the retreat of the various garrisons of the Soudan throughout an area of seventeen degrees of latitude and ten of longitude, separated from Lower Egypt by deserts that would be impassable should the disloyal Arabs have driven off their camels and thereby have destroyed all means of transport.

The mission of General Gordon in a time of open rebellion, alone and unaided, was worse than a cruel blunder. Had he been supported by an army of 5,000 men, he would have accomplished his work successfully. No man could have been better fitted for the task; but, without military force to prove the earnest intentions of the Government, Gordon's position was like Daniel's in the lions' den. I do not think the lions will devour him, as I have implicit faith in his fighting capacity; and now that the Nile has risen at Khartoum, he will be able to use his steamers, fitted as gun-vessels, to purge the river from the rebels. It will be impossible for the enemy to resist these gunboats, which will capture every denomination of craft that floats upon the Blue Nile. All vessels in that country are built of soont (Acacia arabica), which is invaluable as fuel. General Gordon will break up his captures to supply his engines, reserving only the newest ships to convey corn and supplies from his forays on the river's banks to headquarters at Khartoum. Such active service will keep his troops in good spirits, until succour shall arrive from the expedition which we trust is now being organised for his relief. This is the acknowledged duty of Great Britain, and I therefore venture to assume that the expedition is an actual fact.

We will accordingly look forward to the day when Khartoum shall have been re-established as the seat of government, and the insurrection suppressed. What is then to be the policy of Egypt? If the Khedive shall still possess the questionable advantage of British tuition, what shall we advise?

Lord Dufferin suggested the development of the Soudan, at the time when the British Government was dependent upon his guidance. This policy was accepted, as Hicks was permitted to advance; but it was suddenly reversed because the Hicks army was defeated and the Soudan was in great danger. If, therefore, Khartoum shall be relieved and the rebellion shall be crushed, that danger which reversed our policy will have disappeared; we shall be in absolute possession in overwhelming force.

Shall we, accordingly, return to the original policy advocated by Lord Dufferin; or shall we persevere in that miserable determination to yield Khartoum, and to contract the Egyptian frontier to the limits of Wady Halfa or Assouan?

I declare in the most positive language that it is impossible for Egypt to abandon Khartoum, Senaar, and those Central Provinces of the Soudan that should be known in future as Upper Egypt.

The following reasons I submit to the consideration of all those who take a real interest in the welfare of Egypt, and in the future development of those fertile lands which have for so many ages sent down their soil in the annual inundations to form the delta of Egypt Proper.

In the first place we must consider our true position in our relations with the Khedive. If we are sincerely anxious for the success of our administration in Egypt, and if we honestly intend to abide by our declarations of a disinterested policy, we must sympathise with the feelings of the Egyptian people, and, instead of insulting their prejudices, we should endeavour to gain their confidence. We have insulted their prejudices and entirely lost their confidence by the tyranny we exhibited in compelling the Khedive to abandon Khartoum and the Soudan. We should therefore, if possible, regain that confidence by exhibiting a true appreciation of the difficulty, and by assisting Egypt to suppress the insurrection; after which, we should modify the declared policy of abandonment, and consult the wishes of the Khedive and his advisers respecting the future of Khartoum.

Khartoum is a name that is known among the wildest savages of equatorial Africa who never heard of Paris or of London; to them it is the centre of all that is great, and it is the capital of everything. The abandonment of Khartoum would, in their estimation, be the disruption of a central power, which would imply impotence. The slave-hunters have been suppressed by the authority from Khartoum, and the force required for that suppression has emanated from that centre of strength and government; if, therefore, Khartoum should be abandoned, the protection that was the support of loyal tribes of the interior would have been withdrawn, the supporting power would have been overthrown, and the slave-hunters would again be in the ascendant. The result would be immediate those tribes which had been faithful to the Government would become the first victims to those who had been against the Government; a general anarchy would ensue, and the loyal would be sacrificed to the slave-gangs which had been kept in subjection by the Imperial forces. The slave trade would be renewed with tenfold vigour, as no power would remain to curb the atrocities of the traders. This deplorable situation would render impossible all future attempts at government, as the natives would have lost all confidence of support: they would have seen that the loyal had been sacrificed by the aban donment of the Government upon which they had depended for protection, while those who had openly defied the laws had triumphed by rebellion. All the good results of the last five-and-twenty years of exploration and energetic action against the slave trade would have been entirely dissipated, and the end of the long struggle would

have yielded victory to the wrongdoers. The work of sixty-four years since the conquest of the Soudan by Mehemet Ali Pasha would have been utterly destroyed, and the Soudan would relapse into the frightful barbarism described by Bruce a hundred years ago. It is ridiculous to suppose that any Soudan races are capable of selfgovernment. If we refuse this to Ireland, how can we expect a better result from ignorant barbarians, who would extinguish all progress by a chronic inter-tribal strife?

As local autonomy would be impossible, should Khartoum be evacuated by the Egyptian forces, the Soudan, deprived of its capital, would resolve into a political chaos, until some superior force should take advantage of the general disruption and restore order by military conquest. Abyssinia is dangerously situated as a hostile neighbour. From the frontier at Gellabat, the march would be a direct descent upon Khartoum by the river Rahad and the Blue Nile, through a fertile country teeming with supplies. If Khartoum should be abandoned by the imperative orders of the British Government, Egypt will have abdicated her right, and the country will become an easy prey to the first adventurer. If I were a Frenchman I should not neglect the opportunity. French officers might assist the King of Abyssinia in the organisation of his army for the conquest of Khartoum and the fertile provinces of Senaar, Kadarif, and Taka. Khartoum and the richest portions of Africa would be annexed to Abyssinia. French influence would procure concessions of land to various officers in reward for their military services. By degrees, the embryo of a French settlement would be established, and, in less time than many people would believe, we should discover a rival colony firmly rooted at Khartoum.

