The basis of the argument advanced by the Undersigned lies in these 2 propositions:

1st. The Commercial Treaty between the 2 countries provides that articles the growth and product of either, shall be admitted into the other on as low a duty as the same articles from any other country.

2nd. While the Customs Law of Great Britain imposed a duty of 2s. 6d. per bushel on rough rice imported from the United States of America, an Act of Parliament, passed in August, 1836, allowed the same article to be imported from any part of the West Coast of Africa, on payment of a duty of 1d. per quarter, that is, in reality, duty free, the high duty continuing to be levied on American rice.

The basis of the argument of the Undersigned lying in these admitted public facts, the argument itself (if the direct inference from such facts can be properly called by the name of argument) is, that the continuance of the high duty was in direct contravention of the Treaty, and that, therefore, all sums so levied must, in good faith, be restored. The Undersigned can find nothing in Lord Aberdeen's note of the 11th August, 1842, which invalidates this conclusion.

The Earl of Aberdeen speaks of the different views entertained by Her Majesty's late Government and by the present Government, on the one hand, and by that of The United States on the other, as to the proper construction of the Treaty; and, in view of this supposed difference of opinion, regards the matter as a proper subject of compromise. But the Undersigned has not been able to discover, in all the correspondence between his predecessor and Lord Palmerston, nor in the note of Lord Aberdeen to himself, in what this assumed difference of opinion as to the construction of the Treaty consists, or is considered by Her Majesty's Government to consist. In fact, the provision of the Treaty on the matter in hand is so plain, that it does not seem susceptible of any two constructions.

The Undersigned, of course, is aware that while his Government claims of Great Britain the restitution of the differential duty levied on American rice, as being in contravention of the Treaty, Her Majesty's Government considers no such restitution due; and this is, undoubtedly, an important difference of opinion, not as to the construction of the Treaty, but as to its application to the case. But the Undersigned does not find, either in Lord Aberdeen's note, or in any of the former correspondence, a statement of any construction of the terms of the Treaty different from that maintained by the American Government, warranting the law of August, 1836, and authorizing a differential duty in favour of the agricultural products of those parts of the Western Coast of Africa not subject to Great Britain.

Lord Aberdeen intimates, it is true, that the interpretation given by the American Government to the provisions of the Treaty rests in

itsmere letter;" and that the opposite construction of the British Government is sustained by its "spirit and intent." It is, however, highly noticeable, in reference to this suggestion, that the President of the Board of Trade, in replying to Mr. Herries, in the debate in Parliament referred to in the last note of the Undersigned, claimed only that the Act of 1835 was within the letter, and admitted that it might be in violation of the spirit of the Treaty. The Act of 1835 admitted rough rice from the British possessions on the coast of Africa, on the nominal duty; and of this Act, in reference to rice imported from those possessions, though not produced in them, it might, perhaps, be said with justice, that though certainly in violation of the spirit of the Treaty, it was within its letter. But it was the Act of 1836 of which Mr. Herries spoke, and which he considered as a contravention of the Treaty; and that opinion he appears to have held in common with all those with whom he habitually acted. That Act admitted rough rice on the nominal duty from any part of the West Coast of Africa, and without any limitation. It is that Act of which the Undersigned complains as a violation of the Treaty; and in what manner its provisions can be reconciled with the spirit and intent of the Treaty, he is wholly unable to conceive.

Lord Aberdeen observes, that "it will, perhaps, conduce to a more perfect comprehension of the grounds on which Her Majesty's Government have acted, as well as to a more impartial estimate of their decision, if he takes a larger and more general view of the subject, and abstains from attempting to enter into a detailed consideration of the arguments adduced by Mr. Everett in support of his representation of the case."

The Undersigned considers that, apart from the facts of the case, which are necessarily specific, no argument can be of a higher character than that which proceeds on the inviolable obligation of public compacts between nations. The view taken by Lord Aberdeen is, that the peculiar circumstances of this case form an exception from the application of that great and paramount principle. These grounds of exception the Undersigned will now proceed to examine; and, unless he wholly deceives himself, it will be in his power to show that they entirely fail to effect the purpose for which they are adduced.

The first ground assumed by Lord Aberdeen is, that " as no injury was intended to be done, or was done to The United States, by the partial relaxation of the higher duty in favour of a particular district of Africa, from motives, not of gain or other advantage to Great Britain, but of humanity to the negro race,' restitution of the higher duty levied on American rice is not justly to be claimed." But surely Lord Aberdeen will not maintain the principle, that it is at any time permitted to one party to a Treaty to contravene its stipulations, provided the contravention takes place for a humane object,

and, as may afterwards be held, without injury to the other party. These would be very sufficient grounds on which to propose to the other party to agree to a modification of the compact; but they cannot justify its infraction. They strike at the root of public faith between Governments. It is the object of Treaties to place the matters secured by them beyond the control of either party. Although questions of humanity are not likely to divide opinions, the proper modes of promoting humane ends are the subjects of great diversity of judgment, on which one party to the compact may not judge for the other. Whether the other party is injured, is certainly for itself alone to decide. Her Majesty's Government have a right to say that there was no intention to injure The United States in infringing the letter of the compact; but that they were not injured by the differential duty is a matter which, so long as they ask only an adherence to the provisions of the Treaty, must be left to be decided by themselves. Besides, it cannot be necessary to urge that either party has a right to insist upon a strict and literal performance of the compact, even though a departure from it would not be injurious. Lord Aberdeen justly remarks, "the Articles of a Treaty cannot always be interpreted by the mere letter of the stipulations; but that regard must also be had to the spirit and intent in which they were conceived and laid down." If, however, the letter, as well as the spirit, can be literally and fully preserved, it cannot be permitted to violate the express terms, under the plea of some supposed conformity with the spirit and intent. In the present case, Lord Aberdeen seems to admit that the differential duty on African rice violated the letter of the Treaty. The Undersigned maintains that it violated its spirit to the same extent. It was precisely the intent of the clause of the Treaty in question to forbid either party from imposing differential duties on the produce of the other.

