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adjournment, or the morning of the next day, and before the sale commenced, in a conversation between this defendant and his brother, James Hopping, the said James Hopping told him that Daniel Holmes and Septimus Stephens, talked of making up a company to buy the fishing point lot, viz.: No. 8. This defendant then asked said James Hopping if he was going to take a share, to which the said James replied that he could not, as he was a commissioner; said James then said he expected that this defendant could have a share if he wished. This defendant then told him to tell Daniel Holmes that he would take a share; and this defendant, the said John Hopping, expects that his brother did so report him. And the said John Hopping, for himself, says, that the said James Hopping had no interest in said purchase of lots No. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10, at the time of said sale, nor until about three months after, when he consented to come in and advance a part of the purchase money, at the instance and request of this defendant and his brother Primrose. And this defendant, in further answering for himself, says, that neither the said commissioners, nor the said guardian, nor any or either of them, to the best knowledge or belief of this defendant, were interested, directly or indirectly, in said pur chase at the time thereof, nor had he ever heard, until after the reading of the bill in this cause, that there had been any combination, unlawful or otherwise, to bring about a sale of said Key Port property. And these defendants, in further answering, say, that the said sale was in every respect fair, as far as these defendants know, and as they verily believe, and that they never heard of any allegation to the contrary, until about the time of the commencement of the suits in ejectment referred to in the bill of complaint; and this defendant, the said Ezra Osborn, answering for himself, absolutely denies that previous to said sale he combined with any person whatever to procure a sale of said property, nor did he ever know, hear, or believe, that such combination had been entered into by any person or persons whatever, nor did he know or believe at the time of said sale, nor does he now know or be lieve, that the said commissioners and guardian, or either or any of them, were at the time of said sale interested, directly or indirectly, in said purchase. And this defendant, Ezra Os born, in further answering, says, that his object in attending said sale was to bid for lot No. 1, and that he did bid for it until it got up, in the opinion of this defendant, to its full value, when this defendant stopped bidding, and Isaac Lippincott bidding higher, it was struck off to the said Lippincott just before dinner on 500*] the second day of sale. And this de fendant, in further answering, says, that according to his best memory and belief, said lot No. 1 was adjourn d on the first day of sale at $23 per acre on this defendant's bid, and that he became acquainted with said Lippincott for the first time at said sale.

Lippincott, in his answer, thus describes the formation of the company:

And that this defendant, inasmuch as he had then become the purchaser of lot No 1, and it was evidently his interest that lot No. 8 should not fall into the hands of persons whose in

terests were averse to the Key Grove property, consented to be one of several others to join and buy said lot No. 8; that said Daniel Holmes then proceeded to hunt for others to join in the said purchase, and left us for that purpose, as he said; after a short time the said Holmes returned, and reported that he had found several who would join with us in buying said lot No. 8, and mentioned the names of Osborn and Burrowes; and in a consultation between the said Stephens, Holmes, Burrowes, Osborn, and this defendant, it was then agreed that lot No. 8 should be purchased on said joint account, and that said Burrowes should be the bidder.

And this defendant charges the truth to be, that said Holmes did not speak to either of the said commissioners or guardians to join in said purchase, or if he did, that they declined it, and that there was no understanding, directly or indirectly, that said commissioners or guardians should be interested in said purchase; or if there was, or if said Holmes spoke or agreed with either or any of them, this defendant expressly avers that it was without the knowledge and consent of this defendant.

And this defendant further says, that he was induced to join in said purchase by the said representation of said Holmes and Stephens, and that he did not want, and had no intention of bidding for or buying said lot No. 8, nor did he want it on his individual account, and should not have joined in it but for the said solicitation of said Holmes and Stephens.

And this defendant in further answering says, that according to the best of his recollection and belief, that upon said sale being re-opened in the afternoon of said 4th November, 1829, said Burrowes bid for said lot No. 8 in pursuance of said agreement, and that it was struck off and sold by the said commissioners, openly and fairly to the said Burrowes, for the said sum of $43 per acre, as the highest bidder.

And as this defendant then thought and believes, and as he still thinks and believes, the said Burrowes was the only person then known to the commissioners as the purchaser; and this defendant charges that he was the only person legally responsible for the pur [*501 chase money, and amply able to pay the same.

