great interests of the country, including manufactures, agriculture, commerce, navigation, and the mechanic arts, should, as far as may be practicable, derive equal advantages from the incidental protection which a just system of revenue duties may afford. Taxation, direct or indirect, is a burden, and it should be so imposed as to operate as equally as may be on all classes, in the proportion of their ability to bear it. To make the taxing power an actual benefit to one class, necessarily increases the burden of the others beyond their proportion, and would be manifestly unjust. The terms "protection to domestic industry," are of popular import; but they should apply under a just system to all the various branches of industry in our country. The farmer or planter who toils yearly in his fields, is engaged in "domestic industry," and is as much entitled to have his labour "protected," as the manufacturer, the man of commerce, the navigator, or the mechanic, who are engaged also in " domestic industry" in their different pursuits. The joint labours of all these classes constitute the aggregate of the "domestic industry" of the nation, and they are equally entitled to the nation's "protection." No one of them can justly claim to be the exclusive recipients of "protection," which can only be afforded by increasing burdens on the "domestic industry" of the others.

If these views be correct, it remains to inquire how far the Tariff Act of 1842 is consistent with them. That many of the provisions of that Act are in violation of the cardinal principles here laid down, all must concede. The rates of duty imposed by it on some articles are prohibitory, and on others so high as greatly to diminish importations, and to produce a less amount of revenue than would be derived from lower rates. They operate as "protection merely," to one branch of "domestic industry," by taxing other branches.

By the introduction of minimums, or assumed and false values, and by the imposition of specific duties, the injustice and inequality of the Act of 1842 in its practical operations on different classes and pursuits are seen and felt. Many of the oppressive duties imposed by it under the operation of these principles, range from 1 per cent. to more than 200 per cent. They are prohibitory on some articles, and partially so on others, and bear most heavily on articles of common necessity, and but lightly on articles of luxury. It is so framed that much the greatest burden which it imposes is thrown on labour and the poorer classes who are least able to bear it, while it protects capital and exempts the rich from paying their just proportion of the taxation required for the support of Government. While it protects the capital of the wealthy manufacturer, and increases his profits, it does not benefit the operatives or labourers in his employment, whose wages have not been increased by it. Articles of prime necessity or of coarse quality and low price, used by the masses of the people, are,

in many instances, subjected by it to heavy taxes, while articles of finer quality and higher price, or of luxury, which can be used only by the opulent, are lightly taxed. It imposes heavy and unjust burdens on the farmer, the planter, the commercial man, and those of all other pursuits except the capitalist who has made his investments in manufactures. All the great interests of the country are not, as nearly as may be practicable, equally protected by it.

The Government in theory knows no distinction of persons or classes, and should not bestow upon some favours and privileges which all others may not enjoy. It was the purpose of its illustrious founders to base the institutions which they reared upon the great and unchanging principles of justice and equity, conscious that if administered in the spirit in which they were conceived, they would be felt only by the benefits which they diffused, and would secure for themselves a defence in the hearts of the people more powerful than standing armies, and all the means and appliances invented to sustain Governments founded in injustice and oppression.

The well-known fact that the Tariff Act of 1842 was passed by a majority of 1 vote in the Senate, and 2 in the House of Representatives, and that some of those who felt themselves constrained, under the peculiar circumstances existing at the time, to vote in its favour, proclaimed its defects, and expressed their determination to aid in its modification on the first opportunity, affords strong and conclusive evidence that it was not intended to be permanent, and of the expediency and necessity of its thorough revision.

In recommending to Congress a reduction of the present rates of duty, and a revision and modification of the Act of 1842, I am far from entertaining opinions unfriendly to the manufacturers. On the contrary, I desire to see them prosperous, as far as they can be so, without imposing unequal burthens on other interests. The advantage under any system of indirect taxation, even within the revenue standard, must be in favour of the manufacturing interest; and of this no other interest will complain.

I recommend to Congress the abolition of the minimum principle, or assumed, arbitrary, and false values, and of specific duties, and the substitution in their place of ad valorem duties as the fairest and most equitable indirect tax which can be imposed. By the ad valorem principle, all articles are taxed according to their cost or value, and those which are of inferior quality, or of small cost, bear only the just proportion of the tax with those which are of superior quality or greater cost. The articles consumed by all are taxed at the same rate. A system of ad valorem revenue duties, with proper discriminations and proper guards against frauds in collecting them, it is not doubted, will afford ample incidental advantages to the manufacturers, and enable them to derive as great profits as can be

derived from any other regular business. It is believed that such a system, strictly within the revenue standard, will place the manufacturing interests on a stable footing, and inure to their permanent advantage; while it will, as nearly as may be practicable, extend to all the great interests of the country the incidental protection which can be afforded by our revenue laws. Such a system when once firmly established would be permanent, and not be subject to the constant complaints, agitations, and changes which must ever occur when duties are not laid for revenue, but for the "protection merely" of a favoured interest.

In the deliberations of Congress on this subject, it is hoped that a spirit of mutual concession and compromise between conflicting interests may prevail, and that the result of their labours may be crowned with the happiest consequences.

