have a uniform franchise over the whole kingdom? It will, I think, be sufficient to refer to any part of the United Kingdom and inquire how community representation with a uniform franchise will work, to satisfy ourselves on this point.

In Scotland, the Tory voters are said to form about one-fourth part of the whole electorate. At present they are able, mainly by reason of the restricted franchise in the counties, to secure, roughly speaking, one-sixth of the representation. Owing to the inequality of franchise the representation of communities produces a sufficiently true result. But equalise the franchise and retain the present system of community representation, and what is the result? Even supposing the Tories are by the extension converted from one-fourth to one-sixth of the whole, they would even then be entitled to eleven or twelve out of the sixty-nine or seventy representatives which Scotland is entitled by population to receive; but if we seek to represent local majorities only, what security is there that they will receive any representation at all? The Liberals being five-sixths of the whole will command the majority in every district. It may be confidently stated that as soon as we equalise the suffrage in Scotland (shape the constituencies as you please), the Scotch Tories will not be able to return a single representative. Or, suppose the Conservatives were, contrary to expectation, to succeed in winning three seats, then what would be the relative value of the Tory and Liberal vote? If one-sixth of the electors who are Tory return three members, and five-sixths of the electors who are Liberal return sixty-seven members, then the vote of every Liberal is worth more than four Tory votes, for while one-sixth of the electorate who are Tories win three seats, an equal number who are Liberals win thirteen seats.

If this instance be not sufficient, take Ireland. The effect of the Reform Bill will be, according to generally accepted statements, to give in Ireland an electorate of which two-thirds will be Nationalists and one-third Loyalists. It is further stated that, if we adhere to the present system of giving a monopoly of the representation to that party which can poll one more than half the votes, then of the 101 Irish seats (the disfranchised boroughs of Sligo and Cashel and the University seats being deducted) not more than fourteen will go to the Loyalists and not less than eighty-seven will go to the Nationalists. What, then, does this mean? If the Nationalists, who number twothirds of the electorate, obtain eighty-seven seats, the Loyalists, who are half that number, would be entitled to forty-three and a half seats, but we have seen that they will not succeed in winning more than fourteen seats. What, then, is the respective value of the vote of the two parties? If the one-third who are Loyalists get fourteen seats, while an equal number who are Nationalists get forty-three, then the Nationalist elector has three times as much voting power as the Loyalist. Entitled to one-third of the representation, the Loyalists

will only have one-seventh. Can any fair-minded person maintain that a system which produces such results as these is right, fair, or even defensible?

Such results as these, however, are inevitable if people think the expression to every vote an equal value' refers to the size of the constituency and not to the share of the representation. If, however, the formula means, not that every elector shall be a unit of an equal electoral district, but that the vote of every single elector shall count for as much as that of any other elector, it is obvious that the formula is not realised if, by the system of election we adopt, we make the vote of every Nationalist in Ireland as powerful as three Loyalist votes, and in Scotland the vote of every Liberal outweigh the votes of four Conservatives.

The advocates of proportional representation may find some encouragement in the fact that Mr. Gladstone has himself recognised more than once that the principle of representing local majorities only will give in certain circumstances (i.e. where the electorate has a uniform character) a very unfair representation of opinion. He himself introduced the minority vote into the Oxford University Reform Act of 1854, and explained in the House of Commons in 1870 that being extremely desirous not to have the colleges represented as integral quantities, we introduced the minority vote with a view to obtain the most general representation that could be had.' He has also shown the same desire to obtain general representation, and not the representation of local majorities only, in the constitution which he has given to Cyprus. At the end of 1882 it was decided to give Cyprus representative institutions. A legislative council was created in which there were twelve members to be elected by the people. But the census taken in 1881 revealed the fact that one quarter of the people were Mahommedan and three-quarters non-Mahommedan. Now, wishing to secure fair representation, what did the Government do? Did they divide the island into twelve districts each returning one member? No; they knew that such a course would be grossly unfair to the Mahommedans, who, although they were one quarter of the whole, would be of course outvoted in every constituency, and practically disfranchised. So the Government decided that three of the members should be elected by the Mahommedan and nine by the non-Mahommedan inhabitants. No one could possibly maintain that an arrangement such as a representation based on the principle of the community as opposed to the individual, which would have given all the representation to the non-Mahommedans, would have been at all a fair system of representation.

Now it is difficult to understand why, if it is desirable to secure the general representation of the people of Cyprus, it should not be equally desirable to obtain the general representation of the people of the United Kingdom.

It is obvious that if the plan of representing the local majorities, i.e. the communities,' had been resorted to in Cyprus one quarter of the electors would have been virtually disfranchised. The question which we have to determine in England to-day is this. Will not the plan of community representation as opposed to that of individuals expose us in the United Kingdom to the same dangers of disfranchising large sections of opinion that we have seen reason to carefully guard against in Cyprus, and ought we not, if we wish to secure to every vote an equal value,' aim at the representation of the individual as opposed to the community?

