CHAPTER XXIII.

THE ARMY AND NAVY OF RUSSIA.

Having in the preceding chapter presented some facts and statements which show the real character and capabilities of the soldiers of the Northern Empire, it becomes important to inquire how many such soldiers a Russian Emperor can command for offensive or defensive war. Certainly her military power must be regarded as of the most imposing character, if the number of effective soldiers is in the usual proportion to the population of the country; if they are well armed and disciplined; if the munitions of war are abundant, and of suitable quality; and if stores and troops can be readily transported, and accumulated at points where they are required. These points will be the subjects of investigation in the present chapter, to which will be added also an account of the size, position, and condition of the Russian Navy. It is by no means an easy matter to ascertain, even with an approximation to accuracy, the actual military force of the Muscovite nation. While, on her part, national pride and ambition would lead her to present to the world an imposing array, on the contrary, those who fear or dislike her find their interest, as they think, in reducing as far as possible by all manner of deductions, the published statements of the condition of her

military establishment, and after reducing thus her armies within reasonable limits they proceed to show, either that it can not be supported in the field, or that its different corps are so widely separated that they can not be concentrated upon any single point; and again, that the vast extent of territory to be defended absorbs in its protection a large part of the available force of the empire. It is also asserted that the state of the country is such as to render the transport of large bodies of troops from point to point exceedingly difficult-indeed, almost impossible.

These statements are founded rather on the past than the present condition of the Russian Empire, and, though not wholly without foundation, must be received with due caution, when we remember under what strong temptations those who control the press of western Europe now are to underrate the power of their formidable antagonist, and to vail somewhat from the people the actual condition of things. By a comparison of the various estimates of the population of Russia, it would appear that her numbers are nearly or not quite equal to those of France, England, and Austria.

So far, then, as mere numbers are concerned, she should be able to present a military array nearly or quite as formidable as the three combined. What the power of Russia was in 1812, when the immense army of Bonaparte was swept away, not alone by frost or the fires of Smolensko and Moscow, but equally by the courage and skill of the defenders of their country, is now a matter of history, and well known to the world. Since that period she has spared neither effort nor money in augmenting her strength, and giving to it all the efficiency which can be derived both from science and discipline. She has brought to her aid both European and American skill and experience, and has been steadily and silently perfecting her army, her fortifications, and her navy.

Within the last quarter of a century, no state in Europe has augmented its forces in numbers proportionate to the increase of Russia, nor has any other Power so much improved

the quality of its troops. During his long reign, Nicholas applied himself with unremitting ardor to perfect the whole military organization of the empire. Both his capacity and his resources proved fully equal to the task, and, while we heard only of the poverty of Russia, of her barbarism, of the inefficiency of every department of the public service, of the corruption of her officials, and the system of peculation and fraud everywhere established, she has built and equipped a navy which places her in the foremost rank of naval powers, equalled by England, France, and America, alone; she has established arsenals and depots of wood and other military stores, unsurpassed, to say the least, by any; her fortifications show the perfection of military science; her military schools have no parallel anywhere, and her army is, beyond all comparison, the most formidable in Europe, taking into consideration its numbers, its discipline, and the resources from which its losses may be repaired.

The support of such a vast military establishment must press heavily upon the general industry of the nation beyond all doubt; military despotism, and the necessary hardships of a soldier's life, are constantly doing their cruel work, but whether this burthen presses disproportionately upon Russia, as compared with the establishments of other nations of Europe, does not yet appear. The magnitude of her army is scarcely beyond the due proportion of her population, as compared with other military Powers, while she can maintain her troops at home at less expense than any other nation of Europe. The cost of maintaining a foot soldier in the different armies of Europe has been estimated as follows:*

Cost of a foot soldier for a year in Russia,

66

£. S.

5 00

66

TTT

66

Marmont's Voyages.

This shows an immense difference in favor of Russia, and much of this is owing to the fact that the food of the common people, and consequently of the soldier, is abundant and cheap. A late German writer, Haxthausen, describes the Russian peasantry as physically a fine race of men, generally, indeed, eating meat only once a week, but having a variety of other food, and well contented with it, comfortably and even expensively clothed. This proves that the small cost at which the Russian army is maintained is owing, not to their being ill-fed and scantily clothed, but because the means of supporting life with comfort are easily obtained. The vast extent of the empire, and the difficulty which is always experienced in moving large bodies of troops by land from point to point, led the Emperor Nicholas to the adoption of two very important measures, one of which is completed, and the other is urged forward as rapidly as circumstances allow. The first was the arrangement of the whole army into different corps, stationed according to the geographical character of the country, and where they would be needed either for attack or defense.

The English and French governments would probably have avoided their mortifications in the Crimea, had they possessed themselves of reliable information concerning the actual strength of Russia, the character of her defenses, and the condition of her army. By stationing it at the different points of the empire where it will be needed most in case of attack, Nicholas obviated to a great extent the sudden movements of large bodies of troops when the late war began. His force was ready to enter the Principalities, ready to defend Sebastopol, and equally prepared to cover St. Petersburg and support the garrison at Cronstadt.

But a measure far more important than the one already mentioned, having a bearing upon the internal commerce and general development of the country's resources, as well as upon the transport of armies, is the construction of a system of railways already begun, and which, when finished, will greatly increase the military efficiency of Russia. A grand trunk line is already in operation from St.

Petersburgh to Moscow, about four hundred miles, and from Moscow to Odessa the work is in progress, and now nearly finished. These two lines alone through the heart of the empire, crossing, as they do, so many navigable streams on which steam navigation is already begun, will enable Russia to transport troops, munitions of war, and supplies of all sorts, with great facility from the Baltic to the Black Sea, and between her southern frontier and the extreme north. These two railways, as any one will see at a glance by consulting a map, would, by their connections with a network of navigable rivers and uniting canals, command almost all the resources of the Empire, either for the Black Sea or the Baltic. Indeed, with fleets of light steamers on all her navigable streams, she possesses means of transport from and through every portion of her country, even without railways, such as no other country on the eastern continent can boast; and those who believe that she will yet fail from inability to place troops and supplies at any threatened point will be sorely disappointed.

But the world is constantly reminded of the poverty of Russia, of her limited revenue, and her exhausted treasury, and that therefore she can not maintain her military establishment in an efficient position. Those who favor us with such statements forget that the achievement of the Czar show as yet no evidence of want. He has expended money on the most enlarged scale upon every public project, and everything has been done in a manner which France and England may imitate with advantage. Take the admitted fact that for a hundred years no country has made so rapid a progress in all that constitutes a great nation as Russia; that her population doubles in about fifty years, that this is not caused by immigration, but is mainly caused by the natural increase of the people; and add to this that in the meantime Moscow has been rebuilt, the ravages caused by the invasion of more than six hundred thousand men repaired, one of the most magnificent capitals in Europe has been created, an army of more than a million completely organized and fully armed, not with the arms of barbarism,