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case with the present attorney-general, for whom we have a high esteem; but who may succeed him, or what will be hereafter, we cannot foretel. This we are certain of, that precedents never sleep, but will always be pleaded; and therefore bad precedents should never be made, even in the best administration.

It may further be observed, that it is possible, in many cases, the attorney-general may really think that an action for the recovery of the province money will not lie, or cannot be maintained; the general court may be quite in another sentiment, and the gentlemen of the law in the same sentiment with the assembly in such case it will be very hard to oblige the attorney-general to pursue against his own judgment, as well as unsafe to the province.

But none of these inconveniences can arise, if the treasurer and receiver-general brings the action, when the court thinks proper to empower and order him so to do, since he is annually chosen by the people, and is under bond with sureties for his fidelity.

Further, this money being the province's, and entirely at their disposal, an action can well be maintained by the receivergeneral of the province, in the name of the province, against any person that shall retain the same, declaring that that person had received so much of the province's money for the province's use, and promised to render a reasonable account thereof, or pay the same on demand. And it must appear very surprising if we could not maintain such an action, and employ whom we thought hest in it; since, in all popular statutes where a forfeiture is to the king and the informer, the latter, unless by such act particularly restricted, may prosecute in the common law courts, and in the court of admiralty, as well for himself as the king, and it is continually done, and the informer chuses what attorney he pleases to manage the same.

Your excellency is pleased in your message to observe, that for the province treasurer to bring the action would amount to altering an act of parliament. Your excellency did not refer us to the act, and therefore we can make this answer only: That we have most carefully looked over the acts of parliament relative to the point in dispute; we can find none; and that if there is one, we are sensible that it must have its effect.

Upon the whole, we cannot, consistent with our duty, reconsider the resolve passed by both houses. We humbly hope that we have removed the difficulty which lay in your excellency's way, and that you will be pleased to give your assent to it, assuring ourselves that your excellency will be always ready to vindicate and support the rights of the province by all proper and legal means.

B.-Page 119.

Resolves of the Assembly of Virginia on the Stamp Act. May 28, 1765.

Resolved,-THAT the first adventurers and settlers of this his majesty's colony and dominion of Virginia, brought with them and transmitted to their posterity, and all other his majesty's subjects since inhabiting in this his majesty's said colony, all the liberties, privileges, franchises, and immunities, that have at any time been held and enjoyed, or possessed by the people of Great Britain.

Resolved,-That by two royal charters granted by king James the first, the colonies aforesaid are declared entitled to all liberties, privileges, and immunities, of denizens and natural-born subjects, to all intents and purposes, as if they had been abiding and born within the realm of England.

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Resolved, That the taxation of the people by themselves, or by persons chosen by themselves to represent them, who can only know what taxes the people are able to bear, or the easiest method of raising them, and must themselves be affected by every tax laid on the people, is the only security against a burdensome taxation, and the distinguishing characteristick of British freedom, without which the ancient constitution cannot exist.

Resolved, That his majesty's liege people of this his most ancient and loyal colony, have without interruption enjoyed the inestimable right of being governed by such laws respecting their internal polity and taxation, as are derived from their own consent, with the approbation of their sovereign or his substitutes, and that the same hath been constantly recognised by the king and people of Great Britain.

APP. C.

C.-Page 130.

Governor Bernard's Speech to the Assembly at the time of the Stamp Act. September 25, 1765.

Gentlemen of the Council, and,

Gentlemen of the House of Representatives,

I HAVE called you together at this unusual time, in pursuance of the unanimous advice of a very full council, that you may take into consideration the present state of the province, and determine what is to be done at this difficult and dangerous conjuncture. I need not recount to you the violences which have been committed in this town, nor the declarations which have been made and still subsist, that the act of parliament for granting stamp-duties in the British colonies shall not be executed within this province. The ordinary executive authority of this government is much too weak to contradict such declarations, or oppose the force by which they are supported: it has therefore been found necessary to call the whole legislative power in aid of the executive government. From this time this arduous business will be put into your hands, and it will become a provincial concern.

Upon this occasion it is my duty to state to you what will probably be the consequences, if you should suffer a confirmed 'disobedience of this act of parliament to take place. I am sensible how dangerous it is to speak out at this time, and upon this subject; but my station will not allow me to be awed or restrained in what I have to say to the general court: not only my duty to the king, but my duty to the province, my love to it, my concern for it, oblige me to be plain and explicit upon this occasion. And I hope no advocate for liberty will violate that essential constitutional right, freedom of speech in the general assembly.

