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that; and probably that was the end of it. If Cartier had given instructions to any one to watch these refugees, it would have been to Coursol, and by written orders, which could be shown. Coursol was in Montreal: Cartier in Quebec. If the order was given, why is not a copy of it produced ?

Why does not Coursol testify ?

Why does not Sir George Cartier say something definite about the matter ?

August 9, 1864. Only 40 days before the “ Lake Erie Outrage" occurred, Mr. Seward notified Lord Lyons “of hostile projects of insurgent citizens of the United States lurking in Canada," C. p. 37, and encloses a letter from Colonel Hill, stating that he had received information pointing “ to an attempt by rebel refugees in Canada, at the destruction of our cities on the lakes ;"' that there was frequent communication between the refugees at Windsor and Messrs. Saunders and Co. at Niagara Falls; that three of the most prominent refugees at Windsor had been summoned to Niagara. Mr. Seward requested inquiry into the matter, and the adoption of precautionary measures. Lord Monck acknowledges the receipt of the despatch August 18, 1864. C. p. 54.

Yet so little impression do these complaints from Mr. Seward appear to have made upon the mind of Lord Monck, that he now testifies, “I do not remember of any conspiracy or attempt to attack the United States ” after the Johnson Island affair in 1863, “ until the raid of St. Alban’s in October, 1864.” When reminded of the attempt in September, 1864, to seize the “Philo Parsons," he does recollect it, and when asked,

"Question 6. Can you tell if you had any previous intelligence of the intended seizure ?"

Answers, “ If I had any such intelligence I communicated it in my despatches to the Colonial Office, where it will be found. To the best of my recollection, I had no such intelligence.”

It is true that the intelligence did not point directly to the seizure of the “ Philo Parsons ;” but it pointed to that identical plot whose object was, as stated by Jacob Thompson, [see his letter to Benjamin] to seize the steamers, and then Johnson's Island, and attack the cities of Sandusky and Cleveland.

It is plain that Lord Monck had forgotten all about the transactions. He really took no “effective measures” at the time. If he had, he would have remembered them ; for the consummation of the plot within one month after the notice to him (on the 19th of September, 1864), and the seizure of the two steamers, “Philo Parsons” and “ Island Queen,” would have fixed the events and the measures

in his memory

In answer to Question 7, he says: “After 1863, general instructions were given to the police authorities to exercise special vigilance over these Confederate refugees, and whenever any special evidence was brought before me, a special agency was put in operation to ascertain the truth of it.”

Lord Monck would give instructions only to Sir George Cartier

or Sir John McDonald. If there were policemen or special agents, he would not see them or give them directions. All he would know about it would be, that he directed Sir George Cartier or Sir John McDonald to attend to the matter. They were responsible to him. (See answers to Questions 28 and 29, p. 48.) If these policemen and special agents were really employed before the St. Alban's raid, one would think that the instructions given to them might be found in the official records at Quebec; that their names and residences could be stated; that upon reasonable inquiry they could be found and produced as witnesses, and some positive proof had of their employment and services. Nothing of this kind is shown, or attempted to be shown, by any witness.

Again-Lord Monck gives no dates. He obviously confounds what he did after the St. Alban's raid, with what he supposes he may have done before it.

When Lord Monck says that he found his powers sufficient to prevent the conspiracy in November, 1863, as to Johnson's Island, we think he must be speaking rather of his opinions now, than of his acts then. From his despatch to the Duke of Newcastle of November 19th, 1863, all that he appears to have done, except to notify Mr. Seward, was to send a trustworthy person to watch the boats passing through the Welland Canal, and to apply the provisions of the Foreign Enlistment Act, if occasion should arise. But no occasion arose. The action of the United States Authorities had destroyed all chance of success for the conspirators.

We must not forget that what was done in November, 1863, was done under the Dorion Ministry, and that Mr. Lamothe, then Chief of Police in Montreal, who was employed by them to prevent the enterprise, says that “they were friendly to the United States."

