The mail leaves the city in a few hours, so that I have not time to give you the arguments which were urged for and against it. My principal objections, are the impolicy of admitting any distinctions in the interests of the American States which would tend to unite these more closely, and place us in some contingencies without the pale. Treaties, in all probability, by this time, have been concluded between the United States and Buenos Ayres and Chili, on such terms as would render a provision of this nature nugatory in time of peace; but, in the event of a war between the United States and either of those Powers, an event which, however remote, ought to be provided against, such an exception would enable this country to assist very materially our enemies, without violating the treaty. With these impressions, and with this view of the subject, I will not agree to this provision; and as I know the Plenipotentiaries and the President of the Mexican States to be obstinately bent on carrying this point, I earnestly solicit that you will instruct me if you think I ought to yield it."

Extract of a Letter, No. 22, from Mr. Poinsett to Mr. Clay, dated Mexico, 28th September, 1825.

"Anxious to conclude the pending negotiations, in time for the President to communicate the result in his message to the next Congress; I urged the President of these States, either to permit Alaman to continue them, or to appoint another Plenipotentiary. He preferred the latter alternative, and has given powers to Don Jose Gomez Pedraza, the Secretary of War, who now holds the port folio of the Minister of Foreign Relations, ad interim. The Secretary of the Treasury, being about to leave town for the coast, on business connected with the capture of the castle of Ulloa, a desire was expressed to complete the negotiations before his departure. In consequence we have had two conferences, yesterday and to day, but the exception contained in the fourth article of the Treaty, between Great Britain. and Mexico, to which I alluded in my communication No. 18, and to which the Mexican Plenipotentiaries pertinaciously adhere, has prevented our coming to any conclusion.

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They continue to urge the fraternal ties by which they are bound to the American nations, which formerly were Spanish possessions, and the treaties of alliance, offensive and defensive, which have been made between them. But what really prevents them from yielding the point, is their having succeeded in persuading the British negotiators to consent to insert this exception in their treaty. I will, however, give you a succinct account of what passed, at our several conferences on this subject.

"I first objected to the exception in favor of the American nations, formerly Spanish possessions, on the ground, that no distinc

tions ought to be made, between any of the members of the great American family; that Great Britain having consented to such a provision, ought not to influence the United States, because the Republics of America were united, by one and the same interest, and that it was the interest of the European Powers to cause such distinctions to be made as would divide it into small confederacies, and if possible, to prevent us from so uniting, as to present one front against the attempts of Europe upon our Republican Institutions. That it might therefore have been considered by the British Plenipotentiaries, important to lay the foundation of distinctions which must disunite us; but that it was much more manifestly our interest, that all the states of America should be united as intimately as possible, an union which could only exist on the basis of the most perfect equality and reciprocity.

The Plenipotentiaries of Mexico observed, in reply, that Mexico was united by fraternal ties and strong sympathies, to the nations which had, like themselves, shaken off the yoke of Spain; and that they had concluded with them an offensive and defensive alliance, which united them more intimately, and placed them on a different footing, from that on which they stood towards the United States. To which I rejoined, that the policy we had observed towards these countries, gave us a right to expect, that no such distinctions as those sought to be introduced into the treaty, should be made in our case, and entitled us to be considered on, at least, an equal footing with any of the American Republics. And further, that this exception could, now, avail them nothing, as our treaty with Colombia, and those probably by this time concluded with Buenos Ayres and Chili, contained no such provision. The Plenipotentiaries of Mexico hastily remarked, that a war might dissolve any one of those treaties, and in such an event, they thought Mexico ought to possess the power to evince her sympathies in favor of either of the American nations, which had been formerly Spanish possessions, without violating her neutrality. To this observation I replied, that I considered this argument conclusive, why the United States should not accede to the insertion of such a provision in the treaty that I regarded a war between the United States and any of the other Republics of America as a very remote and improbable event; but that I never would consent, by treaty, to place the former in a less favorable situation than their enemies, if, unfortunately, those Republics should ever become This was the substance of our discussion, at the first conference on this subject. It has been alluded to since. in conversation, in a manner that induced me to believe they were bent on carrying their point, and they must have perceived that I was equally decided not to yield it.

SO.

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Yesterday, after adjusting all other disputed points, inserting an article, similar to the 15th article of our Treaty with Spain, signed at San Lorenzo el Real, in 1795; and one on the arrest, detention, and delivery of fugitive slaves, this subject was again renewed. The President, they said, was so decided on the subject, that they feared

to all those changes. In short, what European State has not much at stake, direct or indirect, in the destiny, be it what it may, of that most valuable of all the West India islands? The reflections and the experience of the Emperor, on the vicissitudes of war, must have impressed him with the solemn duty of all Governments to guard against even the distant approach of that most terrible of all scourges, by every precaution with which human prudence and foresight can surround the repose and safety of States.

Such is the view of the war between Spain and the new Republics, which the President desires you most earnestly, but respectfully, to present to his Imperial Majesty. From this view it is evident, that it is not so much for the new States themselves, as for Spain, that peace has become absolutely necessary, Their independence of her, whatever intestine divisions may, if intestine divisions shall yet unhappily await them, is fixed and irrevocable. She may, indeed, by a blind and fatal protraction of the war, yet lose more; gain, for her, is impossible. In becoming the advocate for peace, one is the true advocate of Spain. If the Emperor shall, by his wisdom, enlighten the councils of Spain, and bring home to them a conviction of her real interests. there can be no fears of the success of his powerful interposition. You are authorized, in that spirit of the most perfect frankness and friendship which have ever characterized all the relations between Russia and the United States, to disclose, without reserve, the feelings and the wishes of the United States, in respect to Cuba and Porto Rico. They are satisfied with the present condition of those Islands, now open to the commerce and enterprise of their citizens. They desire, for themselves, no political change in them. If Cuba were to declare itself independent, the amount and the character of its population render it improbable that it could maintain its independence.

