pany, and invested with power or authority to direct or control other employés, should be deemed the superior, not the fellow servant, of those under his direction and control. The legal effect, as well as the object, of this declaration was, in the cases specified, to make the negligence of the superior the negligence of the company. No violence is done to the ordinary meaning of the words of the statute if it be held that the legislature had in mind actions against receivers of railroad corporations as well as actions directly against such corporations. The appointment of a receiver of a railroad does not change the title to the property nor work a dissolution of the corporation. Although the creature of the court, and acting under its orders, the receiver, for most purposes, stands in the place of the corporation, exercising its general powers, asserting its rights, controlling its property, carrying out the objects for which it was created, discharging the public duties resting upon it, and representing the interests as well of those who own the railroad as of those who have claims against the corporation or its property. The corporation remains in existence notwithstanding a provisional receivership established by an order of court; and for the purpose of effectuating the will of the state, as manifested by the act of 1890, an action against the receiver arising out of his management of the property may be regarded as one against the corporation "in the hands of" or "in the possession of" the receiver. McNulta v. Lochridge, 141 U. S. 327, 331, 12 Sup. Ct. 11.

In Central Trust Co. v. Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co. (1886) 26 Fed. 12, it was held that the statute of Missouri giving double damages against "every railroad corporation" which did not erect and maintain fences, openings, gates, farm crossings, and cattle guards on the line of its road (the validity of which act was sustained in Railway Co. v. Humes, 115 U. S. 512, 6 Sup. Ct. 110), was held applicable to a railroad in the hands of a receiver. To the same effect was Hornsby v. Eddy, 5 C. C. A. 560, 572, 56 Fed. 461, where the question was as to the applicability to federal receivers of a railroad of a statute of Kansas providing that "every railroad company" organized or doing business in that state "shall be liable for all damages done to any employé of such company, in consequence of any negligence of its agents, or by any mismanagement of its engineers or other employés, to any person sustaining such damage." In that case, the circuit court of appeals for the Eighth circuit well said:

"It is clear that, with respect to persons employed by a railway company as railway operatives, the statute last above quoted changes the rule of the common law that the master is not liable to a servant for an injury sustained in consequence of the negligence of a fellow servant. Does the fact that a receiver is appointed to temporarily operate a railroad forthwith alter the status of all of its employés, and re-establish as to them the old rule of the common law, so long as the receiver remains in charge? Viewing the question in the light of those considerations of public policy which probably gave birth to the statute, we cannot conceive of any reason why the appointment of a receiver should have such effect. It is a fact of which we may well take judicial notice that great railway systems, which employ thousands of men, are frequently operated for a term of years through the agency of a receiver. Such receivers do not, as a general rule, change the working force of the road, or the rules and regulations by which trains are run, or by which the other business of the road is transacted. The men

whom they employ are engaged in the same quasi public service as other railway employés, and daily encounter the same risks and hazards. Furthermore, the receiver of a railroad operates it for the immediate benefit of the company by which it is owned, in that he discharges all of the public duties of the corporation, and appropriates the income of its road to the preservation of its property and franchises, and to the payment of its debts."

So much as to the scope and true meaning of the Ohio statute, without reference to the courts in which it may be enforced. If the statute means what we hold it to mean, must not full effect be given to it in actions for personal injuries brought against a receiver in a court of the United States? This question must be answered in the affirmative. Such legislation is not liable to the objection that it encroaches upon federal authority, or upon the jurisdiction or power of the United States court. The stat ute does nothing more than to prescribe a rule of action to be ob served by all within the state. The authority to enact it is derived from the general power of the state to regulate the exercise of the relative rights and duties, and to provide for the safety, of all persons within its territorial jurisdiction. It is the duty of the federal court sitting in this state to enforce all enactments having such objects in view, unless they encroach upon the powers and authority of the United States. That duty arises out of the statute declaring that "the laws of the several states, except where the constitution, treaties or statutes of the United States otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply." Rev. St. § 721; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Camp, 31 U. S. App. 213, 13 C. C. A. 233, and 65 Fed. 952. Indeed, if congress had not so declared, this court, upon principles of comity, and in support of the public policy of the state, might well recognize and enforce, in actions brought against receivers of railroads, any rule established by the state for like actions brought against railroad companies.

