Committee on Foreign Relations, in relation to the expediency of sending Ministers to the Congress at Panama: And,

Ordered, That the further consideration thereof, be postponed to, and made the order of the day for, Wednesday, the 1st of February.

MONDAY, JANUARY S0th, 1826.

On motion by Mr. Van Buren,

Resolved, That the President of the United States be requested to inform the Senate, whether the Government of Spain has been informed of the application, made by our Government, for the intervention of the Emperor of Russia, to induce Spain to recognize the independence of the South American States; and to lay before the Senate the correspondence, if any has taken place, between our Minister at Madrid, and the Spanish Government; and, also, between such Ministers and our own Government, on the subject of such intervention and recognition.

MONDAY, FEBRUARY, 2d, 1826.

The following message was received from the President of the United States, by Mr. John Adams, Jr.

To the Senate of the United States.

WASHINGTON, 1st February, 1826.

In compliance with a resolution of the Senate, of the 30th ultimo, I communicate, herewith, in confidence, a report from the Secretary of State, with the documents containing the information desired by the resolution.

JOHN QUINCY ADAMS.

The Secretary of State, to whom the President has referred the resolution of the Senate, of the 30th January, 1826, requesting him to inform the Senate whether the Government of Spain has been informed of the application made by our Government for the intervention of the Emperor of Russia, to induce Spain to recognize the independence of the South American States, and to lay before the Senate the correspondence, if any has taken place, between our Minister at Madrid and the Spanish Government, and also between such Minister and our Government, on the subject of such intervention and recognition, has the honor to report,

An extract of a letter from this Department, to Mr. Everett, dated Department of State, 27th April, 1825.

An extract from the notes of a conversation between Mr. Everett and Mr. Zea, communicated with a despatch from Mr. Everett to this Department, dated 25th September, 1825.

An extract of a despatch from Mr. Everett, to this Department, of the 20th October, 1825.

All which is respectfully submitted,

H. CLAY.

Extract of a letter from Mr. Clay to Mr. Everett, dated "Department of State, 27th April, 1825.

"Besides the preceding objects to which your attention will be directed, others of great interest will also claim it. Of these, that of the highest importance, is the present war between Spain and her former colonies, on this Continent. The President wishes you to bring this subject, in the most conciliating manner possible, before the Spanish Government. It would be as unnecessary as unprofitable, to look to the past, except for the purpose of guiding future conduct. True wisdom dictates that Spain, without indulging in unavailing regrets, on account of what she has irretrievably lost, should employ the means of retaining what she may yet preserve from the wreck of her former possessions. The war upon the Continent is, in fact, at an end. Not a solitary foot of land from the Western limit of the United States to Cape Horn owns her sway; not a bayonet in all that vast extent, remains to sustain her cause. And the Peninsula is utterly incompetent to replace those armies which have been vanquished and annihilated by the victorious forces of the New Republics. What possible object, then, can remain to Spain to protract a war which she can no longer maintain, and to the conclusion of which, in form, there is only wanting the recognition of the New Governments, by treaties of peace? If there were left the most distant prospect of her reconquering her Continental Provinces, which have achieved their independence, there might be a motive for her perseverance. But every expectation of such reconquest, it is manifest, must be perfectly chimerical. If she can entertain no rational hope to recover what has been forced from her grasp, is there not great danger of her losing what she yet but feebly holds? It should be borne in mind that the armies of the New States, flushed with victory, have no longer employment on the Continent and yet, whilst the war continues, if it be only in name, they cannot be disbanded, without a disregard of all the maxims of just precaution. To what object, then, will the New Republics direct their powerful and victorious armies? They have a common interest and a common enemy, and let it be supposed that that enemy, weak and exhausted as he is, refuses to make peace, will they not strike wherever they can reach? and from the proximity and great value of Cuba and Porto Rico, is it not to be anticipated that they will aim, and aim a successful blow too, at those Spanish Islands? Whilst they would operate from without, means would, doubtless, be, at the same time, employed to stimulate the population within to a revolt. And that the disposition exists

among the inhabitants, to a considerable extent, to throw off the Spanish authority, is well known. It is due to the United States to declare, that they have constantly declined to give any countenance to that disposition.

It is not, then, for the new republics, that the President wishes you to urge upon Spain the expediency of concluding the war.

terest is probably on the side of its continuance, if any nation can ever have an interest in a state of war. But, it is for Spain herself, for the cause of humanity, for the general repose of the world, that you are required, with all the delicacy which belongs to the subject, to use every topic of persuasion, to impress upon the councils of Spain the propriety, by a formal pacification, of terminating the war. And as the views and policy of the United States in regard to those islands, may possibly have some influence, you are authorized, frankly and fully, to disclose them. The United States are satisfied with the present condition of those Islands, in the hands of Spain, and with their ports open to our commerce, as they are now open. This Government desires no political change of that condition. The population, itself, of the islands, is incompetent at present, from its composition and its amount, to maintain self-government. The maritime force of the neighboring Republics of Mexico and Colombia is not, now, nor is it likely shortly to be, adequate to the protection of those islands, if the conquest of them were effected. The United States would entertain constant apprehension of their passing from their possession to that of some less friendly sovereignty: And of all the European Powers, this country prefers that Cuba and Porto Rico should remain dependent on Spain. If the war should continue between Spain and the new Republics, and those islands should become the object and the theatre of it, their fortunes have such a connection with the prosperity of the United States, that they could not be indifferent spectators; and the possible contingencies of such a protracted war might bring upon the Government of the United States duties and obligations, the performance of which, however painful it should be, they might not be at liberty to decline. A subsidiary consideration in favor of peace, deserving some weight, is, that as the war has been the parent cause of the shocking piracies in the West Indies, its termination would be, probably, followed by their cessation: And thus the Government of Spain, by one act, would fulfil the double ebligation, under which it lies, to foreign Governments, of repressing enormities, the perpetrators of which find refuge, if not succor, in Spanish territory; and that to the Spanish nation, itself, of promoting its real interests.

