was regarded as essential, in case of grants indefinite as to the location. The survey would be rather matter of form than of substance, and might, therefore, very well be dispensed with. In this case, the description in the grant is, perhaps, sufficiently specific to have enabled the grantee to take possession without the necessity of a survey; and if possession had been taken in pursuance of the grant, he, or those claiming under him, would have presented a proper case for confirming the title under the Act; and the decree of the court below in favor of the claim might well be sustained. But no possession of the land was ever taken under this imperfect and incomplete grant, either during the existence of the Spanish government or since the cession to the United States Not only has no possession been taken, but, for aught that appears in the record, no action has been had, or claim set up, under the grant, during the whole of the period, from its date down to the institution of the suit, 16th of May, 1847. Nor have we any proof of the actual existence of the grant, at all, until the 19th of April, 1835, when the grantee sold and quitclaimed his interest to Martin, under whom the plaintiff claims. No account has been given of it for the period of some thirty-six years. The plaintiff rests his claim exclusively upon the evidence of the signature of the Governor to the concession, under date of 1st of February, 1779, and its production, 16th of May, 1846, before the court when the suit was commenced, together with the transfer from Guidry, the grantee, to Martin, in 1835, and from the latter to himself, in 1846; and this unconnected with any possession of the premises, or claim of right of possession to the same, in the mean time. absence of claim or assertion of right to the land, and absence even of any proof of the actual existence of the grant for the period of more than thirty-six years, we are of opinion, lay a foundation for the inference or presumption of abandonment of the original concession made by Gayoso, too strong to be resisted; at least, a presumption of abandonment that called for explanation on the part of the plaintiff, accounting for the neglect to take the possession, for the great delay in the assertion of the claim, and for the absence of any evidence of even the existence of the grant itself for so long a period of time. On these grounds, we think the decree of the court below erroneous, and should be reversed, proceedings remitted to the court below, and petition be dismissed. ORDER. This cause came on to be heard on the tran script of the record from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana, and was argued by counsel; on consideration whereof, it is now here ordered, adjudged and decreed by this court, that the decree of the said District Court in this cause be, and the same is hereby reversed and annulled; and that this cause be, and the same is hereby remanded to the said District Court, with directions to dismiss the petition of the claimant. Cited-13 How., 6, 8. THE UNITED STATES, Appellants, V. JOSEPH HUGHES. perfect. The court again decides, as in the preceding case, that where a Spanish grant was made in 1798, and no evidence was offered that possession was taken under the *grant, nor any claim of right or title [*5 made under it until 1837, nor any evidence given to account for the neglect, the presumption is that the claim had been abandoned. In this case, also, there was no proof that the persons who purported to convey as heirs, were actually the heirs of the party whom they professed to represent. THIS was a land case, arising under the Acts In view of this state of facts, it is impossible Spanish grant-inchoate title lost by neglect to to deny, but that the claim comes before us under circumstances of very great suspicion; or to resist the conclusion that the grant, if made, had been abandoned. It is difficult to account for the neglect to take possession, or to set up any right or claim to the land for so long a period, upon any other supposition; especially when we see that the description of the premises in the concession is sufficiently specific to have enabled the grantee to take possession under it without the aid of a previous survey. 4*] *This conclusion is strengthend, when take view Governor Gayoso himself, who made the grant in question, respecting the disposition of public lands, published at New Orleans, 9th of September, 1797, about a year and a half before it was made. According to the 14th article, it is declared that the settler shall forfeit the lands, if he fails to establish himself upon them within one year, and shall have put under labor ten arpents in every hundred, within three years. And in the regulations of the Intendant, Morales, published at the same place, July 17, 1799, some six months after the date of this grant, possession and cultivation, within a limited time after the concession, are expressly enjoined, under the penalty of forfeiture. The neglect to comply with these regula tions, thus positively enjoined, within the three years that the Spanish government continued after the date of the grant, together with the from the District Court of the United States for Louisiana. The parties were the same as in the preceding case. The petition in this case was filed in the District Court, for the Eastern District of Louisiana, on the 16th of June, 1846. The petitioner, Hughes, claims under a grant alleged to have been made by Governor Gayoso to Andrè Martin, on the 10th of October, 1798, of a tract of land of twenty-eight arpents front, with a depth of one hundred