Abbildungen der Seite
PDF
EPUB

to all or any of the United States. Lord Shelburne hav ing written to me on the subject of the wished for peace, I acquainted him in my answer sent by our friend Mr. Oswald, that you were one of the commissioners appointed by congress to treat with Britain, and that I imagined his lordship would therefore think proper to discharge you entirely from the obligations you entered into, when you were admitted to bail, that you might be at liberty to act freely in the commission. He wrote to me in reply, that you were accordingly discharged immediately. His lordship mentioned nothing of any exchange being expected for you: nevertheless, I honor your sensibility on the point, and your concern for the credit of America, that she should not be outdone in generosity by Britain, and will cheerfully join with you in any act that you may think proper, to discharge in return the parole of lord Cornwallis, as far as in our power may lie; but as we have no express authority for that purpose, and the congress may possibly in the mean time have made some other arrangement relative to his exchange, I conceive that our act should contain a clause, reserving to congress the final approbation or disallowance of the proceeding. And I have some doubts whether lord Cornwallis will think himself well freed from his engagement, and at liberty to exercise his military employments, by virtue of any concession in his favor, made by persons who are not vested with authority for that purpose. So that on the whole, perhaps the best and surest way will be our writing immediately to congress, and strongly recommend ing the measure. However, I will do what you shall think

best.

I heartily wish you success in any endeavors you may use in Holland for raising a loan of money. We have pressed rather too hard on this court, and we shall want more than they can conveniently spare us; but I am sorry that too scrupulous a regard to our wants and difficulties should induce you, under the present infirmity of your lower limbs, to deny yourself the necessary comfort of an easy carriage, rather than make use of the public assis

tance, when the public must be much in your debt. I beg you would get over that difficulty, and take of me what you may have occasion for.

The letter forwarded to me, was from America's constant friend, the good bishop of St. Asaph. He speaks of you, in terms of the highest esteem and respect.

Mr. Oswald is gone back again to London, but intended to return immediately. Mr. Grenville remains here, and has received powers to treat; but no farther steps can be taken, till Spain and Holland have empowered ministers for the same purpose. I shall inform you and Mr. Adams (if he does not come) of the proceedings from time to time, and request your counsels in case of any difficulty. I hope you will not think of hazarding a return to America before a peace, if we find any hope of its being soon obtained, and that if you do not find you can be useful in the manner you wish in Holland, you will make me happy by your company and counsels here.

With great and sincere esteem, &c.

B. FRANKLIN."

May 26, I received the following letters, &c. from Mr. Hartley.

MY DEAR FRIEND,

London, May 1, 1782.

I HAVE received a packet from you, containing several letters of various dates. As I shall probably have a safe conveyance to you when Mr. Laurens leaves this country; I am now sitting down to write to you an omnium kind of a letter of various matters as they occur. The late minis. try being defeated, I may now speak of things past more freely. I will take a sentence in one of your letters as my text; vide yours of April 13th, 1782, in which you say,

[ocr errors]

you was of opinion, that the late ministry desired sincerely a reconciliation with America, and with that view a separate peace with us was proposed." I must qualify this sentence much before I can adopt it as my opinion. As to reconciliation, I never gave them much credit for that wish:

"It is a sweet expression, it certainly means more than peace." The utmost that I ever gave the late ministry credit for, was a wish for peace; and I still believe that the wisest amongst them, grew from day to day more disposed to peace, (or an abatement of the late war) in proportion, as they became more alarmed for their own situations and their responsibility. Had the war been more successful, I should not have expected much relating towards peace or reconciliation; that this has been always the measure of my opinion of them, I refer you to some words in a letter from me to you, dated January 5th, 1780, for proof: "But for the point of sincerity; why as to that, I have not much to say. I have at last expected some hold upon their prudence. My argument runs thus: It is a bargain for your ministers to be sincere now. Common pru

