combination which gave birth to the product. Certainly, in defendant's color there is no alpha-naphthylamine for reducing agents to destroy. If the same is true of a color produced according to the "example" set forth in the patent, as the evidence shows, then the sixth test is a false one, and must have been known to the patentees to be a false one when they received their patent. Their proper course would have been to correct this false statement by reissue. Inasmuch as complainant now contends that a highly meritorious discovery and a patent otherwise valid has been wrecked by holding the inventors to a rigid construction of tests which they were under no obligation to insert in their specification, it may be appropriate to decide the question, which was not passed upon in the original opinion. It was contended that although the patent could not be sustained for the broad discovery set forth in the specification, that "any sulpho acid of any radical," when treated according to the process described, would give the result indicated, because no such broad discovery had been made, it might yet be valid for the definite product of a special process set forth in the specification as an "example." Reference may be had to our former opinion for a brief statement of the argument in support of this contention. A majority of this court, whose opinion is hereinafter set forth, are unable to assent to the conclusion sought to be sustained. To do so would be practically to rewrite the patent. Such a restriction of it to the product of the special process conforms neither to what the patentees have asserted to be their invention, nor to what they undertook to claim. Even upon this appeal it was still insisted by their counsel that their patent covers such sulpho acids of the general formula as might, when subjected to their process, produce naphthol-black. Their expert advanced this theory of a narrow construction only as a last resource, when the inherent defects of the patent were made apparent. We are unable to find in the patent or elsewhere any evidence that paragraph 3 was inserted merely as a "help to a better comprehension of the special process." On the contrary, it is the special process which is given "as an example" or helpful elucidation of the general process. Moreover, the statement is hardly accurate that paragraph 3 "only describes the class of bodies to which naphthol belongs," nor are we able to see that it "covers only the first step in the reaction." Manifestly, it does more than describe a class of bodies; it gives a recipe:

"First. Take one of a group of compounds which have been obtained by the reaction of certain acids upon a named substance. Second. Convert this into the diazo-azo compound, with a nitrous acid. Third. Take the compound thus formed, and allow it to react upon naphthol or naphthol-sulphonic acids. Fourth. Keeping it during this reaction in an alkaline solution."

And the following out of this recipe will take the experimenter from the first to the last step of the process. We do not understand from the testimony that any one skilled in the art would have any difficulty in applying the process of paragraph 3 seriatim to every sulpho acid in the group corresponding to its general formula.

Certainly, he would not when further assisted as to details

by the "example" given of how to treat one of this general group. That paragraph 3 states what the patentees declare to be their invention seems to us beyond doubt, and the only fair interpretation of the patent is that originally given by complainant's expert, that their invention is, broadly, the formation by their process of the product sought to be patented from any sulpho acid of any radical; any one radical being susceptible of use interchangeably with any other, being the equivalent of that other and the products of all technically the same. The evidence shows conclusively that the statement that they had discovered that "any sulpho acid of any radical," treated according to their process, would give the product they said it would, was untrue. Briefly stated, the "discovery" which the inventors profess to disclose is that all mono-sulpho acids and all di-sulpho acids, treated in a prescribed way, will give a specific result; while the fact is that, so far as appears, no monosulpho acid thus treated will give such result; and, when they professed thus to disclose their "discovery," they either knew that the mono-sulpho acids will not give such result, or else knew nothing about the reaction of mono-sulpho acids under such process. In either case the "discovery" which they disclosed is not the "discovery" they made, and it is for the discovery or invention which the patentee makes and discloses that patent issues. Petition for rehearing is denied.

MEMORANDUM DECISIONS.

BEACH v. INMAN et al.

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. February 1, 1897.) PATENTS-INFRINGEMENT-PAPER-BOX MACHINE.

Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of New York.

Edmund Wetmore, for appellants.

John Dane, Jr., for appellee.

