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travention of the policy of the State, as established by its constitution and laws.

The will requires that the benefit of the schools shall be confined to the poor, as a class. The constitution and laws of Louisiana require that free schools shall be established and kept under the supervision of public officers, where all white children alike, the rich and poor, may be educated by the same teachers, and on terms of equality.

Free schools confined to the poor alone give 398*] rise to distinction of classes in the community, are anti-republican in tendency, and conflict with the policy of the State. (Constitution of La., arts. 133, 134; Acts of Legislature of La., 1841, Digest, p. 239; Acts of Legislature of La., 1847, Digest Laws of La., 228 et seq.) And free schools in which poor white and colored children are to be received indiscriminately, and placed on an equality, would be in tolerable in states where slavery is recognized as a legal institution.

IX. If it be held that the City of New Orleans can take the trust estate bequeathed to it, the executors must be ordered to account to complainants for the half which is devised to the City of Baltimore.

The trust in favor of that city is to be there executed under the laws of Maryland. By that law the trust in question is void. It can not be there executed, because the object is not definite.

"Whenever the word 'poor' or 'poorest' has been used as a term of description in a devise or bequest, it has been held to be insufficient for uncertainty.' (Dashiell v. The AttorneyGeneral, Harr. & Johns., 399.)

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The devise to the school farm in McDonogh's will is for the express and sole purpose of establishing a school farm on an extensive scale for the destitute and the poorest of the poor male children, &c." (Record, p. 18.) And "for rescuing from vice and ignominy millions upon millions of the destitute youth, &c." (Page 22.) The general devise is "for the establishment and support of free schools wherein the poor, and the poor only, of both sexes, of all classes and castes of color, shall have admittance, free of expense." (Page 14.) Schools for the poorer classes, for whom these institutions are alone intended" (Page 27), where every poor child and youth, of every color, may receive a common English education." (Page 29.)

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Such trusts are incapable of execution, according to the concurrent decisions of the highest courts of Maryland. (Trippe v. Frazier, 4 Harr. & Johns., 446; Dashiell v. Attorney General, 5 Id., 398; Dashiell v. Attorney-General, 6 Id., 1; Tolson v. Tolson, 10 Gill & Johns., 159; Meade et al. v. Beale & Latmer, Executors of Ford, decided by Chief Justice Taney, in U. S. C. C., November Term, 1850.)

These decisions are in strict pursuance of those of the English courts, in cases quite as strongly appealing to good feeling as any of those termed charitable. (Ram on Legal Judgment, ch. 19, sec. 2, in 9th vol. Law Library, and cases there cited.)

And this court has more than once determined 399*] "that the *common law of each state must be ascertained by its general policy, the usages sanctioned by its courts, and its statutes; and there is no object of judicial ac

tion which requires the exercise of this discrimination more than the administration of charities." (Wheeler v. Smith, 9 How.. 78; Baptist Association v. Hart, 4 Wheat., 27; Inglis v. Sailors' Snug Harbor, 3 Pet., 112: Vidal v. Girard's Executors, 2 How., 129.)

And if the trust is incapable of execution in Maryland, though valid in Louisiana, the property falls to the legal heirs. (Hawley v. James, 7 Paige, Ch., 213; S. C., 5 Paige, Ch., 323, 441; S. C., 16 Wend., 61.)

So in England it has been held that where a trust was created in personal property abroad, to be invested in lands in England, contrary to the policy of her mortmain_laws, the devise is void. (Åttorney-General v. Mills, 3 Russell, 328.)

The right of Baltimore to accept such a trust is a question of personal capacity, to be governed by the law of the domicil, according to principles of law universally admitted. (Story's Conflict, secs. 51, 65, 446.)

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X. The residuary devises to the states of Louisiana and Maryland are the same in their nature and character as those to the cities of New Orleans and Baltimore. They are trusts 'That the Legislatures of those States, respectively, may carry my intentions, as expressed in this my last will and testament, into effect, as far and in the manner which will appear to them most proper" (p. 29); and this trust is fol lowed by the reiteration of his purpose in the strongest terms he could discover: "For this purpose, and this only, my desire being that one dollar shall never be expended to any other purpose, I destine the whole of my general estate, to form a fund in real estate, which shall never be alienated, but be held and remain forever sacred to it alone."

