CHAPTER III

THE CONGRESS OF AIX-LA-CHAPELLE

If it were allowable for the Allies freely to separate themselves from the Alliance there could be no permanent Society of Nations. But no ally, in this case, may hope to separate himself. and not be considered the common enemy of all the Allies. Abbé de St. Pierre, Projet pour Rendre la Paix Perpétuelle en Europe, 1713.

In April, 1818, a circular was prepared by the Russian Foreign Office, under the Tsar's direction, setting forth at length the beneficent ends already attained through the recognition of the principle of international solidarity. The Powers were exhorted not only to continue an unalterable devotion to the system set up by existing treaties, but also to unite in closer bonds. In the form of a "Confidential Memoir,"1 this document was communicated to the Cabinets of Europe. As proof of the reactionary spirit already prevailing in the councils of the Russian Emperor, and as a credo of his intimate beliefs, the following extract is of the highest interest, especially when compared with the declarations that subsequently completed the conference of Aix-la-Chapelle:

During this memorable epoch, a united Europe has been able to smother the spirit of revolution and to create a new order of things safeguarding the general interest, under the aegis of Universal Justice. The means by which this end has been accomplished are: (a) The alliance of the Powers, unalterable in its principles, yet conformable to the progress of events, so that it may develop into a great confederation of all the states. (b) The restoration of the legitimate government in France fortified by institutions 2 which unite indissolubly the rights of the Bourbon dynasty with those of the people. (c) The declarations following the Congress of Vienna. (d) The subsequent declarations made at Paris during the year 1815.3

Two of Alexander's favorite ideas, grouped in the following sentence, find a prominent place in the "Memoir":

The wrongs under which all humanity groaned during the revolutionary struggle were the inevitable consequence of the errors of the past, viz., individualism and partial or exclusive political combinations.

The conservative nature of the bond which formed the basis of the European system is shown in the concluding paragraph. 1 This "Confidential Memoir" is given in full by Polovstov, Correspondence Diplomatique des Ambassadeurs et Ministres de France en Russie et de Russie en France de 1814 à 1830, vol. 1818, p. 832.

2 The Charter imposed upon Louis XVIII. Polovstov, op. cit., p. 833.

This was intended only for the perusal of the diplomatic chancelleries of the Allied Powers:

This association of states has assured the inestimable advantages of civil order and the inviolability of persons and institutions. It has consecrated and guaranteed everywhere legitimacy, ab antiquo, and recognized by the treaties now in force, the territorial possessions of every state. In order to maintain this end, the principle of a General Coalition must be established and developed by further eventual action.2

Alexander's conversion from republican liberalism to a philosophy of monarchical paternalism was now complete. Yet a private letter from Count Capo d'Istria to General Pozzo di Borgo, the Russian Minister in Paris, written just before the Congress now proposed, proves the Tsar's high-minded intentions towards his allies. In connection with the Memoir it shows Alexander's real aspirations regarding a concert of Europe at this critical time. Quoting the Tsar's own words, Capo d'Istria wrote:

I desire the prosperity of the French Monarchy and the progressive strengthening of its influence, not for myself, nor for Russia, but in the interest of the entire universe. It is Europe that has suffered from the loss and misfortunes of France, and Europe is therefore greatly interested in the future happiness of France and the maintenance of the order there established. All the Powers, consequently, should cooperate to this end, at the same time respecting the plighted faith of treaties. This is the chief aim to which the efforts of each one of the Foreign Ministries should be directed, and aside from it, there is no hope either for France or for Europe.

While General Pozzo endeavors to follow these principles, so often impressed upon him, he feels otherwise. Read his dispatches. They are written in the language of a devoted and zealous servant of the Crown who seeks by his foresight to profit by every possible combination the future may hold. He knows that Austria, England and Prussia have always disputed our right to share in affairs of general interest. anticipation of the condition of affairs which may arise after France is wholly restored, he prepared to oppose them by winning to our side the support of French diplomacy, and if necessary that of Spain as well. With these auxiliaries, he looks confidently upon the future.

In

This fashion of judging of men and affairs can not but impede the progress of the general system, and is not consistent with the purity of its guiding sentiments. Once known to the other Ministries, such conduct will infallibly engender jealousy and suspicion. In adopting such a line, we should be drawn in spite of ourselves into a by-road. Instead of working towards eminently disinterested ends, and by legal and avowed means maintaining concord and union between the Great Powers, our efforts would become devoted to a line of conduct entirely selfish, veiled in mystery and moving by devious ways. We should inevitably

1 For an interesting discussion of the principle of Legitimate Monarchy, see Goebel, The Recognition Policy of the United States.

Polovstov, op. cit., p. 834.

be driven to aim at Power, in order to make the other chancelleries dance to our tune. We should begin by thinking that all this was to preserve Europe in the way of Peace. But where would such a path lead us? 1

1

It must be borne in mind, in judging these utterances, that they were not part of a public manifesto. They are, indeed, but the report of a private conversation between the Tsar and the writer. They were addressed to one who, from the nature of the rebuke they implied, would probably be the last person to publish them abroad. As such, they offer valuable evidence of Alexander's good faith and sincerity of purpose at a time when his motives were and still are most frequently called into question. They explain why, even in the face of a policy they could not but deplore and oppose, the Tsar maintained the respect and admiration of such men as Monroe and Adams. They lead us to understand the verdict of Chateaubriand, whose faculties of criticism, at least, no one can deny, that Alexander of Russia, after Napoleon, was the greatest man of his time.