Before WALLACE, LACOMBE, and SHIPMAN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. We agree with the judge who heard the motion in the circuit court that the grooved roller of defendant's machine is substantially the upper clamping die of the patent, for the mechanical reasons set forth in the opinion below. That being so, defendant's machine is an infringement, and the order of the circuit court (75 Fed. 840) is affirmed, with costs.

THE CHICAGO.

THE ALVENA.

ATLAS S. S. CO. v. THE CHICAGO.

PENNSYLVANIA R. CO. v. THE ALVENA.

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. February 1, 1897.)

COLLISION-FERRYBOAT-TUG AND Tow.

Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. See 78 Fed. 819.

Chas. C. Burlingham, for the tugs.

Everett P. Wheeler, for Atlas S. S. Co.

Henry G. Ward, for Pennsylvania R. Co.

Before WALLACE and LACOMBE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. In these cases the fundamental questions are the distance of the Alvena and tugs from the piers, and the rate of speed of the ferryboat. Upon the evidence contained in the record, much of which was put in in the presence of the district judge, we concur in his conclusion that the collision was occasioned solely by the fault of the, tugs in towing the Alvena so near to the slip of the ferryboat that the latter, when about to leave the slip, on discovering the tug was unable to avoid collision by the exercise of reasonable care.

FIDELITY & CASUALTY CO. v. RANDOLPH. STANDARD L. & ACC. INS. CO. v. SAME. PREFERRED ACC. INS. CO. v. SAME. UNION C. & S. CO. v. SAME.

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit. February 2, 1897.)

Nos. 440-443.

ACCIDENT INSURANCE-VOLUNTARY EXPOSURE-NEGLIGENCE.

In Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Tennessee.

J. K. Flippin and Luke E. Wright, for plaintiffs in error.

Geo. Randolph, Samuel Holloway, and Wm. M. Randolph, for defendant in er

ror.

Before HARLAN, Circuit Justice, LURTON, Circuit Judge, and SAGE, District Judge.

HARLAN, Circuit Justice. These were separate actions upon accident insurance contracts. They were tried with the case of Insurance Co. v. Randolph (just decided) 78 Fed. 754. The evidence in these cases was the same as in that case.

The Fidelity & Casualty Company by its contracts insured against "bodily injuries sustained through external, violent, and accidental means," and against death resulting within 90 days from such injuries independently of all other causes. But the contract did not cover (among other excepted cases) "voluntary exposure to unnecessary danger"; and "in case of injuries, fatal or otherwise, wantonly inflicted upon himself by the accused," the measure of the company's liability was a sum equal to the premium paid.

The Standard Life & Accident Insurance Company by its contracts insured against "immediate, continuous, and total disability or death resulting from bodily injuries" caused "solely by external, violent, and accidental means." But its contracts did not cover (among other excepted cases) "intentional injury (inflicted by the insured or any other persons), voluntary overexertion,

wrestling, lifting, racing, voluntary and unnecessary exposure to danger, entering or trying to enter or leave a moving conveyance using steam as a motor (cable cars excepted), riding in or on any conveyance not provided for the transportation of passengers, or walking or being on the roadbed or bridge of any railway."

The Preferred Accident Insurance Company by its contracts insured against "immediate, continuous, and total disability or death resulting from bodily injuries," effected during the term of the insurance, "through external, violent, and accidental means." But those contracts did not cover (among other excepted cases) "intentional injury (inflicted by the insured or any other person), nor voluntary and unnecessary exposure to danger, nor wrestling, or fighting, or racing or competitive games, nor entering or leaving, or attempting to enter or leave, a moving conveyance using steam, cable, or electricity as a motor (except street cars), nor travel on any conveyance not provided for transporting passengers"; the extent of the liability for "injuries, fatal or otherwise, purposely inflicted upon the insured by himself," to be the sum paid for the insurance ticket.