Holmes, in his answer, thus speaks of it: And this defendant in further answering says, that after he got upon the ground, upon the second day of sale, he went to work, by going first to one person and then another, to get up a company to bid for said lot No. 8, in opposition to the persons who it was understood were bidding from Middletown Point; and finally, after lot No. 1 was struck off to I. K. Lippincott, and with considerable difficulty, the following persons agreed verbally to join with this defendant in purchasing said lot No. 8: Isaac K. Lippincott, Richard C. Burrowes, Horatio N. Kearney, Ezra Osborn, Septimus Stephens, and he thinks Primrose Hopping. And this defendant says that, after the adjournment of the first day of sale, he spoke also to James Hopping, one of said commissioners, to be interested, this defendant not then knowing that there was anything illegal in his becoming so, but the said James Hopping absolutely refused on account of his being a commissioner; this defendant then requested him to speak to

his brother, John Hopping, when he went home, and see if he would not come in. And this defendant says that some one, either James or Primrose Hopping, reported next day that John Hopping would come in, and he was ac cordingly considered as one of the company at the sale.

And this defendant in further answering says, that said company was got up by this de fendant on the spur of the occasion, and for no other purpose whatever but to create competition and make property bring more, and extended originally only to lot No. 8. And this defendant in further answering says, that neither James Hopping, Leonard Walling, [n] or Joseph Taylor, were [was] at the time of the sale a part of said company, or interested in any way in the purchase of any part of said lots 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10.

The evidence of Primrose Hopping was as follows:

Primrose Hopping being sworn, says: I was the crier of this vendue. I struck off No. 8 to Richard C. Burrowes. He was the highest bidder. William Walling and Richard C. Burrowes were the only two bidders some considerable time before it was struck off; one stood on my right hand and the other on the left. William Walling was on the left hand and Richard C. Burrowes on the right. They were bidding twenty-five or fifty cents per acre. William Walling was last bidder, except Richard C. Burrowes. Burrowes bid openly, and Walling by a wink. I had a timepiece, and gave notice that if I had not another bid I would strike it off to the highest bidder; and after I got a bid from Burrowes, I immediately 502*] turned to Walling to get a bid, and did this repeatedly; and dwelt an unusual time to get a bid, but could get none. I dwelt because he looked at me as if anxious, but never bid; and finally I struck it off to Richard C. Burrowes. I gave fair warning that I was going to strike it off. I think it was put up at the first day, but don't recollect the amount it bid up to. I had no instructions from commissioners to strike it off to Burrowes. I had instructions from Edward Taylor several times not to dwell so long upon the property. The whole farm was struck off to the highest bidder, to my certain knowledge Neither of commissioners or Joseph Taylor were interested in this property at the time it was sold. I got the highest possible price for each section of the property. It was much better to have the property sold than partitioned. I did not consider myself interested in this property at the time it was struck off. I think Richard C. Burrowes spoke to me about it. I don't recollect what I said. I don't recollect what the precise words were. I don't think I gave him a decided answer.

I think Burrowes spoke to me on the second day of sale. I don't recollect that he told me who were concerned in the company. I can't say if any of the company lots had been sold when Burrowes spoke to me. I am not sure if Burrowes said it to me, or if it was the common talk to try to make a landing there. When Burrows asked me, I think I did not tell Burrowes I would not join. I extended the time several times in the sale of No. 8. I gave further time after Burrowes' last bid. I think

My

Walling was a little farthest off. I did not know Van Pelt as a bidder. Van Pelt claimed the bid. I requested the property be set up again. That was my custom. It was referred to commissioners, and they decided that it was stricken off fair and should not be set up again. I did have an interest in company property afterwards. I never paid any of the purchase money. James, and John, and self had two thirds. They were my two brothers. share was sold to Capt. Vanderbilt with the rest in 1839. I depended on my brothers. They made payments. Brothers received purchase money, and accounted to me at our settlement after. There was a balance paid me. We had other dealings. I can't remember when I came in partner with them. I can't say whose share of these lots James and John got. I don't know which of my brothers I got the share of, John or James. I don't know when, or if before deed to John I. Taylor. I have no knowledge when I came in a partner. John I. Taylor gave me some land in exchange for lot No. 17, and some money. He and Joseph Taylor gave me 7 acres back, next to Vandine's. The trade was made several years ago, before the commencement of suit, &c., &c., &c.