The Undersigned most cheerfully acquits Her Majesty's Government of any design to inflict gratuitous injury on the Government and people of The United States. In this sense, he is sure that Lord Aberdeen correctly affirms that no injury was intended. He is inclined to think, however, that it really was the object of the law of 1836 to encourage a branch of British commerce at the expense of a branch of American industry; and that, had the law fulfilled its object, serious injury would have been inflicted on the agriculture and trade of The United States.

The policy of relaxation was regarded, from the first, by those interested, either in the American or African rice-trade, as calculated and designed to foster the latter at the expense of the former. It was both urged and protested against, on this ground, as far back as the year 1834. Of this Lord Aberdeen will find documentary proofs in the papers submitted to Parliament on this subject in 1840.

The first step in the way of relaxation was the proposal to admit rice imported from British factories on the coast of Africa, though notoriously not the growth of British territory, to entry on the nominal duty. The parties interested in the trade of American rice protested, and those concerned in the African trade defended this relaxation, in the following terms, setting forth "that certain parties, with whom this proceeding (requiring proof of British origin) originates, have had a patent for cleaning paddy, which only lately expired; and these parties (having large plantations in The United States) have confined themselves to American paddy, setting their face against any competition from Africa." And, again: "The object of the parties now complaining is to perpetuate a monopoly of the trade in favour of the American paddy cleaned by themselves, and they openly boast that they will crush our efforts. We trust, however, that Government will not assist them in such an object. One of them has large rice plantations in Carolina, and it is natural, perhaps, that they should pursue the course they are now doing; but we trust, with confidence, to the support of Government in an undertaking so national and so deeply interesting both to Africa and England."

With this appeal to the Treasury from the parties interested in London, an extract from a communication from their correspondent in Sierra Leone was transmitted to their Lordships, from which the Undersigned will borrow a single sentence:

"Every article that is exported from this to Great Britain, with the exception of pod-pepper, arrow-root, and cassava, are collected in the manner that I have described. Still it finds employment for British manufactures and industry, and no doubt yields a considerable revenue; and this revenue might be considerably increased by encouraging the natives to grow more rice, and admitting their paddy into your market at the low duty. If encouragement of this sort were held out, I have not the slightest doubt that enough might be raised to drive The United States rice and paddy (the produce of slave-labour) out of your market."

These are the considerations addressed to the Treasury in 1834 and 1835, as reasons for the relaxation of the duty on African rice. So far as they influenced Her Majesty's Government in procuring the passage of the Act of 1836, it was the intention of that Act, not certainly to injure The United States as a final end, but to build up a branch of trade which British merchants would monopolize, on the ruins of one which American merchants and planters were said to monopolize; and among the inducements to this policy, was a very considerable increase of the revenue of Great Britain.

These objects were to be effected by admitting rough rice from the entire coast of Africa, on a duty of 1d. per quarter, while the

same article from The United States continued to pay a duty of 17. per quarter. Placing, as he does, entire confidence in the candour of Lord Aberdeen, the Undersigned owns himself really unable to enter into the views of the subject which have brought Lord Aberdeen to the conclusion that such a discrimination, invoked for such a purpose, is not in contravention of the spirit and intent, as well as the letter, of the Treaty; and that there is not a fair claim for the restitution of the duty so levied.

With respect to the actual pecuniary injury inflicted on The United States or their citizens, the Undersigned, although he thinks. he has shown that this point is immaterial to the main question, would observe, that it is the same injury which would be done by the American Government to England and English subjects by subjecting articles of British fabric, which ought, by Treaty to enter free, to heavy discriminating duties. The event might show that the design of the discrimination had been but partially realized in the absence of the competition anticipated, but the differential duty is itself (being in contravention of the Treaty) the injury. The amount of the duty is the measure of the injury; because the injury consists in being compelled to pay a duty, from which by the Treaty the importer from America had a right to be exempted. If the collectors of Her Majesty's revenue have taken from a merchant 2,000l. as the duty on 2,000 quarters of rice in the husk from South Carolina, while the importer is entitled to enter it on the payment of 10%., because the importer of the same article from Mogadore has paid but 107., they take from him 1,9907. more than they had a right to do. He is injured to that extent by a contravention of the Treaty, and he may fairly demand restitution of the excess.

Lord Aberdeen urges that " one parcel of rice only was imported from a foreign place, on the West Coast of Africa, after the passage of the 5th and 6th William IV, chap. 60, (August, 1836,) consisting of 2,352 quarters only; and, therefore, to that amount only could any prejudice be affirmed to have accrued to the rice of The United States." The Undersigned is informed that numerous parcels of rice were imported from places on the coast of Africa not subject to Great Britain, not less than 17 by one house, the return of which is now before the Undersigned; but, after the suggestions just made, it cannot be necessary to go into that inquiry.

Lord Aberdeen argues that no injury has accrued to the importers of American rice from the high duty, because it has been reimbursed by the consumer. To this argument there are two sufficient answers: one, that it is not compensation for injury alone that is demanded, but restitution of that which has been wrongfully exacted in contravention of the Treaty; the other, that it is by no means an invariable law of trade, that a duty is reimbursed by the consumer. It is so