The qualification in the devise to the states merely gives a discretionary power as to the mode of execution of the purpose; it enables them to dispense with such of the machinery of administration of the trust as they might find cumbersome or ill adapted to the object in view, but it is subordinate to the chief illegal conditions of the scheme, and does not admit of its fractional observance. It gives a latitude as to the administration and machinery of the purposes subject to the proviso that these purposes are to be observed, viz.: 1st, the education of the poor of the two cities in preference to all others; and 2d, that this be done by the revenues of a fund formed of inalienable real estate. (Morrice v. Bishop of Durham, 9 Ves., 399; Briggs v. Penny, 8 Eng. Law and Eq.. 234, 235; Morrice v. Bishop of Durham, 10 Ves., 521; Story's Eq. Juris, secs. 979, a. b.; Wheeler v. Smith, 9 How., 55; Adams' Eq., 134, Am. ed.)

*Mr. Justice Campbell delivered the [*400 opinion of the court:

The appellees are the heirs at law of John McDonogh, a native of the State of Maryland, who died at McDonogh, near New Orleans, in the State of Louisiana, in 1850, leaving there a very large succession. In 1839, the decedent executed, at New Orleans, an olographic will for the disposal of the estate he might have at his death. This will is in a legal form, and has been admitted to probate in the District Court of New Orleans. It contains two par

ticular legacies which are not contested, and a single legacy under a universal title. In this bequest the testator declares. "that for the more general diffusion of knowledge, and consequent well-being of mankind," and "being convinced that he could make no disposition of those goods which the Most High had placed under his stewardship, as by means of which the poor will be instructed in wisdom and led into the path of holiness," he gives, wills and bequeaths all the rest, residue and remainder of his estate, real and personal, present and future, as well that which was then his as that which he might acquire at any time before his death, and of which he might die possessed (subject to certain annuities). to the corporations of the cities of New Orleans and Baltimore forever, one half to each," "to and for the several intents and purposes thereafter declared." The testator directs his executors to convert his personal estate into real property, whereby "the whole of his estate will become a permanent fund in real estate, affording rents, no part of which shall ever be touched, divided, sold or alienated, but shall forever remain together as one estate, and be managed" as he shall order.

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For the management of this estate, thus declared to be inalienable, he directs the two cities each to select, annually, three agents, whose duty it should be to receive seisin and possession of the estate from his executors, immediately after his death. They are "to lease or rent the lots," "cultivate the plantations," "collect the rents,' pay the annuities," "invest the moneys," and, in fine, do all acts necessary to its full and perfect management, according to the will;" the will of the testator being "that no part of the general estate, or revenue from rents arising from said general estate, shall go into the hands of the corporate authorities of the said cities, but that the said authorities should have forever the supervision of it."

The testator designed the joint management of the agents of the cities, and the joint supervision of their authorities over the estate, to be perpetual. He forbids the cities to vary, by agreement, or by any compromise, the relations he has established between them in regard to it. They must make no sale of their interests; no traffic with their powers of control; no sur401*] render, *for money or other consider ation, of their supervisory care. But should they combine to violate his scheme of management or appropriation, their rights are declared forfeited, and "the general estate" is limited over to the States of Louisiana and Maryland, "for the purpose of educating the poor of those States,' "under such a general system of education as their Legislatures should appoint." He further provides, that should there be "a lapse of the legacies from the failure of the legatees to accept, or any other cause or means whatsoever," the shares should inure for the benefit of the State or States in which the cities are situate; "that the Legislatures of those States respectively may carry his intentions, as expressed and set forth in the will, into effect, as far and in the manner which will appear to them most proper." The testator having provided for the perpetuity of the McDonogh estate, and the des

