history), had in former years rather a strong effect on the imagination, even when we did not take the trouble to think deeply of the political tendency and result. But in this respect the case will be found to be now greatly changed. What has taken place in our own times, has thrown all the transactions of several centuries past, considered as matter of magnificent exhibition, quite into the shade. It is but very occasionally that the mind catches a momentary sight of the transactions of the times of the Charleses, James, and William, through some opening in the stupendous train of revolutions, wars, abdications, dethronements, conquests, and changing constitutions, which has been moving, and is still rapidly moving, before our eyes. Who will think of going back to trace the adventures of one or two monarchs-errant of former times, when there are whole parties of them up and down Europe, with a sufficient probability of additions to the number? Who will go almost two centuries back to survey a nation risen in arms against a tyrant, though totally ignorant of the true principles of liberty, when they can see such a phenomenon, just springing up in the neighbourhood a few weeks since? The contests of parties in those times, the questions of prerogative, the loyalty of faction leaders, the devising of plans of government, the ravage of armies, the progress of a commander into a despotic monarch, the subsidence of national enthusiasm into the apathy of slaves, are apt to affect us as an old and dull story, at a time when no one cares to buy a map of Europe, or count its kingdoms, or go over the list of its monarchs, or read one page about the nature of its constitutions of government, or ask one sentence about the rival parties in its states, from knowing that a few months may put all such information out of date. On such accounts, as well as from the present indisposition to any study of politics as a science, we have little expectation that the interesting production before us will do more than merely gratify the literary curiosity excited by the name of the great author. The noble spirit of liberty which pervades every part of it, will be flatly offensive to many of his countrymen; and

will appear to others as a kind of high-spirited and patriotic romance, proving that the sanguine temperament of the orator of the people wonderfully retained his juvenility of opinion in his more advanced age, in spite of the years and the events that have made them wiser.

So much of the volume as Mr. Fox wrote, consists of three chapters, of which the first is called introductory, and contains a brief retrospect of the reign of Charles II., and some of the circumstances of what was named the Commonwealth. The two latter go over about seven months of the reign of James II., and form the commencement of the intended history, which, if the author had lived and enjoyed leisure, would probably have been brought down to a period lower than the Revolution; it does not appear that his thoughts had decidedly fixed on any precise point of time as the limit.

It was not to be expected that any singular novelty either of fact or doctrine should be brought out, in the review of a period so often subject to research and controversial discussion; but we feel, as we did expect to feel, that we go over the ground with a better light than we have done before. There is a There is a simplicity in the opening out of the involved crowd of characters and affairs, which brings both the individual objects, and their relations to one another, more palpably into our sight. We feel how delightful it is to go through an important and confused scene in the company of such an illuminating mind, and how easily we could surrender ourselves to an almost implicit reliance on its judgment. Connected with this extremely discriminating analysis, and distinct statement of facts, the reader will find every where a more unaffected unlaboured independence of opinion, than in perhaps any other of our historians; the author seems to judge freely, as by a kind of inherent necessity; and he condemns, (for indeed this is the duty of his office in almost every page) with an entire indifference to those circumstances to which even historians are often obsequious. He passes sentence on nobles and kings with as little

fear, and at the same time in as calm a tone, as the court that summoned, immediately after their death, the monarchs of Egypt. With respect to this calmness, it gives a dignified air to history; yet we will acknowledge that in several instances, in this work, after the indictment and proof of enormous wickedness, we have wished the sentence pronounced with somewhat more emphasis. The mildness of the man, occasionally, a little qualifies in expression the energy of justice; but it only qualifies, it does not pervert it; he most impartially condemns where he ought, and we have only wished, in a few cases, a severer acerbity of language. The criminal charges however are made with a fullness and aggravation which might sometimes perhaps be deemed to excuse the historian from formally pronouncing any judgment, as no expression could be found by which the character of the criminal could be more blasted, than it is already by the statement of the crimes.

