THE THIRD SERIES.

1. FELIX ADVENT. AUG. G. NN. PEN. Reverse of

Dioclesian.

2. AFRICA. S. C.

3. AFRICA. S. C.

4. AEGIPTOS. S. C.

Reverse of Septimius Severus.

Reverse of Adrian.

Reverse of Adrian.

5. MAVRETANIA. S. C. Reverse of Adrian.

6. HISPANIA. S. C. Reverse of Adrian.

7. ADVENTVI AVG. GALLIÆ. S. C. Reverse of Adrian, 8. ITALIA. S. C. Reverse of Marcus Antoninus. Reverse of Nero.

9. ROMA. S. C.

10. RESTITVTORI ACHAIAE. S. C. Reverse of Adrian. 11. BRITANNIA. Reverse of Antoninus Pius.

12. RESTITVTORI SICILIAE. S. C. Reverse of Adrian. 13. IVDEA CAPTA. S. C. Reverse of Vespasian.

14. VICTORIA AVGUSTI. S. C. Ibid.

15. PARTHIA. S. C. COS. II. Reverse of Antoninus Pius, 16. ANTIOCHIA.

17. ΘΥΑΤΕΙΡΗΝΩΝ Κ. CMYPN. ΣΤΡ. Τ. ФАВ. АЛ, AПОɅAINAPIOY. Reverse of Marcus Aurelius. 18. ARAB, ADQ. S. P. Q. R. OPTIMO PRINCIPI. S. C. Reverse of Trajan.

PREFACE.

THE author of the following essay has endeavoured to draw into one continued scheme the whole state of the present war, and the methods that appear to him the most proper for bringing it to a happy conclusion.

After having considered that the French are the constant and most dangerous enemies to the British nation, and that the danger from them is now greater than ever, and will still increase till their present union with Spain be broken, he sets forth the several advantages which this union has already given France, and taken from Great Britain, in relation to the West Indies, the woollen manufacture, the trade of the Levant, and the naval power of the two nations.

He shows how these advantages will still rise higher after a peace, notwithstanding our present conquests, with new additions, should be confirmed to us, as well because the monarchy of Spain would not be weakened by such concessions, as because no guarantee could be found sufficient to secure them to us. For which reasons he lays it down as a fixed rule, that no peace is to be made without an entire disunion of the French and Spanish monarchies.

That this may be brought about, he endeavours to prove from the progress we have already made toward it, and the successes we have purchased in the present war, which are very considerable if well pursued, but of no effect if we acquiesce in them.

In order to complete this disunion, in which we have gone so far, he would not have us rely upon exhausting the French treasury, attempts on the Spanish Indies, descents on France, but chiefly upon outnumbering them in troops, France being already drained of her best supplies, and the confederates masters of much greater forces for multitude and strength, both in men and horse, and provided with generals of greater fame and abilities.

He then considers the wrong measures we have hitherto taken in making too small levies after a successful campaign, in regulating their number by that of the enemy's forces, and hiring them of our confederates; showing at the same time the inconveniencies we suffer from such hired troops, and several advantages we might receive from employing those of our own nation.

He farther recommends this augmentation of our forces, to prevent the keeping up a standing body of them in times of peace, to enable us to make an impression on the enemy in the present posture of the war, and to secure ourselves against a prince, who is now at the head of a powerful army, and has not yet declared himself.

In the last place, he answers, by several considerations, those two popular objections: that we furnish more towards the war than the rest of the allies, and that we are not able to contribute more than we do already.

These are the most material heads of the following essay, in which there are many other subordinate reflections that naturally grow out of so copious a subject.

November, 1707.