*In April, 1830, twenty-four building [*503 lots were laid out upon part of lot No 8, sixteen of which were distributed in severalty amongst the members of the company, and the residue left to be sold by John I. Taylor for their benefit. Other measures of improvement were adopted which it is not necessary to state particularly.

In the case of Doe v. Lambert, 1 Green's Law Reports, 182, the Supreme Court of New Jersey decided, that a deed made by the commissioners in partition proceedings to any other person than the one reported as purchaser, was void.

In consequence of this decision, the heirs of Edmund Kearney instituted actions of ejectment in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of New Jersey, in order to recover the property; whereupon, the company applied to the Legislature for relief.

În March, 1841, the Legislature passed an Act which recited that deeds were sometimes made to other persons than the reported purchasers, and then declared as follows:

'Sec 1. Be it enacted by the Council and General Assembly of this State, and it is hereby enacted by the authority of the same, that, upon proof being made to the satisfaction of the court or jury before whom any such deed or conveyance may be offered in evidence, that the lands or real estate therein mentioned were sold fairly and without fraud, and that such deed or conveyance was made and executed in good faith, and for a sufficient consideration, and with the consent of the person or persons reported to the court as the purchaser or purchasers, the said deed or conveyance shall have the same force and effect as though the same had been made and executed to the purchaser or purchasers reported to the court.'

In October, 1841, the bill in this cause was filed by heirs of Edmund Kearney, charging a fraudulent combination between Daniel Holmes, Joseph Taylor, Leonard Walling. James Hopping, John I Taylor and others named in the bill, for the purpose of bringing

about a compulsory sale of the Key Grove estate, with a view to establishing a seaport town on a part thereof; that, to that end, Holmes made the purchase of James P. Kearney, instituted the proceedings in partition, and, through the fraudulent co-operation of Joseph Taylor, the guardian, and Leonard Walling and James Hopping, two of the commissioners, and Primrose Hopping, the crier, and others confederating with them, wrongfully and fraudulently brought about, under pretext and color of law, a sale of the entire estate, under the proceedings in partition. The bill makes a case of fraud in fact, as well as of fraud in law, growing out of the fiduciary relations which the guardian and commissioners 504*] and auctioneer *respectively sustained to the estate and to the heirs to whom it belongs. The prayer is for an account of the proceeds of all wood and timber cut from the six lots conveyed by the commissioners to John I. Taylor; for an injunction to restrain waste; that the conveyance to John I. Taylor, and the sale of these lots by the commissioners, be declared void; and for other relief.

costs, from which decree the complainants appealed to this court.

*It was argued by Messrs. Converse [*505 and Ewing for the appellants, and by Messrs. Dayton and Johnson for the appellees.

The arguments of the counsel on both sides were directed, in a great measure, to an examination of the facts in the case, as disclosed in the answers and evidence.

The points of law for the appellants were the following:

I. That the courts of the United States, having full jurisdiction of the case conferred on them by the Constitution, and the case being actually pending in the Circuit Court, the Legislature of New Jersey had no power, by private act or special edict, enacted or pronounced while the case was so pending, to interfere with or to control the decision of the United States court therein. That it could not itself directly pronounce or dictate to the court what judgment it should pronounce in the case; nor could it, by changing the principles of law, or the rules of evidence governing it, by such special edict, indirectly Extracts from the answers of the principal make or control the judgment or decree of the defendants have already been given. court; and that, such being the purport and In April, 1842, the trial at law of the eject-end of the Act of February 14, 1844, the same ment came on before Judges Baldwin and Dick is void. enson; and the court held that, under the pro- II. That there was actual fraud by the visions of the Act of 1841, the defendant must commissioners in the execution of their trust, prove that there was no fraud of any kind in and that, if we admit the special Acf of Febthe sale, in order to avail himself of the provis-ruary 14, 1844, to be valid, the sale and conions of the Act; but the jury not agreeing, no veyance, made by the commissioners to themverdict was rendered in the case. selves and their partners, are void under its provisions.

Whilst the present suit was pending, viz.: on the 14th of February, 1844, the Legislature passed a private Act, entitled "An Act to confirm the sales of the real estate whereof Ed mund Kearney, deceased, late of the County of Monmouth, died 'seised.'

