ment, remain suspended at the office of the Second Comptroller, and will require for their passage an increase of appropriation for Indian affairs equal to that amount. Of the sum thus brought to the credit of subsistence, about 65,000 dollars will be required for the service of this year, (subsistence having been debited nearly to that amount in the settlement of other accounts) and the remainder, viz. 65,205 44 may be considered as a balance at the end of the year, and deducted from the estimate, which will leave to be appropriated for the subsistence of the army, in the year 1821, 301,304 56 dollars. Of the appropriation for clothing, a balance will remain, amounting probably to 13,162 dollars, which, deducted from the estimate, will leave 369,125 56 dollars to be appropriated.

About 6,000 dollars will remain unexpended of the appropriation for the Medical and Hospital Department, which, being taken from the estimate, will leave 40,527 93 dollars to be appropriated.

In the Quartermaster's Department there will be a deficiency of about 20,000 00 dollars. It has been found impossible to bring the expenditure within the sum appropriated by that amount, which, being added to the sum estimated, will give 483,540 00 dollars to be appropriated. The expenditure under the appropriations for the Military Academy, and for fortifications, will about equal the appropriation.

A balance will remain of the current expenses of the Ordnance Department of about 42,671 00 dollars, which, taken from the estimate, will leave to be appropriated 57,329 00 dollars.

Of the appropriation for the National Armories, a balance will remain of about 10,000 00 dollars, which will leave 350,000 00 dollars to be appropriated.

The payments under the appropriation for arrearages, previous to the 1st January, 1817, will about equal the appropriation.

Under the operation of the Act of the 1st May last, a balance will remain of the appropriation for revolutionary pensions of 1,391,731 13 dollars, which, it is believed, will be more than sufficient to meet the disbursements of next year, and no appropriation will accordingly be required.

A balance of 101,068 00 dollars will remain of the appropriation for invalid and commutation pensions, which, deducted from the estimate, will leave 213,932 00 dollars to be appropriated.

The payments under the appropriation for half-pay pensions will about equal the appropriation.

The expenditure under the appropriation for Indian Affairs will not equal the appropriation of the last Session by a few thousand dollars, but, as that appropriation will be debited as soon as there is a sufficient appropriation by the sum of 130,205 44 dollars, as has already been stated under the head of subsistence, it will be necessary to make provision in the next year's appropriation to meet this debt.

It is believed that 170,000 00 dollars will be sufficient to meet the current disbursements of next year, to which add 130,205 44 dollars, and it will give 300,205 44 to be appropriated for the next year. It is proper to observe that this debit against the Indian Department has arisen principally from provisions issued in holding Indian Treaties, which, being issued by the Contractors, were in the first instance paid out of the appropriation for subsistence, but on the settlement of their accounts was brought to the debit of the appropriation for Indian Affairs. I have the honour to be, &c. J. C. CALHOUN. The Hon. William H. Crawford, Secretary of the Treasury.

REPORT of the Secretary of War, of a Plan for the Reduction of the Army of The United States.—12th December, 1820.

SIR, War Department, 12th December, 1820. IN obedience to a Resolution of the House of Representatives of the 11th of May last, "directing that the Secretary of War report to this House, at the commencement of the next Session, a plan for the reduction of the Army to 6000 non-commissioned officers, musicians and privates, and preserving such parts of the corps of engineers, as, in his opinion, without regard to that number, it may be for the public interest to retain; and, also, what saving of the public revenue will be produced by such an arrangement of the Army as he may propose in conformity with this Resolution;" I have the honour to make the following Report.

I deem it proper, before a plan is presented in detail for reducing the Army, as proposed in the resolution, to state briefly the general principles on which it is conceived our military peace establishment ought to be organized. It will be readily admitted, that the organization of the Army ought to have reference to the objects for which it is maintained, and ought to be such as may be best calculated to effect such objects; as it must be obvious, on the slightest reflection, that on considerations connected therewith ought to depend, not only its members, but also the principles on which it ought to be formed.

The necessity of a Standing Army in peace is not believed to be involved in the subject under consideration, as the Resolution presupposes the propriety of maintaining one; and in fact its necessity is so apparent, that, even those least friendly to the Army, have never attempted to abolish it, or even to reduce it, since the late War, much below the number proposed in the Resolution. The objects for which a Standing Army in peace ought to be maintained may be comprized under two classes; those which, though they have reference to a state

of war, yet are more immediately connected with its duties in peace; and those which relate immediately and solely to war. Under the first class may be enumerated, as the leading objects, the garrisoning of the Forts along our Atlantic Frontier, in order to preserve them, and to cause the sovereignty of The United States to be respected in their immediate neighbourhood, and the occupying of certain commanding Posts in our Inland Frontier, to keep in check our savage neighbours, and to protect our newly formed and feeble settlements in that quarter. These are, doubtless, important objects; but are by no means so essential as those which relate immediately and solely to a state of war; and, though not to be neglected wholly, ought not to have any decided influence in the organization of our Peace Establishment. Without, therefore, making any farther remark on this point of the inquiry, I will proceed to consider the other class, on which, as it comprises the great and leading inducements to maintain in this country a regular Army in peace, the prominent features of its organization ought to depend.