Lord Monck, however desirous to preserve neutrality, had to rely upon subordinate officers. He says (p. 48 to Ques. 28, 29, 30,) "Sir George Cartier was responsible to me for the administration of justice and the control of the Government Police in Lower Canada. All appointments were made on his advice and responsibility. I did not take any personal share officially in the control of such matters.”

He held Cartier responsible—took his word that all was right, and that was all he could do or know. Hence all his statements as to having used due diligence stands upon information derived from others.

Cartier, in the same way, relied on Coursol.

Sir George Cartier. 1. As to George Cartier, it is proper to say that we must distinguish between the facts he states of his own knowledge, and those of which he knows nothing except by information or rumour. A large share of all the alleged facts in his Deposition stands upon mere information.

2. So what he urges by way of defence of himself and his col

leagues, (for he is really on trial on charge of negligence) his opinions that “they used the utmost diligence to prevent these raids," we trust will not be regarded as evidence by this Honourable Tribunal. Though improperly embodied in á Deposition, they are really a mere plea of “not guilty.”

No pecuniary interest could compare with the personal interest which Sir George Cartier must have felt, when giving his testimony to justify himself in his conduct of public affairs against the serious charge of negligence. He is obliged to put his own general statement, without specifying any acts, or dates, or details, against the most convincing proofs.

3. So, too, when he expresses the opinion" that the raiders kept their conspiracy closely among themselves—that it was not known and could not have been known to any one but themselves in Canada,” we reply that his opinion would be of more value if he could show that he had used any means to find it out. It comes from one whose duty it was to use the utmost diligence to ferret out the conspiracy, but who never took a single step, who never employed a single agent, detective or policeman, and who cannot specify a single act done or a single measure used to find out or prevent the plans and movements of the raiders till after the St. Alban's raid. Perhaps we ought to except his employment of Judge Coursol. He employed Coursol and left all to him. But Coursol was not appointed on account of the refugees and their plans but only generally to a lucrative office.

We will notice one more of his very erroneous and mistaken statements.

He claims [p. 30 and 31] that “the prompt arrest of the raiders and seizure of the money in their hands was due principally to the step he took in the beginning of October, 1864, to extend Judge Coursol's jurisdiction to the frontier, which enabled Coursol and the Government police at Montreal, to act promptly in the matter!"

Now the fact is, that “the step he took” only aided (if it aided at all) in the arrest of two of the raiders, and the recovery of 2,891 dollars of the 89,600 dollars.

Coursol left Montreal on the afternoon of the 20th; went to St. John's; staid that night. The only policemen who left Montreal were “O'Leary and McLaughlin." Eleven of the raiders were arrested by the Vermont pursuers, aided by magistrates and bailiffs, and without any assistance from policemen or Coursol, and without any direction from him.

1. On the night of the 19th, Captain Conger“ drove Sawger and Wallace, two of the raiders, into Camp's house at Frelighsburg, where Wells was enabled to secure them."

A. L. Hall's Deposition, p. 48.
Captain Conger, p. 27.

2. Bennett Young, the leader, was arrested by E. D. Fuller the same night.

See E. D. Fuller's Deposition (No. 3, p. 19).
See Charles Standish (p. 70).
See Young's own letter to the “ Evening Telegraph,”—Paper A,


2 U


p. 3-where he says, “I was seized on) Canadian soil by American citizens ;

placed in a buggy, and started for the United States.

3. Teavis was arrested in a log house near Frelighsburg, on the morning of the 20th, by C. C. Burton and others.

See C. C. Burton, p. 45.
See A. L. Hall, p. 48.

Thus four were arrested at Frelighsburg on the 19th and on the morning of the 20th, and over 19,000 dollars recovered.

4. Six of the raiders, Bruce, Spurr, Collins, Lackey, Doty, and McGrorty, were arrested by Whitman at Stanbridge. The first four very early on the morning of the 20th, Doty and McGrorty on the morning of the 21st. This was on the complaint of Smith and Holmes, Vermont pursuers. About 55,000 dollars was taken with them. Coursol, before he left Montreal, had heard of these arrests and telegraphed them to Sir George Cartier.