tination of its revenues, proceeds to develop a minute and detailed scheme for its management, improvement, and the expenditure of its income. He appropriates one eighth part of its annual revenue for forty years, for colonizing the free people of color, to the American Colonization Society, the sum not to exceed $25,000 per annum; one eighth part for the erection, in New Orleans, of an asylum for the poor of all ages, castes and colors; one eighth part to an incorporated society for the relief of orphan boys in New Orleans; and one eighth part for the establishment of a school farm in Maryland. The money appropriated to the asylum, sohool farm, and orphan boys. he requires to be invested as capital in real estate, and the rents only to be subject to the uses of the donees. The capital of the asylum and school farm is to be entirely collected before any appropriation takes place for their use; and for the one the capital is to be $3,000,000, and for the other $600,000. The remaining four eighths of the income of the general estate, for the present, and the whole, after the objects above mentioned are fulfilled, are destined "for the education of the poor, without the cost of a cent to them, in the cities of New Orleans and Baltimore, and their respective suburbs, in such a manner that every poor child and youth, of every color, in those places, may receive a common English education-based, however, be it particularly understood, on a moral and religious one;" the whole of the general estate "to form a fund in real estate which shall never be sold or alienated, but be held and remain forever sacred."

To carry his purposes into effect, he directs the selection of boards of managers for the different establishments, and suggests that acts of incorporation may become necessary to facilitate their operations.

*The appellees claim that, as to the [*402 property embraced in this bequest to the cities, that John McDonogh died intestate.

Their argument is, that although he makes in the coinmencement of his will a formal gift to the cities; although the cities are designated as his legatees in several clauses of the will, in precise terms; although the property is described as property "willed and bequeathed to the cities," that the testator has sedulously contrived to withdraw from them the seisin and possession of the whole estate, and has committed them to an uncertain and fluctu ating board, for the selection of which he has provided; that the dominion and use of this property, in so far as he has permitted either, has been confided to this board of managers, but that this board is held servilely to a code of regulations he has dictated, the aim of which is to hold the "McDonogh estate" together in perpetuity: that by these restrictive regulations the donations to the cities have become nugatory and unavailing.

This conclusion was adopted by the Circuit Court, whose decree is under revisal, and has been sustained in the argument at the bar of this court with great power and ability.

We may remark of the will of the testator, that it indicates his imagination to have become greatly disturbed by a long and earnest contemplation of plans which he says “had actuated and filled his soul from early boyhood

with a desire to acquire a fortune, and which then occupied his whole soul, desires and affections." In the effort to accomplish these cherished hopes he has overstepped the limits which the laws have imposed upon the powers of ownership, overlooked the practical difficulties which surround the execution of complex arrangements for the administration of property, greatly exaggerated the value of his estate; and unfolded plans far beyond its resources to effect; and has forgotten that false calculations,, mismanagement, or unfaithfulness might occur to postpone or prevent their attainment. Holding and declaring a firm faith in the interposition of Providence to render his enterprise successful, he apparently abandons himself, without apprehension or misgiving, to the contemplation of the "McDonogh estate," as existing through all time, without any waste or alienation, but improving and enlarging, 'extending the blessings of education to the poor through every city, town and hamlet" of the State where he was born, and the State in which he had lived and was to die; "rescuing from ignorance and idleness, vice and ignominy, millions upon millions of the destitute youth of the cities," and serving to bind communities and States in the bonds of brotherly love and affection forever."

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ing property, having determinate ends and abiding agencies to be employed in accomplishing them. These were all requisite for the full attainment of the purposes he has declared.

He excludes, it is true, the municipal authorities from the particular management of the estate, or the application of its revenues.