The Union Casualty & Surety Company by its contracts insured against bodily injuries happening to the assured, as well as death, caused solely by external, violent, and accidental means. But the contracts did not cover (among other excepted cases) "injuries intentionally inflicted on the assured by himself or by any other person, not being an unprovoked assault," nor "voluntary exposure to avoidable danger, except where incurred in an attempt to save human life," nor "any violation of law or municipal ordinance or of the rules of any corporation, entering or trying to enter or leave a moving conveyance (other than street cars) using steam or electricity as a motive power," nor "riding in or upon a conveyance not provided for the transportation of passengers, or walking or being on the roadbed or bridge of any railway."

The defense in each of these cases was substantially the same as in the case against the Travelers' Insurance Company.

The words, "voluntary and unnecessary exposure to danger," in the contracts with the Standard Life & Accident Insurance Company and the Preferred Accident Insurance Company, and the words, "voluntary exposure to avoidable danger," in the contract with the Union Casualty & Surety Company, mean the same as the words, "voluntary exposure to unnecessary danger," in the contracts with the Travelers' Insurance Company and Fidelity & Casualty Company.

For the reasons stated in the opinion in Insurance Co. v. Randolph (just de cided), the judgment in each of these cases is affirmed.

KING v. MCCLINTOCK et al.

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit. February 2, 1897.)

No. 184.

INJUNCTION-DISSOLUTION.

Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of West Virginia.

Maynard F. Stiles, for appellant.

Z. T. Vinson, for appellees.

Before SIMONTON, Circuit Judge, and MORRIS and BRAWLEY, District Judges.

SIMONTON, Circuit Judge. This case presents precisely the same facts and the same questions as that of King v. Buskirk (just decided) 78 Fed. 233. The appellant is the same person as the appellant in that case, and the appellees were defendants in the injunction suits as well as in the action at law. The verdict of the jury was in their favor, and their motion to dissolve the injunction was based on that verdict. The decree of the circuit court is affirmed.

YPSILANTI DRESS-STAY MANUF'G CO. v. VAN VALKENBERG et al. (Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. February 1, 1897.)

Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of New York.

Edmund Wetmore, for appellant.

C. H. Duell, for appellees.

Before WALLACE, LACOMBE, and SHIPMAN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. Decree of circuit court (72 Fed. 277) affirmed, with costs, upon the opinion of court below.

CARTER-CRUME CO. v. BLOOMINGDALE.

(Circuit Court, S. D. New York. February 6, 1897.)

PATENTS-INFRINGEMENT-ANTICIPATION.

In Equity.

Bill brought by Carter-Crume Company against Lyman G. Bloomingdale for infringement of reissue letters patent No. 10,359, issued July 24, 1883, for an improvement in manifold copying books. The defenses were: (1) Noninfringe ment; (2) invalidity of the reissue; (3) anticipation by prior use; and (4) lack of equity in the complaint. On motion for preliminary injunction. Granted. Charles H. Duell, for complainant.

Kerr, Curtis & Page and Benjamin Barker, Jr., for defendant.

LACOMBE, Circuit Judge. All the defenses urged here, save one, appear to have been presented before Judge Coxe. The new one is the "prior use" of a particular book now produced by C. C. Boyles. The evidence touching the authenticity of this book, and to what extent its use anticipated the patent, is of a character which may best be passed upon on final hearing. Following Judge Coxe's decision, the motion for preliminary injunction is granted; injunction not to take effect until 30 days from date, so as to give defendant, who is a user, opportunity to provide himself with noninfringing order books.

DAVIS v. CAMMEYER.

(Circuit Court, S. D. New York. January 30, 1897.)

PATENTS-PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION-DENIAL.

Motion for preliminary injunction. Suit on patent No. 242,382, dated May 31, 1881, to Michael Shuter and Abraham Davis, for "tip for insoles," and sustained on final hearing in Shuter v. Davis, 16 Fed. 564. Denied.

Edwin H. Brown, for complainant.

Philip J. O'Reilly, for defendant.

LACOMBE, Circuit Judge. The articles used in the defendant's shoes are not in all respects like those which, in the former suit, were held to be infringements of the patent. While the variances are not perhaps great, the patent is a narrow one, and the determination of the question whether these particular tips are also infringements may best be reserved for final hearing.