Such a premature declaration might bring about a renewal of those shocking scenes of which a neighboring Island was the afflicting theatre. There could be no effectual preventive of those scenes, but in the guaranty, and in a large resident force of foreign Powers. The terms of such a guaranty, and the quotas which each should contribute, of such a force, would create perplexing questions of very difficult adjustment, to say nothing of the continual jealousies which would be in operation, In the state of possession which Spain has, there would be a ready acquiescence of those very foreign Powers, all of whom would be put into angry activity upon the smallest prospect of a transfer of those islands. The United States could not, with indifference, sce such a transfer to any European Power. And if the new Republics, or either of them, were to conquer them, their maritime force, as it now is, or, for a long time to come, is likely to be, would keep up constant apprehensions of their safety. Nor is it believed that the new States desire, or will attempt the acquisition, unless they shall be compelled, in their own defence, to make it, by the unnecessary prolongation of the war. Acting on the policy which is here unfolded, the Government of the United States, although they

would have been justified to have seized Cuba and Porto Rico, in the just protection of the lives and the commerce of their citizens, which have been a prey to infamous pirates, finding succor and refuge in Spanish territory, have signally displayed their patience and moderation by a scrupulous respect of the sovereignty of Spain. who was herself bound, but has utterly failed, to repress those enormities.

Finally, the President cherishes the hope that the Emperor's devotion to peace, no less than his friendship for Spain, will induce him to lend the high authority of his name to the conclusion of a war, the further prosecution of which must have the certain effect of an useless waste of human life. No Power has displayed more solicitude for the repose of the world, than Russia, who has recently given the strongest evidence of her unwillingness to disturb it in the East, by unexampled moderation and forbearance. By extending to America the blessings of that peace which, under the auspices of his Imperial Majesty, Europe now enjoys, all parts of this continent will have grateful occasion for regarding him, as the United States ever have done, as their most potent and faithful friend.

This despatch is confided to your discretion, to be communicated, in extenso, or its contents disclosed in such other manner, to the Government of Russia, as shall appear to you most likely to accomplish its object.

I have the honor to be, Sir, with great respect, your obedient and very humble servant.

No. 48.

Mr. Middleton to Mr. Clay.

ST. PETERSBURG, 15th, (27th) July, 1825.

SIR: I had the honor of receiving your despatch, No. 1, on the 28th June. (0. S.) The Emperor was, at that period, absent from this residence, but expected about the 5th of the present month. Count Nesselrode had preceded him by a few days, and had announced, by a circular letter, dated 24th June, that he had resumed the direction of the Imperial Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

I conceive it would be best to lose no time in opening the matter committed to my care by your instructions in the despatch above mentioned. After having carefully weighed what would be the best mode of proceeding, I mentioned to the Count the purport of the instructions. He gave me, at first, no great encouragement, adverting to the essential difference in our way of thinking on the question between Spain and her colonies. I begged leave, however, to furnish him with a copy of the despatch, (as you had permitted,) in order that he might lay it before the Emperor. Accordingly, on the second of July, a copy of your instructions, together with a short introductory note, was sent in. (See the accompanying paper.)

I conclude from my knowledge of the modes of proceeding in all matters of general concern, that the proposition is in consideration between the allies; it being a fundamental maxim with them not to take any determination in matters affecting the general policy, without the mutual consent of the parties to this alliance.

I trust that I need not add, that every endeavor shall be made, on my part, to give effect to your proposition.

I have the honor to be, sir,

Very faithfully, your obd't. serv't,

HENRY MIDDLETON.

No. 49.

Mr. Middleton to Mr. Clay.

To the Secretary of State, &c. &c. &c.

ST. PETERSBURG, 27th Aug. (8th Sept.) 1825.

SIR: I have the honor to forward herewith a copy of the answer of the Russian Secretary of State, to my note of 2d July last, by which I had communicated to this Government, in extenso, the instructions I had received by your despatch No. 1.

I think I am warranted in considering this answer to be, in substance, (when divested of diplomatic garb,) in every respect as favorable to the views developed in your despatch, as could possibly be expected to be given by this Government, standing in the predicament it now does. We are left to infer from it, that the proposal that the Emperor shall lend his aid towards the conclusion of the war between Spain and her Colonies, by interposing his good offices in the form of pacific counsel to the mother country, has been communicated to the Allied Cabinets, and I am fully of opinion, that the majority, if not the whole of them, will agree to it. If such should be the event, the Diplomatic Committee sitting at Paris will be instructed accordingly. The chief difficulty to be overcome will be in the Cabinet of the King of Spain, where it is understood that all parties are opposed to the independenco of the Colonies. The necessity of the case, however, begins to be so crying, that a hope may be entertained that even there the counsels of wisdom may ere long be listened to. For obvious reasons we must not expect to learn, officially, that such advice, as that alluded to above, has been given, unless it should be attended to.

I have the honor to be, Sir, very faithfully, your very obedient ser

vant.

HENRY MIDDLETON.