capture, and bringing in of any ship or vessel hovering on our coasts, having on board any negro, mulatto, or person of colour, for the purpose of selling them as slaves; or with intent to land the same, in any port or place within the jurisdiction of the United States. (8 vol. Laws U. S. 266.) But even in this case, those persons are not to be sold; they are to be disposed of otherwise, as therein is directed. The party capturing, receives nothing from the proceeds of such negroes, mulattos or persons of colour; his emoluments arise only, from the proceeds of the ship or vessel, her tackle, apparel and furniture, and the goods and effects, on board; and this under a special proviso, that to entitle him to such reward, he shall "keep safe every negro, mulatto, or person of colour, found on board of any ship or vessel, so seized, taken or brought into port for condemnation, and shall deliver every such negro, mulatto, or person of colour, to such person or persons, as shall be appointed by the respective states, to receive them &c." Hence, as respects the rights and interests vested by the prize act, congress has legislated with caution. When to give energy to that act, that body meant former acts, or parts of acts to be repealed, the same has been expressly enacted; it has not been left to a court, to advance one step farther, than was intended; by its decreeing a virtual repeal. For, it is only under such a decree, or, by such a construction, that the cause of the libellant can be sustained. This is evident, by referring to the 14th and 16th sections of the prize act; which for the purpose of giving free scope to its operations, expressly, repeal so much of the non-importation and embargo laws, as relate to prize goods, or private armed vessels: but, nothing is said as to the prohibitory slave act. It fol lows then, that congress did not intend to repeal such act, as relating to prize of war: as "Exceptio probat regulam, in non exceptis." And slaves, are not considered therein under the term property, or as goods and effects as is evident by the remunerating clause, of the prohibiting slave act, (Sec. 7.) before mentioned. Congress has therein clearly expressed its opinion on

this point; and it is not then for this court, to suppose a different construction."

I am, therefore, of opinion, the negroes or persons of colour, so libelled, cannot be condemned as prize to the captors.

The only question now remaining for consideration, is whether the claim in behalf of the United States, for the same; as prisoners of war or otherwise, shall be sustained or, if not sustained, whether this court, will, in any, and what manner, pronounce judgment in the premises?

As to the claim of prisoners of war, I do not think it proper to decide thereon. It appears to me, as the laws of the United States, are silent on the subject; it becomes a matter of state: respecting which, it is not for the judiciary to determine. The right to do so, remaining with the government of the United States. Because, these persons may have been heretofore informally considered as prisoners; it is no reason this court should now decree them to be prisoners of war. And on this point, there is much similarity, with the reasoning and cases in law, respecting Head In which the court of admiralty pro money. nounces not whether due; but only the number of men taken: leaving the remuneration to the Sovereign power. (1st Robinson's Admiralty Reports 157.)

Under these impressions, I do adjudge and decree, that the libel be dismissed with costs. And, that the claim of the United States, be sustained, so far, as to detain the said negroes, mulattoes, or persons of colour, in the possession and custody of the marshal ; subject to such disposition and uses, in favour of the United States, whether as prisoners of war, as prize to the United States, or otherwise, as shall lawfully be declared, and directed in the premises. And lastly, I adjudge and decree that the libellant pay also the costs of the claim, in this case.

Habeas Corpus.

SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA.

Case of LEWIS a black man claimed as the slave of Langdon Cheves, Esq.-Before M. KEPPELE, Esq. an Alderman of the city of Philadelphia.

The warrant in this case was issued upon the oath of LANGDON CHEVES, Esq. in the words following:

"LANGDON CHEVES being duly sworn, deposeth and saith, that he is a citizen and resident of the state of South-Carolina-that he was born in the said state, and hath never resided in any other state or country but as a sojourner. That during his stay in the state of Pennsylvania, at several times in and since the year 1811, he only sojourned therein, and had not any intention to become domiciled, or otherwise to reside therein, than as a sojournor. That during the several periods of his stay as aforesaid in the said state, he was a member of the house of representatives of the United States-and that he sojourned in the said state for the purpose of more conveniently discharging his duties as a member of congress. That the negro man Lewis, who was in his service as a domestic servant during his stay in Pennsylvania, is now, and was during all the time and times of his stay in the said state as aforesaid, his slave-and that he acquired him by purchase in the state of South Carolina, according to the laws and usages thereof. That the said Lewis absconded from the service of this deponent in Germantown, in the state of Pennsylvania, on or about the first day of the present month of December-and hath since continued absent from the service of the deponent without his leave or consent, and against his will and orders.

(Signed)

17th December, 1813.

LANGDON CHEVES.

N. B. The deposition was sworn to before the mayor of the district of Columbia, Washington City.

It is also stated, and not controverted, that some time in the month of March last, after the termination of the session of congress, Mr. Cheves came from Washington to the state of Pennsylvania, bringing Lewis with him. Mr. Cheves rented a house in Germantown, and, with his family, lived in it until some time in the present month, when he gave up the house in Germantown, and went to Washington to attend in his place as a member of the congress of the United States. And that Lewis lived with him in Pennsylvania more than six months, but absconded from Mr. Cheves before he left this state for Washington. JOHN SERGEANT, Attorney for Langdon Cheves. The within and foregoing facts are agreed to-28th

Dec. 1813

On behalf of Lewis.

WM. MASTER.

ALDERMAN KEPPELE'S OPINION. The opinion to be delivered, depends upon the construction of an act of assembly passed the 1st day of March, 1780, which in the tenth section provides, that "No man or woman of any nation or colour, (except the negroes or mulattoes, who shall be registered as aforesaid,) shall at any time hereafter be deemed, adJudged, or holden within the territories of this commonwealth, as slaves or servants for life, but as free men and free women, except

"The domestic slaves attending upon delegates in congress from the other American states. "Foreign ministers and consuls.

"And persons passing through or sojourning in this state, and not becoming resident therein.

"Ánd seamen employed in ships not belonging to any inhabitant of this state, nor employed in any ship owned by any such inhabitant."

Provided such domestic slaves be not alienated or sold to any inhabitant: nor, except in the case of members of congress foreign ministers and consuls, retained in this state longer than six months.

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It is contended, that "under this act, and under a provision contained in the second section of the supplementary act passed the 29th March, 1788, (which will be considered hereafter,) the defendant is free." The exceptions contained in the act of March, 1780, refer to different descriptions of persons, whose property is saved from its operation, viz:

1. Domestic slaves attending upon delegates in congress, foreign ministers and consuls.

2. Persons passing through, or sojourning in the state, and not being resident therein.

3. Seamen employed in ships owned by foreigners, &c.

If the case rests upon the section quoted, unconnected with any other law, Mr. Cheves being a delegate in congress from South-Carolina, and having the defendant as his domestic slave attending him, does not forfeit his claim to him as a slave, from his residence in Pennsylvania exceeding the term of six months.

The observation made that this act was passed when congress sat in this city, has not that weight with me which the defendant's counsel has been disposed to ascribe to it-the words are general and descriptive of the character of the person, without having reference to the place at which congress convene and hold their sessions.

If within six months a member of congress should be taken sick, so as to render it impossible for him to prosecute his journey, and that his indisposition should continue beyond the six months, according to the doctrine advanced for defendant, he is free. This never could have been intended by the legislature, and indeed the phraseology used in the last part of the section, seems to put the point beyond a doubt. The words are, "except in the case of members of congress," " &c. omitting the former words "attending upon," and referring to the "descriptio personarum exclusively.

Foreign ministers and consuls have had their residences and establishments in this city ever since the passing of the act, and have had their domestic slaves with them-it never was contended that their slaves became Vol.-No. XIX.

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