and use those arguments that have an effect upon the judgment and understanding. But sometimes people are influenced more by their feelings than by their judgment. In this case, if we wish to convince or persuade them, we must adapt our arguments to their feelings. The parties who are thus influenced by their passions can hardly be said to reason; but we who are trying to influence them may be reasoning nevertheless: We are using a means tʊ accomplish an end; we are selecting such arguments, and placing them in such a form, as are best adapted to produce an impression on the mind of the individual with whom we converse. These arguments, according to Dr. Watts, are the following :—

"There is yet another rank of arguments which have Latin names; their true distinction is derived from the topics or middle terms which are used in them, though they are called an address to our judgment, our faith, our ignorance, our profession, our modesty, and our passions. If an argument be taken from the nature or existence of things, and addressed to the reason of mankind, it is called argumentum ad judicium. When it is borrowed from some convincing testimony, it is argumentum ad fidem, an address to our faith. When it is drawn from any insufficient medium whatsoever, and yet the opposer has not skill to refute or answer it, this is argumentum ad ignorantiam, an address to our ignorance. When it is built upon the professed principles or opinions of the person with whom we argue, whether the opinions be true or false, it is named argumentum ad hominem, an address to our professed principles. St. Paul often uses this argument when he reasons with the Jews, and when he says, 'I speak as a man.' When the argument is fetched from the sentiments of some wise, great, or good men, whose authority we reverence and hardly dare oppose, it is called argumentum ad verecundium, an address to our modesty. I add finally, When an argument is borrowed from any topics which are suited to engage the inclinations and passions of the hearers on the side of the speaker, rather than to convince the judgment, this is argumentum ad passiones, an address to the passions; or, if it be made publicly, it is called ad populum, or an appeal to the people."-Watts's Logic.

The argument called Argumentum ad hominem requires a further illustration, and this we have in the Doctor's Improvement of the Mind :"

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"Sometimes we may make use of the very prejudices under which a person labours, in order to convince him of some parti

cular truth, and argue with him upon his own professed principles as though they were true. This is called argumentum ad hominem, and is another way of dealing with the prejudices of men.

"Suppose a Jew lies sick of a fever, and is forbidden flesh by his physician: but hearing that rabbits were provided for the dinner of the family, desired earnestly to eat of them; and suppose he became impatient because his physician did not permit him, and he insisted upon it, that it could do him no hurt; surely, rather than let him persist in that fancy and that desire, to the danger of his life, I would tell him that these animals were strangled, which sort of food was forbidden by the Jewish law, though I myself may believe that law is now abolished.

Encrates used the same means of conviction when he saw a Mahometan drink wine to excess, and heard him maintain the lawfulness and pleasure of drunkenness: Encrates reminded him that his own prophet Mahomet had utterly forbidden all wine to his followers and the good man restrained his vicious appetite by his superstition, when he could no otherwise convince him that drunkenness was unlawful, nor withhold him from excess!"

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14. The effects of circumstances upon the disposition of the mind may fairly be placed under this head, and they enter largely into our daily reasonings.

On this ground Lord Erskine advocated his bill for preventing cruelty to animals.

"In what I am proposing to your lordships, disinterested virtue, as in all other cases, will have its own certain reward. The humanity you shall extend to the lower creation, will come abundantly round in its consequences to the whole human race. The moral sense, which this law will awaken and inculcate, cannot but have a most powerful effect upon our feelings and sympathies for one another. The violences and outrages committed by the lower orders of the people, are offences more owing to want of thought and reflection than to any malignant principle; and whatever, therefore, sets them a-thinking upon the duties of humanity, more especially where they have no rivalries nor resentments, and where there is a peculiar generosity in forbearance and compassion, has an evident tendency to soften their natures, and to moderate their passions in their dealings with one another. The effect of laws, which promulgate a sound moral principle, is incalculable; I have traced it in a thousand instances, and it is impossible to describe its value."

In conformity with this principle, if a man has received a good education, we expect to find him well informed; if he has mixed in polite society, we presume his manners

are courteous; if he has held certain positions in society, we infer that he has the excellencies, and probably the defects, connected with that position; and if we are wise, we shall consider the peculiar temptations to which our own circumstances expose us, and endeavour to guard our minds against them.