It should not be forgotten that a Nilometer at that capital registers the daily level of the Nile, which the telegraph transmits to Cairo, thus preparing the authorities for the gathering inundation about twenty days before the waters reach Lower Egypt. Not only will this inestimable result of modern science be lost by the abandonment of Khartoum, but should a civilised, or even semi-civilised, enemy be in possession of that point, the water of the Rahad, Dinder, Blue Nile, and the Atbara rivers could be diverted from their course, and dispersed throughout the deserts, to the utter ruin and complete destruction of Egypt Proper. If those persons who are ignorant of the basin of the Nile will refer to the Nile Tributaries of Abyssinia, their eyes may be opened to the impossibility of discarding Khartoum and Central Soudan as they would throw away an old hat. The rivers I have enumerated are the Nile Tributaries of Abyssinia, which, flooded by the annual rains commencing early in June, rush in tumultuous torrents into the main channel of the Nile, and unite with the parent stream at only two points-Khartoum, and about

twenty-five miles south of Berber at the confluence of the Atbara. Both the Blue Nile and the Ätbara rivers, which cause the annual inundation in Lower Egypt, can be easily diverted from their channels by a dam thrown across the bed. The water would accordingly disperse in all directions, and would eventually become absorbed in the desert, in the same manner as the river Gash and many others, whose power is unable to cope with the exhaustion of the thirsty sand.

Both the Blue Nile and the Atbara rivers are peculiarly adapted for such an attempt of hostile engineering, as for several hundred miles of their course they flow through a level country, and, although nearly bank-full during the rainy season, the Atbara is perfectly dry from March till June, while the Blue Nile is so shallow that in some places it can be forded almost knee-deep. If powerful dams were constructed at favourable localities across the channels of those important rivers, Egypt would be deprived of the water upon which her existence as a country must depend. I have little doubt that the seven years of famine that afflicted Egypt in Biblical description were occasioned by some interruption of the Abyssinian tributaries, as the Ethiopians were the constant enemies of the lower country, and it is quite possible that they may have diverted the Atbara from its channel. If Joseph had received information of such an attempt, he would have wisely purchased and stored all the corn and available supplies.

I consider this geographical fact should alone be sufficient to deter England from exerting her assumed despotism in compelling the Khedive to abandon Central Soudan against the protests of Cherif Pasha and his entire Ministry. It appears incredible that such a direct attack upon the spirit of Lord Dufferin's Report could have been made by any British authority who was personally inexperienced in the geography of the Soudan. Without native advice or consultation, but in direct opposition to all native opinion, the order was issued, to the utter amazement of the Khedive and all Egyptian notables: Khartoum was to be abandoned!' If, on the other hand, a committee had been formed to take into consideration a scheme for the general rectification of the Egyptian frontier, the native authorities from the highest to the lowest would have appreciated the necessity. There could be no doubt that a welldefined boundary line was essential to the peace and prosperity of Upper Egypt or the so-called Soudan; there was, in fact, no actual frontier, and accordingly no security upon the debateable territory that nominally formed the border.

The word Soudan' had no other meaning than country of the blacks,' and the administration of a limitless area was beyond the power of Egypt; it was absolutely necessary to decide upon a reform both in the government and of the area that was to be

governed, at the time when a formidable insurrection defied the efforts of all authority. The proclamation of total abandonment could only be explained as a sop to appease the rebels, but all persons of experience were aware that it would be universally regarded as a confession of inability to govern, and an exhibition of imbecility that would drive the wavering into the rebel ranks, and destroy all confidence in those who would otherwise have remained loyal.

I have already quoted an extract of an opinion that I expressed respecting the Soudan after reading Lord Dufferin's Report: 'I trust our Government will insist upon the railway development of the Soudan, without which it will be a heavy millstone upon the neck of Egypt.' This is the true position. I would prune the tree most thoroughly, cut off all useless boughs, and reduce it to fruitbearing proportions. Get rid of the term 'Soudan,' and thus adhere to the verbal declaration of abandonment, but resolve the divisions of Egypt into Upper and Lower.

Strike a line at north latitude 13°. Let the White Nile become the western frontier, and abandon Darfur and Kordofan. Khartoum will remain the capital of Upper Egypt. The Atbara river will be the Abyssinian boundary; Gellabat the frontier town, free of all duties, to encourage commerce. Cassala will remain the capital of the Taka province. Boghos will be restored to Abyssinia.

Make a railway from Souakim to the Nile above the last cataract south of Shendy, and, instead of abandoning those regions to an enemy who may divert the waters of Abyssinian tributaries, make use of those rivers for purposes of irrigation, and bring into cultivation those fertile lands which once were famous in the Isle of Meroe. The whole of that territory from Gellabat, throughout the course of the Rahad, Dinder, and Blue Nile, can be converted into a vast field of cotton, sugar, wheat, flax, and the most valuable productions. A dam across the Atbara river, which would at the same time form the railway bridge, would control the waters, and prevent the waste of a sudden rush which exhausts the stream by its own impetuosity. Canals similar to those innumerable channels of Lower Egypt would irrigate the fertile land during the dry season, and would enable boats to bring down the produce to the railway stations. Upper Egypt thus constituted would become the granary for the supply of England, and cotton of the finest quality would be produced in quantities that would render us independent of other countries. Such a development would be almost instantly effected, should the means of transport be afforded by the construction of a railway.

One of the first duties of a statesman should be development. The human being depends upon the conditions of his surroundings: if the locality which he inhabits should be wretched and miserable, and God