arpents, situated on the west bank of the Atchafalaya, about one league above where the trace or road from Opelousas to Point Coupée crosses the said river. The petitioner alleges further, that said Martin took immediate possession, &c., and that the board of commissioners made a favorable report on the claim in the year 1840, but that Congress never acted on it, and that he holds a title to one thousand arpents thereof, &c. He thereupon prays that his title may be decreed to be good. The answer of the United States is a general denial of the allegations of the petition. The evidence of the original title is the petition of Andre Martin to the Governor for the said tract of land, and the Governor's decree thereon, signed by him in these words: Granted forever, that he may establish it,' and dated "New Orleans, October 10th, 1798." Hughes claimed title under a deed from certain persons who represented themselves to be the heirs of Martin, dated 14th of July, 1848. The District Court decided in favor of the petitioner, and the United States appealed. It was argued by Mr. Crittenden (Attorney General) for the United States, and by Messrs. Janin and Taylor for the appellee. Mr. Justice Nelson delivered the opinion of the court: This is an appeal from a decree of the District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. The plaintiff, Hughes, claimed in the court below 3,800 arpents of land, situate in Louisiana, on the west bank of the Atchafalaya River, about one league above where the road from Opelousas to Point Coupée crosses said 6*] river under a concession from *Governor Gayoso to one Andrè Martin, 10th of October, 1798. The petition was presented to the District Court on the 16th of June, 1846, under the Act of 17th June, 1844, reviving the Act of 26th May, 1824, praying for a confirmation of the grant in pursuance of the provisions of the Act. Evidence was given of the handwriting of Martin to the application to the Governor for the grant of the tract in question; and of the handwriting of the Governor to the grant. The plaintiff rests his claim exclusively upon the production and proof of this incomplete grant by Governor Gayoso in 1798, of his title as derived from the grantee in 1848, and of the application to the officers of the Land Office at Opelousas in 1837. We have already held, in a previous case of this plaintiff and the United States, that the neglect to take possession, and the absence of any claim under the grant, and of any evidence even of the existence of the grant itself, for so long a period of time, afford such a violent presumption of abandonment of the claim, that unless explained to the satisfaction of the court, it is impossible, consistent with any sound principles of law or of equity, to uphold it. We refer to the opinion given in that case on this point as decisive of the present one. There is also an additional objection to a recovery in this case, that did not exist in the one referred to. The plaintiff *shows no [*7 title to the land in question. There is no proof in the record that the persons joining in the conveyance to him of the premises in July, 1848, were the heirs of Martin, the original grantee. The recital in the instrument is no evidence of the fact. The proper proof should have been furnished of the heirship. For these reasons we are of opinion that the decree of the court below is erroneous, and should be reversed, and remit the proceedings to the court below, with directions to dismiss the petition. ORDER. This cause came on to be heard on the tran script of the record from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana, and was argued by counsel; on consideration whereof, it is now here ordered, ad judged and decreed by this court, that the decree of the said District Court in this cause be, and the same is hereby reversed and annulled; and that this cause be, and the same is hereby The plaintiff also gave in evidence a convey-rections to dismiss the petition of the claimant. remanded to the said District Court, with diance by notarial act under date of 14th of July, 1848, purporting to be made by the heirs of Andrè Martin, the original grantee, to himself, conveying one thousand arpents, part of the tract of 3,800 arpents, to be taken off the front part of the tract, Evidence was also given of a notice to the registers and receivers of the Land Office at Opelousas in Louisiana, of a claim on behalf of the heirs of Martin by their attorney, for confirmation of the claim under date 1st of Feb. ruary, 1837. What action took place before these officers on the application, if any, does not appear on the record, nor have we been referred to any proceedings therein. There is no evidence that possession was ever taken of the land by the grantee, or any person claiming under him; nor of any claim of right to the possession; or of any right or title under the concession, or of the actual existence even of the concession itself, until the application to the register and receiver in 1837, a period of over thirty-eight years from its date. Nor is there any evidence in the record accounting for the neglect to take possession, or for the absence of evidence of an assertion of right under the grant, or of even the existence of the grant itself for so long a period of time. Cited-13 How., 8. THE UNITED STATES, Appellants, v. JOSEPH HUGHES. The decision in the two preceding cases again affirmed. THIS HIS was a land case arising under the Acts of 1824 and 1844, and came up by appeal from the District Court of the United States for Louisiana. The parties were the same as in the two preceding cases. Joseph Hughes filed his petition on the 16th June, 1846, claiming 3,200 arpents of land, as having been granted by the Governor of Louisiana, Gayoso, on the 26th April, 1798, to Andrè Martin. He alleges that said Mart in took immediate possession, and held it till his death. That in the year 1840, the board of commissioners reported favorably on said claim, but that Congress had never acted upon it; and that he will, on the trial, produce good and legal sales and transfers of the said tract of land from the heirs of the said Martin to himself. The answer put in, on the part of the United States, consists of a general denial of the state ments in the petition. The evidences of title exhibited on the part of the petitioner were, 1st. The petition of Andrè Martin to the Governor for a grant of 3,200 arpents, &c., dated March 28, 1798. 