Romanism as a stimulant, it is easy to foresee what would follow the establishment of French supremacy on this Western Continent.

At least a hundred years before the American Revolution, the Jesuit Missionaries were busy around the Lakes and in the Valley of the Mississippi. They had followed the great lakes to Superior, they had gone on southward to the Mississippi, and their stations were planted on the banks of the Ohio. From Quebec to New Orleans, the whole West has been one great Missionary field for the Church of Rome nearly two hundred years ago, and it is not strange perhaps, that the Catholic Powers should often consider whether it is possible for them to recover again this lost dominion of the West.

The French plan for the military occupation of North America embraced a series of fortified posts, extending from Louisburg on the Atlantic coast westward, to Quebec and Montreal, and along the great lakes, and then southward to New Orleans. Besides this general line, there were some strong positions on Lake Champlain, and in the upper portion of the Valley of the Mohawk, and on the upper waters of the Ohio.

The immediate effect of this chain of forts was to confine the English to the Atlantic coast, rendering the expansion of the colonies westward impossible; the ultimate result of the scheme, had it proved successful, would have been, to expel from America the English, and the Protestant Church together.

In the progress of the war which followed these encroachments of France, she was driven from all these positions in rapid succession, till on the plains of Abraham, Montcalm, in dying, yielded virtually to Great Britain all that France possessed in America, with the exception of New Orleans. This at length was ceded by Napoleon to the United States, and thus the colonial empire of France, both in India and America, vanished, leaving only a little patch of territory in India, and some insignificant islands in the West Indian group.

At the close of the war which ended with the fall of Bonaparte, France found herself stripped of her vast colonial possessions, which were all in the hands of the Power she hated, and feared more than all others—and by that same ancient enemy her navy had been utterly ruined. France was a mortified, defeated, and weakened Power, but she was not utterly discouraged. She accepted such a peace as was granted, and with bitter memories and meditated revenge, she silently bided her time. She had played a stupendous and bloody game for the control of the commerce and manufactures of the world, and with her the Romish church had attempted to extend the Papacy in all lands, and both had utterly failed.

Protestant England was the dominant power in all the earth, her navy had complete command of all seas, her commerce was the commerce of the world, and London was the great money centre of Christendom.

But mighty nations do not abandon a traditional policy, a national idea, because of severe defeat. They simply pause to recruit their strength-and such a people as the French, fertile in resource, energetic, and proud, recover very rapidly even from extreme disaster. In less than a century after the surrender of her North American possessions, forty-five years after the battle of Trafalgar, in which her navy was annihilated, and thirty-five years after Waterloo, where her military power was broken, France was prepared to renew the contest for the control of Europe and the world.

The French, through the period of their humiliation, could scarcely name Waterloo, or think of St. Helena, without an execration for England, and breathing a desire for vengeance. Actively and steadily she gathered her resources, improved her army, and enlarged her navy, and England soon began to be uneasy at the rapid progress of her formidable neighbor. France at this time had been placed permanently under the control of Louis Napoleon. The designs of the new Emperor none then could penetrate, but it was quite evident from his military and naval preparations, that he

intended that France should play no inferior part among the nations of Europe. This brings us to consider the position of the great powers of the world just previous to the Anglo-French Alliance; and it is hoped that this rapid review of French policy for a hundred years, will enable us to understand the nature and objects of this unexpected compact.

CHAPTER VIII.

CONDITION OF ENGLAND, FRANCE, RUSSIA AND AMERICA, WHEN THE ANGLO-FRENCH ALLIANCE WAS FORMED.

Mr. Kinglake, in "The Invasion of the Crimea," comments with great severity upon the Alliance with France, as the one step which rendered inevitable a war with Russia, which might otherwise have been avoided. He says that the French Emperor subordinated all other considerations. to the plan of forming with England a combination against Russia. In studying the policy of France it is very important to remember this fact. France originated the war against Russia, and it began in a quarrel between the Latin and Greek Churches about the holy places at Jerusalem, which was carefully nursed by France into a cause of war, as will hereafter be made to appear, while England with alacrity accepted the proposal of France to attack Russia. But England had motives of her own.

Mr. Kinglake seems to think that the prominent motive of Louis Napoleon in seeking the Alliance was to gain support and recognition for that throne which he had so lately set up with perfidy and in the blood of his countrymen, and he presents no very satisfactory reasons for the course of England.

Events have shown already, and will yet more clearly reveal the real intentions of these two powers in forming that strange agreement, in which, without sufficient ostensible reasons, they suddenly abandoned the policy which for

centuries they had pursued towards each other, and all the humiliations and resentments of France were apparently forgot.

At this point Mr. Kinglake makes a statement in regard to the temper of his countrymen, which it would be wise for those Americans to consider, who think that the good feeling, the kindly sympathies of England, may be relied upon hereafter, if only soothing, friendly words are used by us, or who hope that such men as Mr. Cobden and Mr. Bright can stay the tide of British violence and passion when once the cry is war. After showing that the war was brought on by France, and that England was easily induced to join her, he says:

"Welcome or unwelcome, the truth must be told. A "large obstacle to the maintenance of peace in Europe was "the temper of the English people. In public, men still "used forms of expression implying that they would be "content for England to lead a quiet life among the nations, "and they still classed expectations of peace among their "hopes, and declared in joyous tones that the prospects of "war were glaring and painful; but these phrases were the "time-honored canticles of a doctrine already discarded. "The English people desired war; and perhaps it ought to "be acknowledged that there were many to whom war, for “the sake of war, was no longer a hateful thought." Again he says: "All whose volitions were governed by the ima"gined freeing of Poland, or destroying Cronstadt and "lording it with our flag in the Baltic; or taking command "of the Euxine, and sinking the Russian fleet under the "guns of Sebastopol; all who meant to raise Circassia, and "cut off the Muscovite from the glowing South, by holding "the Dariel Pass, and those also who dwelt in fancy upon "the deeds to be done on the shores of the Caspian; all "these and many more saw plainly enough that separation "from the German Powers, and alliance with the new "Bonaparte, was the only road to adventure." The English people were eager for war, for the sake of war, for the sake of adventure eager to strike down a power that had helped