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This Act recited the circumstances of the sale, and that doubts had arisen respecting the title to the lots, and then declared:

"Section 1. Be it enacted by the Council and General Assembly of this State, and it is hereby enacted by the authority of the the same, that the several deeds, so given by the said commissioners for the said several lots, shall be deemed and taken, and the same are hereby declared to be valid, and effectual in law, to convey the estate therein and thereby intended to be conveyed; and that the said deeds, or any of them, and all subsequent conveyances of the said estate, or any part thereof, shall not be impeached in any court whatever for any such alleged interest in the said commissioners, or any of them, in the prop erty so sold by them, as aforesaid, or for any alleged defect or informality in the execution of the powers of the said commissioners, or in the proceedings of the said Orphans' Court; and that the said deeds, or any of them, shall not be invalidated or impeached upon any other ground than that of absolute, direct, and actual fraud on the part of the said commissioners.” The defendants then filed a supplemental answer, averring that there was no fraud, and praying to be allowed the benefit of this Act; and also filed a cross bill, the proceedings under which it is not material to notice in this report. In September, 1851, the Circuit Court decreed that the bill should be dismissed with

III. That material recitals, in the preamble to that Act, appear to be false; and it being a private act, and the Legislature deceived, and induced by false pretenses to pass it, it is void. I. We contend, then, that the Act of February 14, 1844, is void; and,

1st. Because it violates the 22d article of the constitution of New Jersey, which declares that the common law of England shall remain in force in that State, until altered "by a future law of the Legislature."

This Act is not a law, but a mere legislative edict interposed between two parties litigant, directing what manner of decree shall be made between them—a taking the property from one and giving it to the other. To be a law, it must be get eral-a rule affecting property, generally, in like circumstances. This Act is in violation of the principles of the common law, and, not being itself a law, is therefore void. (1 Bl. Com., 44, 138; Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill, N. Y., 140; Regents of University of Maryland v. Williams, 9 Gill & Johns., 412; Ervine's Appeal, 16 Penn. State, 257; McNutt v. Bland. 2 How., 16, 17; Webster v. Cooper, 14 Id., 503; Proprietors of Kennebeck *v. (*506 Laboree et al., 2 Greenl.. 288-295; AttorneyGeneral v. Stevens, 1 Saxton's N. Jer., 369, 380; see further authorities, post, p. 23.)

2d. It also violates that clause of the same article of the constitution of New Jersey which declares, "that the inestimable right of trial by jury shall remainc onfirmed, as a part of the law of this colony, without repeal, forever." (Scud der v. Trenton Delaware Falls Co., 1 Saxton, N. Jer.. 696, 726, 727; Arrowsmith v. Burlingim, 4 McLean, 489; Embury v. Conner, 3 Com

stock, 511, 516, 517; Benson v. Mayor, &c., 10 Barbour, S. C., 223, 224; People v. White, 11 Id., S. C., 26, 30; Parkham v. Justices, 9 Ga., 341, 349-351; McLeod v. Burroughs, 9 Id., 213, 215. 216; Vanzant v. Waddle, 2 Yerg., 260, 269-271; Walley v. Kennedy, 2 Id., 554, 556; Jones v. Perry, 10 Id., 59, 71, 72; Holden v. James, 11 Mass., 396; Hake v. Henderson, 4 Dev. N. Car., 15; 2 Kent, 1-13 and note b, p. 13, and note, p. 4.)

3d. This Act, not being a law, is not to be regarded as a rule of decision in the courts of the United States, under the provisions of the 34th section of the Judiciary Act, even "in a trial at common law."

4th. It violates the 2d section of the 4th article of the Constitution of the United States, which declares, "that the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of the citizens in the several States."

This Act is a special edict against citizens of States, other than New Jersey, devesting them of their inheritance, or laying down special rules applicable to their estate only, which may have that effect. If the Act were general against all parties, citizens of other states, who might hold property so circumstanced, it would be clearly unconstitutional. We think the objection loses none of its force because the Act is special, and applied to a single case. It declares that the property of these parties, who are citizens of other states, shall not be entitled to the protection which the laws of the State extend to the property of its own citizens. (4 Johns Ch., 430.)

5th. It is against the spirit, if not the letter, of the 2d section of the 3d article of the Constitution of the United States, which gives to the courts of the United States jurisdiction in all cases between citizens of different states.'

