Hampton needed no champion.

Putting aside his well-known reputation, General Charles R. Woods rebukes Sherman for his abuse of Hampton regarding the shelling at Granby, p. 201, Dep. for Defence, and relieves us of the duty.

66

Q. Do you remember the feeling of the army about the shelling?

"A. Those that got hurt did not like it very much; the rest of us did not care particularly about it, and we would have done the same thing if we could have gotten the advantage. We were fighting then, and they had a right to take every advantage.

"Q. Did you regard it as an illegitimate act of warfare?

"Do you think Wade Hampton should have been stigmatised as cowardly for shelling you at that point?

"A. No, sir; he was defending the city, and he had a right to take any means in his power to do so. I never looked at it in that way. If I had been defending the city I would have done the same thing.

"Q. Shelled the sleeping camp?

"A. Shelled anything; troops had no business to sleep where they could be shelled."

In our "Brief for Claim" we show conclusively, without a quotation from Hampton's testimony, that Sherman not only knew, but admitted, that his men had burned Columbia. It is true he may have given different excuses for it, but the fact remains that he knew they burnt it; and with this knowledge he subsequently accused Hampton.

Can Hampton be blamed for speaking of Sherman's "falsehood's" and "false charges?"

Notwithstanding the terrible weight of damning testimony as to the "Rockets," the "warnings," the "pillaging," the "license," and the unchecked and public "incendiarism," Counsel quotes not a word, pro or con, but merely states in general terms—

Error No. 15,

"Proof by a dozen witnesses that they did not see things which a dozen others of equal credibility testify that they did see creates no real conflict of evidence;"

case.

Which, though correct in the abstract, has no application to the

In the tirade against General Hampton we will allow for at least ten more errors; but as a discussion of them is not essential, we will go on to

Error No. 26.

"And yet it is entirely plain that General Sherman is not responsible for its burning."

Our "Brief for Claim," too, thoroughly refutes this assertion for further discussion.

Error No. 27.

"On the contrary, both he and the gallant and distinguished officers immediately in command under him used every precaution to protect the city and when it was found actually in flames to extinguish the flames and save the town."

Our "Brief for Claim" also shows fully how these officers, gallant and distinguished" as they may have been, turned loose on the devoted city soldiers whom they knew would destroy it, and how, with all the pretence to the contrary, they permitted these soldiers to satisfy their lusts unchecked.

Error No. 28.

"It may well be that escaped prisoners, and straggling and lawless soldiers may have contributed on that fearful night to spread the flames; that they may have committed acts of pillage and plunder, and have been guilty of even greater excesses and outrages."

We thank Counsel for admitting so much. But how is it that he does not show why these "lawless soldiers" were suffered so openly, in such bodies, and before their officers, to go unrestrained, the police of the town being in their hands?

Error No. 29.

But it is impossible to read the testimony of these distinguished and honourable officers, who have testified on the part of the United States, and not be entirely satisfied that every precaution was taken by those responsible for the command of the troops to repress disorder, protect the persons and property of the citizens of Columbia, and to extinguish the flames which were consuming the city without their fault.

We have already alluded to the precautions taken by them, and must pass on to the peroration of the distinguished Counsel.

Error No. 30.

"It is only strange that in the face of this evidence men can still be found to charge the burning of Columbia as the crime of Sherman, and Howard, and Logan, and Hazen, and Woods."

We have but to say that we admire rhetoric; but we cannot admit that without an allusion to the evidence supported by a reference or quotation; it is sufficient to meet the mass of testimony fearlessly alluded to with honest references, and fully quoted to support the several points of our Brief.

We submit that our Brief is not even assailed by the learned Counsel, except as to the cotton burning before Sherman entered Columbia,—an unimportant point.

And from the evidence adduced, no shadow whatsoever has been cast upon our conclusion that:

"There can be no reasonable doubt, after a thorough perusal of it, THAT FEDERAL SOLDIERS DID BURN COLUMBIA; THAT GENERAL SHERMAN KNEW IT, and that HIS THEORIES TO THE CONTRARY, although they were true in particulars, ARE THEREFORE OF A MOST EQUIVOCAL CHARACTER, nor can there be any question that General Sherman, as he himself admits, had full reason to believe that his troops would burn Columbia, and yet his only guards were from a corps celebrated for their acts of vandalism, and this very corps itself be permitted to disperse itself about the city, and to PILLAGE, BURN, and STEAL in the PRESENCE OF THEIR OFFICERS, without restraint, and this although the army was in a perfect state of discipline.

"We respectfully submit, therefore, that, if not by direct order, the city of Columbia was destroyed by the tacit permission and with the approbation of the UNITED STATES' MILITARY

AUTHORITIES."

We have further shown, in reply to the United States' Counsel, that Columbia was neither a besieged town, nor taken by storm; that it surrendered before being summoned; that it was from 10 to 12 hours in the unmolested possession of the Federal forces before it was fired, and General Sherman himself testifies that there was "NO MILITARY NECESSITY FOR ITS DESTRUCTION."