8*] *2d. The concession and order of survey made by Governor Gayoso, and dated 26th April, 1798. 3d. The sales and deeds of conveyance by the heirs of Andrè Martin, under which the petitioner, Hughes, claims, dated respectively the 13th and 14th of July, 1848. Testimony was offered to prove the genuine ness of Gayoso's signature to the order of survey. The District Court decided in favor of the petitioner and the United States appealed. It was argued by Mr. Crittenden (Attorney-General) for the United States, and by Messrs. Janin and Taylor for the appellee. Mr. Justice Nelson delivered the opinion of the court: This is an appeal from a decree of the District Court of the Eastern District of Louisiana. The plaintiff claimed three thousand arpents of land situate in Louisiana, and fronting on the back part of lands of Oliver Thibodeaux, Theodore Thibodeaux, and Claude Martin, under a concession to Andrè Martin from Governor Gayoso, 26 April, 1798. The proceed ings were under the Act of 17th June, 1844, reviving the Act of 26th May, 1824. Evidence was given of the handwriting of Martin to the application for the land, and of Governor Gayoso to the concession. The plaintiff also produced evidence of a conveyance of the premises to himself by an instrument bearing date 14th July, 1848, purporting to have been executed by the heirs of Andrè Martin the original grantee. And also notice to the register and receiver of the Land Office at Opelousas, Louisiana, of an application on behalf of the heirs, by their attorney. for confirmation of the grant under date of 23d December, 1836. The concession was an inchoate and incom plete grant; and there is no evidence that any possession was ever taken of the land, nor of any claim set up under the grant to the same, from its date down to 1836, when notice was given to the officers of the Land Office; nor any evidence of the existence of the grant during the whole of this period. The case falls directly within the principles of the two previous cases just decided. There is, also, no proof of any title in the plaintiff derived from the original grantee. The conveyance purporting to be executed by the heirs notwithstanding the recitals to that effect, furnishes no evidence of the fact of heirship. We think the decree of the court below erroneous, and should be reversed; and that the proceedings be remitted to the court below, and the petition be dismissed. This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana, and was argued by counsel; on consideration whereof, it is now here ordered, adjudged and decreed by this court, that the decree of the said District Court in this cause be, and the same is hereby reversed, and annulled; and this cause be, and the same is hereby remanded to the said District Court, with directions to dismiss the petition of the claimant. THE UNITED STATES, Appellants, V. ARMAND PILLERIN ET AL. THE UNITED STATES, Appellants, v. A. B. ROMAN. THE UNITED STATES, Appellants, V. CARLOS DE VILLEMONT'S HEIRS ET AL. THE UNITED STATES, Appellants, V. JEAN B. LABRANCHE'S HEIRS. French grants made after cession of Louisiana to Spain not valid-continued possession, presumption of confirmation by Spain. How., 609, that French grants of land in Louisiana, made after the Treaty of Fontainbleau, by which Louisiana was ceded to Spain, are void, unless confirmed by the Spanish authorities before the cession to the United States. This court again decides, as in 9 How., 127, and 10 But if there has been continued possession under the grants so as to lay the foundation for presuming à confirmation by Spain, then the cases are not included within the Acts of 1824 and 1844, which look only to inchoate and equitable titles. The District Court of the United States has therefore no jurisdiction. THESE four cases were land cases, arising under the Acts of 1824 and 1844, and were appeals from the District Court of the United States for Louisiana. They were cases of French grants made after the Treaty of Fontainbleau by which Louisiana was ceded to Spain. They were argued by Mr. Crittenden (Attorney-General) for the United States, and by Messrs. Janin and Taylor for the ap pellees, except the second, which was argued by Mr. Soule. Mr. Chief Justice Taney delivered the opinion of the court: These four cases are all French grants made after the Treaty of Fontainbleau, by which Louisiana was ceded to Spain. We have already decided in the cases of The United States v. Reynes, 9 How., 127, and The United States v. D'Auterive, 10 How., 607, that grants of this description are void, unless confirmed by the Spanish authorities before the cession to the United States. In some of these cases evidence has been offered *of continued [*10 possession by the grantees of those claiming under them, ever since