Americans for property, illegally taken by their cruisers previous to the treaty.

In negotiating this convention it was quite apparent throughout, that the French commissioners had little other object in view than to relieve themselves of all indemnities. France was exceedingly poor,-the active capital of the country had been wasted or squandered, and such was the unsettled state of public affairs, that men had been altogether deterred from embarking in those occupations and pursuits, that would have led to a renewal of wealth. Mr. Livingston, in a letter of March 1802, observes, "their expenses exceed their income, and the government is, at this moment, maintained by anticipations at an interest of from 12 to 18 per cent.

The period when this convention was matured, was, on the whole, auspicious for negotiation. Napoleon, at his first accession to the consulate, sought for peace with all the world. France truly needed it. She was exhausted by the bloody wars of Germany, Italy, and the low countries, and by the internal commotions of the Vendeans and Chouans. He proposed peace to England and to the enemies of France on the continent. But America was the only country with whom a treaty was definitively concluded.

We are not disposed to criticise with severity any portion of the negotiations with France from the first mission of Mr. Pinckney; on the contrary, the course of the administration, in the outset, admits of a full vindication: but we think there is no injustice in excluding from the benefit of this general praise the two acts that embrace the abrogation of the provision of guaranty, and the manner in which the convention of 1800 was concluded.* The first proceeded from an exercise of authority, that could be assumed by this government only on one ground. That stipulation was undoubtedly the root of all the evil;-every difficulty and embarrassment, experienced by the United States in the negotiations with

*The appropriations for the convention of 1800 were passed by the House of Representatives unanimously.

France from April 1793, may be traced to it in a direct line, but in a legitimate sense it could only be torn out by the joint efforts, the mutual consent of the parties. The act of abrogation presented a fair ground to France for indemnity, and is only to be defended, or rather justified from considerations of rigid necessity and obvious self preservation. There appears, also, some degree of precipitancy in concluding the convention of 1800. More caution and reserve would probably have obtained better and more distinct terms, for after all, the substance of the treaty is contained in the provision under which the First Consul ratified it. To this it may be said in reply, it was extremely important for the United States to withdraw as speedily and as effectually as possible from European politics, then in the greatest fermentation, and that the same defence, which has been urged in the case of the London treaty of 1794, may well be brought forward on the present occasion;-it defined and secured the neutrality of the country. That argument is, we admit, always the most forcible that can be employed on any subject, relating to our diplomacy, but from the minute accounts we have now the advantage of possessing of the situation of France at that period, it is difficult to discern the least symptom, or indication, or desire on her part to force this country into a war;-and the three sets of commissions, successively issued by this government, with somewhat unusual haste and eagerness, could leave little doubt of the course we were disposed to follow. A nominal war had existed, and the convention put an end to it, but without securing a livre in the shape of indemnity for the spoliations, that, on our part, led to hostilities. The government assumed the right of abrogating the guaranty, and yet gave away the whole stipulation for the great amount of claims on France. The mischiefs, resulting from this proceeding, have been felt to this day; and no opportunity for negotiation, so favourable, has since presented itself.

CHAPTER IX.

CESSION OF LOUISIANA.

Purchase, a good one-Necessary for Western country-In '90 de Moustier made enquiries respecting Western country-French possessions in North America extinguished by treaties of '62 and '63— Louisiana secretly ceded to France-Great uneasiness in AmericaWar with France-Coalition with England-France prepares to take possession of it-Prevented by renewal of war-Monroe sent to France-Important instructions—Details of negotiation-First price exorbitant-Ceded to United States-Terms-Made a “territory” and then a state-Letter of British officer on Louisiana.