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The difficulties of continuing a common direction to the foreign policy of a group of states differing widely in political development and civilization became every day more apparent. From the very beginning, the Tsar's conception of a fraternal pact general in its terms such as that uniting the monarchs of the Holy Alliance was opposed by the decision of the British Cabinet to base its whole course of action on the actual text of the agreements signed at Chaumont, Vienna and Paris. Castlereagh, at first far from hostile to the Holy Alliance, was soon convinced that in following such a course lay the only means of remedying the defects of a system largely based on "eventual" decisions. Great Britain from the first found it hard to reconcile parliamentary principles and a traditional foreign policy with the Tsar's ideals of "European action.” 2

It was the Tsar's contention that the Treaty of Alliance of November 20, 1815, had provided (Article VI) the machinery for a real European government. In a series of congresses-wherein the representatives of the Powers might deliberate in common upon all matters concerning the general welfare-he saw the inception of a European legislature. In spite of the example afforded by the Congress of Vienna, he would apparently set no 1 Letter from Count Capo d'Istria to Gen. Pozzo di Borgo, July 10/22, 1818, quoted by Polovstov, op. cit., vol. 1818, p. 774.

Pasquier, Mémoires, vol. iv, pp. 254-255.

limits to the usefulness of international debate. But in the application of this policy he found himself opposed not only by Great Britain but even by Austria and Prussia.1 Both of these Powers believed that a Congress such as the Tsar proposed-one including Spain and the lesser Powers-might readily lead to embarrassing complications with respect to the participation of France. Persistent rumors emanating from St. Petersburg even affirmed that the Tsar, dissatisfied with the conduct of his allies, was meditating an alliance with the restored dynasty of the Bourbons.2 The outcome of this situation was a compromise: Alexander obtained the Congress he so ardently desired, set for September 30, at Aix-la-Chapelle. But in spite of Spanish protests and Ferdinand's complaints that Russia had abandoned him, it was decided to restrict this gathering to the representatives of the four great Powers. Before this tribunal Richelieu, the French Prime Minister, was invited to appear to give an account of the state of affairs existing under the restored monarchy.

Although the conduct of the Bonapartists and other "revolutionaries" still gave cause for serious anxiety to all the signatories of the Treaty of Paris,2 Richelieu by this time had gained the entire confidence of the Tsar. This was the end aimed at when the former Russian official was chosen by the politic Louis XVIII to replace Talleyrand. For nearly a year Richelieu had flattered Alexander's favorite theories by pointing out that on all occasions the federal system of Europe which must grow out of the present state of things could always force France to be just in case she 'sought to be unjust. He insisted, however, that to secure this end, France must form part of this system.1

The growing intimacy between the courts of France and Russia was viewed by the Powers with some apprehension. But after an interview with the Tsar at Aix, Castlereagh reported with some relief the fact that Alexander had declared to Wellington as well as to Metternich and himself: "My army, as well as myself, is at the disposal of Europe." 5

1 Debidour, Histoire Diplomatique de l'Europe, vol. 1, p. 118.

2 Gentz, Dépêches inédites du Chevalier de Gentz aux Hospodars de Valachie, vol. 1, pp. 398-400.

3 Richelieu had for some time been Governor of Odessa, while an emigré in Russia. For the details of this negotiation, see Pasquier, op. cit., vol. IV, pp. 254-255. Dispatch, Castlereagh to Bathrust, October 3, No. 2, quoted in Phillips, The Confederation of Europe, p. 168.

Since the signing of the treaty of November 20, France had shown every disposition exactly to fulfil the terms of the financial arrangement imposed upon her by the Allies. Not only had the scheduled payment of the indemnities-considered enormous at the time-been rigorously fulfilled, but internationally her financial position was even sounder than before. By the end of April, 1818, her debt to the Allies (500,000,000 francs) was completely liquidated. Through the reorganization of the army, the government of Louis XVIII was firmly established upon the throne. No real excuse could now be invoked for maintaining the great Army of Occupation within the borders of France. Moreover, signs were becoming apparent of a dangerous Liberal disaffection among the foreign troops long quartered in Francein not unfriendly contact with the people who had led the revolutionary movement throughout Europe.2

But before finally relinquishing their hold upon the French Government, the Allied Powers desired to exact from Richelieu some guarantee of future good conduct. The first sessions of the Congress were, therefore, almost entirely devoted to securing this end.

The discussions with respect to the evacuation of French territory by the Allied armies were brief and to the point. Nearly all the requirements determining this action had been carried out. A protocol, dated October 2, informed Louis XVIII that the foreign garrisons would leave not later than November 30. This news was received with joy throughout the whole country.3

The question now arose upon what terms the representatives of Louis XVIII might be admitted to take actual part in the council. To make France a party to the treaty of Chaumont would associate her as an ally in an agreement aimed chiefly against her own interests and her own possible military rehabilitation. On October 3, Castlereagh made a formal proposal "that France be admitted under the terms of Article VI of the Treaty of Alliance," which had established "a deliberating system for the purpose of consulting at fixed periods and upon common inter