Extract from the notes of a conversation between Mr. Everett and Mr. Zea, communicated with a despatch, No. 7, from Mr. Everett to Mr. Clay, dated "Madrid, September 25th, 1825.

"In the course of this conversation upon matters touching so nearly the independence of the colonies, there were of course frequent op

portunities of alluding to that question, and the minister seemed to feel no delicacy or reserve in expressing his sentiments upon it. He remarked, repeatedly, that the King would never abandon his claim tə these his ancient and rightful possessions; that the cause was a good one; and that, however, unfavorable their prospect might appear at present, they had a right to suppose that they should, in the end, succeed: that we had seen, of late, revolutions in political affairs at least as violent as this would be; for example, the overthrow of Bonaparte, and the restoration of Louis the XVIII to the throne of his ancestors; that the party in the colonies in favor of independence, though dominant, and apparently unresisted, was not in reality so strong as was generally supposed; that it consisted of a busy and active, but in reality feeble minority; that the mass of the good citizens, constituting a great majority of the population, were in favor of the King, and were only waiting for some suitable occasion to come out in their strength, and to put down the insurgents, and, finally, that the cause being a just one, they had a right to suppose, that they should be assisted, sooner or later, by an interference of Providence.

I did not think it necessary to enter very fully into the argument with Mr. Zea.

I said to him, however, that I regretted to hear from him so decisive a declaration of the King's resolution not to acknowledge the new States; that my Government had hoped that the battle of Ayacucho, and the recognition of England, would have been considered by His Majesty as settling the question, and that he would have been induced to put an end to the violent state of things now existing, which was more or less injurious to all christian nations; that enlightened men of all classes, parties, and opinions, in most of the civilized countries of Europe, and in the United States, were now satisfied that Spain could never recover her authority over the colonies. As a single instance, I mentioned to him the opinion of the Bishop of Hermopolis, minister of church affairs in France, and well known, throughout Europe, as one of the ablest and most decided adherents of the antiTiberal sect, whom I had seen at Paris on my way, and who had told me, expressly, that they regarded the affair of South America as settled.

I re

To this he made answer, that the Bishop had also, in the time of Bonaparte, despaired of the possibility of the King's restoration, and that he might be as much in the wrong now, as he was then. marked that there were evident symptoms in the proceedings of the French Government, of an intention to recognize the new States at no very distant period. He said that France had hitherto stood by them faithfully in all their troubles; that he could not say how long she would be true to them, but should she even desert them, the King would still adhere firmly to his principles; that the standing and invariable rule of conduct observed by His Majesty upon all occasions, was that of strict justice; that he made no concessions to expediency, acknowledged no distinction between politics and morals, and was prepared to sacrifice every thing rather than surrender what he knew to be

his right. He then recurred to his favorite example of Louis the XVIII, said that they were by no means reduced to so low point as he had been: that he too, often had been solicited to abandon his claims to the French Throne; but that, by firmly rejecting all such propositions; and tenaciously adhering to his purpose, he had finally succeeded in recovering every thing.

It struck me that the example of Bonaparte, who had lost all by obstinately refusing to make a timely surrender of a part, would have been rather more to the point, but I did not think it worth while to press this subject at present. I told him that I was not called upon to advise his Majesty's ministers upon this or any other question, and that what I had said, had been thrown out incidentally in reply to his remarks."

No. 10.

Extract of a letter from Mr Everett to the Secretary of State, dated MADRID, October 20th, 1825.

"It was reported here very confidently, a few days ago, that the new Consulative Junta, or Council of Government, was occupied in preparing the way for an arrangement with the South American States. Upon tracing this rumor to its origin, I found that it arose from the fact that the council had deputed some of its members to confer with two Spanish officers who lately arrived from South America,` by way of the Havanna and New York, and are the same that were sent out by the Constitutional Government to Buenos Ayres, as Commissioners. They landed at Bordeaux from New York, and came on immediately to this place, remained here about three weeks, during which time they had occasional conferences with members of the council, and afterwards proceeded to Cadiz. These facts being known, and it being also understood that the council had been request. ed by the minister to give their opinion upon the measures proper to be taken, in regard to the colonies, it was natural enough to draw the conclusion, that the conferences in question had some connexion with this subject, and that the persons with whom they were held, might, perhaps, have gone to Cadiz, on their way to America, as private agents of the Government. Another, and a more probable construction of the fact, would be, that the council had no other object in conferring with these gentlemen, than to obtain information respecting the state of the colonies.

About the time when this report was in circulation, I went to the Escurial, in order to be present at the celebration of the king's birth day, and when there, had, of course, frequent opportunities of seeing the minister. In one of the conversations which I had with him, I inquired of him what foundation there was for this rumor, and whether there was any change of policy contemplated, in regard to the