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The national tribunal would be, in effect, ousted of its jurisdiction, and the citizens of other states deprived of its protection, if the State Legislature could interpose, pending the case, and by special edict, pronounce a decree, or lay down new principles of law and new rules of evidence for that case alone, which would dictate to and control the court in the de507*] cree it *should pronounce. This would defeat the end and purpose of this provision of the Constitution. For everyone is aware that the citizens of other states are much safer from injustice and wrong where their rights are adjudicated by the judiciary, than the Legislature of a state. (United States v. Peters, 5 Cranch, 15; Ogden v. Blackledge, 2 Cranch, 194; Suydam v. Broadnax, 14 Pet., 67, 74, 75; Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Id., 751.)

6th. The right to pass an Act such as this is inconsistent with a republican, constitutional government, or any government with limited powers, for it deprives the citizen of one of his absolute rights-the possession and enjoyment of property. It is admissible only in a purely Asiatic despotism. (People v. Supervisors of Westchester, 4 Barb. S. C., 64; Norman v. Heist, 5 Watts & Serg., 171; Bumberger v. Clippenger, 5 Id., 311; Ervine's Appeal, 16 Penn. State, 257.)

II. We contend that there was actual fraud by the commissioners in the execution of their trust; and if we admit the special Act of February 14, 1844, to be valid, the sale and con

veyance made by the commissioners to themselves and their partners are void.

A trustee who becomes a purchaser of the trust estate is, in the estimation of law, a fradulent purchaser; and because of the temptation and opportunity to commit fraud, and the ease with which he can cover it from detection, such purchase is of itself a fraud, and a title procured under it is void, at the option of the cestui que trust.

The special Act of February 14, 1844, declares that this sale and the deeds made under it, "shall be valid in law," unless "impeached for absolute, direct and actual fraud." It does not, however, require this court to change the rules of evidence applicable in all like cases, where the question is, whether there was or was not actual fraud on the part of the trustee in dealing with the property and funds of his cestui que trust. The special Act merely relieves the trustee from the judgment of law con sequent upon their purchase. It leaves all inci dental questions open, to be dealt with according to general principles.

And the trustees stand in an inauspicious relation to the property; they are vendors of the estate of others, and they are purchasers for themselves; a court of equity will, therefore, examine their acts with jealous caution, and in dubious matters it can allow them the benefit of no favorable presumption. (Michoud v. Girod, 4 How., 503.)

And if the trustees have resorted to artifice or falsehood to conceal their interest; or if, contrary to their duty, they have retained the trust fund, and use it for their own benefit or that of their friends; or if they combined with others to prevent investigation, *or to [*508 postpone accountability, they will be held chargeable with actual fraud.

1st. Two of the commissioners, Leonard Walling and James Hopping, were undoubted partners at the time the sale was reported to the court, if not so by a secret understanding among themselves on the day of sale. But to cover and conceal their interest and that of the guardian, Joseph Taylor, they reported to the court that Ezra Osborn was the purchaser of lots 5, 6, and 10; Isaac K. Lippincott of lots 7 and 9, and Richard S. Burrowes of lot No. 8; which report was false.

And in the deed which they executed to John I. Taylor, April 1st, 1830, they recite that Osborn, Lippincott and Burrowes, bid off lots 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10, for John I, Taylor, as his agent, which recital was false, and together with the conveyance to him, intended to conceal their interest in the purchase.

This falsehood and concealment was for their own advantage. Had they reported the sale and the parties in interest truly to the court, it could not have been confirmed.

2d. They retained the trust fund for a long time in their hands, and used it for the benefit of themselves and their families.

No costs appear to have been taxed in the case; and the amount is left to conjecture. We suppose that $341.19 will be more than sufficient to cover them. This deducted will reduce the net proceeds of sale to $19,600.

(The counsel then went into a long examination of the state of the accounts, which is omitted.)

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3d. In order the better to secure to themselves the use of the trust fund, and to enable them to purchase and improve a portion of the estate with its proceeds, the commissioners associated themselves, and combined with Joseph Taylor, the guardian of four of the minor children and heirs, and through his connivance and participation avoided investigation and postponed accountability.

The record shows that, from April 1st, 1830, to April 1st 1831, there was in the hands of the commissioners and guardian, of the funds of the estate $6,025.29 From April 1st, 1831, to April 1st, 1832 10,017.56 There is no evidence in the record that any part of this fund passed out of the hands of the members of the partnership prior to the 7th of April, 1837. The record shows that there did certainly remain in their hands, until the last named date, at least $7,994.59.