Under these circumstances we propose to show, further, upon the broad principles of "equity and justice," and international law, that the United States is responsible to all subjects of Her Majesty, not engaged in hostilities, for the loss of their property, not "contraband of war," in the conflagration or by licensed pillage.

Respectfully submitted.

(Signed)

WALKER & BACOT.

(To be continued as to the Law.)

APPENDIX No. 43.

No. 2.-John Holmes Hanna v. The United States.

On Motion on part of the United States to dismiss this Case.

BRIEF FOR THE CLAIM.

THERE are five grounds assigned by the Counsel for the United States for this motion. Four of them are purely formal in

their nature, and need not be discussed in this paper. If they shall be found by the Commission to be of sufficient importance they may be cured by amendments without more delay than is necessary to communicate with the claimant.

But it is submitted that in no view of them do they furnish ground for a motion to dismiss the case, which would be in the nature of a final decision thereon, barring it forever under the XVIIth Article of the Treaty.

The rules to which the Counsel for the United States refers, were intended for the convenient despatch of business, and in their nature are directory, and subject to be repealed, altered, or dispensed with, in the discretion of the Commission.

The remaining ground is one of substance, and if decided against the claimant might finally dispose of this case and affect a large number of others. It is that the Memorial "does not state ang ground upon which the claim is founded."

If by this it be meant that the Memorial contains no argument to show that the facts which it sets forth do furnish any sufficient ground for a claim against the United States, it is submitted that such an objection is not well taken. It is conceived to be no part of the duty either of Her Majesty's Claims' Agent, or of the Counsel appointed to attend the Commission to draw up, or superintend, or aid in the preparation of the Memorials, further than to furnish copies of the rules of the Commission, which is in all cases promptly done by the Agent. Claimants themselves, in most of the cases thus far, appear to be persons not skilled in the preparation of such papers, and where the claims are of comparatively insignificant amounts the aid of private counsel will be by no means generally invoked. The consequence must be that the Memorials will be confined to a simple narrative of the facts on which the claim is alleged to have arisen. The principles of international and public law which support such claims are as well known to the United States' Agent as to the Counsel for the claims. The statement of them in the Memorial would be to convert that paper into an argument, and would be entirely inappropriate.

A certain case is stated as matter of fact; and the legal conclusion asserted is that the facts stated constitute a valid claim against the Government of the United States. If these facts are not a sufficient foundation for such claim, then the objection is well taken, but if they are, the motion must be overruled. I proceed, therefore, to show that upon the case stated by the Memorial the international and public law does impose a liability upon the Government of the United States.

The Case.

This is a claim for indemnity for the destruction of 819 bales of cotton, of the value of 265,423 dol. 45 c. (printed Memorial, p. 5), by armed and organized forces acting under the authority of certain States of the American Union, styling themselves the Confederate States. The particular acts of destruction, which was

by fire, appear to have been deliberately committed, under the orders of General Lovell, commanding the Confederate forces in the department of Louisiana, and by the concurrent authority of the the Governor of that State, and of the Commander of the State troops there in arms.

That the claimant was and is a British subject, and that the cotton was his property is sufficiently shown in his Memorial.

The facts disclosed in the Memorial and Exhibits exclude the idea that this was the act of private rioters or marauders, and show that it was a formal and deliberate proceeding under the then actually existing authority of the said so-called Confederate States, being all of them States of the United States, and the State of Louisiana in particular being one of the said States.

The first question which has been suggested, and which is of the greatest importance, is whether there be any liability or responsibility resting upon the United States in the premises.

Conceding the case to be one of the destruction, under such circumstances, of a large amount of valuable property owned by a British subject, it may be asked at the outset is there no remedy or indemnification possible for such injury and loss?

Neither civilly or criminally could the persons engaged in the act have been prosecuted at law, either for reparation or punishment. A plea setting up that the act was done in the course of military operations, ordered and carried on by the authority of the existing Government, whether the same were a lawful or usurped Government, recognized or unrecognized by the nations, would (it is believed) have furnished a complete bar to any such prosecution.

See United States v. Palmer, 3 Wh., 210; also case of McLeod; correspondence between the Secretary of State, Mr. Webster, and Mr. Fox, British Minister; and the instructions to the AttorneyGeneral, Webster's works, 8 Ed., vol. 6, pp. 253, 265.

But whether this be so or not, the injury is one for which, by the well-settled principles of international law, a foreign nation has the right to look for redress to the political power of the country in which it occurred; and the responsibility of individuals is merged in and extinguished by that of the Sovereign.

The next inquiry, then, is, what Government is responsible for the act.

It would be an easy, but superficial and unsatisfactory answer, to assert that the so-called Confederate Government, or the Governments of the States composing it, could alone be responsible, since the Government of the United States had no actual participation in the injury, and was straining every nerve to crush and destroy the power of the States which had confederated against it and attempted to severe their connection with it. But the difficulty is not so easily solved. The supposed answer assumes that recourse could be had, in theory at least, by the British Government against the States of the Union who had set up and attempted to maintain for themselves an independent existence; and it is no answer at all unless it concede this alternative. But can this be conceded by the United States? This brings us to