But, the municipal officers are not his lega tees. They are themselves but agents clothed with a temporary authority; nor do the officers perform their executive duties, except by the interposition of agents subordinate to their control and subject to their supervision. Had the testator confined himself to an unconditional donation of the general estate to the cities, for the use of public schools, it would scarcely have fallen under the personal management of the corporate authorities. They would probably *have appointed boards or agencies, [*404 to whom powers, more or less general, would have been confided, and over whose conduct their supervision would have been more or less particular and exact. The knowledge of this probably induced the testator to describe the board which his experience and observation had marked as the most efficient and responsible. He defines their number, the manner of their appointment, the form of their accounts, the modes of their business, and urgently exThe exaggeration which is apparent in the acts that the great, and to his eyes sacred, in403*] scheme he projects, *and the ideas he terests of his charity should not be blended expresses concerning it, afford the ground of with the vulgar and debauching concerns of the argument for the appellees. It is, how- daily corporate management. These directions ever, unfair to look to the parts of the will must be regarded as subsidiary to the general which relate to the disorders which reign in so- objects of his will, and whether legal and pracciety, or to his aspirations to furnish a relief ticable or otherwise, can exert no influence for these during all time," or to the prophetic over the question of its validity. Nor do we visions awakened by the exalted and exciting esteem the facts, that he has given his estate a ideas which dictated the conditions of the will, name, regards it as a distinct entity, and coupfor the rule of its interpretation. We must les with it language denoting perpetuity, imlook to the conveyances he has made in the in-portant as evidence that the cities are not his strument, the objects they are fitted to accomplish, and the agencies, if any, to be employed, and endeavor to frame these into a consistent and harmonious plan, accordant with his lead ing and controlling intentions. In reference to his controlling purpose there can be no mistake. He says, that the first, principal, and chief object" in his view is the education of the poor" of the two cities. With equal emphasis and precision he has disclaimed the desire of building the fortunes of his natural relations. He says, "that even to his children, if he had them (as he had not), and a fortune to leave behind him, he would, besides a virtuous educa tion, to effect which nothing should be spared, bequeath to each but a very small amount, merely to excite them to habits of industry and frugality, and no more.

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His ruling purpose had no connection with the poor of any one generation. His desire was to establish a foundation to exist for all time-a perpetuity.

legatees. A gift to a municipal corporation tends to create a perpetuity. Property thus held ceases to be the subject of donation, or of devise, of transfer by bankruptcy, or in the order of succession. The property of such a corporation is rarely the subject of sale, and practically it is out of commerce. McDonogh supposed that he could prohibit any alienation or division. We do not perceive, therefore, why he should have sought an incorporation of the general estate; nor do we understand that this forms a prominent portion of his scheme.

The will, through every part, discloses that the cities are the particular objects of his interest and the poor of the cities of his providence and bounty. His will designates the cities, by their corporate name, as his legatees, in definite and legal language. His plan of administration is to be executed through agents, selected by their corporate authorities, and to the end of conveying to the poor of the cities, perpetually, the fruits of his property. We should violate authoritative rules of legal interpretation, were we to disinherit the cities under these circumstances, and to substitute for them "an ideal being" called the "general estate," having no legal capacity, nor juridical character, and whose recognition, therefore, could have no result but to overturn the will of the testator. (C. C., 1706; 1 Spence, Eq. J.,

He knew that to attain this purpose a succession of persons, animated with a corresponding aim, must be obtained, and that the legal capacities of voluntary associations, even if he could hope to find such to enter into his plans, were wholly unfitted for his design; nor did he hope to effectually combine such persons by any power or prayer of his own. Hence, he selected as his devisees bodies corporate, endowed with the faculties of acquiring and hold- | 529, 530; 5 Ann., 557.)

Having thus determined that the legacy is to the cities by a universal title, and having extracted from the will the leading and controlling intention of the testator, the next inquiry is, whether a legacy given for such objects is valid.

The Roman jurisprudence, upon which that of Louisiana is founded, seems originally to have 405*] denied to cities a capacity to *inherit, or even to take by donation or legacy. They were treated as composed of uncertain persons, who could not perform the acts of volition and personalty involved in the acceptance of a succession. The disability was removed by the Emperor of Adrian in regard to donations and leg acies, and soon legacies ad ornatum civitatis and ad honorem civitatis became frequent. Legacies for the relief of the poor, aged and help less, and for the education of children, were ranked of the latter class. This capacity was enlarged by the Christian emperors, and after the time of Justinian there was no impediment. Donations for charitable uses were then favored; and this favorable legislation was diffused over Europe by the canon law, so that it became the common law of Christendom. When the power of the clergy began to arouse the jealousy of the temporal authority, and it became a policy to check their influence and wealth-they being, for the most part, the managers of property thus appropriated-limitations, upon the capacity of donors to make such gifts, were first imposed. These commenced in England in the time of Henry III.; but the learned authors of the history of the corporations of that realm affirm that cities were not included in them "perhaps upon the ground that the grants were for the public good;" and although "the same effect was produced by the grant in perpetuity to the inhabitants," "the same practical inconvenience did not arise for it, nor was it at the time considered a mortmain." (Mereweth. & Steph. Hist. Corp., 489, 702.)