However remote our situation from the Great Powers of the World, and however pacific our policy, we are, notwithstanding, liable to be involved in war; and, to resist with success its calamities and dangers, a standing Army in peace, in the present improved state of the military science, is an indispensable preparation. The opposite opinion cannot be adopted, without putting to hazard the independence and safety of the Country. I am aware that the Militia is considered, and in many respects justly, as the great national force; but, to render them effective, every experienced Officer must acknowledge, that they require the aid of regular Troops. Supported by a suitable Corps of trained Artillerists, and by a small but well disciplined body of Infantry, they may be safely relied on to garrison our Forts, and to act in the field as light Troops. In these services, their zeal, courage, and habit of using fire-arms, would be of great importance, and would have their full effect. To rely on them beyond this, to suppose our Militia capable of meeting in the open field the regular Troops of Europe, would be to resist the most obvious truth, and the whole of our experience as a Nation. War is an art, to obtain perfection in which, much time and experience, particularly for the Officers, are necessary. It is true, that men of great military genius occasionally appear, who, though without experience, may, when an Army is already organized and disciplined, lead it to victory; yet I know of no instance, under circumstances nearly equal, in which the greatest talents have been able, with irregular and undisciplined Troops, to meet with success those that were regularly trained. Genius without much experience may command, but it cannot go much further. It cannot at once organize and discipline an Army, and give it that military tone, and

habit, which only, in the midst of imminent danger, can enable it to perform the most complex evolutions with precision and promptitude. Those qualities, which essentially distinguish an Army from an equal assemblage of untrained individuals, can only be acquired by the instruction of experienced Officers. If they, particularly the company and regimental Officers, are inexperienced, the Army must remain undisciplined, in which case, the genius, and even the experience, of the Commander, will be of little avail. The great and leading objects, then, of a military establishment in peace, ought to be to create and perpetuate military skill and experience; so that, at all times, the Country may have at its command a body of Officers, sufficiently numerous, and well instructed in every branch of duty, both of the Line and Staff; and the organization of the Army ought to be such, as to enable the Government, at the commencement of hostilities, to obtain a regular force, adequate to the emergencies of the Country, properly organized and prepared for actual service. It is thus only, that we can be in the condition to meet the first shocks of hostilities with unyielding firmness; and to press on an enemy, while our resources are yet unexhausted. But if, on the other hand, disregarding the sound dictates of reason and experience, we should in peace neglect our military establishment, we must, with a powerful and skilful enemy, be exposed to the most distressing calamities. Not all the zeal, courage, and patriotism of our Militia, unsupported by regularly trained and disciplined Troops, can avert them. Without such Troops, the two or three first campaigns would be worse than lost. The honour of our arms would be tarnished, and the resources of the Country uselessly lavished; for, in proportion to the want of efficiency, and a proper organization, must, in actual service, be our military expenditures. When taught by sad experience, we would be compelled to make redoubled efforts, with exhausted means, to regain those very advantages, which were lost for the want of experience and skill. In addition to the immense expenditure which would then be necessary, exceeding, manifold, what would have been sufficient to put our peace establishment on a respectable footing, a crisis would be thus brought on of the most dangerous character. If our liberty should ever be endangered by the military power gaining the ascendancy, it will be from the necessity of making those mighty and irregular efforts to retrieve our affairs, after a series of disasters, caused by the want of adequate military knowledge; just as, in our physical system, a state of the most dangerous excitement and paroxysm follows that of the greatest debility and prostration. To avoid these dangerous consequences, and to prepare the Country to meet a state of war, particularly at its commencement, with honour and safety, much must depend on the organization of our military peace establishment; and I have, accordingly, in the Plan about to be proposed,

for the reduction of the Army, directed my attention mainly to that point, believing it to be of the greatest importance.

To give such an organization, the leading principles in its forma tion ought to be, that, at the commencement of hostilities, there should be nothing either to new model or to create. The only difference,

consequently, between the peace and the war formation of the Army, ought to be in the increased magnitude of the latter; and the only change in passing from the former to the latter, should consist in giving to it the augmentation which will then be necessary.

It is thus, and thus only, the dangerous transition from peace to war may be made without confusion or disorder; and the weakness and danger, which otherwise would be inevitable, be avoided. Two consequences result from this principle. First, the organization of the Staff in a peace establishment ought to be such, that every branch of it should be completely formed, with such extension as the number of troops and posts occupied may render necessary; and, secondly, that the organization of the Line ought, as far as practicable, to be such that, in passing from the peace to the war formation, the force may be sufficiently augmented, without adding new regiments or battalions; thus raising the war on the basis of the peace establishment, instead of creating a new Army to be added to the old, as at the commencement of the late War. The next principle to be observed, is, that the organization ought to be such as to induce, in time of peace, Citizens of adequate talents and respectability of character, to enter and remain in the military service of the Country, so that the Government may have Officers at its command, who, to the requisite experience, would add the public confidence. The correctness of this principle can scarcely be doubted, for, surely, if it is worth having an Army at all, it is worth having it well commanded.

These are the general principles upon which I propose to form the organization of the Army, as proposed to be reduced under the Resolution. By reference to Tables A and B, which contain the proposed and present organizations, it will be seen, that the principal difference between them is in the reduction of the rank and file. The present organization of the Staff, with its branches, is retained, with slight alterations. The principal changes in it are, in that of the Commissary-general of purchases, and the Judge Advocates, by which it is intended that they should conform more exactly to the principles on which the other branches are now formed. It is believed that the true principle of its organization is, that every distinct branch of the Staff should terminate in a Chief, to be stationed, at least in Peace, near the seat of Government, and to be made responsible for its condition. It is thus that the Government may at all times obtain correct knowledge of the condition of the Army in every particular, and be enabled to introduce method, order, and economy, in its disburse