As I desire not to dictate to you, and would avoid all appearance of it, I shall resolve what I have to recommend to your consideration into mere questions, and avoid assertions of my own in matters which are doubtful. I shall not enter into any disquisition of the policy of the act: it has never been a part of my business to enter into any judgement of it; and as I have not hitherto had any opportunity to express any sentiments of it, I shall not do it now. I have only to say, that it is an act of the parliament of Great Britain, and as such ought to be obeyed by

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the subjects of Great Britain. And I trust that the supremacy of that parliament, over all the members of their wide and diffused empire, never was, and never will be denied within these walls.

The right of the parliament of Great Britain to make laws for the American colonies, however it has been controverted in America, remains indisputable at Westminster. If it is yet to be made a question, who shall determine it but the parliament? If the parliament declares that this right is inherent in them, are they likely to acquiesce in an open and forcible opposition to the exercise of it? Will they not more probably maintain such right, and support their own authority? Is it in the will, or in the power, or for the interest, of this province to oppose such authority? If such opposition should be made, may it not bring on a contest, which may prove the most detrimental and ruinous event which could happen to this people?

It is said, that the gentlemen who opposed this act in the house of commons, did not dispute the authority of parliament to make such a law, but argued upon the inexpediency of it at this time, and the inability of the colonies to bear such an imposition. These are two distinct questions, which may receive different answers. The power of the parliament to tax the colonies may be admitted, and yet the expediency of exercising that power at such a time, and in such a manner, may be denied. But if the questions are blended together, so as to admit of but one answer, the affirmative of the right of parliament will conclude for the expediency of the act. Consider therefore, gentlemen, if you found your application for relief upon denying the parliament's right to make such a law, whether you will not take from your friends and advocates the use of those arguments, which are most likely to procure the relief you desire?

You, Gentlemen of the House of Representatives, have proposed a congress of committees from the representatives of several colonies, to consider of a general, united, dutiful, loyal, and humble representation which you have proposed? Will the denying the power and authority of the king and parliament be the proper means to obtain their favour? If the parliament should be disposed to repeal this act, will they probably do it whilst there subsists a forcible opposition to the execution of it? Is it not more probable, that they will require a submission to their authority as a preliminary to their granting you any relief? Consider then, whether the opposition to the execution of the act has not a direct tendency to defeat the measures you have taken to procure a repeal of it, if you do not interpose to prevent it.

By this act, all papers which are not duly stamped are to be null and void; and all persons who shall sign, engross, or write any such papers, will forfeit, for each fact, ten pounds. If therefore stamps are not to be used, all publick offices must be shut up: for it cannot be expected, that any officer should incur penal

ties much beyond all he is worth, for the sake of doing what must be null and void when it is done. I would therefore desire you to consider what effects the stopping two kinds of offices only, the courts of justice and the custom-houses, will have upon the generality of the people. When the courts of justice are shut up, no one will be able to sue for a debt due to him. Must not then all credit and mutual faith cease of course, and fraud and rapine take their place? Will any one's person or property be safe, when their sole protector, the law, is debased to act? Must not the hand of violence be then let loose, and force of arms become the only governing power? Is it easy to form an adequate idea of a state of general outlawry? And may not the reality exceed the worst idea you can form of it?

If trade and navigation shall cease by the shutting up the ports of this province for want of legal clearances, are you sure that all other ports which can rival these will be shut up also? Can you depend upon recovering your trade again entire and undiminished, when you shall be pleased to resume it? Can the people of this province subsist without navigation for any long time? What will become of the seamen who will be put out of employment? What will become of the tradesmen who immediately depend upon the navigation for their daily bread? Will these people endure want quietly without troubling their neighbours? What will become of the numberless families which depend upon fishery? Will they be able to turn the produce of their year's work into the necessaries of life without navigation? Are there not numberless other families who do not appear immediately concerned in trade, and yet ultimately depend upon it? Do you think it possible to provide for the infinite chain of the dependants upon trade, who will be brought to want by the stopping of it? Is it certain that this province has a stock of provisions within itself sufficient for all its inhabitants, without the usual imports? If there should be a sufficiency in general, can it be distributed among all the individuals without great violence and confusion? In short, can this province bear a cessation of law and justice, and of trade and navigation, at a time when the business of the year is to be wound up, and the severe season is hastily approaching? These are serious and alarming questions, which deserve a cool and dispassionate consideration.

I would not willingly aggravate the dangers which are before you: I do not think it very easy to do it: this province seems to me to be upon the brink of a precipice; and that it depends upon you to prevent its falling. Possibly I may fear more for you than you do for yourselves; but in the situation you now stand in, a sight of your danger is necessary to your preservation; and it is my business to open it to you. But I do not pretend to enumerate all the evils which may possibly happen; several, and some of no little importance, will occur to you, though they have been omitted

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