dence may hint to you to look to yourselves; it has amazed me beyond measure, that this principle of common, selfish prudence, has not had the effect which I expected.” I have not been disposed to be deceived by any conciliatory professions, which I considered only as arising from prudence, and I hope that I have not led you into any deception, having so fully explained myself to you on that head. Had the American war been more propitious on the part of the late ministry, I do not believe the late resignation would have taken place; but it is evident from the proposition to the court of France, which you have communicated to me (and which I have communicated to the present ministry, with your letter) that even to the last hour, some of the late ministry were still set upon the American war to the last extremity, and probably another more prudent part of the ministry would proceed no farther; which if it be so, may reasonably be expected as the cause of the dissolution of the late ministry. These are the arguments which I have already driven and insisted upon with the greatest expectation of success, viz: prudential arguments, from the total unpracticability of the war, responsibility, &c. I have been astonished beyond measure, that the arguments have not had their effect sooner. If I could give you an

idea of many conferences which I have had upon the subject, I should tell you that many times Felix has trembled. When reduced to the terror of responsibility, either to renounce the American war or to relinquish their places: they have chosen the latter, which is a most wretched and contemptible retribution, either to their country or to mankind for the desolation in which they have involved every nation that they have ever been connected with. Peace they would not leave behind them, their legacy to their country and to mankind has been, "let darkness be the burier of the dead!"

As to the proposal of a separate peace arising from a desire of reconciliation, it certainly was so on the part of the people of England; but on the part of the late ministry, it probably arose from the hopes of suggesting to France ideas of some infidelity on the part of America towards them. If you should asked me why I have seemed to conspire with this, my answer is very plain. In the first place, if I could have prevailed with the late ministry to have actually made an irrevocable offer on their own part of a separate peace to America, that very offer would in the same instant have become on their part also, a consent to a general peace, because they never had any wish to a separate contest with France; and America being out of the question, they would have thought of nothing after that but a general peace. But I never could bring them even to this. They wished that America should make the offer of a separate treaty, (for obvious views) my proposal was, that they should offer irrevocable terms of a peace to America. If they had really meant what they pretended, and what the people of England did really desire, they would have adopted that proposition; then the question would have come forward upon the fair and honorable construction of a treaty between France and America: the essential and direct end of which was fully accomplished. When I speak of Great Britain offering irrevocable terms of peace to America, I mean such terms as would effectually have satisfied the provision of the treaty, viz. tacit independence. I send you a paper

entitled a Breviate, which I laid before the late ministry, and their not having acted upon it, was a proof to me that the disposition of their hearts to America was not altered, but that all their relenting arose from the impracticability of that war and their want of success in it; but desponding as they were at last, it was not inconsistent with my expectations of their conduct, that they should make great offers with France to abandon America; it was the only weapon left in their hands. In course of negociating with the said ministry, I perceived their courage drooping, from three to five, for the last three or four years, and it was upon that ground that I gave them credit for an increasing disposition towards peace. Some dropt off, others sunk under the load of folly, and at last they all failed.

"My argument, ad homines to the late ministry, might be stated thus respecting the American war; "If you don't kill them, they will kill you." But the war is impracticable on your part....Ergo, "the best thing you can do for your own sakes, is to make peace." This was reasoning to men, and through men to things. But there is no measure of

rage in pride and disappointment

[merged small][ocr errors][merged small]
[ocr errors]

Affixe venis animosq; in valuere ponunt.' So much for the argument of the Breviate, as far as it respected the late ministry. It was a test which proved that they were not sincere in their pretensions. If they had been in earnest to have given the war a turn towards the house of Bourbon, and to have dropt the American war, a plain road lay before them. The sentiment of the people of England was conformable to the argument of that Breviate, or rather I should say, what is the real truth, that the argument of that Breviate was dictated by the notoriety of that sentiment in the people of England. My object and wish, has been always to strike at the root of the evil, the American war. If the British nation have jealousies and resentments against the house of Bourbon, yet still the first step in every case should be to rescind the American war, and not to keep it lurking in the rear, to become here

« ZurückWeiter »