It will be my endeavour to show that whatever be the end and object of Reform, whether it be the true representation of opinion,’ as Sir Charles Dilke asserts; or that the majority shall rule,' as Mr. Chamberlain asserts; or that the full privileges of citizenship shall be enjoyed by the largest number of capable citizens, as the Prime Minister asserts; or whether it be that we shall obtain a better Legislature, as Mr. H. Fowler, the member for Wolverhampton, and every political writer from Burke to Bagehot assert; whether it be the attainment of any one of these four objects, or the attainment of all four combined, the best and most effectual means for securing that end lies in the application to our electoral system of that principle which aims at the representation of electors, and not in that which aims at the representation of localities.

First let us consider which principle is the one to be preferred if we aim at the true representation of opinion and at the rule of the majority. We may take both these points together, for it is evident that the majority of electors must get the larger share of the representation if the different portions of the electorate are evenly and proportionately represented.

A mere statement, side by side, of the meaning of the terms individual or proportional representation and community or majority representation will enable us to see at a glance which system is most likely to secure the true representation of opinion and the rule of the majority.

What, then, is the meaning of individual or proportional repretation? Proportional representation means the actual and exhaustive representation of the whole electorate. It means absolutely true representation. It means that if 50,000 voters shall be able to elect five representatives, 40,000 voters shall be able to elect four representatives. It means that the Government shall be carried on by the whole number of electors equally represented, and not by a majority of electors exclusively represented. It does not mean that ninetenths of the representation shall be given to two-thirds of the electors, but that two-thirds of the electors shall have two-thirds of the representation, and one-third of the electors the remaining onethird. The principle of proportional representation is, that the vote of

every single elector shall count for as much as that of any other elector. It insists that two Liberal votes shall count for as much as two Conservative votes, and guards against the scandal of two Conservative votes outweighing three Liberal votes. While on the one hand it will ensure beyond the possibility of a doubt absolute supremacy in the representation to the majority of voters, it will on the other hand. secure to every large section of opinion a representation in just and fair proportion to its strength. It is founded on the principle of pure democracy, which proclaims equality of all and the rule of the majority.

And now what does majority representation mean? It means that the majority shall have everything and the minority nothing. It means that, whether the number of members to be elected by each constituency be large or small, the whole of the representation shall be monopolised by that party which polls one more than half the votes, and that party which polls one less than half the votes shall have no representation at all.

The difference, then, between proportional and majority representation is obvious. Proportional representation aims at the representation of individuals, or personal representation. Majority representation aims at the representation of communities, or locality representation. The advocates of community representation assert that the wishes of the majority are alone to be considered, while I contend, with the late Professor Fawcett, by whose premature death the advocates of proportional representation and the nation have sustained an irreparable loss, that 'the wishes of the whole community should be regarded as far as it is possible to give effect to them.' One party asks for the representation of a part, the other demands the representation of the whole. One party recognises each constituency as being in itself an integer, the prevailing sense of which shall alone be represented; the other party rebels against the majority of the constituency and the constituency itself being used as synonymous expressions. There can be no doubt which system is to be preferred if our object is to secure the true representation of opinion.

But it is not sufficient to show that proportional representation and true representation are equivalent terms. It is necessary to show that the plan of community representation not only may, but frequently does, bring about an absolutely false representation of opinion.

A very simple illustration will be sufficient to prove that if we seek to represent the wishes of communities instead of the wishes of the whole electorate, we have no security against either the political extinction of the minority or the establishment of a minority rule.

Suppose in a certain locality divided into three constituencies, each of which returns one member, 15,000 electors vote, and that of

this number 10,000 are Liberals and 5,000 Conservatives. Then if every vote is to have an equal value, 10,000 Liberals will return two representatives, and 5,000 Conservatives will return one. But what security is there that this will be the result?

Suppose the voters are divided between the three constituencies as follows:

That is to say, one-third of the voters obtain two-thirds of the representation, and that party which in the constituency has a majority of two to one is in the Legislature in the hopeless minority of one to two.

Instead of every vote having an equal value, every Conservative vote by this plan of community representation counts for as much as four Liberal votes the principle of the sovereignty of the people is completely overthrown, and a minority rule is set up. And while the above instance shows that under this plan of community representation it is possible that one-third of the electors may obtain twothirds of the representation, it is equally possible that they shall receive no representation at all. This depends on the shape of the boundary lines. Let us rearrange the boundaries of the constituencies so that the voters are divided between the three constituencies as follows:

Here the Conservatives are practically disfranchised and politically extinguished, and though entitled to one-third of the representation are, owing to the fact that they are too diffused to be able to command in any constituency a local majority, shut out and excluded from obtaining their fair share of representation.

No one can maintain that this is a fair or true representation of opinion. Why should 3,000 voters have a representative, and 4,000 voters have none, simply because they live on two sides of a boundary line instead of one?