THE next treaty made with France was one, by which the important cession of Louisiana was accomplished. Time has already proved this measure to have been judicious on the part of the American government, and the purchase in every respect extremely cheap. The United States held, at the time, wide and broad possessions of fruitful soil and easy cultivation, far exceeding the wants of the population; and, novel and without precedent as was the spectacle of a youthful government, like America, entering into treaties with the ancient European states for the transfer of extensive tracts of country, it did not even appear, at first blush, a discreet arrangement to bring so great a quantity of excellent land into the market. But without a permanent unmolested entrance to the Gulf of Mexico, the territory west of the Alleghany, was despoiled of one half its value. The boundary of the Mississippi, and the free navigation of that river to its mouth, were, at the time of this treaty, indispensable to the proper independence and the full enjoyment of the great water communications of the western country.

The period of the discovery of the Mississippi, and the persons by whom the discovery was made, have been matters

of controversy. But we shall not enter into that subject. The country, now called Louisiana, originally belonged to France, but by a secret compact, concluded between France and Spain in 1762, and by the treaties of the following year between France, Spain and England, the French dominion was extinguished on all the continent of North America. And by the treaty between this country and England in 1783, the Mississippi became the western boundary of the United States from its source to the 31st degree of north latitude, and thence on the same parallel to the St. Mary's. We shall have occasion to speak more particularly of this boundary of the United States in treating of our foreign relations with Spain. A right of deposite at New Orleans for the produce of the west was secured by the treaty of '95 with Spain; but great obstacles being thrown in the way of the navigation, and a serious attempt made to bring about a separation of the western country, the stipulations of this instrument were not carried into effect for three years. Towards the close of the administration of Mr. Adams, measures even were adopted to take forcible possession of New Orleans, but the difficulties with Spain in that quarter having been for the time, overcome, the scheme was abandoned. Nevertheless, alarming uneasiness still existed in the west; the control of the Mississippi remained in foreign hands, and the extreme anxiety and apprehension, always manifested concerning the navigation of that river, were greatly augmented, when the article of the secret treaty of St. Ildefonso, ceding Louisiana to France, was known in the United States. This treaty was in reality, concluded in October 1800, but it was not promulgated till the beginning of 1802. The article of cession is in these words:

"His Catholic Majesty engages to retrocede to the French republic, six months after the full and entire execution of the conditions and stipulations above recited, relative to his Royal Highness the Duke of Parma, the colony or province of Louisiana, with the same extent that it already has in the hands of Spain, and that it had when France possessed it, and such as it should be, after the treaties passed subsequently between Spain and other powers."

Every thing was to be apprehended from the activity and intelligence of the French in a country of such uncommon richness and resources. Speedily, we should have seen them closing the navigation of the Mississippi to the Americans, and securing the whole commerce of the Gulf of Mexico and the West Indies. These considerations, awakening great and just alarm in the United States, it appeared necessary to resort to force to prevent their entrance into Louisiana, and a disposition gradually developed itself to form an alliance with England. It is not probable that the government would ever have allowed France to take possession of Louisiana, although, from a union and comparison of various circumstances, the outlines of the scheme of the First Consul may be sketched with tolerable precision. An armament was, indeed, prepared in the French ports, officers were selected expressly for the expedition, and on the ratification of the treaty of Amiens of 1802, the secret article of the treaty of St. Ildefonso was immediately produced. Whether this enterprize was suggested by the recent crusade into Egypt, or by a recollection of the former power of France in this hemisphere, the operation was a magnificent one, and justly and emphatically belongs to the first class of profound, comprehensive plans. At peace with England, no impediment existed to the transportation of troops and every description of stores;—with the occupation of Louisiana, the conquest of St. Domingo, where the French, though in the outset altogether triumphant, now began to experience cruel reverses, would have followed; and ultimately the principal control of the commerce of the neighbouring seas. Louisiana originally formed part of the French dominions in North America, and traces of the solidity of their works, and of the enterprise and intelligence of that nation, now remain in that country, as, indeed, they do in most of those regions, from which they have been excluded by the Americans or the British. Before the disastrous peace of '63, France surpassed all the civilized people of Europe in the extent and value of her commerce, colonies and foreign possessions, and in her spirit of enterprize; but at that period began the down