The estate was thus made to pay for itself and improve itself; and it is not surprising that one of the partners (Primrose Hopping) testifies that he never paid anything on his purchase, and that John Hopping does not know when, where, or to whom he paid.

509*] *It is not at all probable that either of the commissioners, or their brothers, or the guardian, his son or son-in-law, ever paid a dollar towards their purchase.

The proceeds of the estate could not have been thus held to pay for the estate without combination between the commissioners and guardian.

4th. We will endeavor to show, that the report of the commissioners that the premises could not be divided without great prejudice to the interest of the owners was untrue, and induced by a purpose to possess themselves of a portion of the property. There were seven shares. The commissioners divided the property into fifteen parts before making their report that it could not be divided.

5th. There was a controversy at the bidding which was first decided by Primrose Hopping, a secret partner; and afterwards, on appeal, by the commissioners (two of them, as we think we have shown), also secret partners. It was decided in their own favor.

III. The recitals of the Act of February 14th, 1844, show that the Legislature was deceived and passed the Act under a mistake as to the facts. (Melntire Poor School v. Zanesville Canal and Manuf. Co., 9 Hammond's Ohio, 289, 290; 2 Bi. Com., 345, 346.)

1st. The Act contemplates that the deed which it confirms had been made to a party to whom the interest in the property had been transferred for a valuable consideration—not to a person who received the conveyance to conceal the interest of others.

The combination between the commissioners and the guardian to unite in the purchase of the estate-a combination fraudulent in itself— was not made known to the Legislature.

3d. The sale and conveyance by the commissioners were not made in good faith. There were suppressio veri and suggestio falsi in all their several papers relating to both.

4th. The purchase money was not honestly and fully paid to the persons entitled.

The counsel for the appellees bestowed a great deal of attention upon the Act passed by

the Legislature of 1844. Having given the views of the opposite counsel upon this point, it is proper to state also the views taken by the counsel for the appellees.

The Act of March, 1841, required proof, to the satisfaction of the court or jury, that the lands were sold fairly, and without fraudthat the deed was executed in good faith, for a sufficient consideration, and with the consent of reported purchasers.

The obvious meaning of this Act, as we contended, was actual *fraud, actual good [*510 faith. It was so understood by the Legislature, and so understood by the remonstrants, who opposed it to the last.

Yet Judge Baldwin ruled, in effect, that our condition was made worse rather than better by this Act. He said, first, that the Act was a legislative recognition of Doe v. Lambert; second, that we must convince both court and jury that there was no fraud; third, that the Act did not designate the character of fraud, which was to affect such deeds; that in consequence, all fraud, actual or legal, would vitiate the deed; that if the commissioners were interested in the sale (before their duties were discharged), however innocent or ignorant, or however large the price and fair the sale, it was a fraud in law, and vitiated the deed.

This opinion of Judge Baldwin, involved a necessity for further legislation. Notice of application for a private law, was published six weeks in the Monmouth Democrat (in the county where the lands lie), under a rule of the house. The bill, after such notice, was introduced and passed into a law, 14th February, 1814.

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First. Does that Act conflict with the Constitution of New Jersey or the United States? Second. Was there absolute, direct and actual fraud on the part of said commissioners?" Another point is made by the answer to the cross bill, to wit:

Third. Was the Act of 1844 a fraud on the Legislature, and can it be avoided for that cause?

1. Does the Act of 1844 violate the Constitution of New Jersey?

The Act is purely remedial. It relieves against a technical exception, to wit: the making of a deed to a person other than the bidder; and it relieves from a legal or constructive fraud (if there be any), though not from actual fraud. It is important to remember that even if the commissioners did become interested (which is expressly denied) the deed was not void, but voidable only by the heirs, and them only. (Den v. McKnight, 6 Hal., 386.) And equity even then would put them on terms.

Our Constitution, July 2d, 1776, gives plenary powers of legislation. Nothing is reserved from their power except the rights of conscience and trial by jury.

New Jersey had no bill of rights. Her constitution did not even separate the legislative and judicial departments of government. There was no provision against interference with vested rights or against retrospective laws. (1 Kent's Com., 448; 3 Story on Cont., 266; Bennett v. Boggs, 1 Bald. C.. 74; Bonaparte v. C. & A. R. R. Co., Id., 220.) Under her constitution of 1776 her *courts and [*511 jurists have even held her power of legislation

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