The Ohio statute is not applicable alone to railroad corporations of Ohio engaged in the domestic commerce of this state. It is equally applicable to railroad corporations doing business in Ohio, and engaged in commerce among the states, although the statute, in its operation, may affect in some degree a subject over which congress can exert full power. The states may do many things affecting commerce with foreign nations and among the several states until congress covers the subject by national legislation. This principle is illustrated in many cases; as in Cooley v. Board, 12 How. 299, 320, where the pilot laws of Pennsylvania were sustained, and were held to have been enacted in virtue of the power residing in the state to legislate, congress not having abrogated them nor established regulations inconsistent with them; as in Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U. S. 99, 104, where the court held that a statute of Indiana, giving a right of action to the personal representatives of a deceased when his death was caused by the wrongful act or omission of another, was applicable to the case of death resulting from collisions between vessels engaged in interstate commerce, and in which case it was said, generally, "that the leg

islation of a state, not directed against commerce or any of its regulations, but relating to the rights, duties, and liabilities of citizens, and only indirectly and remotely affecting the operations of commerce, is of obligatory force upon citizens within its territorial jurisdiction, whether on land or water, or engaged in commerce, foreign or interstate, or in any other pursuit"; as in Morgan's Louisiana & T. R. & S. S. Co. v. Louisiana Board of Health, 118 U. S. 455, 463, 6 Sup. Ct. 1114, where a quarantine statute of Louisiana, directly affecting commerce among the states and with foreign nations, was held not to be void as a regulation of commerce, but was valid under the power of the state to protect the public health, and was to be respected until the system of quarantine established by it was abrogated or displaced by congress; as in Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465, 8 Sup. Ct. 564, where a statute of Alabama was upheld that required all locomotive engineers in that state, whether they served on trains engaged in domestic commerce or only on trains engaged in interstate commerce, to be examined and licensed by a state board before acting as engineers within that state; and as in Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Alabama, 128 U. S. 96, 100, 9 Sup. Ct. 28, in which the court held to be constitutional a state enactment requiring all locomotive engineers to be examined by a state board for color blindness, and in which case it was said that "wherever there is any business in which, either from the products created or the instrumentalities used, there is danger to life and property, it is not only within the power of the states, but it is among their plain duties, to make provision against accidents likely to follow in such business, so that the dangers attending it may be guarded against so far as is practicable," and which local enactments were to be deemed valid until congress took action on the subject. In Telegraph Co. v. James, 162 U. S. 650, 662, 16 Sup. Ct. 934, the supreme court of the United States held a statute of Georgia requiring every telegraph company with a line of wires wholly or partly within that state to receive dispatches, and, on payment of the usual charges, to transmit and deliver them with due diligence, under a named penalty, to be a valid exercise of the police power of the state in relation to interstate messages. The court said:

"While it is vitally important that commerce between the states should be unembarrassed by vexatious state regulations regarding it, yet, on the other hand, there are many occasions where the police power of the state can be properly exercised to insure a faithful and prompt performance of duty within the limits of the state upon the part of those who are engaged in interstate commerce. We think the statute in question is one of that class, and, in the absence of any legislation by congress, the statute is a valid exercise of the power of the state over the subject."

In Hennington v. State of Georgia, 163 U. S. 299, 317, 16 Sup. Ct. 1086, in which a statute of Georgia forbidding the running of freight trains in that state on the Sabbath day was assailed as unconstitutional when applied to interstate commerce, the supreme court of the United States, upon a review of the adjudged cases, held it to be clear that:

"The legislative enactments of the states, passed under their admitted police powers, and having a real relation to the domestic peace, order, health, and safety of their people, but which, by their necessary operation, affect to some extent, or for a limited time, the conduct of commerce among the states, are yet not invalid by force alone of the grant of power to congress to regulate such commerce; and, if not obnoxious to some other constitutional provision, or destructive of some right secured by the fundamental law, are to be respected in the courts of the Union until they are superseded and displaced by some act of congress passed in execution of the powers granted to it by the constitution."

