor is not at present attached to the deed. This circumstance, from inspection of the papers, is accidental. It was attached to the deed at the time the papers were first laid before the Department, and was separated from it with some other papers in order that the deed and the plan which accompanied it might be sent to the district attorney at Chicago for his examination into the value of the land so far as he was able. 3. The other suggestions of the Commissioner are, substantially, that the grantor does not speak the English language i that the grantee was an Indian agent; that parties have heretofore procured deeds from Pottawatomie Indians without paying the consideration; that the evidence inclosed in the letter is not sufficient proof that the consideration ex. pressed in the deed was a fair price for the land, or that the consideration was actually paid to the grantor. Purc ase of Land. In regard to these suggestions, I would observe that I heretofore called the attention of the President to the fact that, if possible, a more thorough inquiry should be made to ascertain if the consideration was a fair one. I think the suggestion of the Commissioner also, that the consideration, if ascertained to be fair, should be paid or secured to the Indian, is a highly proper one. I can suggest no more convenient mode of dealing with the matter than that the President, when satisfied that the consideration is a fair one, should approve the deed and transmit it to the Indian Bureau, with directions that it might deliver the same upon satisfactory evidence that the consideration had been either paid or secured to the Indian. In reference to the whole matter, it would seem that if Pewo-mo has a title (which it seems to me he has, although it is difficult to express a decided opinion in advance of adjudication of the matter) he ought to be entitled to convey it, and to receive the value of it. If he has not a title, those persons to whom he conveys purchase clearly with their eyes open, having their attention called to all the difficulties which accompany it. If the deed itself is not executed in compliance with the rules prescribed by the Department, it is still sufficient in law to convey the title, and this objection is one that is not important so far as the interests of Pe-wo-mo are concerned, who is the only person for whom the President is bound to assume any guardianship in the matter. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, The PRESIDENT. CHAS. DEVENS. PURCHASE OF LAND. The discretion given by the act of May 21, 1872, chap., 88, to acquire, either by purchase or by condemnation, a lot of ground in the city of Fall River, Mass., suitable for a site for a public building, does not extend to the acquisition of "adjoining land" referred to in the act of March 3, 1879, chap. 182. The authority to "purchase" given by the latter act does not include authority to acquire by condemnation. Generally, in statutes as in common use, the word "purchase" is em Purchase of Land. ployed in a sense not technical, only as meaning acquisition by agreement with and conveyance from the owner, without governmental interference. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, May 14, 1879. SIR: Your letter of the 21st of March last calls my attention to the act of May 21, 1872 (17 Stat., 140), which authorized the "purchase at private sale, or by condemnation, in pursuance of the statutes of the State of Massachusetts," of a lot of ground in the city of Fall River, Mass., suitable for a site for a public building in that city, and made an appropriation for that purpose; to the act of March 3, 1873 (17 Stat., 523), which authorized the "purchase" of additional ground at same place, for the same object, and made an appropriation therefor; and to the act of March 3, 1879, entitled “An act making appropriations for sundry civil expenses of the Government," &c., authorizing the "purchase" of a certain piece of ground, which adjoins said site, and appropriating $25,000 for such purchase. Under the acts of May 21, 1872, and March 3, 1873, land was acquired for the purpose therein mentioned by purchase from the Pocasset Manufacturing Company. This company owns the piece of ground authorized to be purchased by the act of March 3, 1879, but asks for it a price which is more than twofold the amount appropriated by that act for its purchase, and which, from estimates submitted to your Department, is regarded as about five times its value. In view of these facts, you inquire, "Whether under existing law the United States can proceed to acquire title to this property by condemnation, either under the original act authorizing the purchase of a site by private sale or condemnation, or in accordance with the laws of the State of Massachusetts." I am unable to find any provision in the laws of Massachusetts authorizing the acquisition of the title in this case by condemnation. As to the acts of Congress above cited, it is to be observed that while the act of May 21, 1872, confers upon the Secretary of the Treasury a discretionary power either "to purchase at private sale or by condemnation” a lot of ground suitable for a site, &c., the two acts of March 3, 1873, and March 3, 1879, provide simply for the "purchase" Site for Movable Beacon. of additional ground for a site and of adjoining land. The discretionary power given by the act of 1872 must be deemed to be limited to the acquisition of the lot of ground thereby authorized to be acquired as a site for the public building; it does not extend to the acquisition of the "adjoining land" referred to in the act of 1879, the title to which is to be acquired solely by virtue of the authority conferred by the latter act. The authority given by this act is to "purchase" the property in question. Although, technically, purchase includes all modes of acquisition other than that of descent, yet generally, in statutes as in common use, the word is employed in a sense not technical, only as meaning acquisition by agreement with and conveyance from the owner, without governmental interference. (91 U. S. Rep., 374.) I do not think that the authority to purchase given by the act of 1879 should be taken to include authority to acquire by condemnation. To your inquiry I accordingly reply that, in my opinion, title to the property referred to cannot be acquired by condemnation, either under the existing laws of the United States or those of Massachusetts. I am, sir, very respectfully, Hon. JOHN SHERMAN, Secretary of the Treasury. CHAS. DEVENS. SITE FOR MOVABLE BEACON. The provisions of section 4661, Rev. Stat., viz., that "no light-house, beacon, public piers, or land-mark shall be built or erected on any site until cession of jurisdiction over the same has been made to the United States," do not apply to a movable beacon or bug-light, which is not designed to be permanently fixed in any one place, but whose location is contemplated to be changed on the beach from time to time according to circumstances, these changes extending over a distance of half a mile. Those provisions are only intended to include structures whose location is of a fixed and permanent character. In acquiring a site for such movable beacon or bug-light, under the appropriation made therefor by the act of March 3, 1879, chap. 182, the |