"Different employments, and different conditions of life, beget in us a tendency to our different passions. Those who are exalted above others in their daily stations, and especially if they have to do with many persons under them, and in many affairs, are too often tempted to the haughty, the morose, the surly, and the more unfriendly ruffles and disturbances of nature, unless they watch against them with daily care. The commanders in armies and navies, the governors of workhouses, the masters of public schools, or those who have a great number of servants under them, and a multitude of cares and concerns in human life, should continually set a guard upon themselves, lest they get a habit of affected superiority, pride, and vanity of mind, of fretfulness, impatience, and criminal anger."—Anon.

Upon this ground, we avoid dangerous society, knowing that evil communications corrupt good manners.

"And here I would advise you to have no dealings with a man who is known to be a rogue, even though he should offer a bargain that may, in that instance, be for your advantage to accept. To avoid him is your duty, on the ground of morality; but it is, moreover, your interest in a pecuniary point of view: for, depend upon it, although he may let you get money by him at first, he will contrive to cheat you in the end. An additional reason is, that your own reputation, and even your moral sensibilities, may be endangered by the contact. If you get money by a rogue, there is a danger that you will feel disposed to apologize for his rogueries; and, when you have once become an apologist for roguery, you will probably, on the first temptation, become a rogue yourself."-Lectures on Ancient Commerce.

15. The doctrine of final causes enters largely into our reasonings on the ordinary affairs of human life.

We act upon this principle in judging of other people. As actions are the effect of motives and feelings, we infer from the character of the actions the character of the motives or feelings. "A good tree bringeth forth good fruit, and an evil tree bringeth forth evil fruit; for a tree is known by its fruits."

In cases where the same action may arise from different

motives, we endeavour to ascertain to which motive the action should be ascribed. Our usual mode of reasoning in this case is from circumstantial evidence: from the existence of the sign, we infer the existence of the condition.

There are certain social relations which are usually attended with certain feelings; and hence we expect in such relations to find such feelings, and that the actions will correspond with such feelings. Where there is no such correspondence, we infer that the parties have been unfaithful to their duty. Hence, an unrighteous judge, a cruel husband, an unkind father, an undutiful son, are characters which mankind in all ages have unanimously denounced.

And, finally, we endeavour to act towards other people in such a way as we judge, from the ordinary principles of human nature, is likely to procure for us their good opinion. On the best means of effecting this object, we subjoin the observations of an American writer

"If we desire to be deemed religious, we have only to be religious, and we must be thus deemed. If you desire to be deemed veracious, speak the truth habitually, and you must be thus deemed. If you desire to be deemed trustworthy, patriotic, benevolent, just, hospitable, philanthropic, studious, learned, be what you desire to be deemed, and your reputation must conform to what you are. While the senses and intellect of men are so organized that men must, as we have seen, impute to us the qualities which we possess, the moral feelings of mankind are so organized that men must feel towards us according to the moral qualities which we possess. If we are lovely, we must be loved; if hateful, we must be hated; if contemptible, we must be contemned; if despicable, we must be despised."-Lectures to Young Men on the art of controlling others, by A. B. Johnson, Utica, New York.

PART III.

THE PRINCIPLES OF REASONING-(continued.)

WE have now gone through the second part of our book. In the first, you will recollect, we considered the Introduction to Reasoning. In the second part, we considered the Principles of Reasoning. In this part, we are going to consider still further the principles of reasoning. But these principles are of a different kind. In the former part the principles had a direct relation to the subject itself; we took the subject, and considered its attributes, its parts, its kinds, its causes, and its effects. In this part we shall consider the subject in its relation to other things. You may therefore, if you please, call the principles we have 'discussed, the internal principles of reasoning; and those we are going to discuss, the external principles of reasoning. These we shall consider in separate sections, under the following heads :-Section 1. Reasoning from Examples. 2. Reasoning from Analogy, Comparison, and Contrast. 3. Reasoning from Parables, Fables, and Proverbs. 4. Reasoning from Written Documents. 5. Errors in Reasoning.

SECTION I.

REASONING FROM EXAMPLES.

IN reasoning from examples we adduce examples in proof of the propositions we desire to establish.

1. The following are instances:

"And it came to pass, that he went through the corn fields on the sabbath day; and his disciples began, as they went, to pluck the ears of corn. And the Pharisees said unto him, Behold, why do they on the sabbath day that which is not lawful? And he