If the work had been carried through the whole of the selected period, it would have been an admirable contrast and antidote to the parallel part of Hume's history, in point of honesty of representation. Our author justly accuses Hume of a constant partiality to the cause of the tyrants in his statement and reasonings, and of a base disingenuousness in his observations on the conduct of Charles II., respecting the death of Algernon Sidney; he convicts him of a direct and shameful fabrication of a parliamentary debate in 1685, which debate did not take place, nor any thing like it; and he ascribes to him an almost puerile respect for kings, as such. After all this, we own it requires our whole stock of patience to read those extremely respectful and flattering expressions which he seeks every occasion, and once or twice goes much out of his way, to bestow on this historian; expressions which are applied not only to his talents, to which they would be always due, but to his character, to which these articles of accusation, exhibited by his admirer, may prove what sort of moral principles are fairly attributable. The passage relating to the condemnation of Sydney, is a good

specimen of our author's decided manner of expressing his opinion, and also of his strange prejudice in favour of Hume's moral qualities.

Was it ever understood, till now, that a man eminent at once for the depth and soundness of his understanding, and the integrity and benevolence of his heart, can be an apologist (the full evidence of the nature of the facts being before him,) for the foulest murders of a tyrant! Would not that integrity and benevolence of heart have been high in favour at the court of such a tyrant, which should have put in exercise so strong an understanding to preserve his majesty in a state of entire self-complacency while perpetrating the murder of one of the noblest of his subjects and of mankind? As to posthumous infamy, and the retribution to be inflicted by history, we wonder whether such a thing ever once occurred to the thoughts of a tyrant, who, in pursuing to death a man of such heroic virtue as to have offended or alarmed him, could spurn every human sympathy, defy the indignation of all good men, and find a tribe of courtiers, comprising nobles, prelates, and scholars, ever ready to applaud his justice. And if by "conscience" is here meant, that sentiment which connects with our actions a reference to a God and a future judgment, it is surely a very hopeful thing, that a man, who can deliberately brave the divine vengeance, should be intimidated from committing a crime, by thinking of the fearful doom which awaits him in the paragraphs of some his

torian!

In speaking of the fate of Charles I., Mr. Fox, in an argument of great candour and delicacy, disapproves of his execution, on the ground both of justice and policy, but especially the latter. He passes in too much haste over the character of Cromwell, and gives a rather equivocal estimate of it, except indeed as contrasted with that of Washington, whom he takes the occasion, afforded by the partial similarity of the situations of the two men, to celebrate in terms of the highest possible eulogium.

We should hope the notion that good political institu

tions will be certain of an efficacious operation, by the mere strength of the dead wisdom, if we may so call it, that resides in their construction, independently of the character of the men who are in the administration of them, has lost its influence (on the public mind; if not, the following striking lesson ought to contribute to expel such a vain fancy.

"The reign of Charles the Second forms one of the most singular, as well as of the most important periods of history. It is the era of good laws and bad government. The abolition of the Court of Wards, the repeal of the writ de Heretico Comburendo, the Triennial Parliament Bill, the establishment of the rights of the House of Commons in regard to impeachment, the expiration of the License Act, and above all, the glorious statute of Habeas Corpus, have therefore induced a modern writer of great eminence to fix the year 1679 as the period at which our constitution had arrived at its greatest theoretical perfection, but he owns, in a short note upon the passage alluded to, that the times immediately following were times of great practical oppression. What a field for meditation does this short observation, from such a man, furnish! What reflections does it not suggest to a thinking mind, upon the inefficacy of human laws, and the imperfection of human constitutions! We are called from the contemplation of the progress of our constitution, and our attention is fixed with the most minute accuracy to a particular point, when it is said to have risen to its utmost perfection. Here we are then at the best moment of the best constitution that human wisdom ever framed. What follows? A time of oppression and misery, not arising from external causes, such as war, pestilence, or famine, nor even from any such alteration of the laws as might be supposed to impair this boasted perfection, but from a corrupt and wicked administration, which all the so much admired checks of our constitution were not able to prevent. How vain, then, how idle, how presumptuous is the opinion that laws can do every thing! and how weak and pernicious the maxim founded upon it, that measures, not men, are to be attended to !"—p. 20.

The historian appears to have examined a great deal of evidence on the subject of the pretended popish plot, as the result of which he gives it as his opinion, that the greater part of those who were concerned in the iniquitous prosecution of the papists, were rather under the influence of "an extraordinary degree of blind credulity," than guilty of "the deliberate wickedness of planning and assisting in the perpetration of legal murder."

It is most melancholy to contemplate a great nation,