the grants were made. But if there has been such a continued possession, and acts of ownership over the land as would lay the foundation for presuming a confirmation by Spain of these grants, or of either of them or any portion of either of them, such confirmation would amount to an absolute title, and not an inchoate or imperfect one. For all of the grants are absolute, or upon conditions subsequent; and if they had been originally made by competent authority, would have passed the legal title at the time, subject only to be devested by a breach of the condition, in the cases where a condition subsequent is annexed. Such a title, if afterwards recognized by the Spanish authorities, is protected by the Treaty, and is independent of any leg islation by Congress, and requires no proceed ing in a court of the United States to give it validity. Titles of this description were not therefore embraced in the Acts of 1824 and 1844, under which these proceedings were had. These laws were passed to enable persons who had only an inchoate and equitable title, to obtain an absolute and legal one, by proceeding in the District Court in the manner prescribed. And when the title under which the party claims would be a complete and absolute one, if granted by competent authority or established by proof, the District Courts have no jurisdiction under the Acts of Congress above mentioned to decide upon its validity. The Act of 1824 is very clear upon this point; and it has always been so construed by this court. Upon this ground the decree of the District Court in each of these cases is erroneous and must be reversed and a mandate issued directing the petitions to be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. But this decision is not to prejudice the rights of the respective petitioners or either of them in any suit where the absolute and legal title to these lands or any portion of them may be in question, or prevent them from showing if they can that the French grant was recog nized as valid or confirmed by the Spanish authorities before the Treaty of St. Ildefonso. ORDER. These causes came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana, and were argued by counsel; on consideration whereof, it is now here ordered, adjudged and decreed by this court, that the decree of the said District Court in these causes be, and the same is hereby reversed and annulled; and that these causes be, and the same are hereby remanded to the said District Court, with directions to dismiss the petitions of the claimants for want of jurisdiction. Cited-15 How., 37. THIS HIS was an appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Virginia. The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court so far as they bear upon the question of jurisdiction; and it is unnecessary to state the other facts. It was argued in this court by Mr. Fultz for the appellant, and by Mr. Stuart for the ap pellee. Mr. Chief Justice Taney delivered the opinion of the court: Thi cases may be disposed of in a few words. James Points, the appellee, was appointed assignee of Henry Hottle who had been declared a bankrupt, by the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Virginia. And, upon the petition of the assignee and the hearing of the parties concerned, certain settlements and transfers of property made between the bankrupt and the appellant, were declared to be fraudulent, and set aside by the court. From this decree Crawford appealed to this court. It is very clear that the appeal cannot be sustained. The appellant endeavors to support it, upon the ground that there is no Act of Congress now in force establishing a Circuit Court for the Western District of Virginia. But, assuming this to be the case, it does not follow that an appeal to this court can be taken from For we can the decree of the District Court. exercise no appellate power, unless it is conferred by law; and there is no Act of Congress authorizing an appeal to this court from the decision of a District Court in a case of bankruptcy. It was so held in Nelson v. Carland, 1 How., 265, and in the case Ex-parte Christy, 3 How., 314, 315. Indeed, if an appeal would lie from a final decree of the District Court, this appeal cannot be maintained. For the decree is not final. An account is directed to be taken of the rents and profits of certain lands, with an option to the appellant to purchase them at a price named in the decree; and in that event he is to be discharged from the account for rents and profits. And, moreover, he is permitted to retain possession of certain slaves, until it should be ascertained whether the other assets of the bankrupt's estate would not be sufficient to pay his *debts; and an order to account for their [*12 hire and the profits of their labor is suspended in the mean time. While these things remain to be done the decree is not final, and no appeal from it would lie to this court, even if it had been the decree of a circuit court exercising its ordinary equity jurisdiction. Upon either ground, therefore, this appeal cannot be maintained, and is therefore dismissed for want of jurisdiction. ORDER. This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the District Court of the United States for the Western District of JAMES POINTS, Assignee in Bankruptcy of Virginia, and was argued by counsel; on con HENRY HOTTLE. Jurisdiction-Appeal. An appeal does not lie to this court, from the decision of a District Court in a case of bankruptcy. Even if it would, the decree of the District Court in this case is not a final decree. sideration whereof, it is now here ordered, adjudged and