Supreme Court of Louisiana (in which State these laws were long in force) attest their favor to such donations. (De Pontalba v. New Orleans, 3 Ann., 660.)

This legislation of Europe was directed to check the wealth and influence of juridical persons who had existed for centuries there, some of whom had outlived the necessities which had led to their organization and endowment. Political reasons entered largely into the motives for this legislation-reasons which never have extended their influence to this continent, and consequently, it has not been introduced into our systems of jurisprudence. (2 Kent's Com., 282, 283; Whicker v. Hume, 14 Beav., 509.)

The precise result of the legislation is, that corporations there, with the capacity of acquiring property, must derive their capacity from the sovereign authority, and the practice is, to limit that general capacity within narrow limits, or to subject each acquisition to the revisal of the sovereign. We have examined the legislation of the European states, so as better to appreciate that of Louisiana. No corporation can exist in Louisiana, have a public character, appear in courts of justice, exercise rights as a political body, except by legislative authority; and each may be dissolved, when deemed necessary or convenient to the public interest. Corporations created by law are permitted to possess an estate, receive donations and legacies, make valid obligations and contracts, and manage their own business. (Civil Code, tit. 10, ch. 1, 2, 3, art. 418, et. seq.)

The privileges which thus belong to corporations legally existing, have been granted to the inhabitants of New Orleans in various legislative Acts. The authorities of the city have, besides, received powers of government extending to all subjects affecting their order, tranquillity and improvement. It is agreed, that these powers are limited to the objects for which they are granted, and cannot be employed for ends foreign to the corporation. (1 Paige, 214; 15 N. H., 317; 4 S. & S., C., 156; 3 Ann., 294.)

A century later, there was a direct inhibition upon grants to cities, boroughs, and others, which have a perpetual commonalty, and But there can be no question as to the degree others which have offices perpetual," and, of appreciation in which the subject of educatherefore, be as perpetual as people of relig- tion is held in Louisiana. The constitution of ion." The English statutes of mortmain for the State imposes upon the Legislature the duty feit to the King or superior lord the estates of providing public schools for gratuitous edugranted, which right is to be exerted by entry; cation; and various acts attest the zeal of that a license, therefore, from the King severs the department in performing that public duty. forfeiture. The legal history of the Continent Among these, there is one which authorizes on this subject does not materially vary from and requires the corporate authorities of the that of England. The same alternations of City of New Orleans to establish them in that favor, encouragement, jealousy, restraint, and city, and to enact ordinances for their organiprohibition are discernible. The Code Napo-zation, government and discipline; they are likeleon, maintaining the spirit of the ordinances wise charged with the instruction, [*407 of the monarchy, in 1731, 1749, 1762, provides education and reformation of juvenile delin"that donations, during life or by will, for the quents and vagrants. These acts are from a benefit of hospitals of the poor of a commune, sovereign authority, and endue the city with or of establishments of public utility, shall not the powers of acquiring, retaining, and dispostake effect, except so far as they shall be authoring of property, without limitation as to value, ized by an ordinance of the government."

The learned Savigny, writing for Germany, says: "If modern legislation, for reasons of policy or political economy, have restrained conveyances in mortmain, that those restrictions formed no part of the common law." 406*] The laws of Spain *contain no material change to the Roman and ecclesiastical laws upon this subject. The Reports of the

and assign to it, as one of its municipal functions, the charge of popular education. No parliamentary grant or royal license in Great Britain-no government ordinance in Francecould remove more effectually a disability, if one existed, or create a capacity, if one were wanting, to the corporations of those countries. (Rev. Stat. La., 41, 111, 116, 117, 144, 239; 2 Rob., 244, 491.)

We shall now examine the devise to the cities, in connection with the various conditions annexed to it. The appellees insist it is a disposition reprobated by law, for that it contains substitutions and fidei commissa," which are prohibited by article 1507 of the Code, and which annul the donation in which they are found.

We shall not inquire whether the prohibition extends to donations in favor of corporations, and for objects of public utility, though this seems to have been a question in France. (Lefeb. des Don. Piesuses, 31, 33.)