By the Constitution of The United States it is provided, that "no money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law." A public Treasury was undoubtedly contemplated and intended to be created, in which the public money should be kept from the period of collection until needed for public uses. In the collection and disbursement of the public money, no agencies have ever been employed by law except such as were appointed by the Government, directly responsible to it, and under its control. The safe keeping of the public money should be confided to a public Treasury created by law, and under like responsibility and control. It is not to be imagined that the framers of the Constitution could have intended that a Treasury should be created as a place of deposit and safe keeping of the public money which was irresponsible to the Government. The first Congress under the Constitution, by the Act of the 2nd of September, 1789, "to establish the Treasury Department," provided for the appointment of a treasurer, and made it his duty "to receive and keep the moneys of The United States," and "at all times to submit to the Secretary of the Treasury and the Comptroller, or either of them, the inspection of the moneys in his hands.”

That banks, national or state, could not have been intended to be used as a substitute for the Treasury spoken of in the Constitution, as keepers of the public money, is manifest from the fact, that at that time there was no national bank, and but 3 or 4 State banks of limited capital existed in the country. Their employment as depositories was at first resorted to, to a limited extent, but with no avowed intention of continuing them permanently, in place of the Treasury of the Constitution. When they were afterwards from time to time employed, it was from motives of supposed convenience.

Our experience has shewn, that when banking corporations have

been the keepers of the public money, and been thereby made in effect the Treasury, the Government can have have no guaranty that it can command the use of its own money for public purposes. The late Bank of The United States proved to be faithless. The State banks which were afterwards employed were faithless. But a few years ago with millions of public money in their keeping, the Government was brought almost to bankruptcy, and the public credit seriously impaired, because of their inability or indisposition to pay, on demand, to the public creditors, in the only currency recognized by the Constitution. Their failure occurred in a period of peace, and great inconvenience and loss were suffered by the public from it. Had the country been involved in a foreign war, that inconvenience and loss would have been much greater, and might have resulted in extreme public calamity. The public money should not be mingled with the private funds of banks or individuals, or be used for private purposes. When it is placed in banks for safe keeping, it is in effect loaned to them without interest, and is loaned by them upon interest to the borrowers from them. The public money is converted into banking capital, and is used and loaned out for the private profit of bank stockholders, and when called for, (as was the case in 1837,) it may be in the pockets of the borrowers from the banks, instead of being in the public Treasury contemplated by the Constitution. The framers of the Constitution could never have intended that the money paid into the Treasury should be thus converted to private use, and placed beyond the control of the Government.

Banks which hold the public money are often tempted, by a desire of gain, to extend their loans, increase their circulation, and thus stimulate, if not produce a spirit of speculation and extravagance which sooner or later must result in ruin to thousands. If the public money be not permitted to be thus used, but be kept in the Treasury and paid out to the public creditors in gold and silver, the temptation afforded by its deposit with banks to an undue expansion of their business would be checked, while the amount of the Constitutional currency left in circulation would be enlarged by its employment in the public collections and disbursements, and the banks themselves would in consequence be found in a safer and sounder condition.

At present, State Banks are employed as depositories, but without adequate regulation of law, whereby the public money can be secured against the casualties and excesses, revulsions, suspensions, and defalcations, to which, from overissues, overtrading, an inordinate desire for gain, or other causes, they are constantly exposed. The Secretary of the Treasury has in all cases, when it was practicable, taken collateral security for the amount which they hold, by the pledge of stocks

of The United States, or such of the States as were in good credit. Some of the deposit banks have given this description of security, and others have declined to do so.

Entertaining the opinion that "the separation of the moneys of the Government from banking institutions is indispensable for the safety of the funds of the Government and the rights of the people," I recommend to Congress that provision be made by law for such separation, and that a Constitutional Treasury Le created for the safe keeping of the public money. The Constitutional Treasury recommended is designed as a secure depository for the public money, without any power to make loans or discounts, or to issue any paper whatever as a currency or circulation. I cannot doubt that such a Treasury as was contemplated by the Constitution should be independent of all banking corporations. The money of the people should be kept in the Treasury of the people created by law, and be in the custody of the agents of the people chosen by themselves, according to the forms of the Constitution; agents who are directly responsible to the Government, who are under adequate bonds and oaths, and who are subject to severe punishments for any embezzlement, private use, or misapplication of the public funds, and for any failure in other respects to perform their duties. To say that the people or their Government are incompetent, or not to be trusted with the custody of their own money, in their own Treasury, provided by themselves, but must rely on the presidents, cashiers, and stockholders of banking corporations, not appointed by them, nor responsible to them, would be to concede that they are incompetent for self-government.

In recommending the establishment of a Constitutional Treasury, in which the public money shall be kept, I desire that adequate provision be made by law for its safety, and that all Executive discretion or control over it shall be removed, except such as may be necessary in directing its disbursement in pursuance of appropriations made by law.

Under our present land system, limiting the minimum price at which the public lands can be entered to 1 dollar 25 cents per acre, large quantities of lands of inferior quality remain unsold, because they will not command that price. From the records of the General Land Office it appears, that, of the public lands remaining unsold in the several States and Territories in which they are situated, 39,105,577 acres have been in the market, subject to entry more than 20 years; 49,638,644 acres for more than 15 years; 73,074,600 acres for more than 10 years; and 106,176,961 acres for more than 5 years. Much the largest portion of these lands will continue to be unsaleable at the minimum price at which they are permitted to be sold, so long as large territories of lands from which the more valuable portions have not been selected are annually brought into market by the Govern