5. Moore was taken at Waterloo, on the morning of the 21st, with 1,002 dollars.

These eleven were all taken by the pursuit of the parties from Vermont, without any help from Coursol or his police; of course through the intervention of Canadian magistrates and bailiffs, and about 75,000 dollars recovered.

Torrance only refers to the magistrates and bailiffs—not to the parties who pursued and really captured them.

Thus eight of the raiders were arrested at Frelighsburg and Stanbridge before Coursol had left Montreal, and before “ O'Leary and McLaughlin" with Sowles had reached St. John's; and without any aid from Coursol and his police, and when none of them were within thirty miles of the place where the raiders were arrested.

One was arrested at Waterloo on the morning of the 21st, more than twenty miles beyond Farnham where O'Leary and McLaughlin were with Sowles.

6. On the 21st “O'Leary and McLaughlin,” who went with Mr. Albert Sowles to Farnham, arrested two of the raiders-Scott and Gregg—and got 2,891 dollars. How much the policemen contributed to these two arrests,

and how far Mr. Sowles and necessity compelled them to act, we can judge

1st. From the fact that “O'Leary was a southern sympathizer," McLaughlin Dep., p. 23.

2nd. From the declaration of O'Leary to Standish, pp. 71, 72, and their reluctance to act when urged by the parties from St. Alban's.

In reality these thirteen raiders and about 78,000 dollars were recovered by the energy of the parties from St. Alban's.

7. On the 24th, Lamothe in Montreal arrested Hutchinson, and seized 10.000 dollars.

His statement as to the employment of detectives is considered elsewhere.

Upon these indisputable facts the Commissioners can see how little reliance can be placed on the self-justifying statements of

Sir George Cartier, especially when he speaks of matters of which he has no personal knowledge, and under the strong bias of a defence of his official character.

Sir John A. McDonald.

All is vague

He is certainly entitled to respect and credit when testifying to what he personally knows, or when expressing opinions upon matters that do not involve the official conduct of himself or his colleagues.

But much of his testimony is a statement as to matters of which he has no personal knowledge, and of which he knows nothing but by hearsay.

He gives no specific facts—no dates-no names. and general.

When he says (p. 5), “there were police magistrates and stipendiary magistrates appointed at various exposed points on the frontier, for the purpose of prevention and detection of any outrages,” he does not say when, or where, or who, or for what outrages. In his next answer he points to “crimping” as the outrages, but he does not tell us as was the fact, that none, even for that purpose, went out on the Vermont and New York frontier till the 11th October, 1864. [See Holdbrook's Deposition.] Counsel then suggests, " For the purpose of watching offences of that kind, and for the purpose of watching the frontier generally?Then he answers, “Yes,” but does not pretend that any order, instructions or suggestions of any kind, in regard to the Southern refugees and their plans, were ever given to the police, or ever thought of by the authorities.

When asked (p. 7), “Did the Government take all reasonable means in its power to watch the Southern refugees, and provide against their objects ? His answer is—

"I think so." Nothing more!

Why does he not tell us the means the Government used, when and where ? What he now thinks reasonablu," the Commissioners might not. If he were to specify any facts, he might be shown to be in error.

We trust this case is not to be decided upon the “ think so of Sir John McDonald.

To show of how little value, in this case, his statements are, we call attention to his testimony (p. 4 and 26 and 27) as to what the Canadian Government did when the United States complained as to plots and conspiracies in Canada. He says, “They uniformly made inquiry and adopted other means to ascertain whether there was any foundation for the rumour or allegation.”

Now, when asked to give the names of cases, he can only refer to the manufacture of “Greek fire"—the case of the “Georgian.” The first occurred December 14, 1864; the second November 7, 1864; both after the St. Alban's raid. See Paper C., pp. 84 and 87.

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