We shall limit the inquiry to the nature of the prohibited estates, to determine whether they exist in this legacy. The terms are of Roman origin, and were applied to modes of donation by wil, common during its empire, and from thence were transferred to the deriv ative systems of law in use upon the continent of Europe. The substitute was a person appointed by the testator to take the inheritance, in case of the incapacity or refusal of the instituted heir. A pater familias was authorized to make the will of his son during his nonage, or lunacy, or other incapacity to perform the act; and in the case of his death, under such circumstances, the appointee took the succession. This was a mode of substitution.

The fidei commissum originated in a prayer, petition, or request, of a testator upon his instituted heir, to deliver the inheritance, or some portion of it, to a designated person. Every testament being originally a law of succession, proposed by the testator, and consented to by the Roman people, the language of legislation, that is, of mandate and authority, was essential to its validity. Precatory words were insufficient to raise an obligation upon the heir, or to vest property in the donee. This was afterwards changed, and words of request then imposed a charge upon the heir, to maintain the faith in which the testator had confided. Afterwards, the distinctions between words of mandate and of request became obsolete, and both were con sidered with reference to their significance of 408*] the intentions of the testator. The notion of a fidei commissum thus became limited, implying no more than an estate in possession, encumbered with the charge to surrender it to another. This might be pure and simplethat is, the duty to surrender might be immediate, or it might be on a condition, or after the expiration of a term even extending to the life of the gravatus. The substitute originally came in the place of another; the idea was modified to include those who came after another under certain circumstances.

wealth in a few families at the expense of the interests of the community. The vices of the system were freely exposed by the political writers of the last century, and a general antip athy awakened against it. Substitutions having this object were prohibited during the revolution in France, and that prohibition was continued in the Code Napoleon, whose authors have exposed with masterly ability the evils which accompanied them. (Motifs et Dis., 375.)

This prohibition was transferred to the Code of Louisiana, with the addition of the fidei commissa. These terms imply a disposition of property through a succession of donees. The substitution of the article 1507 of the Code heing an estate for life, to be followed by a continuing estate in another by the appointment of the testator.

The fidei commissa of the Louisiana Code are estates of a similar nature, implying a limita tion over from one to another. They are the fidei commissa of the Spanish and French laws, in so far as those estates are not tolerated by other articles of the Code. We shall not attempt to define them from an examination of the Code and the reports of the Supreme Court of that State. It is not necessary for the decis ion of this case. We are unable to perceive anything in the Code to justify the supposition that the English system of trusts, whether in its limited signification as applied in conveyanc ing, or in its broad and comprehensive import, as applied by the courts of chancery, were within the purview of the authors of this Code in framing this prohibition. The terms [*409

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substitution" and fidei commissa are words foreign to the English law. They are applied to no legal relation which exists in it, and describe nothing which forms a part of it. The technical words, of "charged to preserve and to render," in article 1507, which embrace so much to a continental lawyer, only provoke in quiries in the mind of one accustomed to the language of the common law. The allusion to the Trebillianic portion" is to a right of which there has never been a counterpart in the En glish system. The whole article refers exclusively to things of a continental origin. The estates known as fidei commissa and substitutions, in so far as regards the order of persons and the duration of their interest, may be created by de-. vise in an English will. This can be done without the interposition of trustees or with them. That is legal, estates or equitable estates can be limited to embody those conditions of the fidei commissa and substitution; but the separation of the same estate into parts, legal and equitable, with separate courts in which their respective qualities may be represented, is not of continental origin. We may say of this as Sir William Grant says of another doctrine of equity, "that in its causes, its objects, its provisions, its qualifications and its exceptions, it is a law wholly English." We find nothing of the fidei commissa or substitution in the legacy to the cities. The mischiefs resulting from conSuch a substitution might be properly called veyances in mortmain, and which led to rea "substitution fidei commissaire," or an "ob-straints upon them, also existed in the substitulique substitution." This mode of limiting estates from degree to degree, and generation to generation, was much employed on the con tinent of Europe, and served to accumulate

The conjunction of the fidei commissum with the substitution would then become a natural mode of settlement of property. The instituted heir might be charged to hold and enjoy the succession for his life, and at his death that it should go to another (his heir), and that heir might in turn become a gravatus, for the benefit of another successor, and so from generation to generation.

tions of the French law, and led to their suppression. The remedies for the mischief, in consequence of the difference of the persons, were essentially variant. In the case of natural

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