Undoubtedly, the whole subject of the liability of interstate railroad companies for the negligence of those in their service may be covered by national legislation enacted by congress under its pow er to regulate commerce among the states. But, as congress has not dealt with that subject, it was competent for Ohio to declare that an employé of any railroad corporation doing business here, including those engaged in commerce among the states, shall be deemed, in respect to his acts within this state, the superior, not the fellow servant, of other employés placed under his control. If the effect of the Ohio statute be, as undoubtedly it is, to impose upon such corporations, in particular circumstances, a liability for injuries received by some of its employés which would not otherwise rest upon them according to the principles of general law, that fact does not release the federal court from its ob ligation to enforce the enactments of the state. Of the validity of such state legislation we entertain no doubt. In Railway Co. v. Mackey, 127 U. S. 205, 208, 210, 8 Sup. Ct. 1161, the supreme court had occasion to consider several objections to a law of Kansas making railroad companies liable for injuries suffered by employés through the negligence of their fellow servants. Replying to the objection that such legislation denied the equal protection of the laws to railroad companies, in that it did not apply alike to all corporations, the court said:

"But the hazardous character of the business of operating a railway would seem to call for special legislation with respect to railroad corporations, having for its object the protection of their employés as well as the safety of the public. The business of other corporations is not subject to similar dangers to their employés, and no objections, therefore, can be made to the legislation on the ground of its making an unjust discrimination."

There is another view of this matter, equally conclusive. By Act Cong. March 3, 1887, c. 373 (24 Stat. 554), corrected by Act Aug. 13, 1888, c. 866 (25 Stat. 433), it is provided:

"Sec. 2. That whenever in any cause pending in any court of the United States there shall be a receiver or manager in possession of any property, such receiver or manager shall manage and operate such property according to the requirements of the valid laws of the state in which such property shall be situated in the same manner the owner or possessor thereof would be bound to do if in possession thereof. Any receiver or manager who shall wilfully violate the provisions of this section shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall on conviction thereof be punished by a fine not exceeding three thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.

"Sec. 3. That every receiver or manager of any property appointed by any court of the United States may be sued in respect of any act or transaction of his in carrying on the business connected with such property, without the previous leave of the court in which such receiver or manager was appointed; but such suit shall

be subject to the general equity jurisdiction of the court in which such receiver or manager was appointed, so far as the same shall be necessary to the ends of justice."

It would seem to be clear that, under this act of congress, if a railroad in the possession of a federal receiver is to be managed and operated according to the requirements of the laws of the state in which the property is situated, "in the same manner that the owner or possessor thereof would be bound to do if in possession thereof," such management and operation must be subject to any rule prescribed by the state imposing upon railroad corporations liability for the negligence of employés having su perior authority over other employés.

This we understand to be the effect of the decision in Eddy v. Lafayette, 163 U. S. 456, 464, 16 Sup. Ct. 1082, in which the question arose whether the local statutes regulating the service of process against a railway corporation were applicable to actions against the receivers of such corporations. The trial court and the circuit court of appeals were of opinion that the third section of the judiciary act of March 3, 1887, c. 373, § 2 (24 Stat. 552, 554), authorizing suits to be brought against receivers of railroads without special leave of the court by which they were appointed, was intended to place receivers "upon the same plane with railroad companies," both as respects their liability to be sued for acts done while operating a railroad and as respects the mode of service of process. This court said:

"We concur in that view, and in the conclusion reached, that the service in the present case, on an agent of the receivers, was sufficient to bring them into court in a suit arising within the Indian Territory."

But it is contended that the Ohio statute is repugnant to the provision of the constitution of Ohio declaring that "all laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation throughout the state." Article 2, § 26. The argument made in support of this view by the learned counsel for the receiver may be thus summarized: That the act imposes a liability for damages for the negligence of fellow servants only as against a railroad company operating a railroad within Ohio; that it confers a right of action only upon employés of such railroad companies; that no other employer is subject to the liability, and no other employé is given the right; that the act selects from the general class of employers railroad companies operating railroads, and imposes upon them a special burden; that the act is special class legislation, not uniform throughout the state, and applies to no person or company engaged in any other occupation employing servants, although the occupation be equally hazardous. Consequently, the act is special in its operation and effect, is confined to particular corporations engaged in a specific business, does not cover the whole subject of the relations of master and servant, and is not, therefore, of a general nature, and of uniform operation throughout the state, within the meaning of the constitution of Ohio.

In support of these views counsel have referred to Shaver v. Pennsylvania Co., 71 Fed. 931, which was an action to recover dam