decreed by this court, that this cause be, and the same is hereby dismissed for the want of jurisdiction. Cited 2 Wall., 110. and the Bank was not controlled by the State, but by a president and directors appointed by the Legislature. For the capital and powers of the Bank, see 3 Ala. Rep., 267. According to a previous judgment of this court, the issuance THE BRANCH OF THE BANK OF THE and circulation of its notes as money, by such STATE OF ALABAMA. a bank is no violation of the Constitution of the United States. (11 Pet., 311, 315, 318, 320, LORENZO 321, 322.) Mr. Justice McLean delivered the opinion of the court: This is a writ of error to the Supreme Court. of 1789. Bank bills are not "bills of credit," within the of Alabama, under the 25th section of the Act Constitution. The bills of a banking corporation, which has corporate property, are not bills of credit within the meaning of the Constitution, although the State which created the bank is the only stockholder, and pledges its faith for the ultimate redemption of the bills. THES THESE cases were brought up from the Supreme Court of Alabama, by a writ of error issued under the 25th section of the Judi ciary Act. The facts and pleadings are stated in the opinion of the court. It was argued by Mr. Campbell for the plaintiffs in error, and Mr. Hopkins for the defend ants. Mr. Campbell contended that the transactions as described by the pleas, fell within the prohibitory clause of the Constitution of the United States, "that no State shall issue a bill of credit," and cited 4 Peters, 410; 11 Peters, 313; 7 Ala. Rep., 18. An action was brought in the Circuit Court of Mobile County against the plaintiffs in error, by the commissioners and trustees of the banks of Alabama, under an Act of the State, by serving a notice on them in behalf of the Branch of the Bank of the State of Alabama, at Mobile, as the makers of a promissory note expressly made payable and negotiable at the said Branch Bank, dated 2d of December, 1843, and date, to pay the said Branch Bank by the name in which they promised, twelve months after and description of Henry B. Halcomb, cashier, or bearer, the sum of four thousand dollars, with interest thereon from date, for value received, which said promissory note is regularly due and unpaid, and is the property of the Bank. The defendants below first pleaded nil debet, on which issue was joined. In their second plea, they aver that the consideration of the note sued for consisted of cer Mr. Hopkins, for the defendants in error: In the case of Briscoe v. The Bank of the Com-tain bills of credit issued by the *State [*14 monwealth of Kentucky, 11 Peters, 257, this of Alabama, under the name and style of the court decided that the notes issued by such a at Mobile, by which the State, under that name, Branch of the Bank of the State of Alabama, bank as the one which is the defendant in er ror, were not bills of credit within the prohi bition of the Constitution of the United States. In the case of Owen v. The Branch Bank at Mo. 13*] bile, *which is the defendant in error, the Supreme Court of Alabama decided that the notes issued by this Bank were not bills of cred it. (3 Ala. Rep., 258.) The charter of this Bank is a public statute of the State of Alabama. (6 Ala. Rep., 289, 294.) This court takes notice judicially of such statutes, as it does of the Acts of Congress. (9 Peters, 607, 625, 626.) This Bank had a large capital, and it is not denied in the pleas, and it was in the case of The Kentucky Bank, that the capital was paid. Its notes were received in payment of taxes and debts due to the State of Alabama. As a corporation the Bank incurred responsibility, and gave credit to its paper. It was liable for the notes and bills it issued, and its capital was bound, like that of stock banks, for the pay ment of its notes in gold and silver. All its property, including its capital. was a fund for the payment of the debts of the Bank. The notes of the Bank were circulated upon its own credit, and every holder of the notes had the power to enforce payment, as the Bank could be sued. The notes were not issued by the State, but by the Bank in its corporate name, mand. That these bills of credit were for such promised to pay the bearer of the same on desums as showed they were intended to be circulated as money. And that the object of the State was to circulate them as money, through the agency of the Bank, for a profit. The third plea avers that the note, on which plaintiff as a trustee for the State, and that the suit is brought, was made and delivered to the bills were received of the Bank by the defendthe profit of the State; that the Bank was conants, to put them into circulation as money for trolled by the State, and that it was alone liable for the issues made by the Bank in the transac tion stated. ant's pleas except the first one, which demurrer The plaintiff below demurred to the defendwas sustained. And on a jury being called to try the issue they found the amount of the note and interest for the plaintiff, on which judgby writ of error before the Supreme Court of ment was entered. This judgment was taken Alabama, which affirmed the judgment. And this writ of error is now prosecuted in this court to reverse the judgment of affirmance. It is argued that this case should be dismissed, as there was no special assignment of error in the Supreme Court of Alabama, as required by the law and the practice of that court. The Supreme Court of Alabama exercised ment of the Circuit Court. This court cannot jurisdiction in the case, and affirmed the judg look behind that judgment and dismiss the |